Thursday, October 29, 2015

Politics As Usual: KMT Retreats into the Past, DPP Builds Castles in the Air

Politics As Usual: KMT Retreats into the Past, DPP Builds Castles in the Air
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 30, 2015


Executive Summary: The KMT has yet again sought refuge in the past. For this, we feel sad. But if the Better Tomorrow promised by the Democratic Progressive Party fails to materialize, the disappointment will be even more unimaginable.

Full Text Below:

The KMT Central Standing Committee has amended the "Speaker Clause". It has custom tailored the clause to enable Wang Jin-pyng to remain a Legislator without Portfolio for Life. This comes on the heels of the KMT's forcible ousting of Hung Hsiu-chu as KMT presidential candidate, and her replacement with Eric Chu. The KMT has yet again bowed to electoral realpolitik. The move may have been necessary to avoid a debacle in the upcoming general election. But how did the KMT get itself into this mess in the first place? The answer is simple: party leadership myopia. All that these leaders see is the ground one foot in front of their feet. They fail to see the big picture. They fail to achieve a bird's eye perspective. The result is they constantly misjudge the situation, and are constantly forced to retreat.

Unforunately as of late, the KMT has been retreating into the past. Example One. Eric Chu announced in May that he would not run for president. Had he not done so, his election prospects would be vastly better than they are today. Party morale would be as well. Local party candidates would not be as tempted as they are to defect. The party would not be on the verge of a catastrophic rout. Alas, Eric Chu saw the light five months late. Only then did he step forward. By then he had already missed his window of opportunity. Even worse, he had to take heat for trampling the KMT's nomination process into the dust.

Example Two. Had Wang Jing-pyng announced his candidacy for the party's presidential primaries in May, he might have fulfilled his long-cherished dream of reaching the political summit. B-Lister Hung Hsiu-chu would not have felt compelled to step forward, only to be unceremoniously ousted and replaced. Wang missed his opportunity to run for president. He is eligible to run for legislator without porfolio. But the KMT custom tailored its rules just for him, provoking a backlash within the party. KMT morale has suffered. The party's chances in the legislative election have diminished. The likelihood that Wang Jin-pyng can reclaim his previous position as Speaker of the Legislature has also diminished. The deficits clearly outweigh any benefits.

Example Three. President Ma's power transfer was piecemeal. Had it been more comprehensive, the ruling party would have been bequeathed more substantial policy and personnel legacy. The nine in one election debacle last year might not have taken place. Eric Chu might not have felt compelled to seek a second term as New Taipei Mayor, to promise to remain for the full duration of his term. This year's party nomination fiasco might have been avoided. For eight years, the Ma government refused to groom its successors. Not one Ma administration official had the guts to defend adminstration policy. At election time however, they suddenly began running around like Chicken Little. The Ma administration's hiring practices made the above abundantly clear. Now Ma Ying-jeou cannot prevent Wang Jin-pyng from seeking to become a legislator without portfolio. Eric Chu has been relentlessly blasting Ma government policy. If not for selfishness yesterday, would KMT leaders be distancing themselves from each other today?

Go back five months. Opportunities and legitimacy were lost. Go back one year. Wang Jin-pyng could have run as legislator on his own. Go back eight years. Ma Ying-jeou refused to defend his own administration's policies. He backed down repeatedly. As a result of inside and outside pressure, his eight year legacy may be lost. For the KMT, this is a tragedy. It ruled for eight years. It endured bitter struggles. Alas it lacked the political finesse required to fulfill its ideals. In the end, the only thing it could do, was to bow before harsh reality.

Consider the matter from another angle. The KMT sees retreating to the past a necessary compromise to cope with current realities. It may be right. Perhaps this is only way it can start over again. But the KMT must learn from past mistakes. It must consider long-term growth and the big picture, not merely selfish interest and short term advantage. Otherwise, even if the party wins, the people will lose. Tsai Ing-wen's current campaign is a cakewalk, thanks to the KMT's internal disarray. Without firing a shot, the DPP has gained the upper hand. Many blue camp supporters are still obssessing over the Ma vs. Wang power struggle. They are fighting over nothing.

The KMT has repeatedly retreated into the past. But one must also be wary of the other extreme, the DPP's perennial and imaginary "Better Tomorrow". 

The Democratic Progressive Party has changed its leader. It is now led by Tsai Ing-wen. The party is currently the beneficiary of a favorable political climate. But otherwise, it is almost exactly the same as it was eight years ago. The green camp has undergone no fundamental change in thinking or rhetoric over the past eight years. It has not conducted an analysis of Taiwan's current plight. It has not offered any solutions to Taiwan's current problems. Taiwan continues to wander down blind alleys. It continues to run into the same political and economic obstacles. Expecting a new ruling party to suddenly see the light, is far too optimistic.

Promising a Better Tomorrow is easy. The Democratic Progressive Party's election prospects are bright.  This is primarily the work of Hong Chung-chiu, the Sunflower Student Movement, opponents of the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant, and opponents to history curriculum revision. Successive political movements have induced the younger generation to hate China, to hate Ma, and become pro-green. They brim over with "love for Taiwan". But their narrow-minded emotionalism will not help Taiwan. Tsai Ing-wen has cites a list of concerns. They include cross-Strait relations, industrial restructuring, pension reform, housing and social justice, care for the underprivileged, an aging population, and joining the TPP. But has anyone heard a considered solution? Criticising the ruling KMT is easy. But offering effective remedies is difficult. It requires know how. Absent any debate, we see no evidence of such wisdom inside the DPP.

The KMT has yet again sought refuge in the past. For this, we feel sad. But if the Better Tomorrow promised by the Democratic Progressive Party fails to materialize, the disappointment will be even more unimaginable.

國民黨一再退回昨天 民進黨持續虛構明天
2015-10-30 聯合報

國民黨中常會鬆綁「議長條款」,為王金平量身打造續任不分區立委的資格;繼「抽柱換朱」之後,這是國民黨再度為選舉向現實低頭。儘管這是為了避免大選崩盤不得不為之舉措,但國民黨若細思自己何以走到這種欲進不前的地步,最主要原因,是黨內領導人都只看著自己腳尖前方一尺之地,卻忘了從高處著眼縱觀大局;其結果就是誤判形勢,只能被逼得不斷往後倒退。

說來可悲,但國民黨最近走的路、轉的彎,一直是在「退回昨天」。例如:其一,如果朱立倫五月底不宣布棄選總統,他今天的聲勢一定大為不同,黨內的士氣必然更旺,地方也不致頻遭挖角,而兵敗如山倒。但是,他卻錯過了五個月的時間才想清楚這點,重披戰袍後,還要承受破壞初選程序的不名譽指摘,最佳時機早已失去。

其二,如果王金平五月宣布參加黨內總統初選,他至少有機會一試他嚮往多時的「登孤峰」滋味,不致弄到洪秀柱以二軍上陣卻又遭強換的窘境。而如今王金平錯失參選總統的機會,雖獲不分區立委之禮遇,但國民黨臨陣為他修改規章,也引發反彈。且國民黨的士氣經此摧折,立委選情大受影響,王金平重回國會議長寶座的機率大降,終究得不償失。

其三,馬總統的交班布局如果周全,在政策上和人事上都應留給執政黨更多可以運用的餘裕及政績遺產;如此,或不致發生去年底九合一選舉的慘敗,也不致發生朱立倫去年被迫再參選新北市長,並許下「做滿」之承諾,導致今年猶豫難決。包括馬政府八年未能妥善培養人才,內部一片怯戰,以致四處選情告急;馬政府用人偏好的缺失,至此一目了然。如今,馬英九非僅擋不住王金平續任不分區立委,朱立倫近日連續開砲批評馬政府政策;如果沒有先前的各自為政,怎麼會有今天的強行切割?

退回五個月前的朱立倫,喪失了先機和正當性;退回一年前的王金平,可能由議長變成光桿立委;而倒回昨日的馬英九,則一讓再讓,只剩下內外迫促的逼人情勢,八年政績可能不保。這是國民黨的莫大悲哀,執政八年多少苦心孤詣,卻缺乏相稱的政治手腕來鞏固自己的理想,到頭來卻只能向現實俯首稱臣。

換一個角度看,如果「回到昨天」是國民黨面對生存現實的必要妥協,那麼就算是必須倒退,恐怕也不能不為,唯有如此才能重新出發。關鍵是,國民黨必須從這樣的盲動中學到教訓:政黨的發展必須要有長遠的大局觀照,不能只從一己的利害出發,或僅從眼前的得失盤算;否則徒然大權在握,卻已民心盡失。蔡英文此役能打得如此輕鬆,全是拜國民黨酣於內鬥、自亂陣腳所賜,不費一兵一卒即取得上風。在這種情況,許多藍軍支持者還在為「馬王之爭」的結局惆悵,純屬徒勞。

在慨嘆國民黨一再「退回昨日」的同時,人們必須警惕的是,在另一端,卻是不斷虛構「明天會更好」的民進黨。與八年前相比,今天的民進黨,除了主帥換成蔡英文、側翼增添了「時代力量」之外,核心骨幹幾乎仍然是同一批兵馬。八年來,人們不曾聽聞綠營的思維或論述有什麼根本的修正或調整,也未見他們對台灣今天的處境作出多少深刻的分析,更未見其提出獨到之解方。在這種情況下,要說台灣不斷走入窄巷的政經困境,會因為政黨輪替就豁然開朗,恐怕太過樂觀。

明天的美景是很容易虛構的。民進黨這次大選形勢看漲,主要是洪仲丘、太陽花、反核四、反課綱等幾波運動所推促而成,年輕世代因為反中、反馬,轉而湧向「挺綠」。其中,固然洋溢著「愛台」的熱情,卻可能因過度褊狹與流於情緒,未必能獲致「利台」之果。事實上,不論是兩岸關係、產業轉型、年金改革、居住正義、弱勢照護、乃至人口老化或加入TPP等大小問題,蔡英文提出的政見固然長篇累牘,但仔細分析,人們又何曾聽到茅塞頓開或一針見血的解決之道?原因無他,譴責執政黨易如反掌,但要拿出比對方厲害的仙丹,卻得要有一身本事才行;至少,未經辯論的大選,我們看不出民進黨高明何在。

今天,我們為國民黨一再退回昨天而感到憂傷;但明天台灣如果走不進民進黨虛構的未來,那樣的失望恐怕就難以想像。


Wednesday, October 28, 2015

Shouldn't Tsai Ing-wen Make Her Position Crystal Clear?

Shouldn't Tsai Ing-wen Make Her Position Crystal Clear?
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 29, 2015


Executive Summary: KMT Chairman Eric Chu's presidential campaign is now having a coat tails effect. Sure enough, it is putting pressure on the DPP. For the past few days, Tsai Ing-wen has been blasting the KMT. She has been playing the "confrontation card" and the "intimidation card". She insists she has been waging a hard fought campaign. KMT President Ma Ying-jeou's cross-Strait policy is back on course. This forces Tsai Ing-wen to turn to diehard Taiwan independence elements for support. It helps the KMT stake out the "vital center". It forces Hung Shiu-chu supporters to turn to Eric Chu to ensure victory.

Full Text Below:

KMT Chairman Eric Chu's presidential campaign is now having a coat tails effect. Sure enough, it is putting pressure on the DPP. For the past few days, Tsai Ing-wen has been blasting the KMT. She has been playing the "confrontation card" and the "intimidation card". She insists she has been waging a hard fought campaign. KMT President Ma Ying-jeou's cross-Strait policy is back on course. This forces Tsai Ing-wen to turn to diehard Taiwan independence elements for support. It helps the KMT stake out the "vital center". It forces Hung Shiu-chu supporters to turn to Eric Chu to ensure victory.

