Washington: Returning to My Home vs. Returning to My Brother's Home

Washington: Returning to My Home vs. Returning to My Brother's Home
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 18, 2012

Summary: Washington has expressed enthusiastic approval of Frank Hsieh's visit to the Mainland. But it seems unsure about future developments. The "differences" Frank Hsieh spoke of are the differences between the two side of the Taiwan Strait. These cross-Strait differences must be dealt with. Hsieh must undergo an acid test. He must deal with internal dissent within the DPP. He must deal with differences between the DPP and KMT. This will be a key indicator as Washington monitors the repercussions of Frank Hsieh's visit to the Mainland. 

Full Text below:

Former Premier Frank Hsieh wiped away tears during his visit to his ancestors' graves on Xiamen's Dongshan Island. He met with Beijing's State Council for Taiwan Affairs Office Director Wang Yi, ARATS chairman Chen Yunlin, and State Councilor Dai Bingguo. On the surface at least, Washington was delighted with what it saw.

But US government officials had feelings they were not at liberty to express. These are often expressed on their behalf by US think tank scholars. These scholars include Director Richard Bush of the Brookings Institute Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies, and senior researcher Kenneth Lieberthal. Former Premier Frank Hsieh visited the Chinese mainland. In their opinion, Frank Hsieh's visit was a good thing, both for Washington and for Beijing. It contributed to mutual understanding among political parties across the Taiwan Strait.

Frank Hsieh has spun his visit to the Chinese mainland as a case of "despite countless obstacles, I shall persevere." But as Washington sees it, Frank Hsieh's visit the Chinese mainland means just one thing. A great debate within the DPP regarding the party's view of the Chinese mainland is about to begin.

In this great debate US scholars believe that to achieve victory in the upcoming elections, different voices will make themselves heard within the DPP. These voices must subject themselves to scrutiny by the Taiwan public. For the DPP, the emergence of different opinions will bolster Taiwan's party politics. Washington has long been highly supportive of democracy on Taiwan. But Chen Shui-bian's eight years in office raise concerns about another ruling party change on Taiwan. Will the DPP's policy toward "China" and other nations once again provoke Beijing? Will it make waves in the currently calm waters of cross-Strait relations? Frank Hsieh's visit to the Mainland has touched off a massive debate regarding the DPP's attitude toward Mainland China. Naturally the United States welcomes this.

This is why the American Institute in Taiwan Taipei Office Chief Christopher J. Marut welcomed Frank Hsieh's visit to the Chinese mainland. During the 2012 Republic of China presidential election, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stressed that the ROC is an important security partner and economic partner. Washington sent senior officials to Taiwan. They announced that the ROC was a candidate for the US visa waiver program. They showed goodwill towards the Ma Ying-jeou administration. Conversely, U.S. National Security adviser Thomas E. Donilon, when interviewed by the London Financial Times, questioned DPP presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen's ability to handle cross-Strait affairs. As a result DPP relations with Washington reached a new low. It is easy to see that Washington is deeply concerned about the ability of political parties on Taiwan to deal with cross-Strait relations. This is something the Democratic Progressive Party, which longs to return to power, cannot ignore.

The CCP understands the situation. The goal of its negotiations is to lock in a peace agreement and lock in the political status of Taiwan. This will be a long, drawn out process. Relying exclusively on the KMT is not enough. It must also obtain the support of the DPP.  Washington's response to these developments is not yet clear. US officials have commented on certain subtle differences. When former Vice President Lien Chan first arrived on the Chinese mainland, he spoke of "returning home." When Frank Hsieh arrived on the Chinese mainland he spoke of "returning to my brother's home." The fact that US officials are noticing such fine distinctions reveals their deep concern about the impact of Frank Hsieh's visit to the Mainland.

Beijing allowed Frank Hsieh to visit the Mainland without preconditions. Washington has concluded that Beijing has a deeper understanding of Taiwan's internal affairs. It has concluded from Beijing's policies that it has greater ambitions toward Taiwan. These powerful ambitions are reflected in Beijing's desire to establish a channel of communication with DPP in the event it returns to power. The KMT and the CCP have already established channels for communication. But Beijing knows that changes in the ruling party are the norm on Taiwan. That is why it has decided to increase exchanges with the DPP. Conversely, even if the KMT remains in power long term, Beijing does not want the DPP enagaging in obstructionism whenever it attempts to communicate with the KMT. Risk management is the best way to establish an effective channel of communication with the DPP.

Scholars in the US are generally in agreement. The CCP is gradually learning how to deal with the major political parties on Taiwan. For example, Kenneth Lieberthal thinks Beijing wants to better understand democratic politics on Taiwan. That is why it has decided to establish relations with a wide range of political forces on Taiwan. Political parties on both sides of the Strait must seek mutual understanding. This will enable the Mainland to better grasp the political ecology on Taiwan. This will lead to more effective policies toward Taiwan.

When Frank Hsieh was on the Mainland, he said both sides must "confront their differences, deal with their differences, and transcend their differences." Hsieh met with State Council Taiwan Affairs Office Director Wang Yi. Hsieh said he did not think that the term "1992 consensus" was ever used. He proposed alternatives, either "different constitutions, different interpretations," or "constitutional consensus." These remarks disturbed Su Tseng-chang. The KMT was also dissatisfied. No wonder Su Tseng-chang insisted that Hsieh's visit to the Mainland was merely a private visit, and not an official DPP/CCP event. Consider the Kuomintang's perspective. The "1992 consensus" has undergone trial by fire -- the election process. Beijing has long emphasized actual strength. Will Hsieh be able to rally the troops on Taiwan? One can be sure it has made its own assessments.

