Premier Chiang: Assume Responsibility to Advance Policy
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
August 1, 2013
Summary: The cabinet reshuffle has impacted seven officials. It qualifies as a medium scale reshuffle. The focus has been on the Defense Minister and FSC Chairman. The reshuffling has been heated, but the response lukewarm. The reason is not hard to see. First, the reshuffle was largely a passive reaction, not an act of initiative. Secondly, problematic cabinet leaders may have been replaced. But expectations aside, the crux of the problem -- long-standing defects and wide-ranging difficulties, make reforms daunting. They have yet to be tested.
Full text below:
The cabinet reshuffle has impacted seven officials. It qualifies as a medium scale reshuffle. The focus has been on the Defense Minister and FSC Chairman. The reshuffling has been heated, but the response lukewarm. The reason is not hard to see. First, the reshuffle was largely a passive reaction, not an act of initiative. Secondly, problematic cabinet leaders may have been replaced. But expectations aside, the crux of the problem -- long-standing defects and wide-ranging difficulties, make reforms daunting. They have yet to be tested.
The personnel changes have stopped the bleeding, soothed discontent, and limited the damage. Therefore there is little incentive to make a larger breakthrough or assume greater responsibility. As a result, the entire cabinet is merely reacting to developments and pandering to public sentiment. It is trapped within a mental prison of its own making. The government's ruling principle is to avoid provoking public discontent. It is no longer to discern whether grievances are large or small, warranted or unwarranted. It is even less able to distinguish between government responsibility and government authority, and the burdens leaders must bear. The government has an even bigger blind spot. When true discontent spills over, the government often fails to perceive the problem. It fails to address the problem. It procrastinates until the problem explodes in its face, and gets totally out of control.
This is currently the Ma Chiang regime's biggest blind spot. Many of the government's policies and achievements are positive and far-reaching. They include the improvement of cross-Strait relations, ECFA, and TISA. But the government has failed to highlight them and win recognition for them. It has failed to promote them, communicate them, and the public on them. The governments has found it difficult to trumpet its cabinet leaders' initiative and accomplishments. Its accomplishments have been underplayed. Its failures have been overplayed. The entire cabinet is lifeless. Its approval ratings are low.
But let us be fair. Compare this to authoritarian era imperiousness. Their orders had to be carried out, or else. In today's democratic society, even populist cabinet chiefs find the going harder and harder. No wonder people joke about how "officials can barely get by." Cabinet recruitment is increasingly difficult. This anomaly is a vicious circle. The entire government, specifically President Ma, is overly cautious and indecisive. He has steadily diminished the authority of the head of state. The wind blows, and the grass bends. His appointment of the premier and cabinet ministers have shown excess deference to populist sentiment. He panders to public opinion. Avoiding mistakes outweighs making breakthroughs.
Another anomaly is the willful conduct of "independent authorities." They have transgressed executive leadership team norms. They have raised public concern over quid pro quo media deals. Parties to trades must make declarations, undergo review, and conduct business in accordance with the law. The NCC must approve or reject them in accordance with the law. Yet the NCC stonewalled, motivated by political considerations or indifference to illegal conduct. The interests of law-abiding citizens were harmed. The President and the Executive Yuan ignored these shenanigans. The administration was essentially a runaway train. Another example was FSC anti-corruption measures, intended to ensure the separation of media and money. In principle local shareholders were favored over Mainland capital. In practice select businesses and consortia were favored over all others. Internet firms were concerned about third-party payments. The financial industry was concerned about Free Trade Zone Pilot Programs and favorable liberalization policies. These were repeatedly obstructed. The prime culprit was a trusted President Ma lieutenant. How can this not lead to public resentment and an official backlash? This was a major blow to President Ma's leadership and prestige, and to the cabinet's morale.
The Taiwan Region of the Republic of China has held democratic presidential elections for the past 17 years. After Lee Teng-hui was elected, Premier Vincent Siew served for four years. This was considered a long premiership. Under Chen Shui-bian and Ma Ying-jeou, the average term for premiers was between one year two months, and one year four months. It differs little from Japan, with its rampant turmoil. As we can see, "short-lived cabinets" have become the norm. Breaking this pattern will not be easy. But the power of the legislature is growing. The Legislative Yuan must demonstrate greater finesse when dealing with party politics and party to government operations. Only then can cabinet policy be more robust. This is definitely worth the effort.
Over the past two sessions, the legislature has tackled many problems. They include U.S. beef imports, gasoline price hikes and electricity rate hikes, and the capital gains tax. The administration and the ruling party have not always been on the same page. Never mind the Party Chairman. The Party Secretary-General appears to have no role. Nor do the policy committees and working committees. When the three broadcasting industry laws were amended, the policy committees, the legislative caucuses, and the party whip each went their own way. They parroted the DPP version of the bill, passing it with whirlwind speed. When deliberating major bills, they sought credit for reform, but were simultaneously fearful of the political backlash. Ma's position was often ambiguous and unclear. The presidential office, the executive, and the party were forced to play guessing games. As a result, chaos reigned as they each went their own way. Cabinet policy has been totally disrupted. The Ma government has been blasted for incompetence.
Chiang Yi-hua has been blamed for a long list of problems. They include the Hung Chung-chiu case, The Ta Pu demolition and relocation case, TISA, rabies, and the Referendum on the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant. He has been blamed, justly or unjustly. His approval numbers are low. But he is knowledgeable about political science. He has convictions. He has a solld performance record in the cabinet. Many still have high hopes for him. They hope his cabinet members will do well. They wonder why as soon as he was made premier, things went wrong. The most important thing is that President Ma allows cabinet ministers to do their jobs. The entire cabinet must feel a sense of responsibility. They must change passivity into activity. They must ensure party-administration coordination. They must reform the government. Only then can they rise above today's "soy vat culture," in which officials seek to avoid blame instead of reaching goals.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2013.08.01
