Doing the Right Thing Will Eventually Dissolve Hostility and Win Support

Doing the Right Thing Will Eventually Dissolve Hostility and Win Support
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 16, 2011

Summary: Any presidential bid for re-election, is invariably a referendum on the incumbent. President Ma Ying-jeou was compelled to wage an uphill battle during his bid for re-election. Nevertheless in the end he won 52% of the vote. Clearly over half the voters were unwilling to risk overturning the cross-Strait status quo. They calculated that if they gave Ma Ying-jeou four more years, Taiwan could maintain the cross-Strait status quo and enjoy increased prosperity and growth.

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Any presidential bid for re-election, is invariably a referendum on the incumbent. President Ma Ying-jeou was compelled to wage an uphill battle during his bid for re-election. Nevertheless in the end he won 52% of the vote. Clearly over half the voters were unwilling to risk overturning the cross-Strait status quo. They calculated that if they gave Ma Ying-jeou four more years, Taiwan could maintain the cross-Strait status quo and enjoy increased prosperity and growth.

What is the "cross-Strait status quo?" Actually, it is something dynamic, rather than static. The current cross-Strait situation is unlike the tense standoff in 2004. It is unlike the stagnant situation in 2008, just before Ma Ying-jeou was elected. The advantage of being in office, is that one can define the status quo, even change it. The Ma administration has indeed changed the status quo over the past four years, by means of its cross-Strait policy. It has resumed direct cross-Strait air links after a six decade hiatus. The two sides have signed sixteen agreements on legal cooperation, repatriation of criminals, and financial cooperation. After ECFA was signed, the Mainland made many concessions on tariffs.

This is why the election was so unprecedented. Many entrepreneurs stepped forward to openly support the 1992 Consensus. They saw the benefits of the new status quo. The DPP said the Ma administration benefited only "people with money." Not so. As HTC Chairman Cher Wang said, the day before the election, businesses need a stable environment to be sustainable. Taiwan is not a society riddled by class warfare. Businesses have the ability to remain in operation. Only then will everyone be able to profit. Over half the voters supported Ma, showing that most people long for a peace dividend.

Several presidential candidate policy presentations were held during the election. DPP presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen pointedly criticized Ma Ying-jeou. She accused him of "governing by the numbers." She accused him of not understanding the feelings of ordinary people. But the election results prove that certains numbers do inspire feelings in people. These numbers were not limited to the 8 to 9% economic growth rate. People have had more visceral experiences than that. The Ma administration added 70 nations to the list granting visa-free travel treatment. The new nations include Japan, the UK, and the EU. It includes the United States, the country with which the Republic of China is the most closely connected. Last year, the Republic of China was added to the list of candidates for visa-free travel treatment. By the same token, soon after the two sides signed ECFA, Japan, New Zealand and the Republic of China began talking about investment protection cooperation. The Republic of China may not escape marginalziation even after joining the WTO (World Trade Organization). But voters hope new opportunities will arise now that ECFA has been signed.

The cross-Strait peace dividend refers not just to economic interests. It also refers to Taipei's maneuvering room in the international arena. The backbone that supports all these developments is the 1992 Consensus. Tsai Ing-wen's primary campaign theme during the election was "Is there really a 1992 Consensus?" But the question she should have been asking was "Should there be a 1992 Consensus?" or "How has the 1992 consensus benefited Taiwan?" As former American Institute in Taiwan Taipei Office Director Douglas Paal observed, the 1992 Consensus is a highly creative formulation. Its ambiguity permits both sides to maintain their sovereignty. It also enables them to solve practical problems. Paal, an outsider, has clearly delineated the impact of the 1992 Consensus.

The DPP refuses to recognize the 1992 Consensus. Perhaps the DPP concluded from the poll numbers in recent years that public allegiance to "Taiwan" has reached unprecedented levels. But perhaps they forgot another number. Public expectations for cross-Strait peace have also reached unprecedented levels. Before the election, former President Lee Teng-hui personally posted a newspaper ad supporting Tsai Ing-wen. He did not call on "the brave people of Taiwan" to stand and fight [Mainland] China. He merely stressed that history shows no matter who is elected, exchanges between Mainland China and Taiwan must continue. Only then are dramatic improvements in cross-Strait relations possible.

Tsai Ing-wen once criticized Ma Ying-jeou's "no reunification, no independence, no use of force" policy as self-contradictory. But it is no more self-contradictory than the two sides arguing over sovereignty while conducting peace talks. The raison d'etre of the 1992 Consensus, is to resolve the cross-Strait dilemma. Not only has it successfully shelved the dispute over sovereignty, it has also allowed smooth cross-Strait negotiations.

