Incorporate the Big Roof China Concept into the One China Principle

Incorporate the Big Roof China Concept into the One China Principle
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
December 14, 2012 

Summary: Consider Beijing's perspective. The recent talks in Taipei resemble the 60 Years of Cross-Strait Relations Seminar three years ago. They show that the Blue and Green camps on Taiwan differ in their cross-Strait views. But people on Taiwan as a whole, Blue and Green alike, see "one China" and "reunification" differently. They differ both in their emotional intensity and in their reasoning. They would amend these concepts differently. They have different reservations about them.

Full text below:

Consider Beijing's perspective. The recent talks in Taipei resemble the 60 Years of Cross-Strait Relations Seminar three years ago. They show that the Blue and Green camps on Taiwan differ in their cross-Strait views. But people on Taiwan as a whole, Blue and Green alike, see "one China" and "reunification" differently. They differ both in their emotional intensity and in their reasoning. They would amend these concepts differently. They have different reservations about them.

Sun Yafu is Deputy Director of Beijing's State Council Office of Taiwan Affairs. He is in charge of cross-Strait policy theory. As he sees it, historical conditions have changed. The two sides of the Strait must seize upon their points of agreement regarding "one China advocacy." They must take existing provisions as their point of departure. They must affirm that China's territory and sovereignty are indivisible. They must seek common ground while shelving differences. They must seek a shared belief in one China, while shelving differences concerning one China political policy. This will enable cross-Strait relations to move ahead.

Sun Yafu's reasoning was an extension of Hu Jintao's political report at the 18th National Congress. It was a continuation of Wang Yi's talk at the 20th Anniversary Celebration of the 1992 Consensus. It included several important elements. One. It referred to new historical conditions. It implied that "Times have changed." Two. The oft mentioneed one-China principle was recast as "one China advocacy." Three. He and Wang Yi feel that the two sides should seize upon points that express their common belief in one China. Four. He reiterated that the two sides should treat their existing provisions as their point of departure. This means that both sides of the Strait should derive their positions from their own constitutions. Five. Sun said the two sides have yet to be reunified, but that merely means political opposition. It does not mean that China's territory and sovereignty have been divided. Therefore the two sides are still part of one China. We feel that in this context one China ought to refer to the one China undergoing political confrontation prior to 1949. It should not be taken to mean that "both sides of the Strait are part of the People's Republic of China." The People's Republic of China is merely one of two parties politically opposed to the other within one China. Six. Both sides share a belief in "seeking common ground in one China, while shelving differences in one China policy." In Beijing it is referred to as "seeking common ground while shelving differences." In Taipei it is referred to as "one China, different interpretations."

How will the two sides take their respective constitutions as their point of departure? After all, they differ over the political significance of one China policy, even as they seek common ground under one China. How do they seize the common ground in one China and establish points of linkage? We believe the answer is one China, different interpretations under the Big Roof Concept of China, the signing of a peace agreement, or the establishment of some sort of political relations under special circumstances.

This is the only way each side of the Strait can take its own constitution as its point of departure. This is the only way we can seek common ground while shelving differences under one China advocacy. This is the only way we can seize the common ground and uphold one China.

The 18th National Congress Political Report laid out Beijing's Taiwan policy. The Hu Jintao regime invested ten years of its energy in this policy. This is the legacy it has bequeathed Xi Jinping, who will deal with it over the next decade. One of its major innovations was the notion that the two sides must "seek cross-Strait political relations despite the fact that the nation has yet to be reunified, and make fair and reasonable arrangements."

This turned the phrase "yet to be reunified cross-strait political relations" into official policy. It argued that political relations could go ahead if each each side of the Strait treated their own constitutions as their point of departure. They could then seek common ground under one China, while shelving differences over one China political policy. They could then make fair and reasonable arrangements and establish one China points of linkage. What are "points of linkage," if not the big roof concept of China?

