From Free China to Democratic China
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 11, 2012
Summary: This paper's editorials have pointed out a number of issues. Claims that "Both sides are part of the Republic of China," that "Both sides belong to the People's Republic of China," or that there is "one country on each side," are all unsustainable. The "one China, different interpetations" position is unstable. Perhaps it is time to argue that "The two sides are part of the big roof concept of one China?"
Full Text below:
Suppose one wishes to establish a real world legal framework for the "big roof concept of one China." Suppose one wishes to establish a Chinese Confederation, or include "big roof China" provisions in a peace agreement or military confidence building mechanism. It may not be that easy.
But one can surely establish a "big roof China" climate between Taiwan and the Chinese mainland, and within the ethnic Chinese realm. It merely requires the government and opposition on Taiwan to reach a consensus, and agree that "The Republic of China is democratic China." If they can do this, they can surely change the perception of Chinese citizens on both sides of the Strait, and ethnic Chinese the world over. The "big roof concept of one China" could then become the perceptual reality for "The China of the common man."
The "big roof concept of one China" means that the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China together make up one China. It is a one China that embodies and integrates sovereignty for both sides of the Strait. Under the "big roof concept of one China," the Republic of China is democratic China, and the People's Republic of China is socialist China. Both are part of one China.
On August 15 two flags were simultaneously carried onto the Diaoyutai Islands. This was a manifestation of how the "The China of the common man" perceives China, as a "big roof concept of one China."
Today we have a cross-Strait stalemate. To the public on Taiwan, the claim that "One China is the People's Republic of China" is unthinkable. The psychological and political reintegration of both sides into one China, is inconceivable unless the public on Taiwan can be persuaded to once again think of themselves as Chinese, and as citizens of a Chinese nation.
The two sides remain frozen at the stage of "one China, different interpretations" and "seeking common ground while shelving differences." The claim that "One China is the Republic of China" cannot be sustained. The claim that "One China is the People's Republic of China" cannot be realized. This shows that the two sides have no common ground to seek. If the two sides truly wish to "seek common ground," they must first establish a "one China principle" or "one China framework." They must first establish an achievable common ground that transcends differences. This achievable common ground is the "big roof concept of one China."
An editorial published by this newspaper pointed out that during the 50s and 60s, the Republic of China distinguished itself from the regime on the Chinese mainland by defining itself as "Free China." Since the ROC was still under martial law, it was not really that free. But the public on Taiwan nevertheless felt a sense of righteousness and a sense of honor, even of mission to China as a whole. This led to the concept of "The Three Peoples Principles will reunify China." But 20 years ago, Beijing adopted the position that "The Republic of China was destroyed in 1949." This encouraged two decades of Taiwan independence mania. The very term "China" gradually became taboo on Taiwan. People on Taiwan lost confidence in themselves. They even lost respect for themselves regarding cross-Strait relations. This left people on Taiwan alienated. This left them disinclined to think of their nation as "China," and of themselves as "Chinese."
As a result, Many people on Taiwan fell victim to "cross-Strait identity confusion syndrome." They adopted positions such as "democratic Taiwan," "one China, different interpretations," and "one country on each side." The two sides could not seek common ground. The Taiwan Region devolved from "Free China" to today's "democratic Taiwan."
The "big roof concept of one China" may be the antidote for "cross-Strait identity confusion syndrome." Taiwan independence is impossible. Leaders on Taiwan must seek a solution within the framework of the "one China concept." That solution is the Republic of China. There is no alternative. But the claim that "One China is the Republic of China" is impossible. The claim that "One China is the People's Republic of China" is unacceptable. Therefore one must seek common ground under the "big roof concept of one China." The Mainland authorities must allow the Republic of China to don the honorific of "democratic China," and to experience pride and a sense of mission. Only this will enable the public on Taiwan to once again think of themselves as "Chinese" rather than merely "Taiwanese." The Mainland authorities have had to learn to relate to the public in Hong Kong. They know full well the problems are intractable. They know they cannot act reckleesly and that issues cannot be forced. But the "big roof concept of one China" enables them to seek common ground.
The Republic of China is subsumed under the "big roof concept of one China." It differentiates itself from the Chinese mainland by defining itself as "democratic China." Leaders on Taiwan have clung to concepts of "democratic Taiwan," "one China, different interpretations," and "one country on each side." These reflect "cross-Strait identity confusion syndrome." They must wisely and courageously confront cross-Strait relations and the issue of Chinese identity, by affirming that "The Republic of China is democratic China." They must go from cutting themselves off from the Chinese mainland, from retreating and fleeing from the Chinese mainland, to confronting the Chinese mainland, to engaging in active coopetition with the Chinese mainland.