The DPP and Tsai refuse to recognize the 1992 Consensus. But at the same time they are unable to offer an alternative for resolving cross-Strait differences. Instead they proposed a far too vague "Taiwan consensus," that provoked outside concern. As a result, during the critical, final moments of the presidential race, cross-Strait relations once again became the DPP's Achilles Heel.

The vote proved a point. The ruling Ma Ying-jeou administration may have lost some support. But disaffected Ma supporters did not necessarily vote for Tsai Ing-wen. Tsai Ing-wen received 45% of the vote, only slightly more than the DPP's core support, and less than the 49% it received during last year's five cities mayoral elections. So what is the difference between central and local level elections? The voters understand perfectly. During a presidential election, cross-Strait policy is at stake. Tsai Ing-wen refused to clarify her cross-Strait policy before the election. Therefore the voters were afraid to let her govern the country. They refused to allow the future of the two sides and Taiwan to enter a state of uncertainty.

Another election result, pertaining to cross-Strait economic and trade exchanges, is also worth noting. The just ended presidential election maintained the basic pattern of a Blue Camp dominated northern Taiwan, and a Green Camp dominated southern Taiwan. But the key to Ma Ying-jeou's victory over Tsai Ing-wen is that he won big in the north, but only lost small in the south. Tsai was weak in the north. Yet she only managed to eke out a 30% share of the vote. By contrast, despite the fact that Ma was relatively weak in Kaohsiung and Pingtung, he nevertheless managed to garner 40% of the vote. The gap between the Two Yings in the south was much less than it was during the Blue vs. Green showdown in 2004.

How should one interpret these figures? The wrong interpretation could have fatal consequences for the future of the political parties. For example, the Green Camp could attribute its defeat to the sudden emergence of the Taiwan Solidarity Union, which received 9% of the political party vote. The DPP, by comparison, did not fare nearly so well. It could attribute this to Tsai Ing-wen's failure to adopt a hardline Taiwan independence stance, the way Chen Shui-bian and the DPP did during past elections. It could say this is why it failed to maximize its advantage in the south. But if the DPP interprets the election results this way, it won't be able to change its direction on cross-Strait policy over the next four years. It could find itself riven by internal divisions. When such a DPP challenges the KMT four years from now, it will only encounter the same cross-Strait bottleneck as in the past.

The KMT can be optimistic about one thing. Su Chun-ping, Chen Yi-chen, and other KMT "assassins" were sent into enemy territory, to run against an entrenched DPP. They failed to win. Nevertheless they acquitted themselves surprisingly well. This shows that if one offers the right candidates, one can always make inroads, no matter how hostile the territory. More importantly, the Ma administration has attached immense importance to the benefits showered upon the public by its cross-Strait policies. In the beginning, the benefits were not sufficiently widespread. The man in the street remained oblivious to its potential benefits. But the impact of Mainland tourists arriving on Taiwan, and cross-strait economic and trade, are among the reasons the Blue Camp was able to consolidate support in the south.

This should offer great encouragement to President Ma during his second term. This is not just about the Blue Camp winning back the south. This is about having the guts to do the right thing. Doing the right thing has the potential to win over even the most hostile voters one day. This is the real significance of President Ma's 52% election victory.

做對的事 終能化解敵意贏得支持
2012-01-16中國時報

任何一場總統連任戰，都是對現任者的公投。總統馬英九這次連任戰打得辛苦，但最後仍能拿下五成二的選票，顯示過半的選民，不願意冒險讓兩岸現狀翻盤，他們相信，如果再給馬英九四年機會，台灣有機會在目前的兩岸現狀下，更進一步繁榮發展。

何謂兩岸現狀？現狀其實是流動的，台灣當前的兩岸情勢，別說是有別於二○○四年的劍拔弩張，和二○○八年馬英九當選前的停滯狀態，也有所不同；執政者的一個大優勢是，可以界定、甚至改變現狀。確實，馬政府四年來透過諸多兩岸政策，改變了兩岸現狀，這包括恢復斷航六十年的兩岸直航，以及在兩岸簽定十六項協議之後的司法互助、罪犯遣返、金融合作，還有ＥＣＦＡ簽定後，大陸在關稅方面的諸多讓利等。

這可以解釋，為何在這次大選，會史無前例、有那麼多企業家站出來挺九二共識，因為他們在這個新現狀中看到利基，但這並不是如民進黨所說，是馬政府釋放給「有錢人」的利多而已，正如選前一天站出來的宏達電董事長王雪紅所說的，企業需要一個安定的環境才能永續經營，台灣並不是一個階級對立的社會，企業能永續經營，全民才能獲利；這次過半選民的支持，顯示多數人對和平紅利是有所期待的。

