Can the DPP's Win become Taiwan's Win?

Can the DPP's Win become Taiwan's Win?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 02, 2014

Executive Summary: The Democratic Progressive Party won this election. It now hopes to win the 2016 presidential election. But if Taiwan is to win, the DPP must not slam shut the nation’s doors and engage in political and economic obstructionism. The DPP must adopt a more pragmatic political and economic policy path. Can the DPP make such a pragmatic change? That remains a giant question mark.

Full Text Below:

Tsai Ing-wen said that the DPP will use this election to win back Taiwan. The DPP has won big. But can the DPP turn its own victory into Taiwan's victory?

This election was a political tsunami. It totally transformed Taiwan’s political landscape. No single factor can explain the outcome of this election. But everyone agrees that public discontent with the central government was the primary cause of this "democratic coup."

How should we interpret the results of this election? Does it mean that 60% of the public has rejected the Ma government’s political and economic policy path? Does it mean they prefer the Democratic Progressive Party’s political and economic policy path?

The Ma government's political and economic policy path is clear and consistent. It stresses business-oriented globalization and cross-Strait coopetition. On the one hand, cross-Strait relations supports globalization, On the other hand, globalization provides a check on cross-Strait relations, resulting in a virtuous circle. So what exactly are the election results telling us? Did they repudiate and overturn the nation’s political and economic path? 

If the answer is yes, we  must ask another question.  Did this election wholeheartedly affirm the DPP’s economic and political path?  The DPP’s current political and economic policy path is summed up in its "four pillars." One. Repudiate the 1992 consensus. Two. Refuse to nullify or freeze the Taiwan independence party platform. Three. Continue engaging in backdoor listing. Argue that “The Republic of China is Taiwan, and Taiwan is the Republic of China.” Four. Connect with the rest of the world before connecting with the Chinese mainland. The question now is this: Does the outcome of this election mean the public has given the DPP a mandate to implement its political and economic policy path?

During these local elections, political and economic issues were concealed, distorted, or diluted. Therefore this election merely reflected intense public dissatisfaction with the central government. Was this a reflection of opposition to the Ma government’s political and economic policy path, or identification with the opposition Democratic Progressive Party’s political and economic policy path? That is hard to say. Therefore, this election was merely an election that "critiqued the KMT" or "expressed dissatisfaction with the KMT." It cannot be interpreted as voter identification with the DPP.

This election has greatly increased the likelihood of the DPP returning to power in  2016. The DPP’s political and economic policy path will then be subject to an acid test. It will no longer be able to evade the issues. If the DPP is still clinging to the aforementioned "four pillars" that make up its political and economic policy path, it will have painted itself into a corner, on Taiwan and everywhere else. Therefore this election means only that the public rejected the Kuomintang. This may help the DPP return to power in 2016. But if the DPP refuses to change its political and economic policy path, Taiwan will find itself trapped with no way out. It will not be able to either advance or retreat. If the public on Taiwan asks the DPP to cure Taiwan's political and economic problems, it will be accepting medical advice from a snake oil salesman.

If the Democratic Progressive Party seeks a return to power, it must jettison its political and economic policy path. The key is Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP, and how they intend to interpret the results of this election. One. They can interpret it as an opportunity to divorce themselves from fundamentalist ideology. They can use it to overturn the DPP's "four pillars” political and economic policy path. Two. They can interpret the election as anti-Ma sentiment morphing into Taiwan independence fundamentalist anti-Mainland sentiment. They can cite it as reason to cling to its "four pillars” policy path. We urge the DPP to accept the first interpretation, capitalize on the trend, and throw off the shackles of the past.

This election has become a highly ironic political paradox. The public is unhappy with Ma Ying-jeou and the Kuomintang. This makes it likely that the DPP will win the 2016 presidential election. But if the Democratic Progressive Party returns to power, it will be compelled to “continue the previous administration’s cross-Strait policy." Tsai Ing-wen publicly admitted as much in 2012. The DPP will be compelled to plagiarize the Ma government's political and economic policy path. If it refuses to do so, the DPP government and Taiwan will be trapped. The is the connection between globalization, the rise of the Chinese mainland, and Taiwan’s inevitable marginalization. Tsai Ing-wen or the DPP cannot change this merely by wishing it isn’t so. As the title of this article noted, the Democratic Progressive Party has emerged the winner of this election. But will Taiwan be a winner as well? That remains to be seen.

The DPP must now change its political and economic policy path, making it consistent with Taiwan’s long-term interests. It must make the party's victory Taiwan's victory. Only this will win it the public support it craves. Some have suggested that President Ma Ying-jeou serve as Tsai Ing-wen’s Premier. This of course is sheer fantasy. But it does suggest the political and economic policy path the DPP should take. The most urgent task for the DPP is to facilitate the passage of the STA, MTA, and to establish cross-Strait representative offices in the legislature. Doing so would reduce the cross-Strait friction generated by the Democratic Progressive Party’s return to power. This would lend greater credibility to the DPP government’s "unconditional acceptance" of the previous administration’s cross-Strait policy.

