Tsai Ing-wen Must Do More than “Continue Past Cross-Strait Policy”

Tsai Ing-wen Must Do More than “Continue Past Cross-Strait Policy”
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 22, 2014

Executive Summary: In 2012 Tsai Ing-wen said, "If the DPP returns to power, it will continue the cross-Strait policies of the previous administration." As 2016 approaches Tsai must repeat these words, and add another, "The DPP will unconditionally accept the Ma administration's 1992 consensus, and one China, different interpretations.”

Full Text Below:

During the 2012 presidential election, Tsai promised that the DPP would "unconditionally accept" ECFA, which she previously condemned as "pandering to [Mainland] China and selling out Taiwan." She said, "If the DPP returns to power, it will continue the former administration's cross-Strait policy." Yet she repudiated the "1992 consensus." This made it impossible to reconcile her cross-Strait rhetoric with her campaign promise. This was the main reason for her defeat. Now that scenario is being replayed. Is history repeating itself?

During a recent visit to the US, DPP Secretary-General Joseph Wu said that the results of the nine in one election should not be interpreted as a failure on the part of the cross-Strait policy advocated by Beijing and the KMT. He did not say that the cross-Strait policy adopted by Beijing and the KMT was correct or successful. But he was clear that it "should not be interpreted as a failure." Wu made this statement in his capacity as Secretary-General of the DPP. He was probably paving the way for a future DPP declaration that it was "continuing the previous administration's cross-Strait policy."

Joseph Wu said that if people think the one China principle or the 1992 consensus are that important, then the two sides need to talk. He said they "can be topics of discussion, but not a preconditions for discussions." This was a departure from Tsai Ing-wen's 2012 assertion that there was no such thing as a 1992 consensus.

In fact, as the DPP knows, the Ma government, under the 1992 consensus, has successfully used globalization to guide cross-Strait relations. Therefore its policies can hardly be interpreted as a failure. By the same token, Beijing, under the 1992 consensus, has successfully promoted ECFA and "peaceful development." This can hardly be interpreted as a failure either. This cross-Strait framework may contain flaws and pose risks. But the flaws can be remedied and the risks can be minimized. Globalization reigns supreme. The rise of Mainland China foretells Taiwan's marginalization. This framework is already Taiwan's only survival strategy.

Joseph Wu said, "This cannot be interpreted as [Mainland] China's failure or the failure of KMT cross-Strait policy.” This means the DPP is unable to propose a better or different policy. It is likely to "continue the previous administration's cross-Strait policy." The DPP knows it must reform its cross-Strait policy. Nevertheless, despite this political reality, the DPP shows no sign of relenting on the 1992 consensus. It persists in obstructing ECFA follow-up agreements and the establishment of cross-Strait representative offices. The DPP remains caught in a contradiction. It appears to be repeating the same scenario as it did in 2012.

During the Sunflower Student Movement protests, the DPP encouraged anti-Ma and anti-Mainland mob sentiments. It incited hatred against the STA and other ECFA follow-up agreements. These incitements to violence attempted to prove that “The cross-Strait policy advocated by Beijing and the KMT is mistaken and a failure." The DPP reaped the political rewards of characterizing the cross-Strait policy advocated by Beijing and the KMT as mistaken and failed. This was a major factor in the DPP's populist victory in the nine in one election. Now that the election is over, Joseph Wu is saying that the nine in one election results should not be interpreted as China's failure or a failure of KMT cross-Strait policy. As we all know, those who fabricate lies are obligated to refute them.

Sunflower Student Movement agitation and public objections to cross-Strait policy provided the impetus for anti-government sentiment during the nine in one election. These sidelined other events and factors. Therefore the result of this election cannot be attributed solely to cross-Strait policy. But the 2016 presidential election debate will be about cross-Strait policy. There should be no doubt about that. The DPP say it believes that the cross-Strait policy advocated by Beijing and the KMT “cannot be interpreted as a failure." If so, how does it intend to resolve the riddle of its cross-Strait policy?

On the 17th, Beijing's Taiwan Affairs Office issued its first comments on the impact of the nine in one elections on cross-Strait relations. It made three points. One. It reiterated that the cross-Strait relationship was based on the 1992 consensus. Two. City to city exchanges between Taipei and Shanghai must also be based on 1992 consensus. Three. The interaction between CPC and KMT leaders must of course insist on the 1992 consensus and predicted a Chu Xi meeting. The above shows that Beijing does not consider the nine in one election results proof that the cross-Strait policy advocated by Beijing and the KMT was a failure. The situation is similar to 2012. But the pressure on the DPP is far greater than it was back then. By contrast, the DPP today has been taken hostage by the Sunflower Student Movement, it has more trouble reforming its cross-Strait policies than before.

Given this dilemma, the DPP should first deal with the 1992 consensus. Joseph Wu said that the 1992 consensus can be a topic of discussion, but it cannot be a precondition for discussions. But if the 1992 consensus became a topic of discussion, it would be even more vaguely defined, with different interpretations. It would be even more unmanageable. The 1992 consensus is subject to different interpretations. If the ambiguity in it is eliminated, if the 1992 consensus is eliminated, the bottom line becomes crystal clear: Taiwan independence is out of the question. The DPP needs to think again. Would it prefer to accept the 1992 consensus, with all its glorious ambiguity? Or would it prefer a blunt declaration flatly rejecting Taiwan independence? Does it really want to paint itself into that corner? Does the DPP really want to burst that bubble? As for the ECFA follow-up provisions, the DPP should use the opportunity to promote their implementation before the 2016 election. This will help the party in the event it returns to office and must “unconditionally accept” it.