大選時幾次政見發表會，民進黨總統候選人蔡英文都不忘批評馬英九，靠「數字治國」，無法了解庶民的感受；但是，從選舉的結果顯示，有些數字確實會打動人心，這些數字當然不只是八、九個百分點的經濟成長率，人民更有實際感受的可能是，馬政府任內增加了七十個免簽國，這不只包括日本、英國、歐盟等重要國家，連和台灣關係最緊密的美國，也在去年底將台灣列入免簽候選國；同樣的，在兩岸簽了ＥＣＦＡ之後，日本、紐西蘭和台灣開始談投資保障合作，選民也開始期待，台灣參加ＷＴＯ（世界貿易組織）後仍然無法避免了邊緣化命運，但洽簽兩岸ＥＣＦＡ之後，也許可開出一條機會之路。

可以說，所謂的兩岸和平紅利，指的不只是經濟利益，同時也是台灣的國際空間；而維繫這一切的支柱，就是九二共識。蔡英文將這次大選的主軸打成「到底有沒有九二共識」的考古學，但她更該面對的，是「該不該有九二共識」，或是「九二共識對台灣的效用」。正如美國在台協會台北辦事處前處長包道格接受訪問時所說，九二共識是一個非常具有創意的模式，中間容許模糊存在，讓各自的主權能維持，但實務議題又能夠得到解決；包道格是旁觀者清的說出了九二共識的效能。

民進黨不願接受九二共識；也許，民進黨從民調數字發現，這幾年來，民眾的台灣認同達到新高，但他們忘了另一個數字，民間對兩岸和平的期待也是新高；前總統李登輝選前親筆在各報登廣告支持蔡英文，他呼籲的可不是「勇敢的台灣人」，要站出來和中國對抗！連李登輝都只能強調，歷史證明不論誰當選，中國都必須與台灣交往，兩岸關係不會劇烈變動。

蔡英文曾經批評，馬英九的「不統、不獨、不武」是自相矛盾，但是，兩岸要同時進行主權爭議及和平協商，又何嘗不是矛盾，九二共識的最大意義在於，它化解了兩難之局，不但擱置主權爭議，也讓兩岸可以順利展開協商。

正因為民進黨及蔡英文不願接受九二共識，卻又提不出一套解決兩岸歧見的有效方法，反而提出內容空泛的「台灣共識」，徒增外界疑慮，因此總統選戰到最後關頭，兩岸再度成為民進黨的「罩門」。

選票流向也證明了這一點，執政的馬英九得票流失，但是失望的中間選民並未全盤流向蔡英文，蔡英文只拿到比民進黨基本盤好一點的四成五，也不如去年五都選舉時的四成九佳績；中央與地方選舉的差別在那裡？選民很清楚，總統大選攸關兩岸政策，蔡英文選前說不清兩岸政策，選民怎敢將國家託付給她，讓兩岸及台灣的未來，都進入不確定的狀態。

另一個和兩岸經貿交流有關的選舉數字，也值得觀察。這次的總統大選，還是維持了北藍南綠的基本結構，但是馬英九贏蔡英文的一個關鍵在於，他在北部維持大勝，在南部卻只是小輸，蔡在比較弱的北部，都只拿到三成多的選票；相對的，馬卻能在比較弱的大高雄及屏東都維持了四成的得票率，雙英在南部的差距遠遠小於二○○四年時的藍綠對決。

如何解讀這樣的數字？一個錯誤的解讀，對政黨發展可能有致命的後果。例如，綠營可能鑑於台聯異軍突起、拿到百分之九的政黨票，相對於民進黨不夠好看的成績，解讀這是因為蔡英文及民進黨不像陳水扁當年挑起的極獨路線，因此無法將南部選票極大化。如果民進黨如此解讀，則未來四年不但無法在兩岸方向轉型，民進黨內可能還會陷入路線分裂之爭，這樣的民進黨，四年後挑戰國民黨時，只怕會跟這次的民進黨碰到一樣的兩岸瓶頸。

國民黨可以樂觀的是，這次派到艱困選區的刺客蘇俊賓、陳以真等人，最後雖然沒有當選，但是選舉結果卻都不錯，可見選對人，再怎樣的鐵票區，都有機會鬆動；更重要的是政策，馬政府重視的兩岸利多，一開始並未擴散，升斗小民似乎無感，但藍營這次能穩住南部，陸客來台及兩岸經貿的效應，卻也是值得觀察的重點。

對連任的馬總統而言，這應該是最大的鼓舞。這不只是藍營是否能贏回南部的問題，更重要的是，只要是勇於執行對的政策，即使是最有敵意的選民，有一天也可能認同你，這才是五成二選票背後最大的意義。