社論－評析內閣改組 系列3 期勉江內閣─首長有擔當 政策能主動
本報訊
此次內閣改組人數達七位之多，屬中度規模，焦點主要在於國防部長與金管會主委；而任何人都看得出來，雖然改組新聞熱度不低，但是各界反應卻普遍冷淡。原因倒也不難想見，其一，這次改組是被動因應大於主動布局；其二，發生問題的部會首長雖然換人做看看，但期待之外，真正的癥結、積弊與挑戰，困難重重，改革艱鉅，猶待檢驗。
正因為人事的更替布局，完全只在於止血、弭怨，設下停損點，所以心態上就很難有太大的突破與擔當；也因此整個內閣始終只能追著形勢發展與民眾好惡跑，陷入一種畏首畏尾，過關為上、自我設限的困境。導致政府的施政以不引發「民怨」為最高原則，卻往往分不清民怨的性質、大小、是非，更不論政府的責任與權力何在，首長的擔當何為！而更大的盲點則是，當真正的民怨在醞釀時，政府又常常未能洞見，輕忽以對、因循苟且，直至全面引爆，不可收拾！
這也是馬江體制當前最大的盲點，儘管政府的體質與不少政策的本質與績效（如兩岸關係的改善、ECFA與服貿協議的簽訂）極其正面深遠，但施政的重點卻無法有效凸顯，贏得認同；推動、溝通與說服力也抓不住民意的節奏，首長的擔當與作為又難以主動展現。如此優點頻遭壓抑，缺點老被誇大，整個內閣當然死氣沉沉，民調疲軟，怎個悶字了得！
平心而論，比起過去威權時代所謂「當官的」威風凜凜、令出必行，如今民主社會，甚至是民粹當道的內閣首長，的確是越來越難做了，這也難怪在台灣有所謂「官不聊生」之嘆，以致內閣求才越來越是困難。但這種亂象或怪象，其實也是一種惡性循環，因為從整個政府的最高領導人馬總統，因為謹小慎微、不夠恢弘果斷的政治性格，自己已經把元首的權位不斷做小；風行草偃之下，他與閣揆任用的內閣各部會首長，當然也就常會親民寬容過了頭，看今上眼色辦事，競相討好民意、不要出錯重於開創突破。
還有一種怪象則是所謂「獨立機關」的特立獨行，且超乎行政團隊的領導規範。以之前引發社會關注的幾宗媒體交易案為例，交易當事者依法進行申報、查核與交易，NCC自然也該依法進行審查准駁；但NCC卻可因政治考量而違法不作為，硬拖到底，任令守法民眾權益受損，總統與行政院也完全置之不理，形同默認政府團隊脫軌失控！又如金管會在防弊上之媒金分離、參股陸銀，厚此薄彼，獨惠特定企業財團；在興利上對網路業者關心的第三方支付、金融業者關切的自由經濟示範區等有利開放政策，一再阻撓，而其主事者又被視為馬總統的愛將，如此豈能不激起真正的民怨與官場的反彈，對馬總統領導威信與內閣整體觀感紀律，更是一大傷害！
台灣從民選總統後的十七年，除了李登輝選後四年用了一任四年的行政院長蕭萬長，尚稱長命之外，從陳水扁到馬英九，歷任行政院長任期平均不過一年兩個月到一年四個月，比諸日本政局之動盪，所差無幾，可見「短命內閣」在政治生態上已漸成常態。要突破此一魔咒，牽涉複雜，但國會聲勢增長、立法院內從政黨政治到黨政運作，應該更為細緻，才能使內閣施政更為穩健，絕對是必須深下工夫的課題。
過去兩個會期來，從開放美牛進口、油電雙漲到開徵證所稅等重大政策，執政黨黨政步調總是無法齊一，黨主席就甭提了，既看不到黨祕書長的角色，也看不見政策會和各工作會的功能；甚至一場廣電三法的修法，從政策會到國會大小黨團黨鞭，各行其是，竟然演出呼應民進黨版的飆速修法鬧劇。其間各重大法案，既想收改革之名，又怕反彈力道太大，更因馬態度曖昧不明，出現府院黨國會分別揣摩上意，各自暴走的亂象，不僅完全打亂內閣施政節奏，也間接坐實馬政府無能的罵名。
江宜樺現在遭到洪仲丘案、大埔拆遷案、服貿協議案、狂犬病、核四公投案等等不管有理無理的衝擊或牽連，雖然民調數據不佳，但以他的政治學專業、理念個性以及過去在內閣中的表現，仍有不少人對他寄予厚望，也惋惜他閣員幹得出色，為何一當閣揆便不濟。最要緊的是，馬總統要真正放手讓閣員施為，整個內閣必須具有責任的認同與擔當，化被動為主動，重建黨政協調平台，重整施政的節奏，才能跳脫如今官場不求有功、但求無過的醬缸文化！
Wednesday, July 31, 2013
Tuesday, July 30, 2013
Damage Control Will Not Sooth Public Discontent
Damage Control Will Not Sooth Public Discontent
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
July 31, 2013
Summary: Seven cabinet heads have been replaced. Is that a lot? Perhaps. The real spotlight is on the Ministry of National Defense and on the reorganization of the FSC. With the former, Kao Hua-chu has stepped down to sooth public discontent over the Hung Chung-chiu case. With the latter, Chen Yu-chang has stepped down to sooth official discontent among the financial sector and other cabinet members. Both are Ma administration damage control efforts.
Full text below:
Seven cabinet heads have been replaced. Is that a lot? Perhaps. The real spotlight is on the Ministry of National Defense and on the reorganization of the FSC. With the former, Kao Hua-chu has stepped down to sooth public discontent over the Hung Chung-chiu case. With the latter, Chen Yu-chang has stepped down to sooth official discontent among the financial sector and other cabinet members. Both are Ma administration damage control efforts.
Is soothing discontent the sole purpose of the cabinet reshuffle? Is the administration not fighting for some grander, more long range goal? If it is merely to win Brownie points, then at most it will stop the bleeding. Take the cabinet reshuffle. Seven cabinet heads have been replaced, yet the administration has won little praise if any. Clearly the new cabinet falls short of public expectations. If the Ma Chiang regime still hopes to turn the tide, it ought to be deeply concerned.
Take FSC Chairman Chen Yu-chang's resignation. Chen Yu-chang has been in office for over three years. His conservative manner provoked record dissatisfaction among the public and other cabinet members. But the system of tenure offered him protection. He was protected also because he was considered a Ma Ying-jeou crony. As a result, he survived the Wu Den-yih, Sean Chen, and Chiang Yi-hua cabinet reshuffles. He is currently being replaced only because the impenetrable shield around him was been nullified by organizational restructuring. What is truly mind-boggling is how on the eve of restructuring, five political appointees want Premier Chiang him to replace him. Forcing cabinet colleagues to tolerate a political appointee like him is unheard of. As the saying goes, "Inviting a person to enter is easy. Asking them to leave is difficult." That a political appointee who has incurred such wrath remains so pleased with himself is outrageous. An example like Chen Yu-chang is rare. But who appointed him to such an important position? Wasn't it President Ma?
Chen Yu-chang was not arrogant or difficult to communicate with. That was not his problem. His problem was his uttter failure to understand his official duties. Until the very last moment, Chen Yu-chang assumed he was fired because his strict supervision "offended too many people." In fact, his mistake was to conflate "supervision" with "management." He thought that by strangling financial institutions, he was doing his duty. The only thing in his head was the "management" powers in his hands. He neglected his duty to manage the government and promote the general welfare. He remembered only that industry needed management. He forgot the government's duty to create a suitable environment for e-commerce. His obstinacy stalled the Free Trade Zone Pilot Program over the issue of third party payments. To the financial industry this was intolerable. It stalled government decision-making and the development of new industries. .
Chen Yu-chang was too conservative and too recalcitrant. Kao Hua-chu's voluntary resignation was a responsible move, but not if the sole motive was to stop the bleeding. As Hung Chung-chiu family members said, Kao Hua-chu was not the wrongdoer. Having him step down was not important. What was more important, was a government explanation of what happened. According to conventional political wisdom, a political appointee who has provoked massive resentment must resign, as a matter of course. But as the public sees it, the rule has gradually been weakened. The government must get to the bottom of the case. If it thinks that merely removing the Minister of National Defense can sooth discontent, it is much too naive.
Leave aside the individual ministers' performance for the moment. The Ma Chiang regime is the target of public discontent because it failed to promote the general welfare. Instead, it constantly engaged in damage control. But these attempts at damage control will be for naught. The government focuses its attention on a protest here, and a grievance there. Senior officials spend their time in the countryside explaining basic policy. How can they find time for visionary thinking? How can they find time to plan for Taiwan's development? Imagine a business organization whose management is concerned exclusively with procedural matters, and which takes three years to get anything done. What kind of performance could one expect from it?
Chen Yu-chang's removal from office suggests that Chiang YI-hua's reorganization has more legitimacy than than ever. He deservers recognition for political responsibility alone. But Taiwan's economic development has stagnated. Public anger radiates in all directions. The Ma Chiang regime has yet to rid itself of internal frictions. Therefore this can hardly be considered "good news." This is especially true when any random development could trigger a public reaction. Only government restructuring can address this discontent. The introduction of an elite clique cannot change the course of events. In any event, such responses are much too passive.