This KMT strategy is an open secret. Tsai Ing-wen may criticize the KMT. But she must first explain her own about face on cross-Strait relations. She must present her vision for the future. She must win public trust and voter support. She must persuade voters to accept her leadership for the next four years. Tsai Ing-wen, after all, was the author of the "two states theory". Now she suddenly wants to "maintain the status quo"? Tsai dismissed the Republic of China as a "government in exile". Now she is suddenly eager to defend the “ROC constitutional framework"? For seven long years she refused to attend National Day ceremonies. Tsai Ing-wen refuses to recognize the 1992 consensus. She refuses to disown the Taiwan independence party platform. Yet she suddenly identifies with the "Republic of China"? That is quite a leap! Especially when one compares it to her stance on national identity pre-Sunflower Student Movement. We are looking at two people here.

This is why so few people buy Tsai Ing-wen's Road to Damascus conversion, and maintain a wait and see attitude. Up to 70% of the public thinks Tsai Ing-wen will win the presidential election. Yet only 40% to 45% say they will vote for her. Their skepticism is well warranted. During Chen Shui-bian's 2000 presidential campaign and early presidency, he appeared rational and flexible. Tsai Ing-wen comes across the same way today. But once she consolidates her power, internal and external pressures will gradually lead to a loss of restraint.

In 2000 Taiwan underwent its first ruling party change. During his inauguration, Chen Shui-bian announced his "five noes" policy, which entailed no declaration of independence, no new name for the nation, no inclusion of the two-states theory into the constitution, no referendum to change the status quo vis a vis reunification vs. independence, and no repeal of the National Unification Guidelines or the National Unification Council. The "five noes" reassured all parties. Then Taipei Mayor Ma Ying-jeou affirmed Chen's pledge and called it "sober". Ma said "The CCP will have trouble finding fault with it". Chen Shui-bian won the United States' trust. Even the Mainland agreed to a Cold Peace, during which it would "listen to what he said and look at what he did".

But the Cold Peace lasted only two years. In August 2002, Chen Shui-bian trotted out his "one nation on each side" policy. This left both the Mainland and the United States hopping mad. They felt Chen unilaterally reneged on the five noes. Tsai Ing-wen even had to rush to the US to extinguish fires. But "one nation on each side" was no off-key interlude. It gradually become Chen Shui-bian's main them during the remainder of his term. In 2003, Chen Shui-bian proposed that "Taiwan give birth to a new constitution in 2006". He continued to probe the limits of the "five noes". in 2006 the National Unification Council "ceased operations", directly repudiating Chen's pledge "no abolition of the National Unification Council and National Unification Guidelines".

Because Chen repudiated his pledges, cross-Strait relations went from Cold Peace to Cold War, and eventually to the brink of Hot War. The two sides found themselves in a state of tension. The United States, a long-term ally of Taiwan, lost all patience with Chen's repeated perfidy. Taipei-Washington relations reached the freezing point.

Tsai Ing-wen is attempting to turn perceptions around. But given Chen's precedent, there is little wonder suspicions run deep. Besides, Tsai Ing-wen was a cross-Strait policy hawk during the Chen administration. Consider the 1992 consensus. When Chen won in 2000, the DPP had two opportunities to recognize the 1992 consensus. The first was in June 2000. Chen Shui-bian met with foreign guests and expressed his willingness to accept "one China, different interpretations". But the very next day, Chen's subordinate Tsai Ing-wen shamed him into reversing himself. Lee Yuan-tse's endorsement helped Chen Shui-bian win the presidency. In October that year, Lee attended a "cross-party group" and presented his recommendations. He told Chen that in 1992, the two cross-Strait associations did in fact reach a consensus on "one China, different interpretations", Lee said that "This is a fact". But Tsai Ing-wen disagreed, vehemently. She said there is no such thing as the 1992 consensus, that it did not exist, and dismissed Lee Yuan-tse's observation as "merely his own opinion."

Tsai Ing-wen's hard line stand was a serious mistake. It prevented Chen Shui-bian from increasing cross-Strait trust. It even undermines Tsai Ing-wen today. Had the DPP accepted the 1992 consensus, Tsai Ing-wen would not be in her current dilemma. She would not be searching in vain for face-saving measures. Consequently, if Tsai Ing-wen wins the election, her top priority must be avoiding the cross-Strait policy mistakes of the Chen era. The power imbalance between the two sides is far greater today than it was in 2000 under Chen. The strategic picture in East Asia and around the world is far more complex today than it was in 2000 as well. Chen still held a number of "Cold War" chips back then. Today, Taiwan cannot even survive a Cold War. One can safely predict that Tsai Ing-wen will face challenges far more daunting than Chen Shui-bian's worst crises .

We have three hopes. Hope One. Tsai Ying-wen's recent "conversion" must be genuine, not phony. For the nation as a whole and for the sake of Taiwan, we hope Tsai Ing-wen's belated embrace of the Republic of China is sincere. We hope it is not mere show intended to deceive. If it is mere show, then even if she wins the election, she will fail in the end. Hope Two. Tsai Ing-wen's course correction is right, but still incomplete. She must face the issue squarely, and state her position clearly. Hope Three. She must follow up on Hope Two. In 2000, when she refused to recognize the 1992 consensus, she committed the same mistake twice. In 2016 she can correct that mistake. Without the 1992 consensus, there can be no status quo. Nearly everyone concerned with cross-strait relations knows this. In the face of public skepticism, shouldn't Tsai Ing-wen make her position crystal clear?

蔡英文難道不應該說清楚嗎
20151029 中國時報

國民黨換柱由朱立倫主席帶領小雞打選戰,果然對民進黨選情產生壓力,蔡英文連日高調批評國民黨打「對立牌」、「恐嚇牌」,說自己選得很辛苦。當然,我們不能否認,國民黨兩岸政策重新回到馬英九穩健路線後,正試圖把蔡英文推擠回「傾獨板塊」,搶占社會「主流立場」板塊,然後逼迫洪秀柱路線支持者含淚投票,以創造勝選最大可能性。

不能否認這是國民黨的「陽謀」,但蔡英文在批評國民黨前,也該說清楚自己對兩岸關係的轉變過程、未來願景,才能取得民眾的信賴,心甘情願投下一票,接受她來領導台灣未來4年的命運。畢竟蔡英文從「兩國論」起草人到「維持現狀」倡議人;從指稱中華民國是「流亡政府」到宣稱接受「中華民國憲政體制」;7年不參加國慶大典到選前參加。現在的蔡英文除了「九二共識」還堅持不接受、「台獨黨綱」還堅持不放棄外,在國家認同上,已向「中華民國」公約數修正。這個轉變太過跳躍,尤其與太陽花運動前後她的國家論述比對,更是判若二人。

這就是社會對蔡英文的轉變,抱持不信任與觀望態度的人仍然不少的緣故。蔡英文總統大選的看好度高居7成,支持度卻始終在4成到45徘徊。社會的疑慮不是沒有道理,2000年陳水扁在競選期間及初任總統時展現的理性與彈性,和今天的蔡英文極為相似,但隨著權力的穩固與內政和外部壓力升高卻逐漸失控。

2000年台灣第一次政黨輪替,陳水扁就職時發表「四不一沒有」:不宣布獨立、不更改國號、不推動兩國論入憲、不推動改變現狀的統獨公投,以及沒有廢除國統綱領與國統會的問題。「四不一沒有」提出後,各方都鬆了一口氣,當時擔任台北市長的馬英九,也以「演說平穩,中共難挑毛病」加以肯定,陳水扁取得美國的信任,也獲得了大陸「聽其言、觀其行」的冷和空間。

然而,冷和局面才2年就被打破,20028月陳水扁提出「一邊一國」,讓大陸與美國跳腳,咸認為這是片面毀棄「四不一沒有」,蔡英文還為此銜命去美國滅火。但「一邊一國」不是走調的插曲,卻漸漸成為陳水扁剩餘任期的主旋律。2003陳水扁提出「2006年催生台灣新憲法」,繼續在「四不」承諾上打擦邊球;2006年則將國統會「終止運作」,直接毀棄「沒有廢除國統綱領與國統會的問題」的一沒有。

也因為陳水扁毀諾,兩岸關係從冷和走向冷鬥,再升溫至熱鬥邊緣,讓兩岸處在高度的緊繃狀態,而台灣長期的盟友美國,也對陳水扁的反覆無信失去耐心,台美關係降到冰點。

陳水扁劇本在前,蔡英文嘗試轉彎的作為,不免遭到懷疑。更何況,在陳水扁執政時,蔡英文一直在兩岸政策上扮演強硬的鷹派角色。以九二共識的接受為例,2000年陳水扁剛勝選時,民進黨曾二次有機會接受九二共識,一次是20006月陳水扁在接見外賓時表示,他願意接受「一個中國,各自表述」,但第二天,就被下屬蔡英文打臉否認;同年10月,以「向上提升」名言把陳水扁推上總統大位的李遠哲不放棄,又在「跨黨派小組」向陳水扁獻議,直指兩岸兩會在1992年確有「一中各表」共識,「這是歷史事實」。李遠哲的提議,又再被蔡英文強勢否定,重申九二共識不存在,並直指那是李遠哲的「個人意見」。

蔡英文當時的強硬,是非常嚴重的歷史錯誤,害了當時的陳水扁無法提升兩岸互信,也害了現在的蔡英文,如果當時民進黨即能接受九二共識,就不會有今天蔡英文在九二共識問題上苦尋不著台階可下的窘境。也因此,蔡英文若能勝選,最重要的課題就是,如何避免重蹈陳水扁執政時的兩岸覆轍?特別是,今天兩岸實力較2000年陳水扁時更不均衡,東亞乃至全球的戰略情勢也較2000年時更為複雜。陳水扁執政時的台灣,還握有一定的「冷和」籌碼,現在的台灣則連維持冷和的能力恐怕都不具,可預見的,執政的蔡英文將面對比陳水扁還更艱鉅的危機考驗。

我們有3個希望。第一,蔡英文目前的修正必須是「真實」而非「虛假」的,為國家大局、為台灣利益計,希望蔡英文擁抱中華民國是發乎真心的真改變,因為若這是一場假戲,就算蔡英文可以贏得一時的選舉勝利,也將註定以失敗的執政收場。第二,蔡英文目前的修正方向是「正確」的,卻還不「到位」,必須更正面具體提出主張。第三是第二的延伸,在2000年二度犯下否定九二共識的歷史錯誤的蔡英文,2016年將是她修正這個歷史錯誤的契機。沒有九二共識,就沒有現狀,這幾乎是所有關心兩岸者的共識。面對社會疑慮,蔡英文難道不應該說清楚嗎?


Tuesday, October 27, 2015

As Beijing and Washington Wrestle in the South China Sea, Taipei Must Uphold the ROC Constitution

As Beijing and Washington Wrestle in the South China Sea, Taipei Must Uphold the ROC Constitution
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 28, 2015


Executive Summary: Storm clouds have again gathered over the South China Sea. The US guided missile destroyer Lassen defied stern warnings from Beijing, and sailed within 12 nautical miles of reefs belonging to China. Washington was determined to show that it does not recognize China's sovereignty over islands and reefs in the South China Sea. Yesterday evening Mainland Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Zhang Yesui summoned US Ambassador Max Baucus, and made solemn representations and protests. US military action has escalated, turning Washington's East Asian rebalancing strategy into a confrontation with Mainland China. That confrontation has now reached the breaking point. The repercussions will be felt all across Southeast Asia, even in Taipei.

