Open Not the Pandora's Box of Political Calculation

Open Not the Pandora's Box of Political Calculation
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 12, 2014

Executive Summary: The most direct solution. the most convenient route, is to simply "follow the constitution." Restore the Constitution of the Republic of China to its original form. Restore the legislature’s authority to approve the premier. This may well be the lowest cost, least risky option. Constitutional reform has been seen as "political reform." But experience shows that constitutional reform is often a Pandora's Box. Can we afford to be careless? Can we afford to open it in haste?

Full Text Below:

The nine in one elections ended with a KMT rout. Now "constitutional reform" has become the hot political topic. Advocates of constitutional reform have focused on the cabinet system, the legislative elections, youth suffrage, and cross-strait negotiation oversight. The most critical issue is the distribution of power and the operation of the central government in a cabinet system.

Advocates of the cabinet system can be divided into two categories. The first category is "cabinet system hawks." They have consistently advocated the cabinet system. They feel the cabinet system is more responsive to and reflective of public opinion. They feel that the distribution of power helps avoid zero-sum games. They feel it more closely aligns the executive and legislative powers. They feel it is more applicable to Taiwan society, with its blue vs. green divisions, so-called “ethnic group” frictions, and long-standing disagreements over reunification vs independence. They feel it would promote reconciliation and symbiosis among the political parties and better avoid polarization than the presidential system. These people are concept-based supporters of the cabinet system.  

The second category is "cabinet system vultures." Currently, most cabinet system advocates belong in this category. They have no firm beliefs regarding the relative merits of the presidential system vs. the cabinet system. What they advocated yesterday may not be what they advocate today. Their positions change with the political winds. Today, the KMT has gone down in defeat. Ma Ying-jeou has become the target of public criticism. Cabinet system vultures are demanding that Ma step down to take responsibility. They are also pushing for a constitutional amendment to implement a cabinet system. They want to reduct the president to a figure head. This has became the most extreme expression of "anti-Ma" sentiment. Those who fall into this category change with the wind. They perceive personal advantages in adopting a cabinet system. They are realpolitik-based supporters of the cabinet system.

If we look back at the history of constitutional reform on Taiwan, we see that most advocates of constitutional reform have been opportunists for whom personal and partisan interests trump national stability. Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian amended the constitution seven times. Their motives were almost always personal or partisan advantage for those in power, usually to consolidate power or squash dissent. Many people have criticized the existing constitutional system, in which the president wields power but bears no responsibility. But this system was the crowning achievement of Lee Teng-hui’s constitutional reforms.

The ROC Constitution originally stipulated that "Before the president may issue an executive order, it must be countersigned by the Executive Yuan or the Premier and the heads of the relevant ministries." Also, “Presidential nominees for Premier must be approved by the Legislative Yuan.” These were clearly cabinet system oriented provisions. These provisions date back many years, to when Chang Chun-mai and others were promoting Chinese democracy in an attempt to limit Chiang Kai-shek’s dictatorial powers.

Lee Teng-hui’s constitutional reforms changed the central government system into something neither fish nor fowl. It destroyed the cabinet system, but failed to replicate either an American-style presidential system or the French-style dual leadership system. The President could now appoint the Premier without Legislative Yuan consent. The President was no longer subject to legislative oversight. The Premier was reduced to the president’s chief of staff. Checks and balances, the most important feature of democracy, virtually disappeared. This is the root cause of the chaos in Taiwan's current system.

During the latter days of Chen Shui-bian's reign, corruption scandals erupted one after another. Cross-Strait crises followed wave after wave. Public support for the DPP plummeted. KMT candidate Ma Ying-jeou stood a good chance of winning the presidential election. Advocacy of the cabinet system resurfaced. Those who once advocated a presidential system because it would "strengthen the national will" and "confront the Chinese mainland," suddenly became overnight converts to the cabinet system. Why? Because "Taiwan's democracy has already been consolidated," and "A cabinet system would prevent the president from being bought out by the CCP." Politicians who relentlessly incited blue vs. green confrontation and “ethnic group” frictions, suddenly expressed vigorous support for the cabinet system, because it "promoted ethnic reconciliation." This wave of cabinet system initiatives died stillborn. But the political calculations behind them were all too clear.

The history of constitutional reform is a painful one. The memories are still fresh. Should we amend the constitution? If so, how? Constitutional reform must no longer be motivated by personal or partisan political calculations. They must no longer be the consequence of myopic political considerations. Opposition to Ma is hardly a valid reason to amend the constitution or adopt a cabinet system. Nor is the desire to attain high office or effect a change in the ruling party a valid reason to advocate a presidential system. Central government institutions and constitutional issues must take into consideration three factors. One. Long-term national stability. Two. The pros and cons of the current system. Three. Taiwan's political character and political culture.

If after careful consideration, a cabinet system turns out to be difficult to implement, it should cease being the goal of current political reform. The cabinet system is essentially "parliamentary democracy." The legislature is the heart of the nation’s political institutions. But as it happens the legislature is the branch of government most in need of reform. It is the object of most public criticism and the cause of most people’s suffering. After the 1992 legislative election, a number of capable legislators remained. But local faction leaders and representatives of monied interests came to dominate the legislature. The implementation of the single-member district system, localized and factionalized lawmakers, turning them into family enterprises. These “low information” legislators emphasized local business and ignored national affairs. They lack the qualifications necessary to become cabinet members and form ruling party cabinets. Given Taiwan's political character and political culture, a cabinet system would be truly difficult to implement at this time.

Consider the matter of national stability. Western nations’  experience with the cabinet system, reveal problems with ruling party changes, political instability, and the proliferation of splinter parties. Blue vs. green confrontation has left Taiwan battered. It cannot afford to be subjected to such turmoil again.