New people and a new cabinet would normally warrant congratulations. But the negative atmosphere and the lack of vision have left people wary. We can only remind the government that it must demonstrate a sense of vision, and a determination to promote the public welfare. Only then can the public be persuaded. If the Ma Chiang regime remains mired in damage control, it will not even be able to save itself.
紓怨何如興利：內閣須超越補破網思維
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.07.31 02:17 am
內閣七部會首長易人，幅度說大不大，真正受矚目的就是國防部和金管會的改組。前者，高華柱下台自是為了紓解洪仲丘案引發的「民怨」；後者，陳裕璋去職是為了紓解金融界和其他閣員不滿的「官怨」。兩者，皆為了馬政府之停損。
內閣改組的目的若竟只為「紓怨」，而不是為了更宏遠的衝刺與戰力提升，是為了「減少失分」，而不是為了「增加得分」，至多也只能得到「止血」的效果。看這次改組，七個部會首長的異動，竟未博得外界幾許掌聲；可見，新的內閣陣容和外界對行政團隊的整體期待，仍距離甚遠。對「馬江體制」而言，若還有力挽狂瀾之圖，這點深值警惕。
先談金管會主委陳裕璋之去職。陳裕璋在任三年多，其行事保守招致外界不滿與閣員抨擊之紀錄盈筐，卻因有「任期制」之保障，加上「馬英九親信幕僚」之名護身，安然歷經了吳敦義、陳?、江宜樺三任內閣；至今，才得因組織改造解除其「金鐘罩」，將他撤換。最令人瞠目結舌的是，改組前夕，傳聞有五名政務委員擬聯名上書請求江揆將他撤換；如此讓內閣同僚忍無可忍的政務官，恐怕是前所未聞。所謂「請神容易，送神難」，一名政務官能做到如此天怒人怨卻仍怡然自得，陳裕璋委實是罕見的例子；然而，將他放到這個大位上的始作俑者，不正是馬總統？
陳裕璋的問題，不在於他為人多麼傲慢難以溝通，而在他完全錯看了自己的官位。直到最後一刻，陳裕璋還以為自己下台的原因是由於嚴格監理而「得罪了一缸子人」；事實上，他之所以不稱職，是以為金管會的權責就是「監督」和「管理」，以為把金融機構掐得死死的，就是盡職。他心中想的，只有手上「管理」的權力，卻忽略了政府施政要與時俱進，為國家興利；他只記得產業秩序需要管理，卻忘了為產業發展打造合理的環境條件也是政府的要務。由於一人的固執，網路業者的發展卡在「第三方支付」，自由經濟示範區的開張卡在「金融業」難容，都讓政府決策及新興產業發展一路遲滯。
相對於陳裕璋之保守與頑抗，高華柱的主動請辭，則表現了負責的態度；但若以為這有助於洪案之止血，只怕不然。誠如洪仲丘家屬所言，做錯事的不是高華柱，他下不下台並不重要，更重要的是政府要交代真相。依傳統的政治智慧，政務官為滔天民怨而引咎辭職，是當然之事；但從民間的智慧看，這一定律已經逐漸打破，政府若無法將真相弄個水落石出，卻以為國防部長之撤換即可以紓怨轉運，恐怕是太天真的想法。
事實上，拋開個別閣員的表現與功過不談，目前「馬江體制」陷入民怨泉湧的困境，主要原因是執政團隊缺乏積極作為的「興利」思維，每天都在那裡「補破網」，結果必然是勞而無獲。當政府的全副精力都用來應付東一場抗議、西一個民怨，當高層官員每天都耗在下鄉說明基本政策，怎麼可能有時間進行前瞻思考，又如何有餘裕為台灣的大發展籌謀規畫？試想，如果是一家企業，出現一個墨守成規的管理幹部卻一拖三年無奈他何，這家企業的績效還能期待嗎？
陳裕璋的撤換，意味江宜樺在這次改組取得了較以往更多的主導權，就責任政治的精神而言，這點值得肯定。然而，當台灣經濟發展的腳步停滯不前，當社會大眾的怒火在四面八方延燒，「馬江體制」卻還未擺脫「內部磨合」的拉扯，恐怕也難稱之「可喜」。尤其，當隨便一個事件就能引發民間強烈的情緒反應，政府竟只能藉改組來紓解民怨，而不是推出一支精銳部隊來旋乾轉坤，無論如何，此一部署仍過顯消極。
新人新政，本該說些恭賀的話；但現實的氛圍和缺乏宏圖的安排，都讓人不得不持保留態度。我們只能提醒：重要的是要展現作為企圖，拿出興利政績，才能讓人民有感。若馬江體制一直停留在「補破網」的思維，那恐怕連自救都不夠。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
July 31, 2013
Summary: Seven cabinet heads have been replaced. Is that a lot? Perhaps. The real spotlight is on the Ministry of National Defense and on the reorganization of the FSC. With the former, Kao Hua-chu has stepped down to sooth public discontent over the Hung Chung-chiu case. With the latter, Chen Yu-chang has stepped down to sooth official discontent among the financial sector and other cabinet members. Both are Ma administration damage control efforts.
Full text below:
Seven cabinet heads have been replaced. Is that a lot? Perhaps. The real spotlight is on the Ministry of National Defense and on the reorganization of the FSC. With the former, Kao Hua-chu has stepped down to sooth public discontent over the Hung Chung-chiu case. With the latter, Chen Yu-chang has stepped down to sooth official discontent among the financial sector and other cabinet members. Both are Ma administration damage control efforts.
Is soothing discontent the sole purpose of the cabinet reshuffle? Is the administration not fighting for some grander, more long range goal? If it is merely to win Brownie points, then at most it will stop the bleeding. Take the cabinet reshuffle. Seven cabinet heads have been replaced, yet the administration has won little praise if any. Clearly the new cabinet falls short of public expectations. If the Ma Chiang regime still hopes to turn the tide, it ought to be deeply concerned.
Take FSC Chairman Chen Yu-chang's resignation. Chen Yu-chang has been in office for over three years. His conservative manner provoked record dissatisfaction among the public and other cabinet members. But the system of tenure offered him protection. He was protected also because he was considered a Ma Ying-jeou crony. As a result, he survived the Wu Den-yih, Sean Chen, and Chiang Yi-hua cabinet reshuffles. He is currently being replaced only because the impenetrable shield around him was been nullified by organizational restructuring. What is truly mind-boggling is how on the eve of restructuring, five political appointees want Premier Chiang him to replace him. Forcing cabinet colleagues to tolerate a political appointee like him is unheard of. As the saying goes, "Inviting a person to enter is easy. Asking them to leave is difficult." That a political appointee who has incurred such wrath remains so pleased with himself is outrageous. An example like Chen Yu-chang is rare. But who appointed him to such an important position? Wasn't it President Ma?
Chen Yu-chang was not arrogant or difficult to communicate with. That was not his problem. His problem was his uttter failure to understand his official duties. Until the very last moment, Chen Yu-chang assumed he was fired because his strict supervision "offended too many people." In fact, his mistake was to conflate "supervision" with "management." He thought that by strangling financial institutions, he was doing his duty. The only thing in his head was the "management" powers in his hands. He neglected his duty to manage the government and promote the general welfare. He remembered only that industry needed management. He forgot the government's duty to create a suitable environment for e-commerce. His obstinacy stalled the Free Trade Zone Pilot Program over the issue of third party payments. To the financial industry this was intolerable. It stalled government decision-making and the development of new industries. .
