Seeking a Basis for CCP-DPP Political Relations

Seeking a Basis for CCP-DPP Political Relations
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 4th, 2014

Executive Summary: The results of the nine in one elections are now known. Most people consider them an accurate indicator of what partisan politics and partisan turf wars on Taiwan will be like over the next six years. The KMT's future today is as grim as the DPP's future following the debacle of 2006. The KMT probably cannot reverse its fortunes by the 2016 presidential and legislative elections.

Full Text Below:

The results of the nine in one elections are now known. Most people consider them an accurate indicator of what partisan politics and partisan turf wars on Taiwan will be like over the next six years. The KMT's future today is as grim as the DPP's future following the debacle of 2006. The KMT probably cannot reverse its fortunes by the 2016 presidential and legislative elections.

The KMT is about to lose power. The DPP may return to power. Add to this the power of civic groups. These three factors will determine the future of cross-Strait relations. Veteran analysts of cross-Strait relations say that "Cross-Strait relations will inevitably stagnate. They will not be able to move forward. We will be lucky if we can maintain the status quo." They say that "Cross-Strait relations will undergo serious trials. Opportunities will be few and far between. The Mainland must be psychologically prepared." They say that "Those struggling to promote better cross-Strait relations will face numerous obstacles. The Mainland will have to respond with patience.” Stagnation is likely. Patience will be required. But those truly in the know regarding cross-Strait relations, know that stagnation must be overcome, and solutions must be found.

The key factor in the development of cross-strait relations is the DPP. How will the DPP interpret its victory in the nine in one elections? Will it alter its policy path? That will be the most important variable in cross-Strait relations. The Sunflower Student Movement gave the withered old Taiwan independence movement a shot in the arm. Anti-China forces in the pan-green camp have blamed Taiwan's internal social and economic problems on closer cross-Strait relations. They have accused the KMT of "cozying up to China, selling out Taiwan, and favoring the financial conglomerates." They have concealed their anti-China animus and Taiwan independence agenda under a heavy layer of "social justice." Their ploy has worked. It has deceived many young voters. On the other hand, DPP cross-Strait policy reform has long been all thunder and no rain. long on talk but short on action, largely due to anti-China obstructionism.

As a result, DPP cross-Strait policy reform has been subject to civic group constraints. Call these groups a "white force.” Call them "civic groups" if you wish. In recent years, such civic groups have proliferated on Taiwan. These groups concern themselves with everything from local policy to cross-Strait relations. During the recent election, these civic groups argued that "Until the KMT falls, Taiwan cannot rise.” They presented an obstacle to DPP policy reform. They intend to use sovereignty, human rights, democracy, transparency, and oversight as weapons to obstruct progress in cross-Strait relations

The nine in one elections were a rout. Cross-Strait policy reform has become the Democratic Progressive Party’s final mile on its path to power. The DPP leadership must be clear. If it refuses to alter its cross-Strait policy path, it cannot gain the trust of Beijing, Washington, or even Taiwan’s “economic voters.” The DPP has long been reluctant to recognize the "1992 consensus," or alter its cross-Strait policy path. If it does, it will be attacked by Taiwan independence fundamentalists and lose the support of other groups.

The Ma government advocates "no reunification, no Taiwan independence, no use of force." It corrected the Chen Shui-bian government’s mistaken policy path. It won the cooperation of Mainland officials. It improved cross-Strait relations. But when cross-Strait relations entered more treacherous waters, and more sensitive political issues arose. Ma’s "no reunification" clause was no longer acceptable to the Mainland. The Ma government lacked the courage to resist accusations of “cozying up to China and selling out Taiwan." It could no longer unite the people behind it. It could no longer lead Taiwan toward lasting peace and cross-Strait progress. Those in the know called upon the KMT to adopt a more proactive cross-Strait policy. They urged the KMT to actively address the issue of the two sides’ political status. They urged the KMT to offer a long term vision for the Chinese nation. They urged the KMT to actively promote cross-Strait economic integration and a "KMT-CCP peace agreement." But the Ma government hesitated. Now it faces the prospect of losing power. The Kuomintang must reaffirm its roots. It must engage in “creative destruction.” It must have the courage to throw open its doors. It must debate and adjust its cross-Strait policy, and begin anew. Only then does it stand a chance of winning over a new generation of voters.

In any event, KMT power has already declined. The Mainland now faces an unprecedented change in Taiwan's political situation. It must adopt the "two sides, one family” principle.  It must be more flexible, patient, and meticulous in handling cross-Strait relations. On the one hand, it must adhere to the 1992 consensus as the basis for interaction with Taiwan's political parties. It must not waver. But neither should it act in haste. It must remain open to change. It must continue in-depth exchanges with different segments of the Taiwan public. Through culture, daily life and psychological cohesion, a "two sides, one family" consensus can be reached. This will create a solid foundation for the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations. When the time is ripe, the DPP will accept the 1992 Consensus.

