United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 23, 2016
Executive Summary: In recent years, the PRC has rapidly increased its military might. The strategic balance has become increasingly unfavorable for Taipei. Therefore, Tsai government cries for an autonomous national defense may receive considerable public support. But the government must learn its lessons. It must ensure balance as it procures arms and builds up the defense industry. It must prevent businessmen and politicians from engaging in war profiteering. If mercurial public sentiment enables the looting of the nation's coffers, those responsible will not escape punishment.
Full Text Below:
Since the new government assumed power, calls for “autonomous national defense” industries have rung out. Tsai Ing-wen visited relevant the industries. She emphasized the development of northern, central, and southern Taiwan information, aerospace, shipbuilding industries, as well as the domestic manufacture of submarines and advanced trainer aircraft. But during a recent US Taiwan Defense Industry Conference, Washington poured cold water on the prospect of autonomous national defense. Pentagon senior adviser David Helvey openly questioned domestic Taiwan submarine and trainer aircraft manufacturing. David An, a former State Department official and researcher at the Global Taiwan Institute, a pro-green Washington think tank, warned that for Taiwan, domestically manufactured submarines are an unrealistic proposition.
Over 30 years ago, the United States severed diplomatic relations and ended arms sales to the ROC. President Chiang Ching-kuo called for the domestic manufacture of second-generation military hardware. During Hau Pei-tsun's eight years as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the government spent heavily on R&D for jet fighters, warships, tanks, missiles, and other weapons. By the 1999s, military strength had increased dramatically. But since then, the government has been slow to update equipment. Warships, jet fighters, and other weapons have all been outsourced.
The “no expense spared” approach adopted back then no longer sustainable. The main reason is that while we may seek autonomy, we lack sustainable industrial management. We may be bent on replacing old weapons, but cannot sustain the manufacture of of new weapons. Following the Tiananmen Incident, the United States, France, and other nations relaxed restrictions on the sale of arms to Taiwan, including militarily advanced F-16s, Mirage 2000s, and other fighters. But this unexpectedly undermined production of the Indigenous Defense Fighter. Worse still, the purchase of new equipment, all at one time, placed an enormous strain on the budget. It also posed the problem of simultaneous replacement of aging equipment.
When considering defense industry autonomy, one point must be made clear. Autonomous national defense is not synonymous with having a domestic defense industry. So-called autonomy in domestic arms manufacturing is a matter of degree. On the weapons market, “100% domestic content” is almost non-existent. Even US weapons accessories are not necessarily locally made. In other words, it is meaningless to regard "autonomy" as some sort of Holy Grail. What is important is obtaining the most urgently needed weapons and equipment for national defense. One must also consider whether investments in certain weapons and equipment can promote national industrial development.
Consider the two major would be “autonomous” items. The United States has not produced diesel-powered submarines for years. It has no inventory available for purchase. European countries fear pressure from Beijing. They are even less likely to sell arms to Taiwan. Under the circumstances, our military has no choice but to take the Dutch Sternon Class hull, and outfit it with US weapons systems. Even assuming such a “domestically manufactured” submarine works, it will be a poor value. But submarines can be replaced by other weapons systems. One may have to bite the bullet. But what else can one do?
Consider advanced trainer aircraft. It is possible to purchase products containing top-secret technology. Therefore one must consider cost. One must consider the issue of industrial production. One of the most obvious problems is the economies of scale. Domestically manufactured jet fighters and other advanced weapons, are subject to export controls. Domestic demand is limited. Low production volumes combined with high research and development costs, mean prices will remain high. Therefore, one must carefully consider whether R&D for only 66 new aircraft is worth the outlay.
Also, modern weapons cost more and more. Service lives are longer and longer. Fighters and warships are frequently used for over 30 years. Spare parts must remain available for the life of the product. But the fewer units produced, the more parts are likely to be out of stock, and the more a product is likely to be orphaned in the middle of its service life, seriously impacting combat efficiency and operational safety.
To industrialize national defense, one must reject the shibboleth of autonomy. One must integrate oneself fully into the global industrial chain. One must achieve sufficient economic scale to ensure a sustainable arms industry. Only a sustainable industry can advance upstream, and step by step increase its international presence. Only a small number of absolutely essential items should be “cost is no object” and require "storming the hills" regardless of cost.