Chen Yu-chang was too conservative and too recalcitrant. Kao Hua-chu's voluntary resignation was a responsible move, but not if the sole motive was to stop the bleeding. As Hung Chung-chiu family members said, Kao Hua-chu was not the wrongdoer. Having him step down was not important. What was more important, was a government explanation of what happened. According to conventional political wisdom, a political appointee who has provoked massive resentment must resign, as a matter of course. But as the public sees it, the rule has gradually been weakened. The government must get to the bottom of the case. If it thinks that merely removing the Minister of National Defense can sooth discontent, it is much too naive.
Leave aside the individual ministers' performance for the moment. The Ma Chiang regime is the target of public discontent because it failed to promote the general welfare. Instead, it constantly engaged in damage control. But these attempts at damage control will be for naught. The government focuses its attention on a protest here, and a grievance there. Senior officials spend their time in the countryside explaining basic policy. How can they find time for visionary thinking? How can they find time to plan for Taiwan's development? Imagine a business organization whose management is concerned exclusively with procedural matters, and which takes three years to get anything done. What kind of performance could one expect from it?
Chen Yu-chang's removal from office suggests that Chiang YI-hua's reorganization has more legitimacy than than ever. He deservers recognition for political responsibility alone. But Taiwan's economic development has stagnated. Public anger radiates in all directions. The Ma Chiang regime has yet to rid itself of internal frictions. Therefore this can hardly be considered "good news." This is especially true when any random development could trigger a public reaction. Only government restructuring can address this discontent. The introduction of an elite clique cannot change the course of events. In any event, such responses are much too passive.
New people and a new cabinet would normally warrant congratulations. But the negative atmosphere and the lack of vision have left people wary. We can only remind the government that it must demonstrate a sense of vision, and a determination to promote the public welfare. Only then can the public be persuaded. If the Ma Chiang regime remains mired in damage control, it will not even be able to save itself.
紓怨何如興利：內閣須超越補破網思維
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.07.31 02:17 am
內閣七部會首長易人，幅度說大不大，真正受矚目的就是國防部和金管會的改組。前者，高華柱下台自是為了紓解洪仲丘案引發的「民怨」；後者，陳裕璋去職是為了紓解金融界和其他閣員不滿的「官怨」。兩者，皆為了馬政府之停損。
內閣改組的目的若竟只為「紓怨」，而不是為了更宏遠的衝刺與戰力提升，是為了「減少失分」，而不是為了「增加得分」，至多也只能得到「止血」的效果。看這次改組，七個部會首長的異動，竟未博得外界幾許掌聲；可見，新的內閣陣容和外界對行政團隊的整體期待，仍距離甚遠。對「馬江體制」而言，若還有力挽狂瀾之圖，這點深值警惕。
先談金管會主委陳裕璋之去職。陳裕璋在任三年多，其行事保守招致外界不滿與閣員抨擊之紀錄盈筐，卻因有「任期制」之保障，加上「馬英九親信幕僚」之名護身，安然歷經了吳敦義、陳?、江宜樺三任內閣；至今，才得因組織改造解除其「金鐘罩」，將他撤換。最令人瞠目結舌的是，改組前夕，傳聞有五名政務委員擬聯名上書請求江揆將他撤換；如此讓內閣同僚忍無可忍的政務官，恐怕是前所未聞。所謂「請神容易，送神難」，一名政務官能做到如此天怒人怨卻仍怡然自得，陳裕璋委實是罕見的例子；然而，將他放到這個大位上的始作俑者，不正是馬總統？
陳裕璋的問題，不在於他為人多麼傲慢難以溝通，而在他完全錯看了自己的官位。直到最後一刻，陳裕璋還以為自己下台的原因是由於嚴格監理而「得罪了一缸子人」；事實上，他之所以不稱職，是以為金管會的權責就是「監督」和「管理」，以為把金融機構掐得死死的，就是盡職。他心中想的，只有手上「管理」的權力，卻忽略了政府施政要與時俱進，為國家興利；他只記得產業秩序需要管理，卻忘了為產業發展打造合理的環境條件也是政府的要務。由於一人的固執，網路業者的發展卡在「第三方支付」，自由經濟示範區的開張卡在「金融業」難容，都讓政府決策及新興產業發展一路遲滯。
相對於陳裕璋之保守與頑抗，高華柱的主動請辭，則表現了負責的態度；但若以為這有助於洪案之止血，只怕不然。誠如洪仲丘家屬所言，做錯事的不是高華柱，他下不下台並不重要，更重要的是政府要交代真相。依傳統的政治智慧，政務官為滔天民怨而引咎辭職，是當然之事；但從民間的智慧看，這一定律已經逐漸打破，政府若無法將真相弄個水落石出，卻以為國防部長之撤換即可以紓怨轉運，恐怕是太天真的想法。
事實上，拋開個別閣員的表現與功過不談，目前「馬江體制」陷入民怨泉湧的困境，主要原因是執政團隊缺乏積極作為的「興利」思維，每天都在那裡「補破網」，結果必然是勞而無獲。當政府的全副精力都用來應付東一場抗議、西一個民怨，當高層官員每天都耗在下鄉說明基本政策，怎麼可能有時間進行前瞻思考，又如何有餘裕為台灣的大發展籌謀規畫？試想，如果是一家企業，出現一個墨守成規的管理幹部卻一拖三年無奈他何，這家企業的績效還能期待嗎？
陳裕璋的撤換，意味江宜樺在這次改組取得了較以往更多的主導權，就責任政治的精神而言，這點值得肯定。然而，當台灣經濟發展的腳步停滯不前，當社會大眾的怒火在四面八方延燒，「馬江體制」卻還未擺脫「內部磨合」的拉扯，恐怕也難稱之「可喜」。尤其，當隨便一個事件就能引發民間強烈的情緒反應，政府竟只能藉改組來紓解民怨，而不是推出一支精銳部隊來旋乾轉坤，無論如何，此一部署仍過顯消極。
新人新政，本該說些恭賀的話；但現實的氛圍和缺乏宏圖的安排，都讓人不得不持保留態度。我們只能提醒：重要的是要展現作為企圖，拿出興利政績，才能讓人民有感。若馬江體制一直停留在「補破網」的思維，那恐怕連自救都不夠。
Monday, July 29, 2013
Realization of a Vision: Taiwan's Road to Economic Growth
Realization of a Vision: Taiwan's Road to Economic Growth
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
July 30, 2013
Summary: It is now one year into President Ma's second term. It is now one year away from the upcoming national elections. He must demonstrate courage. He has little time to produce results. Today's summit has convened. We believe the government has the courage and determination necessary to revive the economy. The implementation of reform allows no room for compromise. President Ma, please do not let the people down!
Full text below:
The "2013 Turning Point: Blazing a Trail for Taiwan's Economy" summit convenes today. This is the second time the United Daily News Vision Workshop has promoted its "Taiwan's Rapid Transformation" project. Compare this to last year's "Critical Two Years for Taiwan's Economy: Blazing a Trail for Taiwan's Economy" summit. Today's summit continues the tradition. We hope it will fufill its goal: rapid transformation to jump start a stalled economy.
As we enter the 21st century, Taiwan's economy is essentially stalled. In 2001, the technology bubble burst. In 2004, SARS struck. In 2008, the financial tsunami inundated us. Add to this stalemated cross-Strait relations, and GDP growth moving at a snail's pace. We no longer display the vitality of an emerging developing economy. We survived the financial tsunami. But our slow growth rate has not improved. If anything, it has worsened. This newspaper's United Daily News Group Vision Workshop, established last year, proposed as its first vision the "Taiwan's Rapid Transformation" project. This project will explore issues in depth. It will organize government-academia summits to discuss economic policy priorities for the next two years. It will submit the summit recommendations to President Ma Ying-jeou and DPP Chairman Su Tseng-chang. It will issue follow-up reports. It will urge the different parties to move at a faster pace, to do better. to achieve greater results, allowing Taiwan's economy to undergo positive changes.