Full Text Below:

Storm clouds have again gathered over the South China Sea. The US guided missile destroyer Lassen defied stern warnings from Beijing, and sailed within 12 nautical miles of reefs belonging to China. Washington was determined to show that it does not recognize China's sovereignty over islands and reefs in the South China Sea. Yesterday evening Mainland Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Zhang Yesui summoned US Ambassador Max Baucus, and made solemn representations and protests. US military action has escalated, turning Washington's East Asian rebalancing strategy into a confrontation with Mainland China. That confrontation has now reached the breaking point. The repercussions will be felt all across Southeast Asia, even in Taipei.

On closer examination however, the United States action was highly calculated. The Mainland has expressed solemn objections. But it must be cautious about follow-up actions and long-term countermeasures. Beijing seeks to make the Mainland an “affluent society” by 2020. Taipei is caught between two giants. It must respond to this new situation with care.

Beijing has reclaimed land on seven islands or reefs in the South China Sea. Washington chose to sail past "low-tide elevation" reefs that only appear at low tide. According to international law, one may not claim rights over such reefs. Washington chose to sail past low-tide elevation reefs. Its action was relatively restrained. Therefore Beijing should avoid unnecessarily raising tensions.

Taipei must exercise caution regarding these developments in the South China Sea. The current government or whatever government emerges next year must avoid being dragged into the conflict, lest the national interest be damaged.

The clash between Washington and Beijing over the South China Seas puts Taipei in an difficult position. From the perspective of history, culture, and descent, Taipei obviously ought to stand on the side of Beijing. But from the perspective of current history and national security, its first choice should be Washington. Taipei faces changing circumstances and an uncertain situation. Rushing to choose sides will significantly undermine our interests, no matter which side we choose. Choosing between Beijing and Washington would immediately lead to the loss of strategic maneuvering room. The consequent damage to our interests would be incalculable.

The East Asian diplomatic community has a widely-told true story relating to the South China Sea. When Hillary Clinton was US Secretary of State, she wrestled with Beijing over the South China Sea issue. During a 2011 meeting in Southeast Asia, Clinton and then Mainland Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi exchanged fire. Clinton argued for freedom of navigation. Yang said nations from outside the region should refrain from making irresponsible remarks. According to participants, Clinton and Yang never made eye contact. The luncheon was a buffet with free seating. This enabled participants to talk with whomever they wished. Clinton and Yang were the first to seat themselves. Other foreign ministers were dumbfounded to find Clinton and Yang seated at opposite ends of a rectangular dining table, in strict accordance with diplomatic protocol.

The result was "seating by skin color". People with yellow skin sat on one side of the table. People from New Zealand and Australia, and other whites sat on Clinton's side of the table. Why? Geopolitics. "The Americans are very powerful right now. But will they one day suddenly get up and leave? We have to live here. We cannot get away." Truer words have never been spoken.

Nor can Taiwan get away. The best way to avoid choosing sides is to uphold the Republic of China Constitution. Upholding the Constitution is a comprehensive, not piecemeal, ad hoc approach. In 1947, when the Republic of China Constitution was implemented, we made our stand crystal clear. According to the Republic of China Constitution, the South China Sea territory is denoted by the U-shaped line. We call on all parties to reduce tensions and exercise restraint. We reiterate the South China Sea peace initiative.

When the Republic of China Constitution was implemented in 1947, the U-shaped line had already been announced.  It conformed with the principles and practices of international law in 1945, the year of the Truman Declaration. The U-shaped line claim is valid. The ROC Constitution has been effective with regards this proposition. Article IV of the Republic of China Constitution states that "the long held territory of the Republic of China cannot be changed without a resolution by the National Assembly". Since then, no resolutions pertaining to our national territory have been passed. On November 26, 1993, Constitutional Interpretation No. 328 explicitly defined the boundaries of our national territory, and stipulated that they may not be changed by means of a constitutional interpretation.

Therefore politicians must not make facile, myopic proposals. Not only is doing so unconstitutional, it also puts the nation in danger. We would also like to address the presidential candidates. They must declare their stand on this major issue, one that affects our national territory and national security. They must make clear how, based on our Constitution, Taipei can avoid conflict in the South China Sea and advance a peace strategy. The ROC is a disputant in the South China Sea imbroglio. As such it can play a positive role in international affairs, one far more meaningful than idle chatter about joining the United Nations.

中美南海角力 台灣應堅持憲法立場
20151028 中國時報

南海風雲再起,美軍飛彈驅逐艦拉森號在中國大陸強烈警告下,穿越大陸島礁十二海里線內水域,展現美國不承認中國大陸島礁主權的決心。大陸外交部副部長張業遂昨天傍晚召見美國大使包可士,提出嚴正交涉和強烈抗議。美國的軍事動作已讓東亞再平衡戰略與中國的對抗形勢,更接近了臨界點。影響所及,東南亞相關國家乃至我方都將受到波及。

不過,仔細觀之,美國此一行動其實是相當小心自制的選擇結果,大陸初步已表達嚴正的立場,但後續的行動與長期對策仍應仔細思考,務必以2020年達成中國基本小康社會為最高目標。而台灣在兩大之間難為小,面對中美新形勢必須格外小心應對。

中共在南海有7個擴建的島嶼/島礁;美方在這次的行動中,選擇穿越的島礁屬於「低潮高地」島礁;也就是在低潮時才出現在海平面上的島礁;這種島礁,在現行國際法上,其實原本就不能主張任何權利。美方選擇「低潮高地」島礁穿越,是相對自制的作法,北京也應避免緊張再無端升高。

但就我們而言,面對此一南海形勢的新發展,無論是現任政府乃至明年將會出現的下一任政府,在此事上都必須審慎將事;以免遭無端捲入,平白導致國家利益受損。

在南海議題美國與中共的衝撞上,毫無疑問,台灣的處境是最尷尬的。就歷史、文化、血緣來看,台灣無疑是應站在大陸的一邊;但若就當代史乃至階段性國家安全而言,首選應該是美國。然若就台灣所面臨的現狀,在情勢多變且不確定的狀況下,一旦貿然選邊且作出明確表態,無論選擇哪一邊,必將導致我方利益受到重大傷害。在北京與華府戰略情勢緊繃的狀態下,一旦明確選邊,將立即導致我方戰略迴旋空間的喪失;隨之而來的國家利益損失,將是無可估量的。

東亞外交界有一則流傳甚廣,有關南海的真實故事。在希拉蕊出任美國務卿時,曾因南海問題和大陸鬧得不可開交。2011年東南亞一項有關南海的會議中,希拉蕊和當時大陸外交部長楊潔箎駁火較勁,希拉蕊力主航行自由,楊則主張域外國家不應說三道四。據與會人士表示,會場中希楊二人連眼神都沒有交集一下。會議午宴採自助式,自由入座,讓與會人士有自由交談機會。希楊二人先行取餐就座;各國外長取餐完畢回到用餐地點時,全部當場傻眼;原來,用餐桌是一長方形桌,希楊二人各據一頭;這就是外交上要求表態的作法。

最後的結果是「按膚色就坐」,黃皮膚坐在楊的一頭;紐澳等白種人則坐在希的一邊。為何如此,答案是「地緣政治」。「他們美國人是很強大沒錯,可是我們怎麼知道,他們不會有一天突然就離開了,我們還要在這裡過日子的,我們跑不掉。」誠哉斯言。

台灣也跑不掉。如果要避免這種選邊的尷尬,最好的辦法,就是堅持主張《中華民國憲法》的立場,是完整的憲法立場;不是破破碎碎、片片斷斷的刪節版。很簡單,民國36年(1947年),《中華民國憲法》公布實施時,我們的主張是什麼就是什麼。在主張《中華民國憲法》南海疆域為U形線下,我們呼籲各方自制以降低緊張,並且重申南海和平倡議的立場。

《中華民國憲法》在民國36年實施時,U形線已然公布;且依當時國際法原則及慣例(1945年,即民國34年的杜魯門宣言),U形線的主張是有效的。我國憲法就此一主張一直有效迄今。按《中華民國憲法》第四條,明訂,「中華民國之領土依其固有之疆域,非經國民大會之決議,不得變更之。」至今沒有通過任何領土相關決議。民國821126日的第328號釋憲案,明訂國家領土疆域之界定,不得以釋憲方式為之。

所以,政治人物切勿隨便主張,便宜行事;不但違憲,還可能把國家帶入危險深淵。我們也呼籲要競爭大位的總統參選人,應就此一攸關國家領土與安全的重大問題表態,把本身的相關主張和立場講清楚,台灣在憲法基礎上,如何扮演積極的角色,避免南海衝突升高,並提出有利南海和平的策略。台灣是南海爭議當事方,能在國際事務發揮積極角色,要比空談加入聯合國有意義得多。

Monday, October 26, 2015

DPP Joint Regional Governance Buried Under a Mountain of Garbage

DPP Joint Regional Governance Buried Under a Mountain of Garbage
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 27, 2015


Executive Summary: The Yunlin County garbage crisis shows that green camp "joint regional governance" is nothing more than empty rhetoric. Political advantage trumps administrative cooperation. A storm of criticism has forced Yunlin County Chief Li Jing-yung to change his tune and declare that the Linnei Incinerators "will never go into operation". Li said he was willing to make incinerator operation an "option". This problem is the touchstone for Tsai Ing-wen's joint regional governance, and shows that green camp joint regional governance is easier said than done.

Full Text Below:

The Yunlin County garbage crisis shows that green camp "joint regional governance" is nothing more than empty rhetoric. Political advantage trumps administrative cooperation. A storm of criticism has forced Yunlin County Chief Li Jing-yung to change his tune and declare that the Linnei Incinerators "will never go into operation". Li said he was willing to make incinerator operation an "option". This problem is the touchstone for Tsai Ing-wen's joint regional governance, and shows that green camp joint regional governance is easier said than done.

So-called "joint regional governance" based self-government and urban planning is nothing new. The UK has promoted it for over a century. The idea is to share resources and economic benefits within a given geographical region. But Tsai Ing-wen convened a joint regional governance meeting in April. She boasted that "Thirteen green-ruled counties would jointly resist the central government". This is clearly contrary to the spirit of joint regional governance.

Taiwan has made use of joint regional governance for some time in regional planning. This optimizes land use and addresses the limitations of county and city level comprehensive development planning. It unites interdependent neighboring counties, and enables them to share benefits rooted in geography, population, natural resources, and economic activity. The regional planning system has been around for years. The regional planning system was obviously not motivated by any desire to "resist the central government".

Yunlin county's about face on incinerators, reveals the political calculations behind the green camp's joint regional governance proposal. Former County Chief Chang Jung-wei outsourced Linnei Incinerator construction. Successor Su Chih-fen cited EIA and bribery as justifications for tearing up the contract. The incinerators would "not go into operation, but merely held in reserve". Li Jing-yung declared on the eve of the election that it would "never be put into operation". Unfortunately Yunlin originally commissioned Kaohsiung, Chiayi, and Ilan counties to handle incineration on its behalf. These are all green camp ruled cities and counties. Why are they now citing reasons not to continue doing so? Garbage is now piling up in Yunlin. Besides cost, one reason is other counties think Yunlin should use its own incinerators, which it built but refuses to put into operation. They think this is unreasonable.

Also, some townships in Yunlin have refused to implement county government orders. They refuse to collect garbage from ordinary citizens, while collecting industrial waste on the sly. The result is garbage piling up in the streets. This shows the evils of local government parochialism. Yunlin refuses to clean up its own mess. It wants to pass the buck to the central government. it wants the central government to solve the problem on its behalf. This is clearly unacceptable. If the DPP is serious about joint regional governance, why isn't it coordinating with Tsai Ing-wen to solve the problem?