The big roof concept of China is an abstract concept. It refers to China as a cultural entity, as an historical entity, as a common people. It also refers to a legal concept. For example, the two sides can use their existing provisions, i.e. constitutions, as their point of departure under a big roof concept of China. They can sign a peace agreement, or set up offices on both sides of the Strait. They can lay down the necessary conditions for a big roof concept of China. They can make the big roof concept of China into law. This, bear in mind, is not "two Chinas." Under the big roof concept of China, the Republic of China is democratic China, and the People's Republic of China is socialist China. Both are part of China. both belong under the big roof concept of China.

This is achievable. We need only incorporate the big roof concept of China into the one China principle or one China advocacy. That is because the big roof concept of China was one China advocacy to begin with. Actually the two sides were already engage in big roof concept of China thinking. In 2000, Qian Qichen's "new three statements" was seen as just such a big roof concept. On Taiwan, scholars such as Chang Ya-chung advocate "one China, three constitutions." This too may be regarded as a big roof concept.

Elements on both sides have voiced opposition to the big roof concept of China. On Taiwan, some oppose the one China points of linkage. Others suggest that ECFA represents a final limit to linkage that we must not go beyond. But Taiwan independence has already proven impossible. The Republic of China must find a foothold under the aegis of one China. But the notion that "one China is the Republic of China" is a hard sell. Therefore the big roof concept of China is the best option for the Republic of China. If we cling to "one China is the Republic of China" and "one China, different interpretations," we will eventually end up boiled alive like the frog in the well-known anecdote.

Some on the Mainland are also skeptical about the big roof concept of China. They say this is merely the "two states theory" in a different guise. But the "two states theory" does not advocate a peace agreement signed under the big roof concept of China. In fact, the big roof concept of China is a plus for Beijing as well. One. Beijing knows that reunification is difficult. That is why it now speaks of "political relations under yet to be reunified conditions," and of a peace agreement. Two. Reunification is actually a giant albatross around Beijing's neck. It Is a "commitment quagmire" from which it cannot extricate itself. Let us establish political relations under yet to be reunified conditions. This will benefit Beijing, both within and without the Mainland region. Three. Write the big roof concept of China into law. This will move it beyond the 1992 consensus. One might consider it an upgraded version of the 1992 consensus. Four. In 2016 the political situation on Taiwan will be unpredictable. It may be impossible to establish political relations under a yet to be reunified China conditions. The two sides would descend into reunification vs. independence wrangling.

Under the big roof concept of China, the two sides will be able to common ground while shelving differences. Do not wait until 2016, only to find ourselves trapped. By then It will too late for regrets. .

將大屋頂中國納入一個中國原則
【聯合報╱社論】
2012.12.14 02:03 am

對於北京來說，這次的「台北會談」與三年前的「兩岸一甲子研討會」一樣，雖呈現出台灣藍綠各方的兩岸論述各持異見，但整個台灣不分藍綠，對「一個中國」或「統一」等概念，皆持不同形態、不同程度及不同理由的批判、修正或保留的態度。

北京方面，此次由主掌兩岸政策理論的國台辦副主任孫亞夫提出主體論述。他的主要見解是：在新的歷史條件下，兩岸雙方要把握「一個中國主張」的共同點和連結點，包括從各自現行規定出發，確認中國領土和主權沒有分裂這一客觀事實，通過求同存異，「求一個中國之同、存對一個中國政治涵義認知之異」，兩岸關係就有向前發展的條件。

孫亞夫的此一見解及他在會中表達的相關論述，是十八大胡錦濤政治報告的引申，也是王毅「九二共識二十周年」談話的延續，其中包括了幾個重要元素：一、謂「在新的歷史條件下」，有「與時俱進」的意味。二、習稱的「一個中國原則」，此處改稱「一個中國主張」。三、與王毅一樣，認為兩岸應尋求並把握「一個中國」的「共同點」和「連結點」。四、重申兩岸應從「各自現行規定出發」，即是指兩岸可在「各自憲法上立足」。五、又稱，兩岸尚未統一是一種政治對立，而不是中國領土和主權的分裂，因而兩岸還是同屬「一個中國」。我們認為，此處所指「一個中國」應是指在一九四九年以前發生「政治對立」的「一個中國」，而不是指「兩岸同屬中華人民共和國」，因為「中華人民共和國」只是在「一個中國」之中「政治對立」的一方而已。六、所稱「求一個中國之同，存對一個中國政治涵義認知之異」，在北京曰「求同存異」，在台灣即是「一中各表」。