Over the past year, we have begun to see results. Seven of last year's Summit Declarations have been realized. Taipei-Tokyo industrial cooperation continues to improve. The Executive Yuan has increased economic momentum and improved the industrial structure. The president and the legislature have successfully promoted free trade agreements (FTAs), the cross-strait economic agreement (ECFA), the Trade in Services Agreement (TISA), one of four major agreements under consultation, and the "Taiwan-New Zealand economic cooperation agreement." They are paying more attention to the brain drain and other critical policy matters. Regrettably, their response has not been fast enough. detailed enough, or substantive enough. Confrontation between the ruling and opposition parties persists. Internal friction persists. We hear rhetoric, but no dialogue. As a result, policies remain ineffectual. The people feel helpless. This year's economic growth rate has fallen headlong. At the beginning of the year the forecast was for 4 to 5%. It was revised downward to 3%. Now we may have to settle for an embarrassing 2%. Add to this the referendum on the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant, urban renewal, the demolition and relocation of Ta Pu, the Hung Chung-chiu case, and other controversies. Public dissatisfaction with the government continues to increase.
Today, we are organizing another trail-blazing summit. Its purpose is to give economic issues a boost. Taiwan's economic predicament requires open dialogue between the government and the public. They must inspire each other. They must seek a new direction together. The United Daily News is a responsible member of the media. It is willing to offer a podium to scholars, in the hope that they will issue a clarion call to the government and the public, urging them to act in unison and extricate Taiwan's economy from the mire, and as soon as possible put it back on the road to growth.
The focus of the summit is immediate measures to revive the economy. These include economic structural adjustment measures, economic liberalization programs, and economic confidence restoration projects, short term and long. Former Vice President Vincent Siew has long been concerned about Taiwan's economy. He will be the summit's chief moderator. Four Executive Yuan heads will also speak on matters of special concern. Dialogue between officials and the public is expected to be lively. We anticipate both passion and wisdom.
Sparks may fly during the summit, but eventually they must be turned into concrete policies and actions. Only then can they transform Taiwan and fulfill our vision of growth. The government will be confronted with a wide range of recommendations. It must keep in mind two guiding principles. One. It must realize that without the present, there can be no future. It must buy time to implement long term reforms. Shinzo Abe's highly controversial Abenomics may not be applicable to Taiwan. But Abe's efforts have halted Japan's fall. They have gradually restored public confidence. They have also won increased political support. Short-term success increases the credibility of long-term reforms. This is the key to the restoration of economic confidence.
Two. We must look to the future, but we must lay the groundwork now. The affairs of state are varied, controversial, and require urgent solution. But the government cannot always clean up the mess left behind. It can easily find itself mired in one controversy after another. It can easily find itself overwhelmed. If so, society will descend into chaos. Economic stagnation and recession will follow. Therefore the government must learn to prioritize. It must rid itself of current entanglements. It must skip ahead to the future, adopt a forward-looking posture, and consider countermeasures. That will enable it to think clearly and act calmly.
It is now one year into President Ma's second term. It is now one year away from the upcoming national elections. He must demonstrate courage. He has little time to produce results. Today's summit has convened. We believe the government has the courage and determination necessary to revive the economy. The implementation of reform allows no room for compromise. President Ma, please do not let the people down!
實踐願景：開向台灣經濟成長之路
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.07.30 01:45 am
《關鍵時刻二○一三──為台灣經濟開路》高峰會今天登場，這是聯合報系願景工作室推動「台灣快轉」願景工程的再一次重要行動。相較於去年此時的《關鍵兩年──為台灣經濟開路》高峰會，今天的會議具有承先啟後的意義，更期望它能收預期之功：快轉前進，突破悶經濟。
進入廿一世紀之後的台灣經濟，基本上是一個悶局。從二○○一年的科技泡沫重整，遇上二○○四年的SARS，再到二○○八年的金融海嘯，加上兩岸關係陷入僵峙，GDP顯得步履緩慢，已不見新興開發中國家的活力；熬過金融海嘯後，低速成長的悶局不僅未見改善，反而日顯沈重。本報去年成立的聯合報系願景工作室將「台灣快轉」列為第一項願景工程，除跨國深度報導探索問題，並舉辦產官學高峰會共議未來兩年優先經濟策略，向馬英九總統及民進黨主席蘇貞昌提交峰會建言，並持續追蹤報導，督促各方行動能走得快一點、做得好一點、成果多一點，讓台灣經濟發生正向改變。
一年來，我們看到了一些成果。以去年高峰會提出的七大宣言為例，台日產業合作持續深化、政院制定經濟動能推升方案以調整產業結構、府院訂立推動自由貿易協定（FTA）路徑及進度，並完成兩岸經濟協議（ECFA）四大協商之一的「服務貿易協議」與「台紐經濟合作協議」，關注人才流失危機並升高政策討論層級等。遺憾的是，這些行動不夠快速、不夠細緻、不夠實在，而朝野對峙依舊、內耗依舊，只有喊話、沒有對話，以致政策無力、人民無感。今年的經濟成長率，從年初的坐四望五，一路低探到「保三」，甚至連「保二」就算滿意的狼狽局面。加上核四公投、都市更新、大埔拆遷、洪仲丘案等爭議層出不窮，社會各界對政府的不滿不斷攀升。
今天，我們再次舉辦開路高峰會，目的即是希望在經濟議題上再推一把。我們認為，面對台灣的經濟困局，政府和社會各界有必要進行公開對話，彼此激盪，共同尋求新的方向；聯合報系作為有責任感的民間媒體，願意主動搭起平台，集合產學菁英向政府及社會發出誠摯而堅定的呼籲，希望各界攜手行動，早日幫助台灣經濟脫離泥淖，步向成長之路。
這次開路高峰會的對話主題，主要在討論振興經濟之立即性措施、台灣經濟結構調整對策、經濟自由化行動方案、經濟信心重建工程等「救短」也能「救長」的作為。會中，除請到時時以台灣經濟為念的前副總統蕭萬長擔任總主持人，也請到四位行政院首長親任議題引言人，可望為官民之間的政策對話增添柴火，也期待能激盪出更多的熱情與智慧火花。
然而，不論峰會的火花再如何炫麗，最終仍須化為實實在在的政策與行動，才能落實台灣快轉、迎向成長的願景。因此，我們期望政府在面對各界建言時必須掌握兩大原則。其一，須體認「沒有現在，就沒有未來」的迫切感，為長期改革爭取更多的時間與信任。日本的安倍經濟學雖飽受爭議，或亦未必適用於台灣，但安倍的奮發作為讓日本停止失落，讓人民的自信逐漸恢復，政治上也得到了更多支持。短期作為的可行成就了長期改革的可信，這是經濟信心重建工程的關鍵。
其二，要掌握「放眼未來，鋪陳現在」的跨越性。正值國事如麻，待議、待解的課題何其多，但政府不能總是跟隨在突發事件之後收拾殘局，陷入一個接一個的爭議泥沼；若如此被動消極，不僅社會毫無寧日，經濟停滯衰退也是必然的命運。因此，政府必須掌握機先，擺脫「現在」的糾葛，跳到「未來」的前瞻位置去思考對策，那樣方向將更清晰，行動也更從容。
馬總統的第二任任期已過了一年，距離明年全國性大選僅剩一年，他能展現魄力、交出政績的時間顯已極為緊迫。今天高峰會的召開，是奠基於我們相信：政府衝刺的勇氣是飽滿的，振作經濟的企圖是堅定的，實踐改革承諾的決心是沒有妥協餘地的。馬總統，請不要讓人民失望！
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
July 30, 2013
Summary: It is now one year into President Ma's second term. It is now one year away from the upcoming national elections. He must demonstrate courage. He has little time to produce results. Today's summit has convened. We believe the government has the courage and determination necessary to revive the economy. The implementation of reform allows no room for compromise. President Ma, please do not let the people down!
