Monday, October 3, 2016

Just Who is Leading the Nation? President Tsai, or Chairman Tsai?

Just Who is Leading the Nation? President Tsai, or Chairman Tsai? 
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC) 
A Translation 
October 3, 2016

Executive Summary: President Tsai regards the existing constitutional framework as "fetters". She has totally forgotten her passionate election night rhetoric, when she ringingly proclaimed that, "The DPP will not adopt a winner takes all attitude. We will listen to the public and proceed with reform on behalf of all political parties. In my capacity as president, and my capacity as party chairman, I am issuing my first order to all members of the Democratic Progressive Party: humility, humility, and more humility.”

Full Text Below:

On October 3, President Tsai held her first "Policy Coordination Conference", which will be held on a regular basis every week. The president herself will preside over the meeting. Members will include the vice president, premier, secretary-generals of the Presidential Office and National Security Council, chief convener of the DPP Legislative Yuan party caucus, secretary-general of the DPP, CEO of the DPP think tank, and representatives from DPP governed counties and municipalities. This decision-making model amounts to "merging of party and government". The Executive Yuan and the Legislative Yuan are supposed to check and balance each other. Their merger is clearly contrary to the spirit of the Constitution, and will inevitably lead to the resurgence of authoritarianism. For President Tsai, this is a major political gamble.

At the beginning of her term, President Tsai, like her predecessors, opted to remain behind the front line, and establish communication channels between the government, the party, the executive, and the legislature. But clearly for this president, the results have been less than ideal. Public approval of her and the premier has plummeted, forcing her to take to the front line and manage the big picture.

Will the new coordination mechanism work? That remains in question. After all, the government, the party, the executive, and the legislature, each have their own constitutional roles and functions. They each have different roles, and the public has different expectations from them. Communication barriers will always exist. If the president comes on too strong, she will merely turn any policy coordination conference into a platform by which the president can intervene directly in government affairs. Examples include the "nine-man team" during the Chen era. They were considered nothing more than yes men. The government will then move in the direction of strongman politics. Or, as during the Ma Ying-jeou era, weak presidential leadership led to long-term disagreements between the president and the legislature, divisions within the KMT, and KMT loss of rule.

The obstacles Tsai faces will be harder to overcome than those faced by the previous two presidents. Taiwan's economy faces unprecedented difficulties. Ever since the KMT government gained a foothold on Taiwan, it has never fought for merely a 1% GDP increase. Public demand for social justice has reached new highs. The DPP government must simultaneously grow the economy and promote social reform. Meanwhile, DPP goals are clearly at odds with the constitutional framework of the Republic of China. President Tsai herself uses the expression "fettered by the constitutional framework". Cross-Strait relations have deteriorated to the level of "cold confrontation". The cross-Strait power disparity is increasingly unfavorable to Taiwan. Troubled cross-Strait relations harm Taiwan's economy. The problems are interconnected, layer upon layer, and result in a vicious circle.

Ms. Tsai has two identities: President of the Republic of China, and Chairman of the Democratic Progressive Party. She appears to be consciously switching between the two roles, in an attempt to fulfill both. For example, as party chairman, she published an open letter to the DPP referring to the other side as “China”, in accordance with DPP orthodoxy. She stressed that she would "resist pressure from China". But afterwards, she spoke again as president. She reverted to campaign rhetoric, and referred to the other side as "Mainland China", and responded to Mainland pressure in a low keyed manner. This was intended to moderate the conflict between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. It also represented adherence to the law. After all, President Tsai made a clear commitment in her inaugural address. She would deal with cross-Strait issues in accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of China and the Regulations on Cross-Strait Relations between the People.

This dichotomy shows that President Tsai is deliberately differentiating the government from the DPP. This of course runs counter to President Tsai's goal of unifying party and government. In fact, President Tsai's separation of presidency and party chairmanship will only make it more difficult for the Tsai government to coordinate with the DPP and the DPP dominated legislature. Party leaders and party legislators will not know how to proceed. The party and the government singing different tunes will pose a problem difficult to overcome.

Even more paradoxically, the "Policy Coordination Conference" appears to represent political responsibility. But it will inevitably become a DPP policy-making platform. After all, all the participants are DPP or Presidential appointees. How can this be anything other than “DPP Rules”? Moreover, if this fundamental contradiction remains unresolved, final coordination will be made by the DPP or even the President herself. Government officials will find themselves on the horns of a dilemma.

President Tsai should reconsider the logic of her Policy Coordination Conference. She may be attempting to ensure party and government unity. But she must also honor the public nature of government. Since it is public in nature, it must be subject to oversight by the opposition party and the people as a whole. Any decision-making mechanism that does not include opposition parties and citizen representatives, can hardly provide genuine checks and balances. President Tsai's Policy Coordination Conference is wanting in this respect. We maintain that President Tsai, in her capacity as party chairman, must hold talks with the chairmen of opposition parties, in order to seek consensus. As president, she must also seize the initiative and report to the Legislative Yuan for questioning. The Constitution does not require this, but it would demonstrate her willingness to accept public opinion.