Last year the green camp won 13 seats in the nine in one county and municipal elections. They immediately established a joint regional governance platform. This platform includes a DPP Central Committee joint governance office, as well as key staffers appointed by green camp county chiefs and city mayors. But so far, county chiefs and city mayors have done nothing except besiege the central government. They demand money and power. Li Jing-yung persuaded six counties in central Taiwan to sign an agreement banning the burning of bituminous coal. He led a fight against the central government and industry, but has done nothing to advance joint regional governance. He has no plans to cooperate with anyone in industry, in order to increase employment.

Conceptually, joint regional governance is a good idea. Its aim is to transcend the limitations of administrative districts. Its aim is to enables regional governments to seek out neighboring districts with complementary resources, and shatter the model of top-down central government rule. For example, the Chinese National Federation of Industries recently revealed that Taiwan suffers from shortages in six areas, including power shortages which cannot be solved at the county level. Other issues, such as central Taiwan hogging water resources, can sometimes be resolved through counties coordinating their resources. This is the intent of joint regional governance.

Social housing is also part of Tsai Ing-wen's joint regional governance proposal. But the population of counties and municipalities impose objective limits. Detailed calculations of public infrastructure capacities are required. The same is true for urban planning, which must respond to local living environments. The actual needs of local populations should determine the appropriate sites for social housing. City government operations include many "dirty jobs"" that must be dealt with. These include household garbage collection. Garbage collection is of course the responsibility of counties and municipalities. After all, "no border crossings" is fundamental to waste management. It must not be conducted at the expense of others. Yunlin has incinerators it is not using. It refuses to pay market prices for incineration. This smacks of chicanery.

Another example is measures taken against mosquitoes carrying Dengue fever. The premise is that each administrative district must establish firewalls. These firewalls may be information security firewalls or construction material firewalls. They are all intended to prevent the spread of undesirable elements. Each district is charged with its own epidemic control, with preventing a wildfire. These too are problems that cannot be solved by zone defense. Joint regional governance cannot solve such problems. It will not advance the common interest of neighboring regions. It could even drag neighboring regions down.

Joint regional governance can make better use of local infrastructure and resources. That is undeniable. It can combine administrative organization and human resources, increasing development potential or competitiveness. But joint regional governance must solve problems jointly, and not just pick fights with the central government. Otherwise positive change will be impossible. The DPP has praised joint regional governance to the skies. But it has turned a blind eye to Yunlin's garbage incineration problem. That is why one knows the DPP has marched down the wrong path.

垃圾山上,失能的區域聯合治理
2015-10-27 聯合報

雲林縣垃圾危機難解,暴露綠營的「區域聯合治理」徒託空談,政治氣味高於行政合作。在面對外界撻伐後,曾宣示「永不啟用」林內焚化爐的雲林縣長李進勇終於改口,願將啟用林內焚化爐列入「選項」。這個問題,正是蔡英文「區域聯合治理」的試金石,凸顯綠營對區域治理的知易行難。

「區域聯合治理」在地方自治、都市計畫都不是新鮮事,起於英國而推行已不止百年,其理念是區域內地理、資源、經濟活動等的利益創造與共享。但蔡英文四月召開「區域聯合治理」平台首次會議,不避諱地標舉「串連十三綠色執政縣市以抗衡中央」之意,已違背區域聯合治理的精神。

「區域共治」在台灣早有類似機制,那就是區域計畫制度。這是基於國土利用最佳化,考慮縣市綜合開發計畫之侷限而設計,旨在聯合鄰近縣市,依地理、人口、資源、經濟活動等相互依存與共同利益,訂定出區域發展計畫,已推動多年。可以確定的是,區域計畫制度完全沒有「聯合地方對抗中央」的設想。

雲林考慮啟用焚化爐的轉折,暴露了綠營區域治理的政治算計。前縣長張榮味委外籌建林內焚化爐,蘇治芬繼任後以環評及行賄等理由解約,焚化爐「備而不用」,李進勇更在選前就提出「永不啟用」的政治宣示。問題是,雲林原委託高雄、嘉義、宜蘭等縣市焚燒,這些都是綠營執政縣市,為什麼如今都各以藉口不再代燒,而造成雲林垃圾壓頂的窘境。其中原因,除了價格談不攏,正是其他縣市認為雲林自己有焚化爐卻不用,太不合理。

此外,雲林部分鄉鎮拒絕縣府調度,拒收民生垃圾,卻偷收事業廢棄物,造成街頭垃圾堆積如山,也反映了地方本位主義作祟。雲林自家爛攤子不收拾,卻想把問題賴給中央,要求代為解決,當然是行不通的。反過來看,如果民進黨的「區域聯合治理」是玩真的,為什麼不設法透過這個平台請蔡英文協調解決?

綠營去年九合一選舉拿下十三席縣市長後,隨即成立區域聯合治理平台,不僅黨中央設有聯合治理辦公室,各縣市長也指派核心幕僚加入。但運作迄今,只見縣市首長聯手圍攻中央,要錢要權,乃至由李進勇率中部六縣市簽署禁燒生煤協議,和中央及業者纏鬥,卻未見發揮任何聯合治理的效能,或者任何在產業、就業上互通有無的合作計畫。

在概念上,區域聯合治理是不錯的想法,目的在促使各地跨出「行政區」的侷限,自主尋求鄰近區域的資源互補,打破凡事聽命中央指揮調度的窠臼。舉例而言,工總日前說台灣投資環境亮出「六缺」紅燈,其中如缺電自非縣市層級可以解決,但如中部搶水之事,有時則可透過縣市協調彼此挹注資源,這才是區域聯合治理的原意。

再如,社會住宅是蔡英文列入區域共治的課題,但縣市人口容納量有客觀條件的限制,必須詳細計算公共設施承載量,經過都市計畫的「地方生活圈」配置,再看地方人口移動的實際需要,選擇適當的社會住宅區位。又如,都市運轉中會生出許多「嫌惡」事項,必須由地方自己解決。像家庭垃圾,縣市當然要負責解決,畢竟,「不越境移轉」是廢棄物處理的根本精神,不能以鄰為壑。何況,雲林有焚化爐而不用,又不願根據市場價格支付代燒費用,這恐怕就有耍賴之嫌。

再如登革熱病媒蚊的防治,其概念是行政區各設「防火牆」。不論是資訊安全的「防火牆」,或建物的「防火區隔」,都是在避免「嫌惡」源頭的流動,自家負責疫情控制,不讓野火竄燒燎原;這類情況,也不是區域聯防所能解決。試圖以「區域共治」來化解,不但不能創造共同利益,反而可能將其他地區一起拖下水。

無可諱言,區域共治可強化地方建設之整體資源,聯合運用行政組織和人力資源,拓展單一縣市發展潛力,擴大城市競爭布局。但是,一旦區域聯合治理用錯方向,如果目標只是為了聯合杯葛、施壓中央,而不是為了共同解決問題,那就很難為區域帶來正向改變。民進黨把區域聯合治理喊得震天價響,卻對雲林垃圾這樣火燒眉毛的問題視若無睹,就知道它走錯了方向。


Sunday, October 25, 2015

The DPP is not Taiwan: The DPP Must Do as It Says

The DPP is not Taiwan: The DPP Must Do as It Says
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 24, 2015


Executive Summary: Tsai Ing-wen recently said “The DPP is not Taiwan. The KMT is not the Republic of China.” Coming from Tsai Ing-wen, this was a bolt out of the blue. But it reflect a long-standing misperception on Taiwan that "The DPP loves Taiwan, but the KMT does not." Was Tsai Ing-wen sincere when she uttered these words? We do not know. But she at least admitted this was a misperception. We hope she is not merely indulging in election rhetoric, and will act in accordance with what she said.

Full Text Below:

Tsai Ing-wen recently said “The DPP is not Taiwan. The KMT is not the Republic of China.” Coming from Tsai Ing-wen, this was a bolt out of the blue. But it reflect a long-standing misperception on Taiwan that "The DPP loves Taiwan, but the KMT does not." Was Tsai Ing-wen sincere when she uttered these words? We do not know. But she at least admitted this was a misperception. We hope she is not merely indulging in election rhetoric, and will act in accordance with what she said.

The KMT is indeed not synonymous with the ROC. It is true that the KMT lost control o fthe Mainland. But the Republic of China still exists. It still governs Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu. It still has US military support. The Two Chiangs never forgot their ultimate goal, "the reunification of China". The KMT lost to the DPP in 2000. But the ROC continues to exist. Not only did it have democratic checks and balances, it also had the United States watching Chen Shui-bian's every move. That is why Chen lamented that "I just can't do it. It's impossible" when pressured to change the name of the nation to the "Republic of Taiwan".

When the KMT and ordinary citizens defend the ROC, the DPP vilifies them, saying they "do not love Taiwan". The Republic of China did not come into existence In 1949, when the government moved to Taiwan. It came into existence at the end of the Qing Dynasty. The Republic of China has governed the Taiwan Region of China by itself even longer than it governed the nation as a whole. Yet the DPP has denounced ROC history texts for "distorting history". It has even manipulated the words "Republic of China" on passports, and encouraged people to cover the words with stickers. Now all of a sudden, the DPP has changed its tune. Now it claims it "has always upheld the Republic of China". Is the DPP serious? Is it being facetious? Or is it merely chanting a campaign slogan? No matter which it may be, it has definitely raised eyebrows.

The DPP is indeed not synonymous with Taiwan. Yet the DPP often considers Taiwan its private property. Tsai Ing-wen said, "The Republic of China is a government in exile". She attempted to sever the connection between the Republic of China and Taiwan, to alienate the Republic of China from Taiwan. Tsai Ing-wen shouted "Win back Taiwan!" She attempted to sever the connection between the KMT and Taiwan. She regards Taiwan as the private domain of the DPP. During the last presidential election, Tsai Ing-wen's campaign slogan was "I am Taiwanese. I am Tsai Ing-wen". The DPP was in essence, asserting an exclusive right to the term "Taiwanese". Tsai's intent was to create "ethnic" divisions, and benefit from them during the election.

DPP members often use the term "Taiwanese" (people) and "Taiwanese" (language) in an exclusionary manner. Citizens from other provinces, Hakkas, Aborigines, and recent immigrants are considered non-entities. Mandarin, Hakka, aboriginal languages, and languages spoken by recent immigrants are viewed as irrelevant.  This is naked Hoklo Chauvinism. Meanwhile, Lee Teng-hui would return Taiwan to his colonial motherland Japan. On this, Tsai Ing-wen's silence was deafening. She obdurately refused to criticize him, and instead demanded "tolerance". Is this not insanity? That is why when a DPP official suddenly says she does not consider Taiwan a DPP party asset or campaign asset, no one believes her.

The KMT after all, founded the Republic of China. Countless party members shed blood to found Asia's first democratic republic. True, the KMT once failed to distinguish between party and state. It practiced single-party dictatorship. But military rule evolved into political tutelage, and political tutelage evolved into constitutional rule. Martial law was lifted, and a democratic system was instituted. The historical thread remained unbroken. The KMT has indeed been the guardian of the Republic of China. Many blue camp supporters may not like the Kuomintang. But they are loyal defenders of the Republic of China. To them the KMT is hardly synonymous with the ROC.

Tsai Ing-wen is on her final mile to the presidency. She continues to sidle up to the Republic of China. She proclaims her desire to "maintain the status quo", and "uphold the Republic of China constitutional framework". But on National Day, when singing the national anthem, she skips over key lyrics. Her posturing remains hit and miss. She realizes she must mend the rift over national identity. After all, she is running for President of the Republic of China. This shows that the "Republic of China" is one thing that unites the 23 million people on Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu.