Full text below:
The "2013 Turning Point: Blazing a Trail for Taiwan's Economy" summit convenes today. This is the second time the United Daily News Vision Workshop has promoted its "Taiwan's Rapid Transformation" project. Compare this to last year's "Critical Two Years for Taiwan's Economy: Blazing a Trail for Taiwan's Economy" summit. Today's summit continues the tradition. We hope it will fufill its goal: rapid transformation to jump start a stalled economy.
As we enter the 21st century, Taiwan's economy is essentially stalled. In 2001, the technology bubble burst. In 2004, SARS struck. In 2008, the financial tsunami inundated us. Add to this stalemated cross-Strait relations, and GDP growth moving at a snail's pace. We no longer display the vitality of an emerging developing economy. We survived the financial tsunami. But our slow growth rate has not improved. If anything, it has worsened. This newspaper's United Daily News Group Vision Workshop, established last year, proposed as its first vision the "Taiwan's Rapid Transformation" project. This project will explore issues in depth. It will organize government-academia summits to discuss economic policy priorities for the next two years. It will submit the summit recommendations to President Ma Ying-jeou and DPP Chairman Su Tseng-chang. It will issue follow-up reports. It will urge the different parties to move at a faster pace, to do better. to achieve greater results, allowing Taiwan's economy to undergo positive changes.
Over the past year, we have begun to see results. Seven of last year's Summit Declarations have been realized. Taipei-Tokyo industrial cooperation continues to improve. The Executive Yuan has increased economic momentum and improved the industrial structure. The president and the legislature have successfully promoted free trade agreements (FTAs), the cross-strait economic agreement (ECFA), the Trade in Services Agreement (TISA), one of four major agreements under consultation, and the "Taiwan-New Zealand economic cooperation agreement." They are paying more attention to the brain drain and other critical policy matters. Regrettably, their response has not been fast enough. detailed enough, or substantive enough. Confrontation between the ruling and opposition parties persists. Internal friction persists. We hear rhetoric, but no dialogue. As a result, policies remain ineffectual. The people feel helpless. This year's economic growth rate has fallen headlong. At the beginning of the year the forecast was for 4 to 5%. It was revised downward to 3%. Now we may have to settle for an embarrassing 2%. Add to this the referendum on the Number Four Nuclear Power Plant, urban renewal, the demolition and relocation of Ta Pu, the Hung Chung-chiu case, and other controversies. Public dissatisfaction with the government continues to increase.
Today, we are organizing another trail-blazing summit. Its purpose is to give economic issues a boost. Taiwan's economic predicament requires open dialogue between the government and the public. They must inspire each other. They must seek a new direction together. The United Daily News is a responsible member of the media. It is willing to offer a podium to scholars, in the hope that they will issue a clarion call to the government and the public, urging them to act in unison and extricate Taiwan's economy from the mire, and as soon as possible put it back on the road to growth.
The focus of the summit is immediate measures to revive the economy. These include economic structural adjustment measures, economic liberalization programs, and economic confidence restoration projects, short term and long. Former Vice President Vincent Siew has long been concerned about Taiwan's economy. He will be the summit's chief moderator. Four Executive Yuan heads will also speak on matters of special concern. Dialogue between officials and the public is expected to be lively. We anticipate both passion and wisdom.
Sparks may fly during the summit, but eventually they must be turned into concrete policies and actions. Only then can they transform Taiwan and fulfill our vision of growth. The government will be confronted with a wide range of recommendations. It must keep in mind two guiding principles. One. It must realize that without the present, there can be no future. It must buy time to implement long term reforms. Shinzo Abe's highly controversial Abenomics may not be applicable to Taiwan. But Abe's efforts have halted Japan's fall. They have gradually restored public confidence. They have also won increased political support. Short-term success increases the credibility of long-term reforms. This is the key to the restoration of economic confidence.
Two. We must look to the future, but we must lay the groundwork now. The affairs of state are varied, controversial, and require urgent solution. But the government cannot always clean up the mess left behind. It can easily find itself mired in one controversy after another. It can easily find itself overwhelmed. If so, society will descend into chaos. Economic stagnation and recession will follow. Therefore the government must learn to prioritize. It must rid itself of current entanglements. It must skip ahead to the future, adopt a forward-looking posture, and consider countermeasures. That will enable it to think clearly and act calmly.
It is now one year into President Ma's second term. It is now one year away from the upcoming national elections. He must demonstrate courage. He has little time to produce results. Today's summit has convened. We believe the government has the courage and determination necessary to revive the economy. The implementation of reform allows no room for compromise. President Ma, please do not let the people down!
實踐願景：開向台灣經濟成長之路
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.07.30 01:45 am
《關鍵時刻二○一三──為台灣經濟開路》高峰會今天登場，這是聯合報系願景工作室推動「台灣快轉」願景工程的再一次重要行動。相較於去年此時的《關鍵兩年──為台灣經濟開路》高峰會，今天的會議具有承先啟後的意義，更期望它能收預期之功：快轉前進，突破悶經濟。
進入廿一世紀之後的台灣經濟，基本上是一個悶局。從二○○一年的科技泡沫重整，遇上二○○四年的SARS，再到二○○八年的金融海嘯，加上兩岸關係陷入僵峙，GDP顯得步履緩慢，已不見新興開發中國家的活力；熬過金融海嘯後，低速成長的悶局不僅未見改善，反而日顯沈重。本報去年成立的聯合報系願景工作室將「台灣快轉」列為第一項願景工程，除跨國深度報導探索問題，並舉辦產官學高峰會共議未來兩年優先經濟策略，向馬英九總統及民進黨主席蘇貞昌提交峰會建言，並持續追蹤報導，督促各方行動能走得快一點、做得好一點、成果多一點，讓台灣經濟發生正向改變。
一年來，我們看到了一些成果。以去年高峰會提出的七大宣言為例，台日產業合作持續深化、政院制定經濟動能推升方案以調整產業結構、府院訂立推動自由貿易協定（FTA）路徑及進度，並完成兩岸經濟協議（ECFA）四大協商之一的「服務貿易協議」與「台紐經濟合作協議」，關注人才流失危機並升高政策討論層級等。遺憾的是，這些行動不夠快速、不夠細緻、不夠實在，而朝野對峙依舊、內耗依舊，只有喊話、沒有對話，以致政策無力、人民無感。今年的經濟成長率，從年初的坐四望五，一路低探到「保三」，甚至連「保二」就算滿意的狼狽局面。加上核四公投、都市更新、大埔拆遷、洪仲丘案等爭議層出不窮，社會各界對政府的不滿不斷攀升。
今天，我們再次舉辦開路高峰會，目的即是希望在經濟議題上再推一把。我們認為，面對台灣的經濟困局，政府和社會各界有必要進行公開對話，彼此激盪，共同尋求新的方向；聯合報系作為有責任感的民間媒體，願意主動搭起平台，集合產學菁英向政府及社會發出誠摯而堅定的呼籲，希望各界攜手行動，早日幫助台灣經濟脫離泥淖，步向成長之路。
這次開路高峰會的對話主題，主要在討論振興經濟之立即性措施、台灣經濟結構調整對策、經濟自由化行動方案、經濟信心重建工程等「救短」也能「救長」的作為。會中，除請到時時以台灣經濟為念的前副總統蕭萬長擔任總主持人，也請到四位行政院首長親任議題引言人，可望為官民之間的政策對話增添柴火，也期待能激盪出更多的熱情與智慧火花。
然而，不論峰會的火花再如何炫麗，最終仍須化為實實在在的政策與行動，才能落實台灣快轉、迎向成長的願景。因此，我們期望政府在面對各界建言時必須掌握兩大原則。其一，須體認「沒有現在，就沒有未來」的迫切感，為長期改革爭取更多的時間與信任。日本的安倍經濟學雖飽受爭議，或亦未必適用於台灣，但安倍的奮發作為讓日本停止失落，讓人民的自信逐漸恢復，政治上也得到了更多支持。短期作為的可行成就了長期改革的可信，這是經濟信心重建工程的關鍵。
其二，要掌握「放眼未來，鋪陳現在」的跨越性。正值國事如麻，待議、待解的課題何其多，但政府不能總是跟隨在突發事件之後收拾殘局，陷入一個接一個的爭議泥沼；若如此被動消極，不僅社會毫無寧日，經濟停滯衰退也是必然的命運。因此，政府必須掌握機先，擺脫「現在」的糾葛，跳到「未來」的前瞻位置去思考對策，那樣方向將更清晰，行動也更從容。
馬總統的第二任任期已過了一年，距離明年全國性大選僅剩一年，他能展現魄力、交出政績的時間顯已極為緊迫。今天高峰會的召開，是奠基於我們相信：政府衝刺的勇氣是飽滿的，振作經濟的企圖是堅定的，實踐改革承諾的決心是沒有妥協餘地的。馬總統，請不要讓人民失望！
Sunday, July 28, 2013
People Merely Want the Truth
People Merely Want the Truth
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
July 29, 2013
Summary: The Hung Chung-chiu case is already four weeks old, but the truth has yet to emerge. It is rumored that the Ma administration has made Minister of Defense Kao Hua-chu's resignation its "stop-loss point." If so, its calculations are both cheap and facile. They also misjudge public opinion.
