The Vanishing Taiwan Relations Act

The Vanishing Taiwan Relations Act
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 6, 2015

Executive Summary: Mainland China is reinventing itself. The United States and Mainland China are engaged in a new tug of war. The value and strategic importance of Taiwan to the US has been diminished. US officials make little mention of the Taiwan Relations Act. That is certainly a matter of concern. But even more importantly, we must think about the next five years, 10 years, or even 20 years. Will the situation on Mainland China, the Asian-Pacific region, and the rest of the world change? Will Washington-Beijing relations change? What part will Taipei play in all this? The Republic of China's survival, development, and sovereignty will receive less and less US support. It must rely more on soft power and the flexible application of smart power. These are survival strategies we must consider, apart from the Taiwan Relations Act.

Full Text Below:

On April 10, 1979, US President Jimmy Carter signed the House and Senate approved "Taiwan Relations Act" (TRA). This important act pertaining to Washington-Taipei relations is now 36 years old. But recently high-ranking officials of the US have mentioned only the three joint communiques, and not the Taiwan Relations Act. Is the Taiwan Relations Act becoming less important to US policy? If it is, then the development is highly unfavorable to Taiwan.

Several months ago, during a Carnegie Endowment for International Peace seminar, US State Department Undersecretary for Political Affairs Wendy Sherman was asked about Taiwan. Sherman said the situation has changed. In the past, frequent mention of the Taiwan issue was a positive sign. Now however, the one China policy and the three communiques are the basis for stability and prosperity on Taiwan, and for stable relations with Mainland China.

Did we hear that right? If we did, then what happened to the Taiwan Relations Act? The US has long upheld the one China policy on the basis of "one act and three joint communiques." The one act is the Taiwan Relations Act. The three joint communiques are the Shanghai Communique, the U.S.-PRC Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations, and the U.S.-PRC Joint Communique on Arms Sales. To be complete, the Taiwan Relations Act should be mentioned along with the three joint communiques. A senior State Department official omitted mention of the Taiwan Relations Act. Was this purely a verbal omission? Or were there other implications? Coincidentally, in February, US State Department Assistant Secretary for Asian-Pacific Affairs Daniel Russell also said that the US is guided by the one-China policy, which consists of the three joint communiques. He too failed to mention the Taiwan Relations Act. Scripted statements repeated for decades now fail to mention the TRA. The US apparently does not care. This is something that warrants our attention.

The Taiwan Relations Act is a unique bit of legislation. It is US domestic law. Yet it regulates US relations with a foreign nation, the Republic of China. When Taipei and Washington severed diplomatic relations, both the White House and Congress hoped to establish a legal basis and a policy framework for continued relations with Taipei. Whenever Beijing accused Washington of not adhering to the U.S.-PRC Joint Communique on Arms Sales, and for not reducing arms sales to Taipei, Washington would cite the Taiwan Relations Act, since it stipulated that Washington would provide defensive weapons to Taipei.

In recent years however, there have been no major US arms sales to Taipei. This may be the reason US officials have forgotten to mention the Taiwan Relations Act in their recent statements. But frequent verbal omissions often reflect a change of heart. In 2009, US President Barack Obama failed to mention the Taiwan Relations Act during visits to the Chinese mainland. This has led to anxiety on Taiwan. Now US officials routinely fail to mention the Taiwan Relations Act. That probably means that Taiwan is being increasingly marginalized.

In fact, if we broaden our perspective, the strategic scenario between Washington and Beijing is undergoing major adjustments. These are merely the initial stages. Mainland China has mostly followed Deng Xiaoping's principle of keeping a low profile. But ever since Xi Jinping became president, it has become much more assertive in the international community. It has begun to make fundamental challenges to the old order.

Most attention-grabbing is the Beijing's hardline stance on sovereignty in territorial disputes. When Japan and Mainland China established diplomatic relations, they shelved their dispute over the Diaoyutai Islands. Mainland China has begun to patrol the territory, and announced the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone. Its moves in the South China Sea have been even more high profile. Mainland China has increased its territorial claims around occupied islands. It has already increased the area around Yong Shu Reef to 0.9 square kilometers. As a result, the Republic of China's Taiping Island is no longer the largest island in the Nansha Archipelago. This is unprecedented in international politics, but has many benefits. One. It clearly proclaims sovereignty. Two. It increases the number of military bases, and expands the scope of naval and air force power projection. Three. It facilitates future ocean and seabed resource development.

The Philippines and other South China Sea region nations have protested. The United States has dismissed this a "great wall of sand". But the reality is that no one can do anything about Beijing's actions. Everyone can only look on idly as the South China Sea strategic map is rewritten.

Mainland China is no longer what it once was. It is using both the carrot and the stick to redefine itself in the international arena. The US is unable to cope with this new reality. It is accustomed to thinking in terms of containment. Take the AIIB for example. The US continues to use the World Bank and other agencies to keep Mainland China down. From the very beginning, it attempted to block the AIIB. Who knew that other countries would see the situation more clearly, and express their desire to join, even America's closest ally Britain. Mainland China's rise is obvious. It has become a regional power. The US is unable to prevent or reverse this trend. Eventually it must compromise, and adapt to this new Asian-Pacific scenario. It must rethink its strategic policy and establish a new cooperative relationship with Mainland China.

Mainland China is reinventing itself. The United States and Mainland China are engaged in a new tug of war. The value and strategic importance of Taiwan to the US has been diminished. US officials make little mention of the Taiwan Relations Act. That is certainly a matter of concern. But even more importantly, we must think about the next five years, 10 years, or even 20 years. Will the situation on Mainland China, the Asian-Pacific region, and the rest of the world change? Will Washington-Beijing relations change? What part will Taipei play in all this? The Republic of China's survival, development, and sovereignty will receive less and less US support. It must rely more on soft power and the flexible application of smart power. These are survival strategies we must consider, apart from the Taiwan Relations Act.


社論－消失中的台灣關係法
2015年04月06日 04:10

1979年4月10日，當時的美國總統卡特簽署了參眾兩院通過的《台灣關係法》（Taiwan Relations Act, TRA），這項規範美台關係的重要法案，至今即將邁入第36個年頭。但最近美方高層在論述對台政策時，卻只提三公報，不提《台灣關係法》，如果《台灣關係法》在美國的政策思維中漸漸退位，那對台灣而言，絕對大大不妙了。

月前華府智庫「卡內基國際和平基金會」研討會裡，美國國務院主管政治事務次卿薛曼被問到台灣問題時說，台灣不像過去常被提出來討論是好現象，這說明台灣的穩定繁榮及與中國大陸關係堅實，代表一個中國和美中三項公報的概念變成了標準。

咦？《台灣關係法》哪裡去了？美國向來秉持的「一個中國政策」，其基礎是「一法三公報」─《台灣關係法》、上海公報、美中建交公報、817公報，所以三公報之外還要加上《台灣關係法》才算完整。國務院資深官員漏講《台灣關係法》，究竟只是單純的口語疏漏，還是另有意涵？無獨有偶，2月間，國務院亞太助卿羅素在談到美台關係時，同樣表示是由美中三公報等構成的一個中國政策所指導，《台灣關係法》也被漏掉了。照本宣科了幾十年的東西，如今總是「三缺一」，而且美方似乎不以為意，這就很值得我們在意了。

《台灣關係法》是一項非常獨特的法案，它是美國的國內法，規範的卻是美國與某個外國（台灣）的關係，這是因為台美斷交後，美國府會都希望為雙方關係建立一個法律基礎與政策綱要。而當中方指責美方沒有遵循817公報逐年減少對台軍售時，美方也總抬出《台灣關係法》作為理由，因為該法明定美國要提供防衛性武器給台灣。

不過近年來美國沒有重大對台軍售項目，也許因為久未提及，美方官員表述時忘了要講《台灣關係法》，但口頭上經常性的遺漏，往往也反映了在心頭上的退位。2009年美國總統歐巴馬訪中時沒提《台灣關係法》，就令台灣大感焦慮，如今美方官員依舊經常性地遺忘《台灣關係法》，恐怕反映的，是決策思維上愈來愈把台灣放在邊緣位置。

其實，拉開視野看，美中之間的戰略態勢正在進行重大調整，現在只是在初始階段而已。中國過去的崛起之勢基本上仍遵循鄧小平韜光養晦的路線，但自從習近平擔任國家主席後，中國大陸在國際社會的舉止明顯益趨強勢，並且開始對舊有秩序作根本性的重寫。

最受矚目的，是對周邊主權爭議地區強硬劃定勢力版圖。例如對日中自建交以來即擱置爭議的釣魚台，中方開始頻繁巡航，並且宣布劃設東海防空識別區。在南海的動作更大，中方積極填海造地擴大占有小島的面積，永暑礁已經被增加到0.9平方公里，我國的太平島因而不再是南沙群島第一大島。這在國際政治史上可謂空前創舉，而且有多重效益。一來能夠極度鮮明地宣示主權地位；二來增加軍事據點，擴大海空軍武力投射範圍；三來有助未來海洋、海底資源開發的經濟收益。

菲律賓等南海諸國雖然抗議，美方雖然指責其為「沙土長城」，但現實是，沒有人能奈中方何，大家只能眼睜睜看著南海權力地圖一天天被改寫。

中國大陸確實和以前不一樣了，而當中國軟硬兼施重新在國際舞台上界定自己時，美國卻還沒能對新的現實思考出有足夠前瞻性的因應策略，仍習於過去圍堵式的思維。例如對亞投行，美方延續在世銀等機構壓制中國的政策，一開始也試圖阻擋，不料其他國家情勢看得比較清楚，紛紛表態加入，包括美國最親密的盟友英國。但中國的崛起態勢明確，已成區域強權，美方既無力攔阻或扭轉，終究要對亞太勢力版圖的調整作出妥協，重新思考一套戰略方針，建立能與中國積極交往合作的新關係。

在中國重塑自我、美中拉鋸新關係的過程當中，台灣對美國的政策價值與戰略意義都會受到影響。對台灣而言，美國官員少提《台灣關係法》固然值得警覺，但更重要的，是我們必須思考未來5年、10年乃至20年後，中國、亞太及國際局勢會有什麼變化，美中關係又會如何，而台灣要怎麼在其中開創自己的位置。未來台灣的生存發展與主權地位，能依賴美國作槓桿操作的空間會愈來愈少，必須更厚植軟實力，靈活運用巧實力。這是我們在《台灣關係法》之外，更必須慎重思考的生存課題。