United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 17, 2016
Executive Summary: The Tsai government must come to the realization that internally directed Taiwan independence requires an internally directed solution. Without such an understanding, the contradiction between "We will not yield under pressure", and "We will not return to the old path of confrontation", will continue to undermine the credibility of her administration. Taiwan independence forces will run rampant. Centrist voters will be disillusioned. Problems will be harder to solve
Full Text Below:
Is Taiwan independence a problem that can be resolved by means of international and cross-Strait politics? If not, then it must be resolved by means of internal politics within Taiwan. The Tsai government must not divide Taiwan internally, while denying it solution externally. Internal problems require internal solutions.
Taiwan independence was once regarded as an external problem. It was seen as a breakthrough that could solve the nation's external problems. The belief was that severing Taiwan's connection to the Mainland would enable it to become a new and independent nation on the international scene.
But the cross-Strait and international situation has changed. Taiwan independence is clearly impossible. It is no longer an external problem. It has become an internal problem. In other words, Taiwan independence has become a purely internal political controversy inside Taiwan. It has even been reduced to the level of an internal struggle within the green camp, one concerning the green camp's political path and who will hold power. Taiwan independence is a unsolved problem, because internal struggles within the green camp have remained unsolved.
Editorials published by this newspaper have said that “externally directed Taiwan independence”, or "Taiwan independence directed against forces outside of Taiwan”, has waned, while “internally directed Taiwan independence", or “Taiwan independence that tears Taiwan apart from within”, persists. These are the two forms that Taiwan independence takes.
In her National Day address, President Tsai said, "We will not return to the old path of confrontation." This is consistent with Su Tseng-chang's declaration that, "We will not return to the old ways of Taiwan independence." President Tsai also pledged to conduct cross-Strait relations “in accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of China and the Regulations Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the People of the Mainland China Area”. These remarks show that President Tsai realizes externally directed Taiwan independence has lost its appeal.
On the other hand, President Tsai failed to mention the 1992 Consensus, and instead stressed that, "We will not yield under pressure." This was intended to mollify Taiwan independence forces. It shows that internally directed Taiwan independence continues to hold the Tsai government hostage.
The Tsai government's current dilemma reveals that externally directed Taiwan independence has subsided, but internally directed Taiwan independence persists. Therefore, if the Tsai government cannot promote externally directed Taiwan independence, it must defang internally directed Taiwan independence.
The Tsai government is clearly being held hostage by the Taiwan independence camp. Taiwan independence forces, both abroad and within Taiwan, have shrunk dramatically. Nevertheless they continue to exert a major impact on Taiwan's politics. Therefore, if the Tsai government wants to resolve the problem of Taiwan independence, it must find a new base of support. It must liberate itself from Taiwan independence captivity. It must appeal to pale green voters, pale blue voters, and swing voters. It must change its base of support, enabling it to change its cross-Strait policy and rhetoric.
During President Tsai's inaugural address and National Day address, what Tsai actually said was the following: In fact I have accepted everything that [Beijing wants]. I will not renege on my commitments. I will not retract my goodwill gestures. I will not return to the old ways of confrontation. But because I remain fettered by Taiwan independence forces, I will not change my mind, and I cannot utter the words "1992 Consensus". Beijing's view is this: Since you have accepted all of our demands, and since you have no intention of reneging on your promises, of retracting your goodwill gestures, or returning to the old ways of confrontation, why do you refuse to utter the words "1992 Consensus"? Beijing knows that Tsai's refusal to utter these two words show that she has yet to liberate herself from Taiwan independence captivity. They know that if she is willing to utter the words "1992 Consensus", then she is willing to fight.
Anyone can see that President Tsai's statement, "We will not yield under pressure", flatly contradicts her other statement, "We will not return to the old path of confrontation". Since President Tsai has vowed not to return to the old path of confrontation, what reason does she have for not accepting the 1992 Consensus and peaceful cross-Strait relations? When President Tsai vows that she "will not yield under pressure", it is a sure sign that feels obligated to “confront” the 1992 Consensus. The Tsai government knows that externally directed Taiwan independence is no longer feasible. But she remains fettered by internally directed Taiwan independence. Beijing understands this. Therefore, Beijing considers Tsai's willingness or unwillingness to utter the words "1992 Consensus" an indicator of whether she remains a captive of Taiwan independence forces.
President Tsai's inaugural address and National Day address show that externally directed Taiwan independence has retreated, but internally directed Taiwan independence persists. Therefore the Tsai government cannot count on help from the outside world. Its only solution is to change its base of support. Only then can it break free of interference from Taiwan independence forces.