Full text below:
The Hung Chung-chiu case is already four weeks old, but the truth has yet to emerge. It is rumored that the Ma administration has made Minister of Defense Kao Hua-chu's resignation its "stop-loss point." If so, its calculations are both cheap and facile. They also misjudge public opinion.
Whether Kao Hua-chu remains or leaves is not the issue. His resignation will do nothing to resolve public doubts. It might even intensify public anger at government incompetence. When the case first broke, this newspaper proclaimed in no uncertain terms that "Without the truth, there can be no forgiveness." The public wants the whole story, They do not necessarily want a long list of high ranking government officials to be punished. The Hung family merely wants to know what happened to Hung Chung-chiu during his last days on earth. They want to know why he was tortured to death. It is not their intention to deliberately make trouble for the military. Therefore the government must uncover the truth. Merely forcing the Minister of Defense to step down wiil not help the government to stop its losses. That is the wrong direction. .
President Ma is deeply concerned about the Hung case. He has instructed the agencies in charge to look into "integrating of military justice and criminal proceedings" instead of
court martialing those who abuse their subordinates. The Ministry of Defense has proposed 13 military reform measures. These are undoubtedly essential long-term institutional reforms. But they ignore the burning issue at hand. They leave unanswered questions about the case hanging. They trumpet long-term reform while watching the direction the wind blows. How can people not conclude that the government is merely putting on an act?
The public merely wants the truth behind the Hung Chung-chiu case. The government's response however, was to offer assurances of long-term reform. The Hung family wants justice. It does not want the military telling stories. Yet the government insists it must wait until the law is amended and the system is reformed before it can act. Day after day, it declares that it is investigating. But if it fails to uncover more facts, how can it possibly stop the bleeding?
We have reiterated the need for the truth. Only the truth can determine ultimate responsibility and avoid implicating the innocent. Only the truth will enable the Ministry of Defense to address the problem and implement in-depth reforms. The Army report has been revised repeatedly. Compare it to the Hung family's own investigation, and revelations by other soldiers. Outsiders already see the extent to which the incident has been obscured. Some obscurity is the result of the military's failure to conduct a thorough investigation. Some of it is the result of the military's deliberately withholding of the facts from outsiders. The result is that key parts of the larger picture have been "pixelated," making them difficult to read. If the military wants to dispel doubts among outsiders, it must first remove the pixelated portions of the picture.
The Hung family and the general public most urgently want to know four things. These are the things to which the military must give the highest priority. One. The military must make public the record of the proceedings in order to instill public confidence. The "Non-Commissioned Officers Evaluation Commission" investigation and solitary confinement of Hung Chung-chiu was conducted by Fan Cho-hsien of the Brigade Headquarters and Headquarters Company. The lack of higher level "Personnel Evaluation Commission" review was the result of indolence or self-interest. This too must be accounted for. Two. The military must make public the 813 Hospital medical report, in toto, from beginning to end. It must review the contents for signs of fraud, including who purchased beverages. Three. Was the CCTV monitor blackout the result of mechanical failure, bad connections, or deliberate erasure? This must be explained to the public's satisfaction. The personnel in charge of monitoring the CCTV system should be called on to explain. The public cannot accept vague conclusions such as "Somehow something went wrong." Four. The military must explain what happened during the final hours, when Hung Chung-chiu was in solitary confinement, including the forced drills and emergency rescue process. If necessary, the responsible personnel should provide evidence.
Perhaps the investigation cannot be fully opened to the public. But Chief Military Prosecutor Tsao Ching-sheng held a joint press conference with DPP legislators. The case raged on for more than 20 days. If the government fails to offer a convincing explanation, how can it quiet public speculation? The fact is local prosecutors joining the investigation shattered the military's ability to tell fairy tales. This includes the autopsy report, which was changed from "accidental death" to "homicide." These show that third-party involvement is essential. But what Taoyuan prosecutors can do remains limited. They cannot uncover more facts. President Ma has personally promised the Hung family that he will get to the bottom of the case. But when it comes to act, Ma erects barriers in his own way. He appears unwilling to do what is necessary to resolve the case. This is truly regrettable.
The military must remove the "pixelation." It must respond candidly to questions raised by the public and by the Hung family. Only then can it allay public doubts and public anger. It must clarify certain key points. Only then can Hung Chung-chiu's family let go of their pain and resentment. Only then can the public conclude that Ministry of Defense "military reform" is more than empty lip service. The more the military conceals the truth, the more the public will be forced to take over the case. The harder the Ma administration will have to work to repair its image.
The victims of the Hung case are not confined to Hung Chung-chiu alone. They include innocent officers and enlisted men who have been implicated and punished unjustly. They include anxious soliders outside, who have been caught up in the "witch-hunt." They include the military as a whole, whose morale and image have suffered. If the government refuses to tell the truth, but admits only to what investigators uncover, then it is merely spouting hot air.