Retreating will only lead to "One China is the People's Republic of China." Advancing enables one to seek the protection of the "big roof concept of one China." It enables one to elevate one's status from "democratic Taiwan" to "democratic China." It enables one to change the focus from whether the nation is "Chinese," to whether the nation is "democratic." It is an aggressive strategy that enables leaders on Taiwan to differentiate our side from the Chinese mainland, by claiming that "The Republic of China is democratic China." It should be able to win approval from 1.3 billion people on the Chinese mainland as well as the Beijing authorities. Why? Because "China" is the genus, while "democracy" is the differentia.
This paper's editorials have pointed out a number of issues. Claims that "Both sides are part of the Republic of China," that "Both sides belong to the People's Republic of China," or that there is "one country on each side," are all unsustainable. The "one China, different interpetations" position is unstable. Perhaps it is time to argue that "The two sides are part of the big roof concept of one China?"
從「自由中國」到「民主中國」
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.10.11 02:09 am
若要將「大屋頂中國」建構為具體的法制架構,例如建置成「中華邦聯」,或在《和平協議》及《軍事互信機制》中設定「大屋頂條款」,也許皆非易事。
但若先將「大屋頂中國」醞釀成兩岸之間及華人世界的一種心理氛圍,卻必有可能;只要台灣朝野能建立共識,則「中華民國是民主中國」,必能影響兩岸人心及全球華人視聽,「大屋頂中國」即有可能愈益成為「庶民中國」的心理境界。
「大屋頂中國」是「在中華民國與中華人民共和國之上的一個中國」,亦即是「兩岸主權相互含蘊並共同合成的一個中國」;在「大屋頂中國」這個概念下,中華民國是民主中國,中華人民共和國是社會主義中國,二者皆是一部分的中國。
八月十五日同登釣魚台的「兩幅國旗」,或可視為「庶民中國」對「大屋頂中國」的心理投射。
如今的兩岸僵局是:在台灣而言,沒有辦法想像台灣人民會接受「一個中國是中華人民共和國」;就大陸而言,則如果不能重建台灣人的「中國認同」及「中國人認同」,就無從想像兩岸的心理整合工程,遑論政治整合。
倘兩岸始終停留在「一中各表/求同存異」的階段,「一個中國是中華民國」不可能維持,「一個中國是中華人民共和國」亦無可能實現,於是正顯示了兩岸其實「無同可求」;若兩岸真欲「求同」,即須首先在「一個中國原則」或「一中框架」之上建立一個「超越差異」的「可求之同」,這個「可求之同」即是「大屋頂中國」。
本報日前社論指出,在五○、六○年代,中華民國曾以「自由中國」在兩岸之間定位,但因當時處在戒嚴統治,其實並不「自由」;然而,在那個年代,台灣社會卻有一種正義感與光榮感,甚至有一種對整個「中國」的使命感,後來又有「三民主義統一中國」的主張。但是,二十年前,由於北京採取「中華民國在一九四九年已經滅亡」的打壓政策,激化了二十年來的台獨狂飆,「中國」漸漸成為台灣避忌的對象,這反映出台灣在處理兩岸關係上已經失去了自信,甚至喪失了自尊,也使得台灣人在心理上與「中國」及「中國人」漸形疏離。
於是,「民主台灣/一中各表/一邊一國」遂成為許多台灣人的「兩岸政治混搭症候群」,兩岸之間遂失「可求之同」。台灣亦由昔日的「自由中國」,轉為今日的「民主台灣」。
「大屋頂中國」也許是這個「混搭症候群」的解藥。就台灣而言,由於台獨已絕無可能,台灣必須以「中華民國」的體制,在「中國概念」之中爭取出路,別無他途;但既然「一個中國是中華民國」不可能,「一個中國是中華人民共和國」不接受,則「大屋頂中國」即當是「可求之同」。再對大陸而言,兩岸的關鍵在於,若不能使「中華民國」感覺到承當「民主中國」的尊榮與使命,如何能使「台灣人變成中國人」?這在大陸當局與香港人民的交往中,即能深知此一問題的嚴峻難解且根本不能強求蠻幹,而「大屋頂中國」即是「可求之同」。
中華民國在「大屋頂中國」之下,以「民主中國」在兩岸之間定位,可使台灣從「民主台灣/一中各表/一邊一國」的「混搭心態」中,明智且勇敢地以「中華民國是民主中國」的立場面對兩岸關係與中國問題,從「切割/退卻/逃避」,轉向「面對/進取/競合」。
因為,退會退到「一個中國是中華人民共和國」,進則可能進入「大屋頂中國」;由「民主台灣」提升至「民主中國」,可使兩岸的爭議焦點由「中國」轉移到「民主」,其實始是台灣可操之在我的進取戰略。而台灣若以「中華民國是民主中國」的姿態在兩岸間定位,應可獲得十三億大陸人民的珍惜,北京當局亦當歡迎;因為,「中國」是「求同」,「民主」則是「化異」。
本系列社論提出的問題是:既不能「兩岸同屬中華民國」,也不能「兩岸同屬中華人民共和國」,且又不能「一邊一國」,而「一中各表」亦不穩定,則能否思考:「兩岸同屬大屋頂中國」?
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