Can Tsai Ying-wen Control the DPP's Factions?

Can Tsai Ying-wen Control the DPP's Factions?
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC) 
A Translation 
October 30, 2016

Executive Summary: Political arm-twising requires both power distribution and power sharing. For example, the "Policy Coordination Committee” meetings convened by the president include such dubious participants asChen Chu and Chiu Yi-jen. She was merely using factional rivalry to consolidate her political power. Unfortunately when Tsai's popularity declines, she will find it harder to control factions using her prestige. She will be forced to meet factional demands by resorting to ever more power distribtion and power sharing. By that time, will Tsai Ing-wen still be in control of the government, or will she have become a mere figurehead? Will she be forced to appoint someone she does not want as premier?

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The chairmanship of China Steel, which has remained vacant for four months, will finally be filled from within the company by former General Manager Weng Chao-tung. Meanwhile, former chairman Sung Chi-yu has retired. Jostling among DPP factions has made the appointment of a successor impossible. Ministry of Economic Affairs Deputy Chief Shen Jung-chin is filling in on a temporary basis. This has set a new and rare precedent. These personnel appointments have remained unfilled for such a long time because the Tsai government and Kaohsiung Mayor Chen Chu have both dug in their heels.

According to reports, The Tsai government's preferred candidate was former China Steel chairman Chiang Yao-chung. Chen Chu's perferred candidate was former board member Lin Wen-yuan. Lin is less cooperative. His personal manners are controversial. He even intervened in a rights dispute over Taiwan Benzene, a one time party owned enterprise belonging to the KMT. Therefore the Tsai government is reluctant to accept him as a candidate. But fearful of angering Chen Ju, Tsai hesitated to come right out and appoint Chiang Yao-chung. Eventually the Tsai government was forced to appoint Chiang Yao-chung to the Taiwan High Speed Rail System, and compromise on the China Steel appointment by appointing Weng Chao-tung. Weng tung is nominally a compromise candidate, but was in fact vetted by Chen Chu.

China Petroleum chairman Chen Chin-teh is also a beloved Chen Chu lieutenant, and former deputy mayor of Kaohsiung. The central government takes into consideration the feelings of local government heads regarding local state-owned enterprises. This is understandable, and conducive to good relations. But appointments to state owned enterprises are the purview of the central government. Local government heads normally do have veto power over central government appointments. Chen Chu was an elder of the New Tide Faction, and current head of the Chen Chu Faction. Such an arrangement makes it even more difficult to escape the shadow of factional struggle.

DPP factions have long enjoyed a symbiotic relationship with the DPP. The DPP has repeatedly proclaimed the "dissolution of factions". But intraparty factions have repeatedly reconstituted themselves or cross-bred in response to political necessity. They never really disappeared. This is evidenced by the fact that SEF Chairman Hung Chi-chang was expelled from the New Tide Faction this March.

DPP factions differ from the Kuomintang's "bottom up" local factions. DPP factions are the result of a combination of party member ideology and shared history. After long evolution, many factions have become personal connections. As a result, many factions are named after persons. For example, Chen Chu and William Lai both emerged from the New Tide Faction. But years of cultivating their own power bases has enabled them to head their own factions. Others, such as Frank Hsieh, Su Tseng-chang, and Yu Hsi-kun, each have their eponymous factions. During his presidency, Chen Shui-bian had his Mainstream Alliance faction. Today there is even a "One Nation on Each Side Faction".

These factions however, are largely distinct from traditional DPP factions. The sole exception to this rule is President Tsai. She does not belong to any traditional faction, but has gradually become a party leader in her own right. Tsai Ing-wen has long been an outsider, beginning when the DPP was out of power, and ending when it assumed power for the first time. Tsai Ing-wen rose to power with considerable help from the New Tide Faction. Only after Tsai Ying-wen was elected president, did the so-called Ying Faction formally take shape.

The Ying Faction is the result of a combination of special interests and political styles. It lacks deep roots. It lacks revolutionary fervor and ideological commitment. It lacks close ties to regional power brokers. It lacks personal connections. As a result, the Tsai government requires “factional symbiosis" to survive. Factional symbiosis rests on three pillars. The first is camaraderie among a leader and his followers, rooted in shared party history and revolutionary sentiments. The second is quid pro quo power exchanges. The third is the leader's prestige. Tsai Ing-wen lacks the first. She must rely solely on power and prestige. For example, during the battle over leadership of the legislature, Tsai Ying-wen vigorously backed Su Chia-chuan, one of her own, as premier, who partnered with the New Tide Faction's Tsai Chi-chang. This was a perfect example of her dependence upon power and prestige.

The problem is, no matter how many positions of power one has to allocate, it is hard to meet the demands of so many factions. More positions unequally distributed could even provoke a greater backlash. As a result, the Tsai government has been forced to create new positions. These include previously rumored level three central government agency heads, nominations by blue camp legislators, and the relaxation of qualifications for diplomats. They even include level two political appointees to deputy chief, and deputy chiefs of level three agencies.