In 2012 Tsai Ing-wen said, "If the DPP returns to power, it will continue the cross-Strait policies of the previous administration." As 2016 approaches Tsai must repeat these words, and add another, "The DPP will unconditionally accept the Ma administration's 1992 consensus, and one China, different interpretations.”
   
延續前朝兩岸政策 蔡英文須加一句話
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.12.22 02:24 am

二○一二年總統大選期間，蔡英文表示將「概括承受」她曾指為「傾中賣台」的ＥＣＦＡ，並宣示「若再執政將延續前朝兩岸政策」；但因她否定「九二共識」，遂使其兩岸論述不能自圓其說，成為敗選主因。如今這似曾相識的情景彷彿再度浮現，歷史難道正在重演？

民進黨秘書長吳釗燮日前訪美期間表示：九合一的選舉結果，不應解讀為中國的失敗或國民黨兩岸政策的失敗。他雖未正面表述成北京及國民黨的兩岸政策為正確或成功，卻明白指出「不應解讀為失敗」。以黨秘書長身分作此發言，應是為「若再執政將延續前朝兩岸政策」預作鋪墊。

且吳釗燮又說：如果認為九二共識或一中原則那麼重要，雙方需要談一談，「可以當作議題，但不能當前提」。此段發言至少已改變了二○一二年蔡英文根本否認「九二共識」之存在的說法。

其實，民進黨深知，馬政府在「九二共識」下，經營以全球化為導向的兩岸競合關係，不能解讀為失敗；相對地，北京在「九二共識」下，藉ＥＣＦＡ架構推動兩岸「和平發展」的進程，亦不能解讀為失敗。此一兩岸架構容有缺陷及風險，自待彌補與防範；但在全球化當道、中國崛起及台灣邊緣化的走勢下，此一架構已然是台灣別無選擇的生存戰略。

吳釗燮說「不能解讀為中國的失敗及國民黨兩岸政策的失敗」，應是深知民進黨其實無法提出較此更佳或與此不同的政策，極有可能「若再執政將延續前朝兩岸政策」，亦顯示民進黨深知其兩岸政策有轉型之必要。但是，在眼下的政治現實中，民進黨對「九二共識」卻仍無鬆口跡象，且對ＥＣＦＡ架構後續協議及兩岸互設辦事處等續持杯葛立場。這種進退維谷、自相矛盾的情勢，儼然正在重演二○一二年的場景。

在太陽花事件期間，民進黨全力鼓動「反馬即反中／反中即反馬」的民憤，更煽動反對服貿協議等ＥＣＦＡ後續工程，此種激越的操作不啻是要證明「北京及國民黨的兩岸政策是錯誤、失敗的」，且民進黨最後亦收割了「將北京及國民黨的兩岸政策打成失敗」的政治果實，這也成為民進黨九合一大勝的主要民粹因素。但是，豈知到了選後，吳釗燮卻說：九合一的選舉結果，不應解讀為中國的失敗或國民黨兩岸政策的失敗。莫非已知：解鈴還須繫鈴人。

由於太陽花事件的激盪，民間對兩岸政策的不滿雖是九合一選舉反政府的底氣，卻大多藉其他事件及因素嫁接轉移出去，因而不能視此次選舉為對兩岸政策的攤牌；但是，二○一六總統大選的主要議題將是兩岸政策的辯論，應無疑問。民進黨若認為，在二○一六大選中，北京的與國民黨的兩岸政策仍「不能解讀為失敗」，則將如何重建其兩岸論述？

十七日，北京國台辦首度對九合一選後的兩岸情勢發表談話，要點有三：一、再申兩岸大局建立在「九二共識」之上；二、台北與上海的城市交流亦必須依循「九二共識」；三、國共兩黨黨魁的互動「當然應該堅持」，亦即預告「朱習會」。以上足徵北京亦未將九合一選舉解讀為國共政府兩岸政策的失敗。此一情勢與二○一二年相似，但對民進黨的壓力卻遠逾當年；相對而言，今日的民進黨因受太陽花餘緒的挾持，其轉型的困難則甚於當年。

面對此情勢，民進黨首應處理的是「九二共識」。吳釗燮說，九二共識可作議題，不能當前提。但是，九二共識若真成為一個說破、說透的「議題」，似較作為一個「定義模糊／各自表述」的「前提」更難處理。因為，「九二共識」尚有「各自表述」的空間，但若說破了，拿掉「九二共識」，即是「反台獨」；民進黨應思，接納「九二共識」畢竟比較含糊，若至必須直接表態「反台獨」，則更無轉圜餘地，則民進黨何必要把這層窗戶紙捅破？至於對ＥＣＦＡ後續工程，民進黨尤應運用二○一六大選前的時機促其實現，以便倘重返執政即能「概括承受」。

在二○一二年，蔡英文曾說過：「若再執政將延續前朝兩岸政策。」面對二○一六，蔡英文必須把這句話再說一遍，且要加上一句：「包括延續馬政府一中各表的九二共識。」