Cross-Strait Relations: From Reunification vs. Independence to Coopetition

Cross-Strait Relations: From Reunification vs. Independence to Coopetition
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 17, 2015

Executive Summary: Hung Hsiu-chu said "I am not pro-unification, I am pro-truth!" She said "We are champions of the Republic of China faction. There is nothing else to champion!" Her blunt remarks highlight a major change in cross-Strait thinking. Cross-Strait relations have changed, from reunification vs. independence, to coopetition.

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Hung Hsiu-chu said "I am not pro-unification, I am pro-truth!" She said "We are champions of the Republic of China faction. There is nothing else to champion!" Her blunt remarks highlight a major change in cross-Strait thinking. Cross-Strait relations have changed, from reunification vs. independence, to coopetition.

Cross-Strait relations over the past six decades, fall into three stages. Stage One. "Liberate Taiwan" vs. "Retake the Mainland" reunification by military means. Stage Two. Peaceful reunification. "The Three Peoples Principles will reunify China". Stage Three. The provisions in the preamble to the Constitution of the Republic of China. "For the sake of national unity" the Ma government champions "one China, different interpretations" and "no [immediate] reunification, no Taiwan independence, and no use of force". The Beijing government champions "fair and reasonable arrangements for cross-Strait political relations under special circumstances in which the nation has yet to be reunified". It champions the 1992 consensus and "seeking common ground while shelving differences". Both sides realize that reunification in the short term is extremely difficult. They know that talk about reunification is premature. Most people, realize that reunification is not yet feasible, and instead emphasize peaceful development. Since 2008, the two sides have signed 21 agreements. Hung Hsiu-chu's remarks show that cross-Strait relations have evolved from reunification vs. independence to coopetition. Reunification vs. independence is goal oriented. Coopetition is process oriented.

In fact, Taiwan's political spectrum now includes only champions of Taiwan independence and champions of the Republic of China. The DPP clings to its Taiwan Independence Party Platform. Champions of reunification do not of course advocate unconditional reunification under the People's Republic of China. Few if any advocate that. Hung Hsiu-chu has ripped away the reunification label and replaced it with coopetition oriented thinking. The DPP, by contrast, has gone from advocating the Taiwan Independence Party Platform, to the Resolution on Taiwan's Future, to the Five Noes, to One Country on Each Side, to a Constitutional Consensus, to freezing the Taiwan Independence Party Platform. It has flip-flopped repeatedly, again and again. Tsai Ing-wen now assures us that she "affirms the constitutional framework of the Republic of China". She is flip-flopping between championing Taiwan independence and forsaking Taiwan independence

Tsai Ing-wen may "affirm the constitutional framework of the Republic of China" on the eve of the DPP's return to power. She knows she must choose between the constitutional framework of the Republic of China and the Taiwan Independence Party Platform. She knows she must choose between becoming a "traitor to Taiwan independence" and a "sinner against Taiwan". In other words, the DPP and Tsai Ing-wen are wondering whether their cross-Strait policy should move toward reunification vs. independence or coopetition.

Interestingly enough, Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP have less latitude in their cross-Strait policy advocacy than Hung Hsiu-chu and the Kuomintang. Hung Hsiu-chu can say "I am not a champion of reunification, I am champion of the truth". But Tsai Ing-wen cannot say "I am not a champion of Taiwan independence. I am a champion ofthe truth". Hung Hsiu-chu can say "I am a champion of the Republic of China". Can Tsai Ing-wen do the same? 

Due to strategic concerns, Beijing is not about to forsake the one China framework. Therefore it is not about to forsake reunification. Taipei, also due to strategic thinking, is not about to forsake the one China Constitution. It is not about to challenge the Mainland's rationale concerning "the nation's needs prior to reunification". Both sides know that reunification is not feasible in the short term. They must cope with serious problems prior to eventual reunification. They must conduct political relations under special circumstances. Therefore a shift from reunification vs. independence thinking towards coopetition oriented thinking is in the interest of both sides.

Assuming a framework of coopetition, just what are "fair and reasonable arrangements for cross-Strait political relations under special circumstances in which the nation has yet to be reunified"? We must concede that the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China both exist and are separately ruled. These special circumstances must be acknowledged before reasonable arrangements can be made. Therefore when Hung Hsiu-chu speaks of "championing the Republic of China" this must not be construed as a unilateral vision of the KMT. As Beijing itself has noted, without the Republic of China it cannot stabilize cross-Strait political relations under special circumstances in which the nation has yet to be reunified". Finally, for the DPP, the disappearance of the ROC would mean Taiwan's decline. Therefore the blue, green, and red camps must all champion the Republic of China. They must change from reunification vs. independence thinking, to coopetition oriented thinking.

We hope the 2016 election will be a milestone in cross-Strait relations. We hope reunification vs. independence thinking will become coopetition oriented thinking. Hung Hsiu-chu will of course advance this line of thinking. The key plank in her election campaign after all, is "Champion the Republic of China". Beijing also knows that the Republic of China is essential to cross-Strait relations, and that therefore it must eliminate Taiwan independence before attempting to promote Chinese reunification.