Political arm-twising requires both power distribution and power sharing. For example, the "Policy Coordination Committee” meetings convened by the president include such dubious participants asChen Chu and Chiu Yi-jen. She was merely using factional rivalry to consolidate her political power. Unfortunately when Tsai's popularity declines, she will find it harder to control factions using her prestige. She will be forced to meet factional demands by resorting to ever more power distribtion and power sharing. By that time, will Tsai Ing-wen still be in control of the government, or will she have become a mere figurehead? Will she be forced to appoint someone she does not want as premier?

蔡英文駕馭得了民進黨派系嗎？
2016-10-30 聯合報

懸缺四個月的中鋼董事長，終於確定由原總經理翁朝棟內升。在此期間，前董事長宋志育退休，接任人選卻因民進黨派系競相推薦人選爭取無法擺平，而由經濟部政務次長沈榮津暫代，創下罕見紀錄。此一人事之所以久懸，與蔡政府和高雄市長陳菊各有堅持有關。

據報導，蔡政府屬意的人選，是曾任中鋼董事長的江耀宗；而陳菊想要的人選，則是另一名與其配合度較佳、亦曾任中鋼董座的林文淵。由於林文淵個人作風爭議甚大，甚至介入前國民黨黨營事業台苯的經營權之爭，蔡政府因此遲遲不願埋單；但為免觸怒陳菊，也不敢直接任命江耀宗接任。最後，蔡政府只好改派江耀宗接任高鐵，中鋼則由雙方妥協的人選翁朝棟出任。雖曰「妥協」，但翁朝棟仍是經「陳菊認可」而出線。

除了中鋼人事，中油董事長陳金德也是陳菊愛將，曾任高雄市副市長。為求「敦親睦鄰」，政府對於在地國營事業的人事要尊重地方首長意見，本無可厚非；然而，原本屬於中央的國營事業人事權，竟要地方首長點頭才能敲定，實非尋常。陳菊是民進黨「新潮流」的元老，更是當今「菊系」龍頭，此一安排，就更難脫派系角力的影子。

民進黨的派系，與民進黨的發展一直是一種「共生」關係。儘管民進黨幾度宣布「解散派系」，事實上，黨內派系因為政治形勢而迭有重組或換血，卻從來不曾真正消失。這點，從今年三月前海基會董事長洪奇昌遭到新潮流系「除名」，即可見一斑。

民進黨內的派系，和國民黨「由下而上」的地方派系本質不同，是成員基於理念或歷史背景的結合；經過多年演變，如今不少派系則變成是「人脈」的繁衍與分殖，因此才有眾多依姓氏命名的派系。例如，陳菊和賴清德都出身新潮流系，卻因多年經營的政治實力，擁有各自的派系；其餘如謝長廷的「謝系」、蘇貞昌的「蘇系」、游錫堃的「游系」，陳水扁擔任總統時有「主流聯盟」，現在則有「一邊一國連線」。

但萬變不離其宗，這些派系多半仍與民進黨的傳統派系相承。唯一的例外，是蔡總統在黨內逐漸定於一尊，但蔡英文並不屬於任何傳統派系。畢竟，在民進黨從在野到第一次執政的過程，蔡英文始終是一個「局外人」。蔡英文在取得政權的過程中，得力於新系的助力甚多；一直到蔡英文當選總統，所謂「英系」才正式以組織化的型態出線。

所謂的英系，其實是基於利益與風格向實力靠攏的結合，缺乏革命感情與意識形態的根深底蘊，也缺乏地緣或人脈的緊密關係；也因此，蔡政府注定只能「與派系共生」。「派系共生」原仰賴三大支柱：一，是領導者與黨內的淵源及革命情感，二是權位的交換，三是領導人的威望。蔡英文缺了其一，只能靠權位和威望來羈縻。例如在國會龍頭之爭，蔡英文強推自己屬意的蘇嘉全為院長，搭配新系的蔡其昌，就是結合威望與權位的範例。

問題是，可以分配的位子再多，也難讓眾多派系人馬完全饜足。甚至可以說，位子越多，因為分配不均而引發的反彈還可能更大。為此，蔡政府只好拚命製造「新位子」，除了先前傳出的中央三級機關首長、監委提名和外交官資格放寬，連二級政務次長、三級機關副首長也欲染指。

政治上的攏絡手段，除了權位分配，還有權力分享。例如，總統召集的「執政決策協調會議」，納入非名正言順的陳菊和邱義仁，就是在借重派系力量來鞏固政權。問題是，當蔡英文聲望不斷下跌，她勢必更難用威望來駕馭派系，而必須用更多的權位或權力分享來滿足派系的要求。屆時，蔡英文是否仍能充分掌握國政，或者她將變成名義上的共主，或者她將被迫任命自己不想要的閣揆？