Outer and Inner Directed Taiwan Independence: The End of the Road

Outer and Inner Directed Taiwan Independence: The End of the Road
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 4, 2012

Summary: Frank Hsieh is visiting the Mainland. Strip away all his surface rhetoric. What is Frank Hsieh really trying to say? He is saying that the DPP must stop chasing after Taiwan independence. Ultimately there can be no Taiwan independence ideology that only opposes the KMT, but not the CCP. Any "inner directed" Taiwan independence will necessarily be a failed form of "outer directed" Taiwan independence.

Full Text below:

Frank Hsieh is visiting the Mainland. Strip away all his surface rhetoric. What is Frank Hsieh really trying to say? He is saying that the DPP must stop chasing after Taiwan independence.

This may not be DPP's official position. At least not yet. But it is Frank Hsieh's position. And it is the policy direction that the DPP has no choice but to take. Frank Hsieh says "Our cross-Strait policy must be based on the Constitution of the Republic of China. We must not violate the Constitution." He speaks of the "one China Constitution." The constitutional framework of the Republic of China is not a framework for Taiwan independence. Nor is the "one China Constitution." Take Frank Hsieh's guiding theme. Strip away the surface rhetoric. Clear away the political smokescreen. What is he saying, really? Put simply, he is saying the DPP must return to the Constitution of the Republic of China. He is saying that the DPP must stop chasing after Taiwan independence.

Frank Hsieh said "There are no grievances between the Democratic Progressive Party and the Chinese Communist Party. The DPP once promoted Taiwan independence. But it was merely opposing Kuomintang rule. This had nothing to do with the Chinese Communist Party."

This passage is the clearest and most explicit statement any DPP party prince has ever made regarding Taiwan independence. It is also grotesquely distorted and seriously imbalanced. In fact, Taiwan independence has long had two different theoretical frameworks. One was "outer directed." It was based upon opposition to the Chinese Communist Party and opposition to cross-Strait political and economic integration. Another was "inner directed." It was based upon the overthrow of the Kuomintang and the subversion of the Republic of China. These two modes of thinking reinforce each other. In order to oppose the Chinese Communist Party, "inner directed" Taiwan independence must subvert the Republic of China, in order to sever all connections with China. Conversely, in order to subvert the Republic of China, Taiwan independence must oppose the Chinese Communist Party, to sever all connections with China. Frank Hsieh has deconstructed these two mutually reinforcing forms of Taiwan independence rhetoric. He is asserting that "Taiwan independence merely opposes the KMT, not the CCP." This is a highly revealing and shocking distortion of the facts.

Frank Hsieh's spin control shows that the Taiwan independence movement's "outer directed" ideology has failed. The last two decades of chaos provoked by Taiwan independence proves this. Nor has Taiwan independence been an effective strategy for opposing the CCP. As a result, "outer directed" Taiwan independence ideology has steadily lost effectiveness. Now the DPP is left with only "inner directed" Taiwan independence ideology. All this can do is tear Taiwan apart. It can do nothing in the political struggle against the CCP.

This reveals the flaws in Frank Hsieh's rhetoric. Is it possible for Taiwan independence to oppose only the Kuomintang, but not the Chinese Communist Party? The answer is clearly no. This is the DPP's plight today, as it continues to advocate Taiwan independence. Frank Hsieh's rhetoric is tantamount to an admission that Taiwan independence ideology has reached the end of its rope.

Frank Hsieh's "bartending trip" should be applauded. Hsieh went with some reluctance. To date, any earnest [Mainland] China policy debate within the DPP is essentially taboo. No one dares to open this Pandora's Box. There is no consensus within the party at the moment. Nevertheless Frank Hsieh rushed off to Beijing. He hoped to work out a DPP "China policy" with the Chinese Communist Party. But isn't this putting the cart before the horse? Isn't this swimming upstream? Take Frank Hsieh's arguments. If the DPP refuses to accept his "constitutional consensus," how can he expect Beijing to accept his "different Constitutions, different interpretations" of one China? Expressed even more clearly, if Beijing accepts "different constitutions, different interpretations," can Frank Hsieh persuade Su Tseng-chang and the DPP to accept his "Constitutional consensus?"

Given its Taiwan independence path, the DPP faces a dilemma. Its "outer directed" Taiwan independence rhetoric has failed. But it refuses to forsake its "inner directed" Taiwan independence rhetoric. Frank Hsieh has now put his own spin on Taiwan independence.   He has trotted out a peculiar brand of Taiwan independence, one that is able to oppose the Kuomintang, but not the Chinese Communist Party. Frank Hsieh went to Beijing to declare that he was "no longer chasing after Taiwan independence." But the Democratic Progressive Party on Taiwan has said nothing to this effect. It is reluctant to forsake the political benefits of "inner directed" Taiwan independence rhetoric. This is why some within the DPP are unwilling to forsake "inner directed" Taiwan independence ideology. This is why they opposed Frank Hsieh's visit to Beijing, which sought to engage in "outer directed" Taiwan independence as relief.

Frank Hsieh's visit to the Mainland has provoked a backlash among Taiwan independence elements. Frank Hsieh said "Criticisms are like ocean waves. Those standing on the crest of these waves cannot avoid them." Do Taiwan independence elements intend to oppose Frank Hsieh? If so, they must step forward and offer their fellow citizens an explanation. Can this sort of Taiwan independence, which only knows how to direct its attacks inward, but which is powerless to direct its attacks outward, still be considered "Taiwan independence""

Frank Hsieh wants to export his "one China Constitution" to Beijing, then promote them back home on Taiwan. He is doing things backwards. HIs argument is hard to justify. He cannot tell the Chinese Communist Party that the DPP has forsaken "outer directed" Taiwan independence. He cannot expect Beijing to tolerate the DPP's continued use of "inner directed" Taiwan independence rhetoric during election campaigns on Taiwan. In the final analysis, can the the ROC flag appear at DPP mass rallies? If not, how convincing can Frank Hsieh's "one China Constitution" be?