In recent years, the PRC has rapidly increased its military might. The strategic balance has become increasingly unfavorable for Taipei. Therefore, Tsai government cries for an autonomous national defense may receive considerable public support. But the government must learn its lessons. It must ensure balance as it procures arms and builds up the defense industry. It must prevent businessmen and politicians from engaging in war profiteering. If mercurial public sentiment enables the looting of the nation's coffers, those responsible will not escape punishment.
美國何以潑我「自主國防」冷水
2016-10-23 聯合報
新政府上台後，「自主國防產業」的口號震天；蔡英文並走訪相關廠商，強調要在北中南基地發展資訊、航太、造船產業，要自製潛艦及高級教練機。但美方最近卻在美台國防工業會議對這股「自主國防熱」大潑冷水，五角大廈資深顧問海大衛（David Helvey），公開質疑自製潛艦與教練機政策；華府親綠智庫「全球台灣研究所」研究員，國務院出身的安大維（David An）最近也警告，「完全自製潛艦」對台灣是不切實際的誘惑。
早在卅多年前美國與我斷交並限縮軍售時，蔣經國總統就裁示自製二代兵力。在參謀總長郝柏村八年任內，政府砸下重金研發戰機、軍艦、戰車、飛彈等武器，到九○年代逐一開花結果，使國軍實力大幅提升。但自此之後，裝備更新卻呈現遲緩趨勢，主力戰艦、戰機等兵器又落到必須外購的境地。
當年不惜砸巨資的成就，如今難以為繼，主因是主事者雖有自立自強的雄心，卻缺乏產業永續經營的觀念：一心想著汰換舊武器，卻未考慮新裝備入列後生產線如何維持。中共六四事件後，美法等國大幅放寬對台軍售限制，國軍獲得先進的F-16、幻象兩千等戰機；不料，卻也使得經國號產量慘遭腰斬。更糟的是，所有新裝備同時換裝，不僅造成使用單位壓力大增，也面臨未來同時屆齡汰換的難題。
倡議自主國防產業，必須先釐清：「自主國防」與「國防產業」之間並非等號關係。所謂「自主」，其實只是自製程度之別，武器市場幾乎不存在「純國產」；即使是美國，武器裝備的零附件也未必皆為本土製造。亦即，把「自主」當成神主牌，其實毫無意義。重要的是如何獲得最迫切需要的武器裝備，以滿足國防的需求。同時仔細盤算，為獲得某些武器裝備所付出的投資，是否有帶動本國產業發展的作用。
檢視目前國軍兩大「自主」計畫：在潛艦方面，美國已多年不生產柴電動力潛艦，根本沒有現貨可賣；歐洲各國忌憚北京壓力，更不可能軍售台灣。面對此情況，國軍以現役荷蘭劍龍級船體設計，搭配美國的戰系、兵器等「內裝」，堪稱是無奈的選擇。可以斷言，即使國造潛艦成功，「性價比」也必偏低。但潛艦的戰略價值非其他武器所能取代，即使咬牙吞血，也只能勉力一拚。
至於高級教練機，並非無法購得的絕密技術產品，就不該「何必曰利」，而須先從產業角度出發。其中最需注意的，就是規模經濟問題：國人自製戰機等先進武器，受限外交情勢難以外銷，本身需求數目有限，以低產量負擔研發開銷，成本必定居高不下。因此，為了區區六十六架的需求量，去研發一架新機，是否合算，便必須仔細斟酌。
另一方面，現代武器愈來愈貴，役期愈來愈長，戰機艦艇動輒使用廿、卅年以上，所使用的各種零附件也必須在壽期內都保證無缺。如果產量愈少，零件愈可能斷貨，就愈容易在服役中期後，淪為後勤不繼的「孤兒機」，嚴重影響戰力與操作安全性。
要落實國防工業「產業化」，必須捨棄「全自製」的誘惑，而要盡最大可能融入全球產業鏈，才能夠建立足夠的經濟規模，並替業者找出可行的獲利模式。只有確認能永續經營，業者才可能力爭上游，按部就班提升其國際合作的參與度。只有在少數絕對必要的項目上，才須忘記經濟面的優先考量，應不計成本地「強攻山頭」。
近年中共軍力突飛猛進，戰略天平日益對我不利。也因此，蔡政府喊出自主國防，可以獲得相當程度的輿論支持。但當局仍務須記取教訓，在獲得新武器與建立國防產業間，須找到適切的平衡點，更不可容許商人或政客趁機「發國難財」。若以一時民氣為障眼，趁機攫取國防資源，造成國家得不償失，將罪無可逭。
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