Lest we forget, Tsai Ing-wen was the author of the "two-states theory". Yet she is now embracing the ROC and the ROC constitutional framework. Is this political deceit? Does this represent a genuine desire to defuse opposition over reunification and independence? People have not forgotten the last time the DPP deceived them. Chen Shui-bian played his "new centrist path" card and his "five noes" card. Blue and green camp supporters alike approved. But the moment he seized power, he immediately began hacking away at the ROC and the ROC flag, dividing people to rally election support. He pandered to Taiwan independence fundamentalists. Even Frank Hsieh's "constitutional one China" was rejected as beyond the pale.

Tsai Ing-wen recently said "The DPP is no synonymous with Taiwan, the KMT is not synonymous with the Republic of China". This reeks of sophistry. Is the DPP genuinely willing to take such a step? If so, it merits a "like". Is the term "Taiwan" no longer a means for inciting "ethnic" tensions? Has the Republic of China become a shared asset of the ruling and opposition parties? If so, this is a positive development. Will the Democratic Progressive Party assume power? Whether it will or not, we hope it will do what it says and continue to reduce opposition, increase cohesion on the road ahead.

The DPP must scale back its manipulation of "ethnic" tensions. It must renounce its Hoklo Chauvinist mentality. Most of all, it must abandon its deluded affection for a Japanese colonial motherland. Given Taiwan back to the Republic of China. Give the Republic of China back to the people of Taiwan.

「民進黨不等於台灣」 要說到做到
2015-10-24 聯合報

「民進黨不等於台灣,國民黨也不等於中華民國」,聽起來荒謬無比的「兩個不等於」敘述,卻真實反映了台灣存在已久的認同落差和政治歧見。這項敘述,其實是對流行已久的「民進黨等於愛台,國民黨等於不愛台」謬論,做了一次簡單的反思。此語出自蔡英文之口,無論真心或假意,顯示她承認原來的二分法並不正確;希望這不只是她一句選舉語言,而能說到做到。

國民黨的確不等於中華民國,所以國民黨雖在大陸丟掉江山,中華民國仍然存在,因為還有台澎金馬,還有美軍協防,兩蔣也念茲在茲「統一中國」;所以國民黨雖在台灣丟掉過執政權,中華民國也還在,因為還有民主制衡,還有美國盯著,陳水扁才會說改國號「做不到就是做不到」。

然而,國民黨或一般人堅持中華民國的主張,卻常常被民進黨醜化為「不愛台灣」。中華民國的存在,並不是從民國三十八年政府遷台才開始,而始於清朝的終結,中華民國在台灣的歷史甚至遠要比在大陸久長許多年;但以中華民國史觀所撰寫的教科書,卻被民進黨批評是「扭曲歷史」。甚至連護照上的「中華民國」字樣,都要動手動腳,慫恿民眾用貼紙遮蔽。也因此,民進黨最近突然改口說自己「一直捍衛中華民國的存在」,無論這是認同、嘲諷、或選舉語言,都令人側目。

民進黨也的確不等於台灣,但台灣卻常被民進黨據為己有。蔡英文曾說「中華民國是流亡政府」,粗暴切斷中華民國和台灣的臍帶連結,讓台灣外隔於中華民國;蔡英文也曾高喊「把台灣贏回來」,那是硬生生切割國民黨與台灣的關係,把台灣視為民進黨的私產。上次總統大選,蔡英文的文宣結語是:「我是台灣人,我是蔡英文」,這不啻將「台灣人」擁為民進黨的專利標籤,意圖分化族群,從選舉獲取漁利。

許多民進黨人士常以排他的手法定義「台灣人」和「台灣話」,視外省籍、客家人、原住民和新住民等多元族群如無物,棄國語、客家話、原住民語和新住民語等多元母語如敝屣,這是福佬沙文主義作風。相形之下,對於李登輝要把台灣推回殖民祖國的日本,蔡英文倒是刻意包容,未置一詞,這豈不錯亂乖謬!凡此種種,要說民進黨未將「台灣」視為自己獨攬的選舉資產,恐怕無人相信。

國民黨畢竟是中華民國的肇建者,多少黨員拋頭顱、灑熱血,創建了亞洲第一個民主共和國。儘管國民黨有過黨國不分、一黨獨大、威權統治的歷史,但從軍政、訓政到憲政,從動員戡亂到解嚴、乃至民主制度的落實,歷史一脈相承,國民黨確實是中華民國的守護者。許多藍營支持者未必喜歡國民黨,卻忠實捍衛中華民國的存在;可見,在他們中心,國民黨不等於中華民國。

蔡英文在邁向總統之路的最後一哩,不斷向中華民國靠攏,從「維持現狀」到「中華民國憲政體制」說,到參加國慶卻在國歌跳詞;其姿態斧鑿斑斑,卻也顯示她知道必須修補這個感情裂痕,跨越這個認同鴻溝。畢竟,她正在競選的,是「中華民國」的總統。這證明,「中華民國」確實是台澎金馬這塊土地上的兩千三百萬人民的最大公約數。

問題在,「兩國論」起草者的蔡英文,今天回頭擁抱中華民國、中華民國憲法架構,究竟是基於政治權謀,或有意化解統獨對立?人們仍未忘記,上次民進黨執政,陳水扁曾打出「新中間路線」、「四不一沒有」等訴求,獲得不分藍綠的民眾認同;但當其執政出現問題時,他卻毫不猶豫地拿中華民國來開刀、祭旗,以撕裂族群來凝聚支持;他轉向台獨基本教義派靠攏,連謝長廷的「憲法一中」都容不下。

蔡英文說出「民進黨不等於台灣,國民黨不等於中華民國」,雖然充滿詭辯的心思,但民進黨願意跨出這步反省,仍值得為它按個「讚」。如果「台灣」不再成為操弄族群的工具,「中華民國」成為朝野共同認定的資產,無論如何,是值得肯定的發展;也希望不論民進黨執政與否,都能說到做到,繼續向化解對立、凝聚認同之路前進。

民進黨必須從族群操弄中縮手,從福佬沙文思維解放,更從日本祖國迷思中解殖還魂。請把台灣還給中華民國、把中華民國還給台灣人民吧!

Thursday, October 22, 2015

PRC vs. USA in the South China Sea: View from Taipei

PRC vs. USA in the South China Sea: View from Taipei
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 23, 2015


Executive Summary: US Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter recently declared that the United States would not recognize the Mainland's man-made reefs in the South China Sea and their 12 nautical mile territorial waters. Sources say President Obama has dispatched military vessels to these waters to exercise the right to freedom of navigation. Their arrival is imminent. The Mainland media and Mainland military experts consider this a flagrant violation of China's sovereignty, and say that China will be forced to take countermeasures. If the two sides continue down this path, a PRC-US showdown in the South China Sea is imminent.

Full Text Below:

US Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter recently declared that the United States would not recognize the Mainland's man-made reefs in the South China Sea and their 12 nautical mile territorial waters. Sources say President Obama has dispatched military vessels to these waters to exercise the right to freedom of navigation. Their arrival is imminent. The Mainland media and Mainland military experts consider this a flagrant violation of China's sovereignty, and say that China will be forced to take countermeasures. If the two sides continue down this path, a PRC-US showdown in the South China Sea is imminent.

Will PRC vs. US conflict erupt suddenly in the South China Sea ? Or will the result be a long drawn out wrestling match?

The PRC is a land power. The United States is a sea power. As such their thinking is fundamentally different. The PRC sees the South China Sea as "maritime territory". It sees territorial waters as if they were dry land. By contrast, sea powers such as Spain, Britain, and now the United States, consider the seas open to all. Anyone's navy may enter. In other words, whoever has the most powerful navy may assert control. As a result, when the People's Liberation Army Navy entered the waters off Alaska, the US reaction was muted.

The US view is that the South China Sea must remain open, and that this openness must be enforced through a show of strength. Otherwise the PRC will be insatiable. Last year it was the 981 drilling rig. This year it is land reclamation. The US accuses the PRC of swallowing up the South China Sea. The US State Department argues that if the US military fails to patrol the South China Sea, it will lead to greater destabilization.

But the US must choose which reefs to target with care. The South China Sea has "low-tide elevations", i.e., land above water at low tide, but submerged at high tide, such as Mischief Reef. The United States argues that under international law these do not qualify as territorial waters. It does not recognize PRC sovereignty over them. It emphasizes the right to freedom of navigation through these waters, and freedom of overflight over them. High-tide elevations are land which remain above water at high tide, such as Yongshu Reef. There, the PRC has undertaken land reclamation. The US military may not dare enter.

What action would the US take? PRC military experts say that the United States has three Zumwalt Class Littoral Combat Ships. Their maximum speed is 60 knots. They are highly maneuverable. They are highly suitable for infiltrating and exfiltrating the 12 nautical mile zones surrounding artificial reefs. P8A Poseidon anti-submarine patrol aircraft may be deployed to probe the airspace. But some think the Littoral Combat Ships, which weigh only 3000 tons, would have difficulty surviving collisions with PRC Coast Guard cutters. The United States might dispatch 10,000 ton Aegis destroyers, and simultaneously provide air cover.

The two sides are now at loggerheads. The clash does not appear to be military conflict however, but political posturing. US Secretary of Defense Carter loudly proclaimed that "the United States will fly, sail and operate wherever international law allows, as we do around the world, and the South China Sea will not be an exception".  He served notice to Southeast Asian allies. The implication was that they should rest assured. The United States will remain in the Asian Pacific region. It will ignore the PRC's claims regarding territorial waters and airspace.

Japan, Australia, Vietnam and other allies, are of course unhappy with the Mainland's claims of historical sovereignty over the South China Sea. But expecting them to take part in US military action is another matter. Some Asian-Pacific countries would like to see the United States challenge the PRC. But that does not mean they are willing to allow themselves to be dragged into the conflict. So far, only the Philippines has expressed support, and then only for diplomacy.

The PRC knows the United States is bluffing. During last weekend's Xiangshan Forum, CCP Central Military Commission Vice-Chairman Fan Changlong declared that on matters concerning China's territorial sovereignty, the PRC "never lightly resorts to force". This reminded the United States not to misjudge the situation. It let people on the Mainland know the PRC's bottom line, and to allow public sentiment to cool.

Based on US announcements, US military aircraft and warships are likely to enter waters surrounding the PRC's artificial reefs in the next few days. But given the two sides' posture, the PRC and the US are likely to exercise self-restraint and avoid conflict. Several years ago the PLA declared its "East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone". The United States sent bombers through the zone without prior notification. Symbolically it ignored the new control zone. But it did not go beyond that. The two sides were then able to stand down.

What is worrisome is that this might be the beginning of a long term struggle between the PRC and US in the South China Sea. Current high-profile US posturing is intended as deterrence. Current PRC forbearance is intended to buy time. The two sides will find it difficult to maintain the status quo through negotiation. When Xi Jinping visited the United States, he said the PRC was "not militarizing new reefs".  Clearly the United States did not believe him. As a result, it took military action to test PRC resolve. This ironically, provoked the PRC into making military preparations. Neither side is likely to concede.

The ROC occupies Taiping Island, the largest island and reef chain in the South China Sea. It has fresh water, and is the only one suitable for human habitation. But Vietnam, the Philippines, and the Mainland are all busy with land reclamation and runway extensions. The ROC is also stepping up construction. But it lags far behind others. Yongshu Reef is currently the largest. It is now over three times larger than Taiping Island.

The PRC and US are clashing in the South China Sea. Yesterday NSB Chief Yang Kuo-chiang said Taipei wants close relations with Washington and peace with Beijing. Therefore it is in no position to issue strong declarations concerning the South China Sea dispute. We would liie to remind whatever government takes office next year – do not change existing policy. If Taipei attempts to curry favor with the United States, and renounces historical claims of sovereignty as manifested in the nine-dotted line, there will be serious consequences.