An editorial published by this paper on the 2nd noted that Frank Hsieh went to Beijing to mend fences between the DPP and the CCP. But he first needs to mend the ROC, which as been ripped apart by Taiwan independence demagoguery. Does Frank Hsieh believe that the "one China Constitution" is "outer directed" Taiwan independence that opposes the Chinese Communist Party? If so, he should demand that the DPP forsake "inner directed" Taiwan independence, hold high the banner of the Republic of China, and return to the "one China constitution."

Ultimately there can be no Taiwan independence ideology that only opposes the KMT, but not the CCP. Any "inner directed" Taiwan independence will necessarily be a failed form of "outer directed" Taiwan independence.

台獨的終局：外擊型及內殺型
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.10.04 01:53 am

謝長廷赴大陸訪問，若撕掉所有的表面文章，他想要傳遞的主軸信息是：民進黨不搞台獨了。

或許此時還不能說，這是代表民進黨的官方政見，卻是謝長廷的核心論述，更已是民進黨不得不然的政策走向。謝長廷說：「應當依據中華民國憲法來回應兩岸關係，不能違憲。」又說：「憲法一中。」然則，因為中華民國憲法不是台獨的架構，「憲法一中」更不是台獨；所以，謝長廷的主軸論述，若撥開曲繞周折的表面文章及政治煙幕，他要說的無非是：回歸中華民國憲法，民進黨不搞台獨了。

謝長廷說：「民進黨與共產黨並沒有冤仇，民進黨早期推動台獨，是反對國民黨的統治，而不是針對共產黨。」

這段話，是歷來民進黨天王級領袖對台獨最徹底、最露骨的評論，卻也是相當扭曲失衡的評論。其實，台獨的理論架構，一直有兩種類型的思維：一種是「外擊型」，立足於外禦中共，反對兩岸的政經整合；另一種是「內殺型」，主張推翻國民黨，顛覆中華民國。這兩種類型的思維，其實是相互支撐、互為表裡的；亦即主張，為了外禦中共，所以必須顛覆中華民國，切斷一切中國關聯；反過來說，亦為了顛覆中華民國，所以必須外禦中共，切斷一切中國關聯。然而，如今謝長廷卻將此種互為表裡的論述解構，說成了「台獨只是反對國民黨，而不是針對共產黨」，非但露骨，抑且是令人駭異的扭曲。

謝長廷的說法顯示，台獨的「外擊型」思維已經失敗，近二十年來的台獨狂飆也證實，台獨不是外禦中共的有效策略；因此，亦使台獨在「外擊型」的機能日漸式微的過程中，只剩下「內殺型」的效能，而成為只能撕裂台灣，卻不能外禦中共的政爭手段。

在此，顯露了謝長廷的破綻，那就是：究竟有無可能存在一種「只反對國民黨，卻不針對中共」的「台獨」？答案顯然是否定的。這也正是民進黨今日台獨論述的困境，亦形同宣告台獨理論之終局。

謝長廷的「調酒之行」，值得鼓勵，卻去得有些勉強。迄今，「中國政策大辯論」在民進黨內幾成禁忌，無人敢打開這一只潘朵拉魔盒；卻在黨內迄無共識的情況下，謝長廷已奔赴北京，欲與中共「磨合」民進黨的「中國政策」。這是否本末倒置？這是不是反其道而行？即以謝長廷的語彙來說，如果民進黨不接受他的「憲法共識」，他如何要北京來接受他的「憲法各表」？再挑明了說，如果北京接受了「憲法各表」，謝長廷就能讓蘇貞昌及民進黨接受「憲法共識」嗎？

民進黨台獨路線的困境是：「外擊型」已然失敗，卻不願割捨台獨在「內殺型」的效能；於是就出現了謝長廷口中這種「只用於反對國民黨，卻沒有能力針對中共」的「台獨」。因而，謝長廷可以跑到北京表態「不搞台獨了」，但民進黨在台灣這一句話卻始終說不出口，因為捨不得台獨的「內殺型」效能。也正因民進黨內有人不願放棄台獨的「內殺型」效能，所以反對謝長廷赴北京為「外擊型」台獨解套。

謝長廷訪陸，獨派頗有反彈。謝長廷說，「批評聲如海浪，但站在浪頭上的人卻無可迴避」；獨派若要反對謝長廷，至少必須站出來向國人說明，這種「只知內殺，無力外擊」的台獨，還能算是「台獨」嗎？

所以，謝長廷欲將他主張的「憲法一中」，出口北京，再轉內銷台灣，其實是反其道而行，不易自圓其說。因為，他不能向中共說，民進黨已放棄「外擊型」的台獨，期望北京理解民進黨為了選舉而仍須保留「內殺型」的台獨操作。其實，一句話說到底，如果中華民國國旗不能回到民進黨的群眾大會，謝長廷的「憲法一中」如何能有說服力？

因此，本報二日社論指出，謝長廷赴北京修補民、共兩黨關係之際，首應「縫合」被台獨操作所「撕裂的中華民國」。如果謝長廷認為，「憲法一中」始是外禦中共的「外擊型」思維，即應先要求民進黨放棄炒作「內殺型」的台獨，舉起中華民國國旗，真正回到「憲法一中」的道路上。

終究，不可能存在一種「只反對國民黨／不針對中共」的台獨；「內殺型」的台獨，亦必是失敗的「外擊型」台獨。