New Chu Xi Framework: Legacy of Lien Hu Meeting

New Chu Xi Framework: Legacy of Lien Hu Meeting
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 23, 2015

Executive Summary: On May 3, KMT Chairman Eric Chu will head a delegation to the KMT-CCP Forum. This high profile Chu Xi meeting will take place in Beijing on May 4. KMT sources reveal that in addition to reaffirming the 1992 consensus, Chu will propose a new cross-Strait framework that "goes beyond the 1992 consensus".

Full Text Below:

On May 3, KMT Chairman Eric Chu will head a delegation to the KMT-CCP Forum. This high profile Chu Xi meeting will take place in Beijing on May 4. KMT sources reveal that in addition to reaffirming the 1992 consensus, Chu will propose a new cross-Strait framework that "goes beyond the 1992 consensus".

Predictably, the Chu Xi meeting will invite green camp allegations that Chu is a "puppet emperor" who is "pandering to [Mainland] China and selling out Taiwan". Sure enough, a physical altercation erupted in the New Taipei City Council yesterday over the Chu Xi meeting. Eric Chu knows full well he will be the target of defamation. Yet he remains determined to meet with Xi Jinping. Surely he has the confidence required to shrug off accusations that he is selling out Taiwan. Surely he has clear goals and is reasonably confident he can achieve them.

If the Chu Xi meeting is successful, the public on Taiwan will witness an historic breakthrough. At best, it may disperse the fog that has shrouded Taiwan since the 3/18 Sunflower Student Movement. Failing that, it may give the Kuomintang, a patient under intensive care, a shot in the arm. Finally, it may reduce the political fallout from Eric Chu's decision not to run for president, and even reverse the KMT's political fortunes.

The political situation is such that even the tiniest move can affect the entire situation. For the moment, Eric Chu has chosen not to run in 2016. If the politcal picture improves, Eric Chu may have the option of reconsidering. The "three benefits" could fall flat and become "three disappointments", That is something Eric Chu must consider. This is a critical moment. The success of cross-Strait relations and the realization of the China Dream require unprecedented wisdom and courage on the part of the Mainland. In this regard, we offer three reminders.

Reminder One. Eric Chu leading a delegation to participate in KMT-CCP talks and meeting with Xi Jinping on the tenth anniversary of the Lien Hu meeting has enormous significance, both past and future. In 2005, Lien Chan embarked on his Journey of Peace. He met with President Hu Jintao and together they reached a five-point consensus. They agreed to promote cross-Strait exchanges and negotiations on the basis of the 1992 consensus. Lien Chan became the first KMT leader since the Chinese Civil War and the KMT's relocation of the nation's capital to Taiwan in 1949. Lien laid the foundation for healthy development of cross-Strait relations once Ma Ying-jeou took office.

Given the historical background, can Eric Chu write a new chapter of cross-Strait relations, based on but different from the Lien Hu meeting? Given the current cross-Strait atmosphere, that may be difficult. Yet that is the outcome Chu must strive for during his trip. Cross-Strait relations have undeniably entered the deep water zone. One may talk about "going beyond" or "transcending" the 1992 consensus. But one must at least attain the same heights. Many obstacles stand in the way. The Chu Xi meeting must build a bridge for cross-Strait relations, one that enables us to cross the ravine without falling into the water below. It must establish a horizontal link connecting the two sides, enabling them to enjoy a new beginning.

Reminder Two. Pay attention to changes in the way the DPP and Tsai Ing-wen respond. Tsai Ing-wen has long denied that the 1992 consensus even exists. Recently, under pressure from Mainland China and the United States, she has changed her tune. She has begun assuring people that she wishes to "maintain the cross-Strait status quo". On the one hand, that is a deliberately vague statement. The cross-Strait status quo covers a lot of ground. Strictly speaking, the 1992 consensus and one China, different interpretations also maintain the status quo. One could say that Tsai has moved in the direction of KMT cross-Strait policy.

Tsai Ing-wen's "maintenance of the status quo" is still based on the DPP's Resolution on Taiwan's Future, and even its Taiwan Independence Party Platform. This too distinguishes it from KMT cross-Strait policy. The two together, constitute a "Taiwan version of one China, different interpretations". This could lead to a "bat effect" in politics, making birds mistake bats for birds, and making rats mistake bats for rats. In other words, "maintaining the status quo" can reassure those who hope the DPP will undergo transformation, without making Taiwan independence fundamentalists too alarmed.

How will Eric Chu deal with Tsai Ing-wen's deliberate ambiguity? What sort of new framework will Eric Chu propose during the Chu Xi meeting? We think the "cross-Strait version of one China, different interpretations" should become the Kuomintang's version of the 1992 consensus, namely, both sides of the Strait are part of one China.

Reminder Three. This "cross-Strait version of one China, different interpretations" is not Eric Chu's one-man show. It must meet with the approval of the United States and the Chu Xi meeting.

Xi Jinping has reiterated that his most important task is the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. This great rejuvenation means that both sides of the Strait are part of one nation. The link that makes both sides of the Strait part of one China, is the "Republic of China." For Taiwan, the Republic of China constitutes a shared domestic consensus. For the Mainland, the Republic of China is more than just a political symbol. It also means shared history, shared culture, and shared emotions. The Mainland should view these emotions in a positive light. Let the "Republic of China" have a larger say and greater participation in shaping the cross-Strait framework and in contributing to Xi Jinping's Chinese Dream.