那麼，兩岸如何在「各自憲法上出發」，既「存對一個中國政治涵義認知之異」，又「求一個中國之同」，進而尋求並把握「一個中國」的「共同點」及「連結點」呢？我們認為，答案是：在大屋頂中國之下一中各表，簽定和平協議，或建立某種「特殊情況下的政治關係」。

唯有如此，始能維持「兩岸各自從憲法上出發並立足」，在「一個中國主張」之上求同存異，戮力尋求出且把握住「一個中國」的共同點及連結點。

十八大政治報告中關於北京對台政策的陳述，是胡錦濤團隊往昔十年的心血，也是習近平團隊未來十年的資產。其中最大的創新與發明，即在：「探討國家尚未統一特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係，並對此作出合情合理的安排。」

這是將「尚未統一的兩岸政治關係」正式作為政策課目，而認為此一「政治關係」可從「兩岸各自憲法出發」、「求一個中國之同，存對一個中國政治涵義認知之異」，以作出「合情合理的安排」，並建立「一個中國」的「連結點」。試問：這個「連結點」，若不是「大屋頂中國」，還能是什麼？

此處所言「大屋頂中國」，不只是指「文化中國／歷史中國／血緣中國」的抽象概念，而是一個法制概念。例如，兩岸倘若能在「從各自現行規定（憲法）出發」的大屋頂中國架構上，簽定《和平協議》；或在兩岸互設辦事處時，設定約制「大屋頂中國」的條款，即可將「大屋頂中國」法制化。這不是兩個中國，在大屋頂中國之下，中華民國是民主中國，中華人民共和國是社會主義中國，二者皆是一部分的中國，同屬「一個大屋頂中國」。

要做到這一點，只要將「大屋頂中國」納入「一個中國原則」或「一個中國主張」即可；因為，「大屋頂中國」原本即是一種「一個中國主張」。其實，兩岸皆早已存有「大屋頂中國」的思想。在北京，二○○○年錢其琛的「新三句」，即被視為「屋頂理論」；在台灣，如學者張亞中等所倡「一中三憲」，或許亦可視為「泛屋頂理論」。

然而，兩岸亦皆有反對「大屋頂中國」的聲音。在台灣，有人反對關於「一個中國」的一切「連結點」；也有人認為，ECFA已是連結的終局，不宜再踰越。但是，台獨已絕無可能，中華民國必須在「一個中國」的範圍內找到立足點，而「一個中國就是中華民國」的「一中各表」恐終難撐持，所以「大屋頂中國」應是中華民國在「一個中國」架構下的最佳利基。倘若緊守「一個中國是中華民國」的「一中各表」，恐終究將是冷水煮青蛙的結局。

大陸也有人對「大屋頂中國」質疑，認為這是「兩國論」的變形；但是，「兩國論」難道會主張「在大屋頂中國下簽定和平協議」嗎？其實，「大屋頂中國」，對北京也應是正算：一、北京亦知「統一」難期，因此將政策焦點轉移至「尚未統一的政治關係」，如《和平協議》等；二、「統一」其實是北京的重大政治負荷，亦是一種難以自拔的「承諾的陷阱」，倘能確立「尚未統一的政治關係」，對北京的內外治理極有利益；三、「大屋頂中國」若能法制化，即較「九二共識」更進一級，可稱「九二共識的升級版」。四、二○一六年台灣的政治變局莫測，倘若又生政黨輪替，則非但「尚未統一的政治關係」無從建立，兩岸將又陷入暗無天日的統獨角力中。

兩岸應在大屋頂中國之下，化異求同；勿待二○一六年又陷於不可開交，以致噬臍莫及。