The DPP now finds itself in a worrisome situation. Tsai Ing-wen has one foot in the constitutional framework of the ROC, and the other in the Taiwan independence party platform. As such, she can neither confirm that she is a champion of Chinese reunification, nor deny that she is a champion of Taiwan independence. She cannot say that she is a champion of the Republic of China. She is the only candidate still mired in reunification vs. independence controversy. As such, how can she possibly lead the two sides toward a coopetition oriented relationship?

Reunification is a difficult long range goal. We cannot afford just to talk about it. We must instead manage cross-Strait political relations under special circumstances in which the nation has yet to be reunified. In other words, the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China must enjoy a coopetition oriented relationship under a big roof concept of China.

兩岸關係：由統獨到競合

2015-06-17聯合報

洪秀柱說：「我不是統派，是正派！」「我們只有中華民國派，沒有其他派！」這兩句大白話，點出了兩岸思維的重大變遷，亦即：兩岸關係已經從「統獨關係」，演化為「競合關係」。

六十餘年來，兩岸關係的遞嬗變遷可分三階段：一、「解放台灣」、「反攻大陸」的軍事統一論。二、轉化至「和平統一」、「三民主義統一中國」的和平統一論。三、如今再演化至中華民國憲法增修條文序文的「為因應國家統一前之需要」、馬政府的「一中各表」與「不統／不獨／不武」，及北京的「探討國家尚未統一特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係，作出合情合理的安排」與「九二共識／求同存異」；至此，「統一」的高難度已是兩岸共識，兩岸皆知不能空論統一，因而對「未能統一的特殊情況」之經營轉為主流意識，開始強調「和平發展」，遂有二○○八年以來二十一個協議。洪秀柱的語言，正是點出了兩岸關係由統獨論述轉向競合思維的大趨勢。統獨是目的論，競合則是過程論。

其實，在台灣的政治光譜上，如今只有「獨派」和「中華民國派」，因為民進黨仍保留《台獨黨綱》，但若說「統派」是指「無條件統一於中華人民共和國之下」，恐怕就找不到幾個「統派」了。洪秀柱撕掉「統派」的標籤，將兩岸思維由統獨關係導向競合關係。而民進黨歷經《台獨黨綱》、《台灣前途決議文》、「四不一沒有」、「一邊一國」、「憲法共識」、「凍結台獨黨綱」，反反覆覆，到今日蔡英文又提「中華民國憲政體制推動論」，則是在「保獨／去獨」之間的來回擺盪。

蔡英文在民進黨可能重返執政前夕，提出「中華民國憲政推動論」，應是已經意識到，處此關鍵時刻，她必須在「憲政體制」與「台獨黨綱」之間作一抉擇，亦即必須在「台獨叛徒」與「台灣罪人」兩個角色之間作一抉擇。也就是說，民進黨與蔡英文此刻也在思考，如何將兩岸關係由統獨論述轉向競合關係。

但是，蔡英文及民進黨的兩岸政策腹地及縱深，似乎不如洪秀柱及國民黨。因為，洪秀柱可以說「我不是統派，我是正派」，但蔡英文卻不敢說「我不是獨派，我是正派」。洪秀柱可以說「我是中華民國派」，但蔡英文如何才能跟著說「我是中華民國派」？

基於戰略思維，北京不會放棄「一中框架」的思維，因此也就不會放棄「統一」的標誌；而台灣也因戰略思維，不能放棄「憲法一中」，不可挑戰「為因應國家統一前之需要」的憲法論述。但是，兩岸如今皆知不能「空論統一」，而必須正視如今「未能統一」的現實，認真經營這種「特殊情況下的政治關係」。因而，由統獨掛帥轉向競合思維，是符合兩岸共同利益的。

那麼，如何在競合思維下，對「國家尚未統一特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係，作出合情合理的安排」呢？即必須正視「中華民國與中華人民共和國並存分治」的「特殊情況」，始有可能「作出合情合理的安排」。所以，洪秀柱說「只有中華民國派」，這不應視為國民黨片面的戰略觀點；其實，就北京來說，若不能鞏固中華民國，如何能穩定「國家尚未統一特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係」？就民進黨來說，如果中華民國不保，台灣更將伊於胡底？因此，「中華民國」應當是藍綠紅三方最大的交集，亦是將兩岸關係由統獨轉向競合的主要憑藉。

我們期待，二○一六大選能成為兩岸關係由統獨轉向競合的重要節點。洪秀柱當然會持守此一論述，因為她的競選根基即在「中華民國要挺住（柱）」。北京亦深知「不能維持中華民國／即無可能維持兩岸關係」，因此也必然「去獨先於促統」。

如今令人擔憂的是民進黨的處境：蔡英文一腳踏上「中華民國憲政體制」，另一腳卻未能從「台獨黨綱」抽腿，處此情勢，她不能說「我不是統派」，也不能說「我不是獨派」，大概也不好意思說「我是中華民國派」。倘係如此，蔡英文由於不能說「不獨」，所以也失去了說「不統」的空間，她將成為唯一仍陷溺在統獨爭論的一方，又如何能將兩岸論述導向競合關係？

統一是高難度的遠程議題，不能空論統一，而應當認真經營「尚未統一特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係」，此即「中華民國與中華人民共和國在大屋頂中國下共存分治」的競合關係。