The Tsai government must come to the realization that internally directed Taiwan independence requires an internally directed solution. Without such an understanding, the contradiction between "We will not yield under pressure", and "We will not return to the old path of confrontation", will continue to undermine the credibility of her administration. Taiwan independence forces will run rampant. Centrist voters will be disillusioned. Problems will be harder to solve
台獨：內向事件 內部解決
2016-10-17 聯合報
台獨的方案，若不能向國際及兩岸取得發展，即必須設法在台灣內部政治中加以化解。蔡政府不可使台獨成為「對外沒有出路／對內只有撕裂」的自我戕害之路。內向事件，必須內部解決。
台獨曾被認為是一個「外向事件」，亦即被視為是一個突破及解決國家外在困境的方案。具體而言，即切斷與中國的連結，使台灣在國際上成為新而獨立的國家。
但是，隨著兩岸格局及國際情勢的推移變化，台獨顯然已是無可能實現之事，其「外向性」也就急劇消減，反過來則愈來愈變成只是一個「內向事件」。亦即，台獨其實已然成為純粹台灣內部的政治爭議，甚至成為只是綠營內部路線及權力鬥爭的外溢題材而已。台獨之所以無解，只因綠營內部的鬥爭無解。
本報社論曾說，「外擊型的台獨」（即攻擊台灣外在敵對勢力的台獨）已經式微，「內殺型的台獨」（即撕裂台灣內部政治的台獨）仍然存在。這即是指出了台獨的外向性及內向性。
蔡總統在國慶演說中說「不會走回對抗的老路」，此語與蘇貞昌曾說的「不會走回台獨的老路」應有交集；蔡總統並重申，「依據中華民國憲法、兩岸人民關係條例，處理兩岸事務」。這些說法，皆可印證蔡總統也知：外向性外擊型的台獨已然消退。
與此對照，蔡總統在演說中仍未提「九二共識」四字，並說「我們不會在壓力下屈服」，這則是要向獨派交代，也顯示了內向性內殺型的台獨仍然綑綁了蔡政府。
蔡政府今日的矛盾，其實只是反映了「外向性外擊型台獨」已然消退，及「內向性內殺型台獨」依然存在的悖論。因而，蔡政府若不能發展外擊型的台獨，即必須化解內殺型的台獨。
蔡政府顯然已被獨派所挾持，這股內向性內殺型的台獨勢力，無論在國際上及台灣內部皆趨向萎縮，如今卻對台灣政局產生了巨幅超越比例的嚴重影響。因此，蔡政府若想處理台獨問題，即必須設法換置改組其社會支持的結構。亦即，必須設法從獨派的挾持中脫困，積極地柔化淺綠、爭取淺藍、擁抱廣大的中間選民，使其社會支持結構得以換置改組，並在此基礎上重新整理其兩岸論述及政策。
蔡總統就職演說及國慶談話的兩岸論述語意是：我其實什麼都接受了，我不會改變承諾，不會改變善意，我也不會走回對抗的老路；只是，我因獨派的羈絆而不能說出「九二共識」那四個字。北京的語境則是：妳既然認為什麼都可以接受，有承諾，有善意，不走回對抗的老路，則為什麼不能說出「九二共識」這四個字？北京知道，蔡不說這四個字，正顯示她未跳脫獨派的挾持。如此，是否說出九二共識四字，就成了是否「對抗」的指標。
任何人皆可看出，蔡總統所說「我們不會在壓力下屈服」與「不會走回對抗的老路」這兩句話的矛盾。蔡總統既說「不會走回對抗的老路」，則有何理由不接受「和平發展」的九二共識？而她所謂的「不會在壓力下屈服」，正是表明了她在獨派挾持下不得不「對抗」「九二共識」四字的困境。蔡政府這種自知外擊型台獨已無可能，卻又被內殺型台獨綑綁的困境，自然看在北京的眼中；所以北京也就將「說不說九二共識」視為蔡英文能不能擺脫獨派挾持的指標，因而更不肯放過這四個字。
蔡總統的就職演說及國慶談話，皆顯示外擊型的台獨已然消退，而內殺型的台獨依然存在。因此，處理台獨問題既不可能寄望於對外發展，唯一的解決路徑就是要換置改造蔡政府的社會支持結構，掙脫獨派挾持。
蔡政府若沒有這種「內向事件／內部解決」的認知，倘放任現今這種「不屈服／不對抗」的矛盾情勢繼續惡化下去，將使獨派更加張揚，中間選民更加失望，整個局面就更難收拾了。
No comments:
Post a Comment