If Xi Jinping is willing to accept such sentiments, Eric Chu should highlight the positive role the Republic of China plays in the one China based 1992 consensus, and incorporate it into cross-Strait policy.

Do we really not know how Eric Chu feels about the 1992 Consensus? Allow the "ROC" to become the basis for discussion. Allow Eric Chu to lead the Kuomintang, and even the Republic of China into deep water. He, at least, will not lose his way.

傳承連胡會 朱習會開兩岸新局

2015年04月23日 中國時報

國民黨主席朱立倫將於5月3日率團參加國共論壇，各方關注的「朱習會」也敲定5月4日北京登場，國民黨方面透露，朱除將重申延續「九二共識」立場外，更將提出「跨越九二共識」兩岸新政策論述。

可以預見的，朱習會的舉行，必將招來綠營「兒皇帝」、「傾中賣台」等政治語言的攻擊批評，昨天新北市議會果然因朱習會的確定而爆發藍綠議員肢體衝突。朱立倫明知謗之必來，仍決定與習近平會面，想必已有充分信心擺脫賣台的牽制，且已設定清楚的目標，並有相當把握取得一定成果。

可以合理推斷，如果朱習會能取得讓台灣人民眼睛一亮的突破性成果，大則有助撥開318學運後籠罩台灣上空的兩岸霧霾；中則可以為國民黨幾已進入加護病房的選情打一劑強心針；小則對朱立倫因選不選總統而多面受傷的政治能量，產生修補乃至於逆轉強化的作用。

政治局勢牽一髮動全身，若氛圍有正向變化，目前宣布不選2016的朱立倫，也多了重新思考布局的可能性。然而，三利多如果操作不順，也可能變成三利空。這一點朱立倫必須審慎思量。同時，面對關鍵時刻，大陸對兩岸關係大局與中國夢的圓滿也必須有開創性的智慧與大魄力。對此，我們有3個提醒。

首先，朱立倫在連胡會十周年時率團參加國共論壇與習近平會談，具有承先啟後的重要意義。2005年，連戰的和平之旅，與胡錦濤見面取得五點共識，並同意在九二共識的基礎上推動兩岸交流談判，連戰成為國共內戰、1949年國民政府遷台後，第一位登陸的國民黨最高領導人，也為馬英九上台後兩岸關係的良性發展打下了基礎。

朱立倫如何在這個歷史基礎下，開創植基於「連胡」而又有別於「連胡」、屬於「朱習」的歷史性篇章？這一點，在兩岸交流氛圍趨下、懸壁在前的此刻，並不容易，這應是朱立倫此行必須取得的成果。不容否認，兩岸關係已進入深水區，九二共識無論是要「跨越」或「超越」，都必須「再攀巔峰」，但眺望前景障礙不小。朱習會至少要能搭木築橋，讓兩岸關係跨過河谷深水，不要跌入溝壑，也就是要能水平式的建立讓兩岸關係開啟新氣象的新局面。

第二提醒，要注意蔡英文與民進黨的若干轉變並有所回應。長期主張九二共識不存在的蔡英文，在中國大陸與美國雙重壓力下近來已改變論述，取而代之的是「維持兩岸現狀」。一方面，這是一種大圈包小圈的論述法，何謂兩岸現狀，此圈疆界極廣，嚴格來說，一中各表的九二共識，也涵蓋在維持現狀的大圈之中，可以說，是一種向國民黨兩岸政策的貼近。

二方面，蔡英文的「維持現狀」，仍是立足於民進黨的台灣前途決議文甚至台獨黨綱。這又形成與國民黨兩岸政策的區隔。二者結合，即形成一種「台灣版的一中各表」。這在政治上可以發揮「蝙蝠效應」，讓鳥視蝠為鳥，讓鼠視蝠為鼠，也就是，維持現狀說，可以讓期待民進黨轉型的民眾，看見轉型的希望而安心，又同時讓基本教義派不致於太不放心。

朱立倫要在朱習會中端出什麼樣的新論述，來應對蔡英文這種外貼近內區隔的論述呢？我們認為，「兩岸版的一中各表」，應可做為國民黨對「九二共識」的新認知，也就是兩岸同屬一中。

這就必須進入第三提醒，這「兩岸版的一中各表」，不能只是朱立倫的獨角戲，必須至少是在美方配樂下的朱習雙人舞。

習近平多次宣示，他最重要的任務，是實現中華民族的偉大復興，要偉大復興，就不能缺少「兩岸同屬一中」的偉大建構。建構「兩岸同屬一中」的連結點無他，就是「中華民國」。對台灣來說，中華民國是內部情感的公約數；對大陸來說，中華民國也不只是政治圖象，更包涵了歷史與文化的意義與情感。大陸應該從這個角度去正視這樣的情感。讓「中華民國」在兩岸論述的建構上、在習近平重視的中華民族偉大復興上，擁有更大的決定權、更多的參與權。

如果習近平願意迎納這樣的情感，朱立倫也應積極的把凸顯中華民國元素的兩岸一中做為九二共識的認知，並融入兩岸政策。

我們還不知道朱立倫對九二共識的態度是什麼？只要讓「中華民國」成為論述的指南針，朱立倫帶領國民黨，甚至帶領中華民國進入兩岸深水區，至少不會迷失方向。