Taiwan has "socialism with Chinese characteristics." It is a convergence point in institutional and ideological competition with the Western nations. Taiwan's political path can serve as a reference point for the Mainland. It can be seen as an opposition party under the Mainland’s one-party dictatorship. Cross-Strait relations are something the Mainland must cherish.

社論－尋找民共政治關係的基礎
2014年12月04日 04:10
本報訊

九合一大選結果出爐後，多數人認為未來6年，台灣政治發展趨勢與政黨版圖已經確立，國民黨的前途就如同2006年民進黨的慘敗一樣，在2016年的總統和立委選舉中，幾乎可以確定沒有翻身的契機。

國民黨即將失去政權，民進黨可能重新執政，加上「公民運動」的牽制，將成為未來影響兩岸關係變動的三大因素。已經有資深的兩岸關係學者指出，「兩岸關係必然停滯，不可能繼續往前走，如果能維持現狀就很好了」，「未來兩岸關係考驗大、機遇少，希望大陸做好心理準備」，「兩岸關係推動會面臨很多障礙，大陸需要耐心因應」。「停滯」是兩岸關係前景極可能的圖像，「耐心」則是必須的心理準備。但真正關心兩岸關係和平發展的有識之士，還是必須尋求擺脫停滯、開創新局的方向與解答。

目前來看，影響兩岸關係發展的一大關鍵是民進黨的動向，民進黨如何解讀自己在九合一大選中的勝利，並從而調整該黨的路線策略，將是兩岸關係發展上的一大變數。太陽花學運以來，原本老舊凋零的台獨運動獲得了新生力量。這段時間，泛綠陣營中的反中力量一直將兩岸議題與台灣內部的社會經濟問題結合起來，主打國民黨「侵中、賣台、親財團」的政黨性格，試圖把「反中」或台獨路線塗抹厚厚一層「社會公平正義」的包裝，也獲得了效果，在年輕選民中有很大的欺騙性。另一方面，民進黨內部關於兩岸關係路線的調整始終雷聲大、雨點小，花言巧語多，實際作為少，在很大程度上也是因為反中力量的阻撓。

因此，民進黨在兩岸路線上的轉型，還將受到所謂「公民運動」很大的牽制。不管稱之為「白色力量」還是「公民運動」，近幾年台灣民間的反抗運動，已經蔚為風潮，其關注的議題已從地方公共政策延伸到兩岸關係，在這次選戰中，這股所謂的「公民運動」不但匯聚出「國民黨不倒，台灣不會好」的聲浪，更形成對民進黨轉型路線的牽制力量，他們將以主權、人權、民主、透明、監督等作為武器，在兩岸關係的進展上發揮阻滯的作用

在九合一狂勝後，兩岸路線的轉型，已真正成為民進黨重返執政的最後一哩路，民進黨的領導層應該清楚，如果不在兩岸路線上做出調整，將很難取信於北京、華盛頓，甚至台灣的經濟選民。但纏繞民進黨體質已久的痼疾，就是顧忌於如果接受、承認「九二共識」，或在兩岸路線上做出更大的調整，將會面臨基本教義派等支持力量的反撲與動盪。

馬政府堅持「不統、不獨、不武」，曾經發揮糾正陳水扁政府錯誤路線，取得大陸官方合作之效，帶領兩岸關係的正向發展，但當兩岸關係進入深水區要開始面對政治議題時，「不統」對大陸已不足以因應未來發展的需要，對台灣內部卻無法抵抗民進黨「傾中賣台」的攻擊，因而不再能凝聚人心支持，不能帶領台灣走向兩岸永久和平與永續發展的方向。有識之士曾呼籲國民黨，應採取更積極的兩岸路線，例如積極討論兩岸政治定位問題，多談中華民族的願景，積極推動兩岸經濟整合與「國共和平協議」，馬政府卻猶豫不決。如今面臨失去政權的可能性，國民黨如能正本清源，以大破大立、大開大闔的魄力，對兩岸關係的路線、論述、政策作調整、再出發，或有機會爭取新世代選民的認同。

無論如何，國民黨已勢衰。大陸面對台灣政治前所未有的變局，宜以「兩岸一家親」為基本方針，更靈活而有耐心的細緻處理兩岸關係，一方面，繼續堅持以「九二共識」作為與台灣各政黨互動的基礎，不輕易動搖，但也不要躁進，要以開放態度創造轉圜的空間，持續與台灣各階層民眾深入交流，從文化、生活、心理面凝聚「兩岸一家親」的共識，厚實兩岸關係和平發展的基礎，水到渠成，民進黨就會接受九二共識。

台灣是「中國特色社會主義」與西方國家在體制與意識形態競合的銜接點，台灣的道路可以做為大陸的借鑑，也可以視為大陸一黨專政體制下，治理範圍的反對黨，兩岸關係值得大陸珍惜。