從台灣看中美在南海的角力
2015-10-23 聯合報

美國國防部長卡特日前聲稱,美國不會承認大陸在南海填建的人工島礁及其十二海里的領海範圍;據透露,歐巴馬總統已批准美軍派遣船艦進入這些海域行使自由航行權,近日即將抵達該海域。對此,大陸媒體和軍事專家同表反對,認為這是對中國主權赤裸裸的侵犯,中國將被迫採取反制;事態若持續發展,可能導致中美在南海攤牌。

美中在南海會爆發衝突嗎?或者引發連串的軍事角力?

中國作為一個陸權國家,和美國作為一個海權國家,其基本思維大相逕庭。中國視南海為「海洋領土」,把海域當成土地一樣看;而海權國家如過去的西班牙、英國到現在的美國,認為海域是開放的,誰都可以前往,誰的海軍強大即決定誰具有控制力。也因此,中國解放軍海軍雖進入阿拉斯加海域,但美國表現得非常淡定。

美方的看法是,南海必須開放,但如果不以實力告誡,中方一定會得寸進尺。從去年的九八一鑽井平台,到今年的填島造陸,中方不斷在南海蠶食鯨吞,所以美國國務院才會說:美軍若不對南中國海進行巡航和飛越活動,會導致更多破壞穩定的行為。

然而,要選擇何處島礁做為示威目標,卻不能不審慎考慮。南海中的「低潮高地」──即在低潮時才會露出水面的礁岩,如美濟礁等,美國認為依國際法無權劃定領海,不承認其屬於大陸主權,強調有權在該島礁四周海域行使航行與飛越的自由。至於高潮高地,即在漲潮時也仍浮現水面的礁岩,如永暑礁,經中方填島擴大,美軍也未必敢造次進入。

美軍的行動可能如何部署呢?中共軍事專家的研判是,美國擁有三艘「朱瓦特」級的濱海戰鬥艦,速度最高達到六十節,轉彎靈巧,最適宜在人工島礁十二海里附近快進快出。另外,P8A海神反潛巡邏機則可能用來測試領空。但是也有人認為,濱海戰鬥艦僅三千噸,不易招架大陸海巡船之衝撞,美方可能派出萬噸級的神盾艦,同時兼顧防空屏障。

儘管雙方劍拔弩張,但這個回合的角力,打從一開始,就不準備出現軍事衝突,而僅止於政治動作。美國防部長卡特高調聲稱,「只要是國際法允許的地方,美國軍隊都可以航行、飛行和行動,南海也不例外。」隨即通報東南亞盟邦。其言下之意是:大家放心,美國會繼續留守亞太,不會理會中國宣布的領海領空。

日本、澳大利亞、越南等盟國,當然不滿大陸假藉歷史主權霸佔南海;然而,要它們力挺乃至參與美軍的行動,則是另一回事。部分亞太國家樂見美國挑戰中國,卻不意味他們願意把自己捲入。目前,僅有菲律賓表示外交支持。

中共當然也知道,美國是在虛張聲勢;因此,上周末的「香山論壇」上,中共中央軍委副主席范長龍聲稱,即使在涉及領土主權的問題上,中方「絕不輕言訴諸武力」。此語,除提醒美方不要誤判,也讓大陸內部知道政策底線,讓輿論降溫。

依美方宣布的時機估計,美軍機艦未來數日即可能進入中國在南海的人工島礁領海;但從雙方的姿態看,中美都會自我克制,避免衝突。就如幾年前解放軍宣布「東海防空識別區」後,美方派出轟炸機通過,事先不通報,象徵性地不理會新管制區,但也不挑釁,雙方各有下台階。

但值得擔心的,這會不會是中美在南海長期爭霸戰的開端。目前,美方的高調是為了威懾,中方的隱忍則是為了爭取時間,雙方很難經由協商達成維持現狀之共識。習近平訪美時曾稱「不進行新島礁的軍事化」,顯然美方並不相信他的承諾,所以要藉由軍事動作作出試探。這勢必促使中方進行軍事準備,不會有哪一邊先退讓。

我方占有的太平島,原為南海諸島礁中面積最大島,有淡水,且是唯一適宜人居的。但是,在越南、菲律賓與中國大陸競相填海造陸、延伸跑道的熱潮下,雖然我國也在加強島上的建設,卻已遠遠落後他國;目前永暑礁已成最大島礁,超過太平島三倍大。

對於中美在南海的交鋒,國安局長楊國強昨天答詢說:台灣既要親美又要和陸,不宜在南海之爭表達立場。我們也要提醒明年五月將上任的新政府:不要輕易改變既有政策,如果台灣企圖討好美國,而宣布放棄九段線的歷史主權,必將引起嚴重後果。


Wednesday, October 21, 2015

To Voters Afflicted with Post-Sunflower Distress Disorder

To Voters Afflicted with Post-Sunflower Distress Disorder
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 22, 2015


Executive Summary: The 2016 general election is less than three months away. Yet voters remain disaffected. One reason is that the blue camp suffered a major setback when the KMT “changed generals before the charge”. But the main reason is that last year's Sunflower Student Movement undermined respect for the government. Many voters are now disillusioned with democracy. It is difficult to whip up enthusiasm among them. This phenomenon is especially prevalent among blue camp supporters, and could be termed “Post-Sunflower Distress Disorder" or “PSDD”.

Full Text Below:

The 2016 general election is less than three months away. Yet voters remain disaffected. One reason is that the blue camp suffered a major setback when the KMT “changed generals before the charge”. But the main reason is that last year's Sunflower Student Movement undermined respect for the government. Many voters are now disillusioned with democracy. It is difficult to whip up enthusiasm among them. This phenomenon is especially prevalent among blue camp supporters, and could be termed “Post-Sunflower Distress Disorder" or “PSDD”.

The Sunflower Student Movement had both positive and negative effects on Taiwan. But it has not been subjected to serious review and discussion. Positive effects include increased political participation among young people, increased awareness of the plight and aspirations of the younger generation, and increased awareness of economic inequality and generational injustice. Negative effects include the undermining of democracy and social order by violent street protests, the whitewashing of illegal occupation of public buildings, the sidelining of rational debate, the monopolization of public expression on the Internet, and the bullying of those who dare dissent. Older citizens in particular, those not conversant with the Internet, had their values demeaned and opinions belittled. They have become politically disaffected and withdrawn.

Consider the matter of democratic evolution. Last year, during the Sunflower Student Movement, the political atmosphere on Taiwan was electric. Today, all that remains is apathy. This is definitely not a healthy phenomenon. In any society, reform requires passion. It requires political action exercised within the system. If extremists run amok with impunity, those who value rational debate will withdraw. Few will take part in the election process. The result will be democracy in which the tail wags the dog.

The Sunflower Student Movement cited opposition to the STA as its pretext. Green camp support enabled it to morph into an “anti-[Mainland]China", "anti-Ma" “appendectomy" movement. It even occupied the Legislative Yuan, and with Wang Jin-pyng's assistance, formed an anti-Ma army. Add to the mix blue vs green political wrangling, all of which attacked the soft underbelly of the Ma government. The blue camp's nine in one election debacle last year cowed ruling KMT leaders. They tucked their tails between their legs and did nothing. These factors are likely to lead to the same result in the general election next year.

The Sunflower Student Movement dealt the ruling KMT a severe blow. Yet it does nothing. This is its own fault. This is something it must reflect upon. Meanwhile, many have lost faith in politics in the wake of the Sunflower Student Movement. Some feel intense disgust. These people need reassurance and encouragement. We hope they will resume participation in politics. Only that will prevent democracy on Taiwan from imploding. After all, the backbone of democracy, apart from political parties, is support from independent citizens.

The Sunflower Student Movement has left many disaffected with politics, for three reasons. Reason One. When students occupied the legislature and paralyzed the government, it exposed the weakness of their democratic institutions. Their disillusionment led to disaffectation. Reason Two. Violence in the streets and vituperation on the Internet, reflected predominantly the feelings of the younger generation. The feelings of non-Internet users and older generations have been ignored. More mature, more thoughtful insights have been drowned in a sea of unconsidered opinion. Many can no longer be bothered to speak out. Many cannot not even be bothered to participate in politics. Reason Three. The student movement's violence challenged the values of more conservative members of society. In most democracies, universities are leftist, while the grass-roots are conservative. This is the norm. But the Sunflower Student Movement on Taiwan had too intense a political coloration. It seethed with hatred and indulged in outright provocation. It shook the faith of many in politics, and left them with the sense that political participation is futile.

The most obvious example of this is of course blue camp dejection in the face of the upcoming election. The KMT recently replaced Hung with Chu. Supporters now plan to boycott the election or cast invalid ballots in protest. During last week's plenary session, attendance fell to 60%. Among party representatives from Taipei City, attendance plummeted to 40%. This reflects their alienation from the party. Rumors have emerged over the past two days. Apparently the KMT Central Committee intends to change the rules for non-constituency legislators, to enable Wang Jing-pyn to remain in office. Voters are threatening to cast invalid party vote ballots in protest. These are serious symptoms of Post-Sunflower Distress Disorder that the blue camp must address.

Many blue camp supporters pride themselves on being independent voters. They reserve the right to criticize KMT decisions or repudiate them categorically. Nearly 20 years of voting history show that most blue camp divisions, election boycotts, or casting of invalid ballots in protest, are the result of these same people's actions. Such is the paradox of democracy. From a libertarian perspective, voting as an individual chooses is entirely understandable. The problem is that too many such independent voters have made it impossible to transform and upgrade the KMT. This is deeply regrettable. Even more worrisome, if these independent voters become indifferent, hostile, or even nihilistic, as a result of the student movement, it means disaster for democracy.

If Taiwan's democracy degenerates, the critical factor will not be who represents Taiwan, or who represents the Republic of China. It will be voter indifference or even contempt, for politics.

致後太陽花的政治冷感症患者
2015-10-22 聯合報

二○一六大選僅剩不到三個月,而選情卻出奇的冷。這除了受藍軍陣前換將周折影響,最主要的因素,是去年的太陽花學運對馬政府的威信構成嚴重挑戰,更使得許多選民對於民主政治感到深沉失望,難再點燃熱情。這種情況,尤以藍營支持者為甚,或可稱之為「後太陽花」的政治冷感症候群。

太陽花學運對台灣政治的衝擊,有利有弊,卻始終未受到認真的檢視和討論。其正面影響,諸如:年輕人的政治參與熱度升高,新世代的困境和心聲受到注意,台灣分配不均及世代剝奪問題表面化;而其負面影響則是:街頭運動衝撞民主體制和社會秩序,違法占領受到美化,政治論述出現倒退現象,網路聲量唯我獨尊,動輒霸凌民間的不同意見。尤其後者,對於那些非年輕世代、非網路活躍族群而言,他們認同的價值遭到抹煞,他們的意見甚至受到蔑視,他們的政治態度也因此變得退縮和冷漠。

從民主發展的角度看,去年台灣社會在太陽花運動期間的熱情澎湃,對比民眾今天對二○一六大選的反應冷淡,絕對不是一個健康的現象。原因是,任何社會激情或改革訴求,都必須透過體制的政治行動中尋求扎根,才有落實的可能;如果街頭燃燒的憤怒溫度如此之高,而選舉討論和參與的情緒卻如此低落,可能只會產生「尾巴搖狗」的民主。

假「反服貿」之名而起的太陽花運動,在綠營的補給下,演變成「反中」乃至「反馬」及「割闌尾」行動,甚至以占領立法院的方式借王金平之力反將馬政府一軍;其間,摻雜了複雜的藍綠政治角力因素,卻重擊了馬政府的軟肋。藍營去年九合一選舉的大敗,即肇因於執政者的畏首畏尾與處理無方;同一因素,極可能再度重挫明年的大選。