The Democratic Progressive Party won this election. It now hopes to win the 2016 presidential election. But if Taiwan is to win, the DPP must not slam shut the nation’s doors and engage in political and economic obstructionism. The DPP must adopt a more pragmatic political and economic policy path. Can the DPP make such a pragmatic change? That remains a giant question mark.

民進黨的贏，要如何化為台灣的勝利？
【聯合報╱社論】
2014.12.02 02:13 am

蔡英文說：民進黨要用這場選舉贏回台灣。現在，民進黨大贏，接下來的一步，是民進黨要如何把它自己的勝利轉化為台灣的勝利。

這場政治海嘯般的選舉，徹底改變了台灣的政治地貌。雖說不能用單一因素來解讀這場選舉，但眾議咸同的是：民意對「中央執政」的不滿，是造成這場「民主政變」的主要原因。

那麼，能否將這場選舉解讀為台灣六成民意對馬政府的國家政經總路線之否定與顛覆，而選擇了民進黨現今所主張的國家政經總路線？

馬政府的國家政經總路線，是清晰而一致的，那就是：專注經營以全球化為導向的兩岸競合關係。一方面，用兩岸關係來支持全球化，另一方面用全球化來制約兩岸關係。循環相生，往復利用。那麼，這次選舉結果，是否對於此一國家政經總路線的全盤否定與顛覆？

如果是，則另一層次的問題便是：這次選舉是否對民進黨的國家政經總路線的全盤肯定與支持？截至此刻，民進黨的國家政經總路線可謂有「四大支柱」：一、否認九二共識。二、不廢凍台獨黨綱。三、借殼上市，中華民國是台灣，台灣是中華民國。四、從世界走向中國。試問：這次選舉能否解讀為民意給了民進黨繼續貫徹這套政經總路線的政治令狀（mandate）？

在這場地方選舉中，國家政經總路線的議題被掩蓋或扭曲、淡化，因此我們認為，或許只能說這場選舉充分反映了民意對「中央執政」的強烈不滿，但是否顯示即是對馬政府政經總路線的反對與對民進黨政經總路線的認同，尚難定論。因而，這場選舉在相當程度上，就國家政經總路線而言，可視為一場「批判國民黨」或「不滿國民黨」的選舉，但尚不能直接解讀為選民「認同民進黨」。

這場選舉使民進黨在二○一六年重返執政的可能性大增，屆時，民進黨的國家政經總路線才將進入實際考驗，沒有掩蓋迴避的可能。到時候，民進黨如果仍然持守前述「四大支柱」的政經總路線，則台灣在裡裡外外必無出路。因而，這場選舉所造成的政治情勢儼然是：民意「反對國民黨」，可能使民進黨在二○一六重返執政；但民進黨若不翻轉調整其國家總路線，則台灣必無出路，成為「頭過身不過」的僵局。倘係如此，而台灣民意若欲藉此次選舉請民進黨提供台灣政經難題之解藥，那不啻是請鬼拿藥單。

民進黨若重返執政，必須翻轉其政經總路線。關鍵在於民進黨及蔡英文如何解讀這場選舉的意義：一、可將這次選舉解讀為突破意識形態及基本教義捆綁的契機，藉用中間選民為槓桿來翻轉民進黨的「四大支柱總路線」。二、也可將這次選舉解讀為「從反馬到仇中」基本教義的大發酵，因而愈加持守「四大支柱總路線」。我們的建議是，民進黨應當對這次選舉採用第一種解讀，因勢利導，始能頭過身也過。

容我們預言，這次選舉已形成了一個極諷刺的政治悖論，亦即：民意對國民黨及馬英九的不滿，極可能使民進黨贏得二○一六總統大選；然而，民進黨若重返執政，除了「延續前朝兩岸政策」（蔡英文二○一二年語），大幅抄襲延續馬政府的國家政經總路線之外，民進黨政府及台灣均難有出路。這是在全球化大局及中國大陸崛起，與台灣急劇邊緣化之下的必然趨勢，不會隨蔡英文或民進黨的個別意志為轉移。此即文首所說：民進黨贏了這場選舉，但台灣能不能贏，尚是未知數。

如今民進黨必須儘速思考的是：如何修正它的政經總路線，使之與台灣的長期利益接軌，使該黨的勝利轉換為台灣的勝利，這才是取得人民支持的根本之計。有人提議，由馬總統任蔡英文為行政院長；此議雖屬狂想，卻點出了民進黨自此刻即應負起為國家政經總路線鋪平道路的責任。目下最起碼的工作，是民進黨應協力促成兩岸服貿協議、貨貿協議及互設辦事處等立法工程的完成；如此即可減少民進黨重返執政所遭遇的兩岸折衝與磨擦，並增加民進黨政府「概括承受」的資產。

民進黨贏了這次選舉，並向二○一六總統大選的贏局逼近。但是，如果台灣也要贏，不能靠民進黨以封鎖、杯葛為主軸的政經路線，而有賴民進黨向更務實可行的國家政經路線調整。民進黨能否務實自我調整，目前仍是一座等待征服的大山。