President Tsai regards the existing constitutional framework as "fetters". She has totally forgotten her passionate election night rhetoric, when she ringingly proclaimed that, "The DPP will not adopt a winner takes all attitude. We will listen to the public and proceed with reform on behalf of all political parties. In my capacity as president, and my capacity as party chairman, I am issuing my first order to all members of the Democratic Progressive Party: humility, humility, and more humility.”

社論》究竟是蔡總統或蔡主席領導國家
2016/10/3 下午 08:36:00  主筆室

蔡總統3日舉行首次「執政決策協調會議」,將每周定期舉行。會報由總統本人主持,成員包括政府方面的副總統、行政院長、總統府和國安會兩祕書長,及黨職的立法院黨團總召、民進黨祕書長和民進黨智庫執行長,並加入該黨執政直轄市長或代表。這是一種「黨政合一」的決策模式,將原屬制衡關係的行政院與立法院納入,與憲政精神顯有扞格,難免遭致「威權復辟」的質疑,就蔡英文總統個人而言,更是極大的政治賭注。

就任之初,蔡總統與前兩任總統類似,都選擇退居第二線,藉成立多個協調機制來處理府、黨與行政、立法兩院間的溝通整合事宜,但顯然和前兩任總統類似,都沒有產生很好的效果,總統和行政院長民意支持度急遽下滑,迫使她必須親上火線,直接領導全局。

但新協調機制能否發揮作用,恐怕要打上大大問號,畢竟府、黨及行政、立法兩院各有憲政地位、職務功能及不同的民意角色和期待,溝通障礙永遠存在。親上火線的總統如果過度強勢,只會讓執政決策協調會議成為總統直接干預政務的平台,如阿扁當年的「九人小組」,與會者淪為背書角色,國家走向強人政治,朝野衝突擴大,民心不安;或如馬英九總統時代,弱勢領導造成總統與立法院之間的長期不合,終至國民黨分裂而失去執政權。

蔡英文面對的障礙,可能比前兩任總統更難克服,一方面來自台灣經濟陷入前所未有的困難,自國民黨政府在台灣站穩腳跟開始,從來不曾為GDP「保1」奮鬥,但民眾對社會公平正義的需求又空前高漲,民進黨政府必須同時拚經濟並推動社會改革,改革不易。二方面,民進黨的發展目標與中華民國憲政體制顯有矛盾與衝突,連蔡總統自己都用「憲政體制羈絆」一詞。民進黨的台獨目標又造成大陸的疑慮,兩岸關係陷入「冷對抗」,兩岸實力對比對台灣已經愈來愈不利,兩岸關係不順,又對台灣經濟造成新的傷害,障礙環環相扣、層層相加,走向惡性循環。

蔡英文女士其實有兩個身分,一是中華民國總統,二是民進黨主席,她似乎有意周旋在兩個角色之間,企圖左右逢源。譬如,她曾以黨主席身分發表致民進黨員公開信,按照民進黨立場用「中國」稱呼對岸,強調要「力抗中國的壓力」。之後又以總統身分發表演說,又回到勝選以來的處理方式,以「中國大陸」稱呼對岸,使用溫和的「面對」一詞來敘述大陸的壓力。這不僅是想要降低兩岸衝突氛圍,更代表總統依法行政的理念,畢竟蔡總統在就職演說中曾明確承諾,要依照《中華民國憲法》和《兩岸人民關係條例》來處理兩岸問題。

這種二分的作法顯示蔡總統有意區分政府與民進黨,卻又與蔡總統召開協調會議的黨政合一目標背道而馳。事實上,蔡總統區隔總統與黨主席身分的作法,只會讓政府部會與民進黨及其立法院黨團之間更加難以協調,也讓部會首長與黨籍立委不知所措,黨政不同調反而難以克服。

更弔詭的是,「執政決策協調會議」看似為了落實執政黨責任政治,卻難免變成民進黨的決策平台,因為所有參與者都是民進黨員或是總統任命的政務官,這豈不成了民進黨家天下?而且,如若不解決上述根本矛盾,最終這一協調機制只會變成民進黨甚至蔡總統本人的一言堂,政府官員則只會陷入進退維谷的境地。

蔡總統應該重新思考這一協調機制的運作邏輯,即便是要推行黨政合一,也應該注意到政府的公器性質。既然是公器,自然該接受反對黨和全民的監督,任何決策機制若不納入在野黨和公民代表,都難以產生真正的制衡,蔡總統的協調機制卻在此問題上付之闕如。我們主張,蔡總統應以黨主席身分與在野黨主席會談,尋求共識。她也應以總統身分主動到立法院提出施政報告並接受質詢。《憲法》雖無規定,亦未禁止,卻能彰顯接受民意監督的意義。

蔡總統將現有的憲政體制視為「羈絆」,全然忘記她在勝選之夜的熱血演說,「民進黨不會整碗捧去,我們開放傾聽民眾聲音,邀請所有政黨為了改革全力以赴。在這我要以總統當選人身分,也要以黨主席的身分,對民進黨全體黨公職人員下達第一個命令:謙卑、謙卑、再謙卑。

No comments: