Frank Hsieh Mixes a Drink for Beijing

Frank Hsieh Mixes a Drink for Beijing
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 30, 2012

Summary: Frank Hsieh's visit to the Chinese mainland is 12 years overdue. In May 2000, Chen Shui-bian became president. In June, Kaohsiung Mayor Frank Hsieh announced that he would accept Xiamen Mayor Zhu Yayan's invitation to visit the Chinese mainland. But fate intervened. Then MAC Chairwoman Tsai Ing-wen blasted him. Twelve years later, assuming he makes this trip, Frank Hsieh will have finally gotten his wish.

Full Text below:

If Beijing does not turn him down, Frank Hsieh will soon visit the Chinese mainland. We cannot think of any reason why Beijing would turn him down. Therefore Frank Hsieh should be able to make the trip.

Frank Hsieh's visit to the Chinese mainland is 12 years overdue. In May 2000, Chen Shui-bian became president. In June, Kaohsiung Mayor Frank Hsieh announced that he would accept Xiamen Mayor Zhu Yayan's invitation to visit the Chinese mainland. But fate intervened. Then MAC Chairwoman Tsai Ing-wen blasted him. Twelve years later, assuming he makes this trip, Frank Hsieh will have finally gotten his wish.

Twelve years ago Frank Hsieh said, "According to our constitution, Kaohsiung and Xiamen are two cities belonging to the same nation. They (Beijing) also see it the same way. As long as one does not name which nation they belong to, that is acceptable." Take our current understanding, and consider these words from 12 years ago. The first half of what Frank Hsieh spoke of was the "one China Constitution." The second half was "one China, different interpretations." Back then Frank Hsieh advanced the concept of the "one China Constitution." Thenceforth it will become his political trademark.

When one refers to history, one cannot talk about ifs. But if Frank Hsieh had made the trip 12 years ago, he would have preceded Lien Chan's 2005 "ice-breaking journey" by a full five years. In which case, history would have to be rewritten.

But history allows no ifs. In June 2000, Frank Hsieh's visit to Xiamen awaited approval. On June 27, when President Chen Shui-bian met with foreign guests, he declared that the new government would be willing to accept the "1992 consensus" and "one China, different interpretations." But the very next day, Mainland Affairs Council Chairwoman Tsai Ing-wen stepped forward and insisted that the two sides never reached a consensus on the "one China principle." The Chen government's cross-Strait policy has remained frozen in this state ever since.

Since then all anyone remembers is the "rectification of names," "What in the hell is the Republic of China?" the "Referendum on UN membership," "one country on each side," and the "resolution for a normal nation." Tsai Ing-wen's presidential campaign first alleged that ECFA "forfeited our sovereignty and demeaned our nation." Then it accepted ECFA in toto, without conditions, while simultaneously repudiating the 1992 consensus. Why? Was it because Tsai Ing-wen pressured Chen Shui-bian to repudiate the 1992 consensus? Was she too embarrassed to reverse herself? Tsai Ing-wen's fear of losing face prevented the DPP from making this historic change.

History does not allow for ifs. But it does allow for change. Frank Hsieh's trip bypasses countless twists and turns in the course of history. It makes a giant 180 degree about face. It draws a line between Hsieh and Tsai Ing-wen. It picks up on where Hsieh left off  12 years ago, regarding the "one China Constitution" and "one China, different interpretations" 12 years ago. Frank Hsieh should have no difficulty completing this task. He merely needs to wipe his face and rewind the clock 12 years. Frank Hsieh's personal change is of little significance. But if it leads to the DPP's collective change, it will have meaning.

This could pave the way for Frank Hsieh to return and take over as chairman of the DPP "China Affairs Committee." Once Frank Hsieh takes over as as committee chairman, he will be the highest ranking member of the DPP dealing with Beijing. Over the next few years he is expected to visit the Chinese mainland in his capacity as committee chairman. Frank Hsieh is likely to embark on the same path as Lien Chan in 2005.

How will Frank Hsieh present his cross-Strait views to Beijing once he arrives? Will Beijing buy his rhetoric? Will Taiwan independence elements? What will swing voters make of it? Will they buy into it?

To make a long story short, Frank Hsieh should consider clearing the air on his cross-Strait policy, once and for all. At the very least, he must say what he means and mean what he says. He must accept in toto the Republic of China and the Constitution of the Republic of China. He must not attempt to equivocate by splitting semantic hairs. Still less may he engage in "backdoor listing," and saying "Republic of China" when he really means "Nation of Taiwan." Frank Hsieh once said that "No one ever used the term 1992 consensus, but the spirit of the meeting amounted to a consensus." If so, Frank Hsieh could rename the "1992 consensus" the "Consensus of 1992." He need not force the DPP to use the term "1992 consensus." Frank Hsieh wants to use "two Constitutions, different interpretations" instead of "one China, different interpretations." This is still a game of words. The March "Wu Hu Meeting" established a "Constitution of the Republic of China bottom line." Perhaps during this trip Frank Hsieh can go from "one China, different interpretations" to the "Big Roof" concept. Perhaps he can go further in setting the agenda and setting the trend.

Frank Hsieh is of course not merely attending a bartending competition. He wants to participate in a bartending contest because for Beijing it is Taiwan-related. This was predictable. Frank Hsieh intends to mix a drink. If Beijing is willing to drink it, if swing voters are willing to drink it, then Taiwan independence elements will probably find it impossible to swallow. But is Frank Hsieh still worrying about the feelings of Taiwan independence elements? Is he still bound by them hand and foot? Is he still leaving things only half said? Is he still unwilling to set the record straight, once and for all? If so, then he is unlikely to break the ice in Beijing. For swing voters, he is unlikely to cut the Gordian Knot. He is likely to come up empty. The drink he mixes, no one will drink.

During this trip, Frank Hsieh will attempt to overcome all manner of obstacles in order to achieve his goal. One. Can he overcome his own internal resistance? Two. Can he speak for the DPP? Three. Can he convince Beijing? Four. Can he become "China Affairs Committee Chairman?" Five. Can he persuade the DPP to make a major about face? Six. Can he transcend Blue vs. Green, and persuade swing voters to vote for the DPP?

We do not know where then Xiamen Mayor Zhu Yayan is 12 years later. But he may wish to go up to Beijing to meet with Frank Hsieh. They can then hold the meeting they wanted to 12 years ago,

謝長廷赴北京調酒
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.09.30

如果北京不拒絕，謝長廷可望近日往訪大陸；我們想不出北京有拒絕的理由，所以謝長廷應可成行。

其實，謝長廷的這趟訪陸之行，對他而言，整整遲了十二年。二○○○年五月，陳水扁就任總統；六月，高雄市長謝長廷宣布，將應廈門市長朱亞衍之邀往訪；但幾經周折，被時任陸委會主委的蔡英文批駁。十二年後，此行若成，謝長廷也算終於如願以償。

十二年前的當時，謝長廷說：「依照我們的憲法，高雄與廈門是同一個國家的兩個城市；他們（對岸）也是這樣講的，沒有講明是哪一個國家，可以接受。」從今天的理解，來看十二年前的這段話，其實，謝長廷在分號（；）以前說的是「一中憲法」，分號以後說的則是「一中各表」。當年，謝長廷也提出了「憲法一中」的概念，此後即成為他的政治標誌。

談「歷史」，不能說「如果」。但且說「如果」謝長廷十二年前成行，他較二○○五年連戰的「破冰之旅」即整整早了五年，那麼，歷史會不會改寫？

畢竟，歷史沒有「如果」。二○○○年六月，正當謝長廷的廈門行在准駁角力之際，六月二十七日陳水扁總統接見外賓時宣示，新政府願接受「一個中國／各自表述」的「九二共識」，次日二十八日，陸委會主委蔡英文卻出面指出，兩岸從無「一中原則」的共識；扁政府的兩岸政策自此確立。

此後的發展，國人記憶猶新，即是：「正名制憲」、「中華民國是什麼碗糕」、「入聯公投」、「一邊一國」、「正常國家決議文」……最後到了蔡英文競選總統，先指ＥＣＦＡ喪權辱國，後稱ＥＣＦＡ概括承受，又堅決否認「九二共識」，只因蔡英文曾逼陳水扁否認九二共識，她自己有什麼臉面回過頭來承認？蔡英文的面子，阻擋了民進黨轉彎。

歷史沒有「如果」，但是可以「轉彎」。謝長廷此行，應是想繞過這十二年曲折跌宕的歷史，轉一個一百八十度的大迴轉，設法把歷史的線頭再接回十二年前被蔡英文扯斷處，也就是接回到他十二年前所主張的「一中憲法」與「一中各表」。這個工程，對謝長廷應無困難，因為，他只要抹一把臉，即可回到十二年前；但是，這若只是謝長廷個人的「轉彎」，意義不大，必須是也能帶動民進黨的「轉彎」，始有意義。

因而，此行應是在為謝長廷返來後接任民進黨「中國事務委員會」主任委員預作鋪墊；而謝長廷接任主委後，即可成為民進黨對北京的最高窗口，未來幾年亦可望以主委的身分訪陸，謝長廷即可能走上如同二○○五年連戰走過的路。

然而，問題的關鍵卻在於謝長廷到北京後如何呈現他的兩岸論述，以及此一論述北京接不接受？獨派接不接受？中間選民對此一論述的評價與接受度如何？

長話短說，謝長廷應當考慮呈現一個「一次說清楚」的兩岸論述，至少應是表裡如一、概括承受的「中華民國論」與「中華民國憲法論」，而不是挑精剔肥，更不可「借殼上市」。謝長廷曾說，「沒有『九二共識』這四個字，但會議精神是有一個共識」；倘係如此，謝長廷或許亦可改稱「九二年的共識」，加上「年的」二字，不必再用「九二共識」綁住民進黨。至於謝長廷欲以「憲法各表」取代「一中各表」，這仍是文字遊戲；但倘若能與三月「吳胡會」中所建立的「中華民國憲法底線論」接軌，也許是此行可以寄望的成果。而謝長廷若能從「一中各表」進一步作「大屋頂中國」的試探，也許更能創造議題，引領風潮。

謝長廷此行當然不只是去看調酒比賽，而是自己要與北京涉台系統進行一場調酒大賽。已可預見，謝長廷調的這杯酒，倘若北京喝得下去，中間選民喝得下去，獨派恐怕難以入口；但若謝長廷仍顧慮獨派的感受，綁手綁腳，話說一半，未能「一次說清楚」，則北京之冰難破，中間選民的心結難解，一切即可能竹籃打水一場空，調出的酒沒人喝。

謝長廷此行不啻是過五關斬六將：一、能不能超越自己的心障？二、能不能代表民進黨？三、能不能說服北京？四、能不能出任「中國事務委員會主委」？五、能不能帶領民進黨大轉彎？六、能不能打破藍綠，說服中間選民？

不知十二年前的廈門市長朱亞衍今在何處？何妨上京與謝長廷見面，一圓十二年前的舊約。