執政黨飽受太陽花衝擊,卻束手無策,這是它咎由自取,必須深刻反省。但與此同時,對於那些因太陽花後遺症而對政治喪失信任、乃至感到極度厭棄的民眾,我們則認為這是需要寬慰與鼓勵的一群,也希望他們能重拾政治參與的動力,台灣民主政治的根基才不致崩壞或傾斜。畢竟,民主政治最重要的骨幹,除了政黨,還是要靠一個個具有獨立意志的公民支撐。

太陽花運動之所以造成民眾的「政治冷感症」,主要作用有三:第一,學生占領國會、癱瘓政府的行動,讓許多人看到了民主體制的無力,因失望而轉為冷漠。第二,街頭的激烈行動和網路流行的批評言論,反映的主要是年輕世代的聲音,其他世代或非網路活躍者的意見相對受到輕忽,許多更成熟、深思的見解更淹沒於輕浮的民意之海。有些人因此懶得再發言,有些人甚至懶得再過問政治。第三,學生運動的激進性,不免對比較保守的民眾構成價值上的衝擊與挑戰。在一般民主國家,「大學向左,草根保守」原是常態,而台灣的太陽花學運卻因添加了太多政治香精,摻入太多仇恨與挑釁,竟讓許多人對自己的信念產生動搖,進而有了「政治無用」的倦怠感。

最明顯的例子是,藍軍選情一片低迷,在國民黨最近的「抽柱換朱」風波中,陸續有支持者傳出「不投票」或「投廢票」的聲音。上週臨全會的出席率僅六成,而台北市黨代表的出席率更低至四成,在在反映了黨內的疏離。這兩天,傳出黨中央將修改規章以便王金平出任不分區立委,「政黨票投廢票」的聲音亦不絕於耳。這些,都是症狀不輕的政治冷感徵候,有待藍軍設法克服。

許多藍軍支持者自詡是「自主選民」,對國民黨的決策常保持批評,或動輒予以否定。然而,觀察近廿年的投票歷史,最常在分裂、拒投或投廢票行動中飽嘗挫折的,也正是這些人,這實在是民主政治的弔詭。從自由意志的角度看,投票行為只要是個人的自主選擇,即無可厚非。問題是,這麼多的自主選民,多年來卻無法促成國民黨內部的轉型與提升,實在是令人遺憾的事。更值得擔心的是,如果這些所謂自主選民,卻因為一場學生運動而變得冷漠、消極、甚至虛無,那才是民主的大患。

台灣民主政治若走向退化,癥結其實不在誰代表台灣、誰代表中華民國的問題,而在選民變得冷漠與退卻,甚至對政治感到嫌惡。

Tuesday, October 20, 2015

Co-authoring of History Must Begin with Official History

Co-authoring of History Must Begin with Official History
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 21, 2015


Executive Summary: This year is the 70th anniversary of the victory of the War of Resistance against Japan. Officials and private citizens on both sides of the Taiwan Strait have held several meaningful commemorations. But the two sides still differ on many aspects of modern Chinese history. This is particularly true regarding the history of the war, the two political status of the ROC and PRC, and cross-Strait relations, and leads to political controversy. Fortunately despite such disputes, the two sides have decided to co-author a history of the war. A common understanding of history is important to cross-Strait emotional and spiritual understanding. We hope officials and private citizens on both sides will act promptly, and reach a common understanding of history. Such an understanding will provide a social foundation of cross-Strait peace.

Full Text Below:

This year is the 70th anniversary of the victory of the War of Resistance against Japan. Officials and private citizens on both sides of the Taiwan Strait have held several meaningful commemorations. But the two sides still differ on many aspects of modern Chinese history. This is particularly true regarding the history of the war, the two political status of the ROC and PRC, and cross-Strait relations, and leads to political controversy. Fortunately despite such disputes, the two sides have decided to co-author a history of the war. A common understanding of history is important to cross-Strait emotional and spiritual understanding. We hope officials and private citizens on both sides will act promptly, and reach a common understanding of history. Such an understanding will provide a social foundation of cross-Strait peace.

Consider the bloody War of Resistance against Japan. According to Nationalist Government Chairman Chiang Kai-shek's speech in Lushan, the war lasted eight years. But if one takes the Mukden Incident as the war's starting point, it lasted 14 years. If one takes the First Sino-Japanese War, or the Japanese Peony Society invasion of Taiwan in 1874, it lasted 100 years. Victory may be glorious. But the tens of millions of deaths must never be forgotten. Unfortunately, the War of Resistance against Japan was almost immediately followed by the KMT CCP civil war. The two sides of the Taiwan Strait found themselves under divided rule. As a result, the history of the War of Resistance against Japan has yet to be fully written.

Years of peaceful cross-Strait exchanges have now taken place. This is the 70th anniversary of victory in the War of Resistance against Japan. Both sides of the Strait are commemorating the victory simultaneously. Both sides have extended olive branches. Both sides have proposed co-authoring a history of the war. This of course is the best way for the two sides to commemorate the tragic history of the war.

On National Day, President Ma Ying-jeou delivered a speech. He said the two sides should co-author a history of the war. President Ma has long argued for this. President Ma was responding positively to Mainland President Xi Jinping's recent remark that historians from both sides of the Strait should share historical data, co-author a history of the war, and safeguard China's national dignity.

During official talks between cross-strait affairs directors, Mainland Affairs Council Chair Hsia Li-yan and the Mainland's Taiwan Affairs Office Director Zhang Zhijun agreed. Non governmental organizations from both sides should come forward. They should invite scholars from both sides and overseas to share historical data and begin cooperation.

The two sides are currently co-authoring a history of the war. They are taking advantage of this critical moment. Many elderly people who took part in war are still with us. They can provide direct testimony. Each side has precious historical material. Both must work together to rehabilitate and reconstruct historical truth. Co-authoring a history of the war will help make things right. It will refute ridiculous distortions of history. It will honor the sacrifices and suffering of compatriots. It will provide the world with an accurate, in-depth understanding of this period of history. It will teach the world a lesson regarding militarism, and help avoid the repeat of a major human tragedy. Leaders from both sides have reached a high degree of agreement regarding the events. Therefore we urge the two governments to treat the project seriously, and promote it energetically. They must not merely go through the motions.

Non-governmental organizations must come forward. But if the two governments fail to act, their leaders' promises to co-author a history of the war will remain empty talk. Why? Because the majority of first-hand testimony is under government management. Information disclosure requires bilateral agreements. That is why the two governments must act.

The governments on the two sides of the Strait are currently managing their own historical documents. They should immediately inventory their archives and upload the material they have onto the Internet. Governments have their own approach to managing important documents. The Republic of China government on Taiwan has a Government Information Disclosure Law. Article IX states: citizens may apply for access to government archives and other information. Non-citizens "may request information not limited to ROC citizens by the government." In other words, the government opens its archives only to countries or regions with which it has reciprocal disclosure agreements. So why not conclude a cross-Strait agreement?  It is difficult for Mainland scholars to come to Taiwan and read government files. Taiwan scholars have even less opportunity to access Mainland files. Without an accelerated information disclosure agreement and consultations between the two sides, accessing historical files and co-authoring a history of the war will be impossible.

To co-author a history of the war, the two sides must first complete three important assignments.

First, governments on the two sides must make historical documents related to the war fully accessible by the end of the year. They should provide an easy to use index which researchers can consult to examine the material.

Second, the two sides must simultaneously conclude a disclosure of information agreement. If it is too late for full disclosure, then at least documents pertaining to the history of the war should be made public. This is the 70th anniversary of victory in the War of Resistance against Japan. There is no longer any reason not disclose historical data. Openness and joint research will provide a sound basis for co-authoring a history of the war.

Third, private academic institutions are coming forward to co-author a history of the war. This is of course very good. But the two governments cannot remain aloof. Both governments must help non-governmental organizations conduct research into war history. They must offer long-term war history research grants, encouraging valuable research into war history.

Having the two sides co-author a history of the war is a far-reaching and urgent task. We must seize the opportunity.  Once the two governments open their archives, once the excitement in academia subsides, diversified research will enable the early completion of this history of the great war.


合寫抗戰史 需先開放官方史料
2015年10月21日 中國時報

今年是對日抗戰勝利70周年,兩岸官方與民間都進行了許多深具意義的紀念活動,但由於兩岸官方對中國現代史,尤其抗戰史,及兩岸關係定位的認知,仍有很大的差異,因而引起了若干政治性的扞格與爭議。所幸在爭議風暴中,仍然達成了一項有意義的共識,就是兩岸應合寫抗戰史。要實現兩岸民眾心靈的和解,建構共同史觀是非常重要的一步。希望兩岸官方與民間立即付諸行動,共同為兩岸和平發展的社會基礎鞏固基石。

對日抗戰血淚史,從國民政府蔣中正委員長發表廬山講話算起,長達8年;從九一八事變算起,長達14年;如果從甲午戰爭算起,甚至從1874年日本侵略台灣的牡丹社事件算起,更長達一百多年。回顧這段歷史,雖然最後獲得了光榮勝利,但是過程中血跡斑斑、死亡人數高達數千萬,絕對不容後人遺忘。遺憾的是,對日抗戰勝利之後不久就發生了國共內戰,兩岸陷入分治,竟然使得這段對日抗戰史至今尚未獲得最全面而完整的呈現。

直到如今,在兩岸和平交流多年之後、在抗戰勝利70年之際,兩岸各自紀念抗戰勝利的同時,都伸出了橄欖枝,分別提議要合寫抗戰史,這當然是對兩岸抗日血淚史最好的紀念方式。

馬英九總統在國慶演說公開呼籲,兩岸可以合寫抗戰史。這不只是馬總統一貫的立場與主張,也可以看成是對於大陸國家主席習近平日前提到兩岸史學界應該共用史料、共寫史書、共同捍衛民族尊嚴這段談話的善意與正面回應。

日前兩岸事務首長正式會談中,陸委會主委夏立言與大陸國台辦主任張志軍也同意:兩岸可由民間單位出面,邀集兩岸及國際學者一起從共享史料開始進行合作。

兩岸此刻合寫抗戰史的意義在於利用當下這個重要時刻,把握曾經參與抗戰的耆老還有不少仍與我們同在之時,留下最直接的見證;同時,結合兩岸過去各自擁有與保存的珍貴史料,一起努力為歷史的真相進行復原與重建。在這個合寫抗戰史的過程中,不僅可以撥亂反正,駁斥歪曲歷史的荒謬言論,也可以告慰犧牲與傷亡的苦難同胞,更可以讓世人重新正確而深入的認識這一段血淚史,從而在這個軍國主義蠢蠢欲動的時刻,避免人類的重大悲劇重演。對於這件深具意義的大事,既然雙邊領導人與對話部門都已經達成高度共識,我們要具體建議兩岸政府應該嚴肅看待、認真推動,絕不是敷衍以對。

在實際的作法上,雖然可由民間單位出面,但是如果兩岸政府不作為,雙邊領導人對於合寫抗戰史的呼籲與允諾必將成為空話,這是由於重要的第一手史料多數都是由政府管理,而且在資訊公開上還涉及雙邊協議的磋商,顯見兩岸政府都必須有所作為。