So far, Washington has expressed enthusiastic approval of Frank Hsieh's visit to the Mainland. But it seems unsure about future developments. The "differences" Frank Hsieh spoke of are the differences between the two side of the Taiwan Strait. These cross-Strait differences must be dealt with. Hsieh must undergo an acid test. He must deal with internal dissent within the DPP. He must deal with differences between the DPP and KMT. This will be a key indicator as Washington monitors the repercussions of Frank Hsieh's visit to the Mainland. 

美國注目：「回家」VS.「回到兄弟的家」
    2012-10-18
    中國時報

　從廈門東山島祭祖拭淚開始，前行政院長謝長廷大陸行一路會見中共國台辦主任王毅、大陸海協會長陳雲林、國務委員戴秉國，至少從表面上看，美國是看在眼裡，樂在心裡。

　美國政府官員不便表達的意見，常常由美國智庫學者代為表達。美國布魯金斯研究院東北亞研究所主任卜睿哲和該所資深研究員李侃如，針對前行政院長謝長廷訪問中國大陸一事，分別從美國和大陸觀點分析，認為謝長廷大陸行是件好事，有利兩岸政黨的相互瞭解。

　謝長廷自己對大陸行的自我定位頗有「雖千萬人吾往矣」的氣魄。但是，在美國看來，謝長廷訪問大陸反映出一件事，那就是民進黨內部定位中國大陸的大論戰即將展開。

　在這場可能的大論戰中，美方學者認為，為了在未來選舉中爭取勝選機會，民進黨內各種不同聲音自會百花齊放，而同時也會面對台灣社會的審視。對民進黨來說，有不同的選擇方案有助強化台灣的政黨政治。美國一向對台灣的民主持高度肯定態度，但是陳水扁八年執政的經驗卻也令其擔心若是台灣再度政黨輪替，民進黨的「中國」政策與外交政策不無可能再次挑戰大陸，讓目前平穩的兩岸關係平地生波。如今，謝長廷訪問大陸若引發大規模辯論，重行定位中國大陸，自為美國所歡迎。

　這也正是美國在台協會（AIT）台北辦事處長馬啟思為何對謝長廷訪陸表示歡迎的主要原因。華府在二○一二年中華民國總統大選期間透過國務卿希拉蕊強調台灣是美國「重要安全與經濟夥伴」、派遣高級官員訪台、宣布台灣為「免簽證計畫」候選國，對馬英九政府展現善意，另一方面，美國國安顧問多尼隆（Thomas E. Donilon）又透過倫敦《金融時報》質疑民進黨總統候選人蔡英文處理兩岸事務的能力，讓民進黨與美國的關係一時間跌入谷底。不難看出美國對台灣政黨處理兩岸關係的能力高度關注，這是有意再度執政的民進黨不能視而不見的。

　此外，中共也非常瞭解，如果將談判目標鎖定在和平協議和台灣的政治地位，這是一個長期的過程，單靠國民黨是不夠的，而必須取得民進黨的支持。針對這些可能的發展，美方的立場尚未明朗，惟從美方官員四處打聽前副總統連戰首次登陸時稱是「回家」與謝長廷訪陸時稱是「回到兄弟的家」之間有何微妙的差異，可以確定美國對謝長廷訪陸的衝擊的確保持高度關切。

　大陸同意在沒有預設立場的前提下安排謝長廷訪陸，美國方面據此認為北京對台灣內政已有更深一層的認識，並在未來對台政策上展現出更大的企圖心，而此一強大的企圖心反映在大陸強烈希望與民進黨在重返執政前建立一個溝通管道上。儘管國民黨和北京有較多的聯繫管道，但大陸瞭解政黨輪替將是台灣政壇常態之後，決定與民進黨擴大交流。另一方面，即使國民黨長期執政，北京也不希望與國民黨交流的同時，民進黨老是在一旁掣肘。而風險管控的最好方法就是與民進黨建立一個有效的溝通管道。

　美國學者普遍認為，中共在處理台灣主要政黨關係的手法日益圓融。例如，李侃如認為，正因北京瞭解台灣的民主政治，所以決定廣泛與台灣政治勢力建立關係。兩岸政黨相互瞭解，大陸將更能掌握台灣政治生態，有助未來長期對台政策上擬定更有效的作法。

　謝長廷在大陸指出，兩岸都必須「面對差異、處理差異、超越差異」。會見國台辦主任王毅時，他表示，他不認為有「九二共識」這四個字，他提出的替代方案是「憲法各表」或「憲法共識」。這番談話既讓蘇貞昌不安，也讓國民黨不滿。難怪蘇貞昌在接受訪問時要表示謝的訪陸只是私人行程，非關民共平台。就國民黨來說，「九二共識」畢竟是歷經選戰試煉。至於北京則一向注重實力原則，對於謝在台灣政壇能否掀起千層浪並趁勢而起，自會有準確的評估與對應之道。

　至目前為止，美國對謝長廷訪陸抱持高度的肯定態度，但對未來的可能發展似乎還無法掌握。謝長廷的「差異說」談的是兩岸差異，不過，在處理兩岸差異之前，謝的考驗是處理民進黨的內部差異，以及民、國兩黨間差異的能耐，這自然是美國觀察謝長廷訪陸後續效應的指標。