The president “wields power but bears no responsibility.” The premier "bears responsibilities but wields no power." Presidential power is too concentrated. The cabinet system is not necessarily the most effective or direct solution. The most direct solution. the most convenient route, is to simply "follow the constitution." Restore the Constitution of the Republic of China to its original form. Restore the legislature’s authority to approve the premier. This may well be the lowest cost, least risky option.

Constitutional reform has been seen as "political reform." But experience shows that constitutional reform is often a Pandora's Box. Can we afford to be careless? Can we afford to open it in haste?

社論－不要打開政治算計的潘朵拉之盒
2014年12月12日 04:10
本報訊

九合一選舉結束，國民黨慘敗，「修憲」一時之間又成了政壇話題。這次的修憲聲浪，針對的焦點有內閣制、立委選制、青年參政權和兩岸談判的監督等等，其中，要以涉及中央層級權力分配與運作的內閣制問題最為關鍵。

談到主張內閣制修憲的陣營，一般可以粗分為兩大類，一是「內閣制鷹派」，他們長期以來不改其志，始終認定內閣制具有迅速而準確反映民意，避免政治權力分配的零合遊戲，行政與立法密切配合等優點，且適用於台灣這種藍綠、族群、統獨長期對立分裂的社會，能夠促進政治黨派的和解共生，避免兩極化，與總統制相比更為優越。這群人也可稱之為內閣制的「理念型支持者」。

另一種可稱之為「內閣制禿鷹派」，多數在此時主張內閣制修憲的政客屬於此陣營，他們對於總統制、內閣制沒有固定的信念，往往昨是今非，不斷隨政治局勢演變而變更立場。如今，國民黨敗選，馬英九成為眾矢之的，除要求他下台負責外，推動「內閣制修憲」，讓總統成為虛位元首，更成了「反馬」的釜底抽薪之計。這群順應時勢變化，看有利可圖而主張採行內閣制的人士，也可以說是內閣制的「現實型支持者」。

回首台灣的修憲史，多數推動修憲的人士都是屬於個人與黨派利害至上，忽視國家長治久安的「現實派」。從李登輝到陳水扁，台灣進行了7次修憲，幾乎多是從掌權者的一己之私、一黨之利出發而修憲，多是為了鞏固權力、打壓異己而修憲。許多人批評現行憲政體制下，總統有權無責，但是這樣的制度設計，其實正是李登輝修憲的「成果」。

原本《中華民國憲法》規定「總統依法公布法律，發布命令，須經行政院院長之副署，或行政院院長及有關部會首長之副署」，同時「行政院院長由總統提名，經立法院同意任命之」，這些條文明顯具有內閣制的精神，這是當年張君勱等人制憲時，為了促進中國民主、限縮蔣介石獨裁的巧思。

李登輝主導的修憲，卻將中央政府體制改得不倫不類，失去內閣制精神，卻又不是美國式總統制，更和法國雙首長制有很大差別，總統任命行政院長無須立法院同意，總統又不直接受到國會監督，行政院長成了總統幕僚長，民主政治中最重要的制衡原則幾乎消失殆盡，這是今日台灣政治體制錯亂、政局動盪的根源。

陳水扁執政後期，貪腐問題接連爆發，兩岸關係風波不斷，民意支持大幅下滑，眼看著國民黨的馬英九大有機會在總統大選中獲勝，這時，內閣制之議又起。原本主張總統制，因為可以「凝聚國民意志」、「對抗中國大陸」的人士，現在搖身一變成了內閣制的倡議者，理由是「台灣民主已經鞏固」，「內閣制可以避免總統被中共收買」，而原本不斷挑動藍綠、族群對抗的政客，轉過頭來又大力擁護內閣制，因為可以「促進族群和解」。這波有關內閣制的倡議雖然胎死腹中，但卻也清楚看出其背後的政治盤算。

過去幾段修憲痛史，殷鑑不遠，修憲與否，如何修，實在不能再從個人與黨派的政治算計出發，不能再從眼前的政治需要出發，「反馬」固然不宜也不應成為內閣制修憲的原因與動力，謀取大位、政黨輪替也不是支持總統制的主要理由。思考中央政府體制與修憲問題，一要從國家的長治久安著眼，二要從當前體制的利弊得失檢討，三要從台灣的政治特性、政治文化考量。

如果通盤衡酌，「內閣制」實在難成為、也不應為當前台灣政治改革的目標。內閣制可說是「議會民主制」，是以國會為國家政治中心的體制，然而，恰恰好立法院卻是最需要改革、也最遭受民眾詬病的對象。1992年國會全面改選後，雖然一度有不少專業立委進入國會問政，但地方派系、金權代表越來越成為國會的主流，隨著小選區制的實施，立法委員地方化、派系化、家族化的問題日益嚴重，偏重地方經營，忽視國家大政，問政品質低落，遑論有能力入閣、組閣執政。從台灣政治文化考量，內閣制實在有窒礙難行之處。

若從國家長治久安著眼，西方國家內閣制的經驗，往往難以擺脫政府更迭、政局不穩，甚至小黨林立的弊害，對已飽受藍綠對立摧殘的台灣政治來說，實在難以再承受這樣的動盪不安。

至於針對總統「有權無責」、行政院長「有責無權」，甚至總統權力過於集中等體制問題，「內閣制」也未必是最有效、最直接的解決方案。最便捷的路徑，就是「行憲」，恢復《中華民國憲法》本文中閣揆副署權、立院行使閣揆同意權等條文，可能還是成本最低、風險最小的可行方案。

修憲，曾被認為是「政治改革」的手段，但實踐驗證的結果，修憲卻可能成為「潘朵拉的盒子」，我們豈能不慎？又豈能貿然開啟？