以實際情況來看,兩岸政府各自管理的抗戰史料與檔案,應該立即彙整完整清冊,並且將清冊公開上網;除此之外,各國對重要檔案往往有其管理辦法,以台灣為例,《政府資訊公開法》第九條明訂:具國籍的公民才能申請查閱政府檔案等資訊,如果沒有國籍,則「以其本國法令未限制中華民國國民申請提供其政府資訊者為限」。換句話說,目前政府檔案只針對雙邊已有資訊互惠公開的國家或地區開放。偏偏兩岸之間尚未完成這方面的協議,於是大陸學者固然難以來台申閱政府檔案,台灣學者更不容易接觸到大陸檔案,因此兩岸之間如果不加速資訊互惠公開協議的磋商,根本不可能在相互開放史料的基礎上合寫抗戰史。

兩岸要合寫抗戰史,有三項重要功課必須先完成。

第一,雙邊政府應在年底之前,各自全面開放現有抗戰史料,並且應該提供方便檢索的清單與典藏地點,以供研究人員查閱。

第二,在此同時,兩岸必須完成資訊互惠公開的協議,萬一來不及推動資訊的全面互惠公開,也應該先針對抗戰史的部分互惠公開。坦白講,抗戰勝利至今已經70周年,這些史料實在沒有不能公開的道理;相互公開,共同研究,這才是合寫抗戰史的堅實基礎。

第三,由民間學術機構來出面合寫抗戰史,當然是非常務實的建議,但是政府部門也不能置身事外。我們還要建議兩岸政府也必須在年底之前,規畫出可以立刻委託非政府機構進行抗戰史研究的近期計畫,並且安排未來中長期的抗戰史研究補助,積極催生出珍貴的抗戰史研究成果。

兩岸合寫抗戰史是一項意義深遠、刻不容緩的重要任務,唯有把握當下的重要時機,在政府積極開放史料、學術研究眾聲喧譁之後,才能進一步在多元研究成果的基礎上,早日完成這部偉大的抗戰史。

Monday, October 19, 2015

Ma Government Must Abandon Its Lame Duck Mindset

Ma Government Must Abandon Its Lame Duck Mindset
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 20, 2015


Executive Summary: A timid government cannot lead the country. A cowardly cabinet cannot win respect. The Sunflower Student Movement routed the Ma government. Ma seems determined to ride out the rest of his term. Cabinet appointments and governance have stalled. As everyone knows, the election is a mere three months away. But the expiration of Ma's term in May of next year is a full seven months away. Does the Ma government intend to wallow in its lame duck caretaker mindset, waiting to step down, all that time? If so, is that not a black mark on democracy?

Full Text Below:

The KMT, having replaced Hung Hsiu-chu as its presidential candidate, is in utter disarray. Within one short week, the Mao Chi-kuo cabinet and the Legislative Yuan, have shot the ruling KMT in the foot, on three separate occasions. First, the Council of Agriculture's (COA) revised regulations for farmland and new farmhouse construction met with fierce resistance from 17 blue camp legislators. Next, the Mao cabinet generously doled out supplementary premiums, sacrificing health insurance income in order to attract votes. Instead, it was blasted for it. Finally, the Minister and Vice Minister of Culture have clashed repeatedly over information leaks.

Why have spectacles such as these continued to unfold? For one reason alone. When a government no longer stands for any sort of ideals, what is there left for it to do than myopically pander to this or that special interest? As a result, officials have difficulty maintaining even rudimentary decorum. A lame duck or caretaker mindset is a vacuum. Individuals with such a mindset seek only to survive, one day to the next. Accomplishing anything is impossible. Governments with such mindsets put themselves on hold. Governance breaks down. Economic and social progress grind to a halt. The Mao cabinet currently displays just such a lame duck, caretaker mindset.

Take the reduction of supplementary health insurance premiums for example. In one fell swoop, the Executive Yuan increased withholding from 5000 NT to 20,000 NT. This was uniformly applied to dividends, interest, rents, and business income. This is flat out “policy vote buying” with an eye on election day. If funds in the treasury were adequate, if the health insurance fund was secure, such a change might benefit the public and warrant applause. Alas, this single change means health care expenditures will experience a 7 billion NT shortfall two years down the line. The Executive Yuan's magnanimity is consuming our seed corn, and undermining the National Health Insurance system.

Supplementary premiums were an important Ma government policy. It adopted a non-taxation approach to national health insurance, and helped make end meet. Some withholding provisions unduly squeezed low-income family income derived from moonlighting. These were later corrected by the Executive Yuan, restoring some measure of justice. But the upcoming elections have led to the dismantling of a hard-won system, on the assumption that voters will be pleased. In fact, the move may prove counterproductive and make people despise the government for its opportunistic short-sightedness.

In fact, supplementary premiums, capital gains taxes, and gasoline price and electricity rate hikes, were Ma government policies. Yet now, capital gains tax deductions have left the tax a hollow shell, subject to repeal at any moment. Gasoline prices and electricity rate hikes provoked widespread resentment, and led instead to price and rate cuts. President Ma watched his policies rejected one by one. How must he have felt? Did he wonder whether his original decision was too rash? Or did he wonder whether his administration simply lacked the necessary determination?

Now take the farmhouse construction issue. Over the last decade, ersatz “farmhouse” construction has seriously eroded arable land. Without revised regulations, much farmland will be gone forever. Taiwan's ecology will be affected. Seventeen blue camp legislators have joined forces to obstruct their passage. Whose interests are they really serving? Even more frustrating, the Executive Yuan immediately caved in to pressure. It said it "respected" the legislators' opinions, and asked the Council of Agriculture, the government, and legislators to “communicate”. Where is the Executive Yuan's backbone? It would have the COA fend for itself. The outcome can easily be imagined.

The KMT is the ruling party. Yet its record failed to inspire public support. Who is to blame? The DPP has engaged in endless obstructionism. But the public knows this. Ma government officials are namby pamby and timid. They have never argued their case in a dignified and reasonable manner. That is the main reason it failed to win the hearts and minds of the people. The DPP dreams about "total rule". In fact, the Ma government already enjoys total rule. So why is it bound hand and foot, unable to do a thing? For several reasons. One. Lack of will. Two. Low morale. Three. Inept political tactics. Four. Lack of talent. The first three reasons far outweigh the last.

Take the 2016 general election. If the ruling KMT hopes to turn the tide, replacing Hung with Chu is not enough. The Ma government must offer the people something tangible. But “tangible” does not mean little favors like lowering electricity rates and reducing the premium supplement. It means offering a newer and better vision for the future, one that fulfills peoples' expectations for social justice and moral principles. A single inspiring debate would enable the ruling KMT to soundly refute the opposition DPP's subterfuges. It would help win the hearts and minds of the people. Alas, the Ma administration offered no such response to Hung Chung-chiu incident demonstrators, Sunflower Student Movement members, opponents of the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant, and opponents of curriculum reform.

A timid government cannot lead the country. A cowardly cabinet cannot win respect. The Sunflower Student Movement routed the Ma government. Ma seems determined to ride out the rest of his term. Cabinet appointments and governance have stalled. As everyone knows, the election is a mere three months away. But the expiration of Ma's term in May of next year is a full seven months away. Does the Ma government intend to wallow in its lame duck caretaker mindset, waiting to step down, all that time? If so, is that not a black mark on democracy?

馬政府必須揚棄「五日京兆」心態
2015-10-20 聯合報

正當國民黨為換柱而焦頭爛額之際,短短一 周內,毛內閣和立法院又幫了執政黨三個倒忙:一是農委會重新規範農地興建農舍辦法,竟遭十七名藍委聯手力阻;二是毛內閣慷慨大放送鬆綁補充保費,犧牲健保 收入以創造選舉利多,卻飽受訾議;三是文化部部長、次長為洩密案內鬥不止,醜戲連連。

之所以不斷上演這些難看的戲碼,原 因無他,正是一個缺乏宏圖的政府胸中只剩下東討好、西敷衍的短期盤計所致;也因此,有時連官員的基本格調和官箴都難以維持。「過渡心態」是一種很虛無的情 狀,在個人而言,只想把日子混過去,一事難成;在政府而言,則是政務停頓、行政廢弛,讓國家社會發展陷入停頓。毛內閣目前所展現的,正是如此這般的「五日 京兆」心態。
以健保補充保費的全面減徵為例,行政院一舉將五千元的扣繳基準大幅提高到兩萬元,且對股利、利息、租金、執 行業務所得等一律適用。此舉,無非就是為了營造選舉利多,以換取選民的支持。如果今天國庫充裕、健保基金安全無虞,透過這樣的調整,還利於民,倒是值得大 聲喝采。問題是,經此一調,兩年後健保收支便要出現七十多億元的缺口;那麼,今天行政院的闊綽出手,豈非寅吃卯糧,挖全民健保的牆腳?

補 充保費是馬政府任內推動的重要政策,擷取了課稅之外的蹊徑,化解了全民健保入不敷出的窘境。其中,有一些有失允當的扣繳,例如低收入打工族兼差所得受到過 度壓榨;這些,行政院後來慢慢調整,還了他們公道。但今天,只因選舉在即,卻要將好不容易建立的制度拆解改裝,以為可以討好選民;其結果,可能適得其反, 使人民厭惡政府的投機短視。

事實上,除了補充保費,證所稅、油電雙漲也是馬政府任內大力宣揚的政策。事到如今,證所稅東 折西扣,只剩一個空殼子,隨時可能廢除;而油電雙漲則徒然激起漫天民怨,反而走上雙雙降價的背道而馳之路。馬總統看到自己的主張逐一遭到廢棄,不知作何感 想;是當初決策太過莽撞呢?還是整個執政團隊已磨光了志氣?
再談農舍的興建問題。近十幾年來,各地農舍的濫建嚴重侵蝕了 良田綠地,再不設法重新規範,不僅許多農田將一去不復返,台灣的生態環境也將崩壞變色。在這種情況下,十七名藍委卻還要聯手阻擋,他們究竟代表誰的利益發 聲?更令人扼腕的是,行政院面對這樣的壓力,竟然也就立刻矮了半截,聲稱「尊重」,並要求農委會繼續和朝野立委溝通。行政院的腰桿都不知道在哪裡了,卻要 農委會自己去力爭,結局如何自是可想而知。

身為執政黨,卻拿不出亮眼的執政績效來召喚人民支持,這應該怪誰?民進黨對政 府決策的處處掣肘,民眾並不是沒有看在眼裡;然而,馬政府官員的唯唯諾諾、畏畏縮縮,從來無法不卑不亢地將事理說個透徹,更是施政難獲人心的主要原因。民 進黨正在大談「完全執政」的美夢,但今天,馬政府不就是握有完全執政的優勢嗎,為何卻落得縛手縛腳,難以施展?其中癥結,一是意志薄弱,二是士氣低迷,三 是政治手腕拙劣,四是才能不足;而前三者的因素可能要遠大過最後一項。

面對二○一六大選,執政黨若要力挽狂瀾,光是「朱 上柱下」是不夠的,馬政府一定要拿出讓人民「有感」的作為才行。所謂「有感」,絕對不是像降電價、減補充保費這樣討好式的小恩小惠,而是必須在論述和境界 上有所開展,讓民眾覺得對未來有更美好的憧憬,覺得社會正義和人情義理受到了照顧。哪怕只是一次精采的辯論,執政者能鏗鏘有聲地駁斥了在野黨的遁詞,都有 助於贏得人心。這些,是馬政府歷經了洪仲丘事件、太陽花、廢核四、反課綱等運動後,似是再也看不到的情景。

一個畏怯的政 府不可能帶領國家,一個懦弱的內閣不可能贏得尊重。從太陽花學運後,馬政府就在一路退卻,彷彿只求安然拖過任期;也因此,內閣人事布局與施政作為都形同一 片死水。殊不知,目前距離大選雖只有三個月,但距離明年五月的任期屆滿還有七個月;如果政府早早就抱持「五日京兆」的心態等著下台,請問:這不是在羞辱民 主政治嗎?