人們要的只是一個去馬賽克的真相
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.07.29 01:47 am
洪仲丘案已經四周，真相依然不白；最新進展之一，傳聞馬政府將以國防部長高華柱的下台作為「停損點」。若果真如此，這種盤算不僅過度廉價而老套，也錯估了民意。
高華柱的去留絕非本案的核心焦點，他去職，無助化解人們心頭的疑問，反而可能助長社會大眾對政府顢頇無能的憤怒。此案一開始，本報社論即說得很清楚：「沒有真相，沒有原諒」；人民期待知道的是此案的事實原委，而不是政府懲處名單多長、層級多高。對洪家人而言，他們渴盼的也只是還原洪仲丘生前最後數日的經過，何以被凌虐致死，而非意圖鬧到軍中不安不靜為止。也因此，不交代真相，卻以為國防部長下台即可「停損」，恐怕搞錯了方向。
馬總統對洪案高度關注，指示了相關部門針對「凌虐部屬移出軍法審判」及「軍法與刑事訴訟整合」提出檢討；國防部方面，也提出了十三項軍中興革措施。這些，都是長期必須修整的制度問題，殆無疑義。然而，放著火燒眉毛的具體問題不談，看著沒調查清楚的疑點在那裡懸空擺盪，卻顧左右而言他在那裡大唱長期改革的高調，如何不教人民覺得政府是在「莊孝維」？
簡單地說，人民要的是洪仲丘案的具體真相，政府回答的卻是要給你一個長期的改革保證；洪家要的是司法介入調查，不要任由軍檢在那裡自說自話，政府卻推說這得等修法改變體制才行。日復一日的宣示與調查，如果不能把更多真相帶給人民，這危機豈有止血的時刻？
我們之所以一再強調「要真相」，因為唯有真相大白，才能確定最終責任的公平處置，而不致使無辜官兵揹上「陪榜」、「連坐」之冤；也唯有真相大白，國防部才能對症下藥，深入改革弊端。目前軍方提出的報告，經過一修再修，再比對洪家自行調查及相關兵員的爆料，外界已大致可看出整起事件的模糊輪廓。而模糊的部分，有些是軍方未調查透徹，有些是故意對外隱去實情，因而在若干關鍵環節即形成了「馬賽克效應」，讓人們難以參透。軍方若要消釋外界疑慮，非得先將這幾個部位的「馬賽克」去除不可。
洪家和一般社會大眾最迫切想要知道的事實有四，這也是軍方應優先公開的部分：一、公布范佐憲主導旅部連「士評會」將洪仲丘移送禁閉的過程，並提示會議紀錄以昭公信；更高層級的「人評會」未召開審核會，是純屬疏怠或有人居中運作，也應作出說明；二、公布八一三醫院體檢報告過關的完整經手流程，並檢視內容有否造假，包括誰買了飲料；三、監視器黑畫面究竟是機器故障或線路不良，或有人趁隙下手刪除，須提出可昭公信的說明，甚至請管理監視器人員現身說明，民眾難以接受「陰錯陽差」這種含糊結論；四、說明洪仲丘在禁閉室最後幾小時的操練及搶救經過，必要時，邀相關人員說明佐證。
儘管偵辦中的案情無法悉數公開，但軍檢署檢察長曹金生曾配合民進黨立委召開記者會，此案延燒廿多日，政府若不公開有說服力的事實，如何杜悠悠眾口？事實上，在司法加入局部偵辦後，已打破了軍方「自說自話」的局面，包括驗屍報告由「意外」改為「他為」，都顯示第三方介入之必要；然而，桃檢所能過問的範圍仍極有限，無法探知更多真相。馬總統親口承諾洪家「管定了」洪案，行事卻自我拘礙，不知大破大立之道，令人遺憾。
為今之計，唯有軍方去除馬賽克，針對民眾和洪家關注的幾項疑點提出坦誠的說明，才有可能解除人們的疑惑與憤怒。我們也相信，唯有把關鍵事實交代清楚，洪仲丘家人才能放下心中的痛苦和怨恨，人民也才有可能相信國防部保證的「軍中改革」不是敷衍之詞。軍方越是隱瞞真相，只會越迫使人民自力辦案，馬政府受創的形象也就越難彌補。
必須提醒的是，洪案發展至此，受害者已不止洪仲丘一人，還包括那些無辜受到牽連記過的官兵，包括在外界「獵巫」氛圍下因遭到敵視或貶抑而焦慮不安的軍人，乃至整體國軍對外士氣和形象的挫折。政府若不攤開真相，卻反覆奢言「證據到哪就辦到哪」，都只是空口白話。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
July 29, 2013
Summary: The Hung Chung-chiu case is already four weeks old, but the truth has yet to emerge. It is rumored that the Ma administration has made Minister of Defense Kao Hua-chu's resignation its "stop-loss point." If so, its calculations are both cheap and facile. They also misjudge public opinion.
Full text below:
The Hung Chung-chiu case is already four weeks old, but the truth has yet to emerge. It is rumored that the Ma administration has made Minister of Defense Kao Hua-chu's resignation its "stop-loss point." If so, its calculations are both cheap and facile. They also misjudge public opinion.
Whether Kao Hua-chu remains or leaves is not the issue. His resignation will do nothing to resolve public doubts. It might even intensify public anger at government incompetence. When the case first broke, this newspaper proclaimed in no uncertain terms that "Without the truth, there can be no forgiveness." The public wants the whole story, They do not necessarily want a long list of high ranking government officials to be punished. The Hung family merely wants to know what happened to Hung Chung-chiu during his last days on earth. They want to know why he was tortured to death. It is not their intention to deliberately make trouble for the military. Therefore the government must uncover the truth. Merely forcing the Minister of Defense to step down wiil not help the government to stop its losses. That is the wrong direction. .
President Ma is deeply concerned about the Hung case. He has instructed the agencies in charge to look into "integrating of military justice and criminal proceedings" instead of
court martialing those who abuse their subordinates. The Ministry of Defense has proposed 13 military reform measures. These are undoubtedly essential long-term institutional reforms. But they ignore the burning issue at hand. They leave unanswered questions about the case hanging. They trumpet long-term reform while watching the direction the wind blows. How can people not conclude that the government is merely putting on an act?
The public merely wants the truth behind the Hung Chung-chiu case. The government's response however, was to offer assurances of long-term reform. The Hung family wants justice. It does not want the military telling stories. Yet the government insists it must wait until the law is amended and the system is reformed before it can act. Day after day, it declares that it is investigating. But if it fails to uncover more facts, how can it possibly stop the bleeding?
We have reiterated the need for the truth. Only the truth can determine ultimate responsibility and avoid implicating the innocent. Only the truth will enable the Ministry of Defense to address the problem and implement in-depth reforms. The Army report has been revised repeatedly. Compare it to the Hung family's own investigation, and revelations by other soldiers. Outsiders already see the extent to which the incident has been obscured. Some obscurity is the result of the military's failure to conduct a thorough investigation. Some of it is the result of the military's deliberately withholding of the facts from outsiders. The result is that key parts of the larger picture have been "pixelated," making them difficult to read. If the military wants to dispel doubts among outsiders, it must first remove the pixelated portions of the picture.
The Hung family and the general public most urgently want to know four things. These are the things to which the military must give the highest priority. One. The military must make public the record of the proceedings in order to instill public confidence. The "Non-Commissioned Officers Evaluation Commission" investigation and solitary confinement of Hung Chung-chiu was conducted by Fan Cho-hsien of the Brigade Headquarters and Headquarters Company. The lack of higher level "Personnel Evaluation Commission" review was the result of indolence or self-interest. This too must be accounted for. Two. The military must make public the 813 Hospital medical report, in toto, from beginning to end. It must review the contents for signs of fraud, including who purchased beverages. Three. Was the CCTV monitor blackout the result of mechanical failure, bad connections, or deliberate erasure? This must be explained to the public's satisfaction. The personnel in charge of monitoring the CCTV system should be called on to explain. The public cannot accept vague conclusions such as "Somehow something went wrong." Four. The military must explain what happened during the final hours, when Hung Chung-chiu was in solitary confinement, including the forced drills and emergency rescue process. If necessary, the responsible personnel should provide evidence.
Perhaps the investigation cannot be fully opened to the public. But Chief Military Prosecutor Tsao Ching-sheng held a joint press conference with DPP legislators. The case raged on for more than 20 days. If the government fails to offer a convincing explanation, how can it quiet public speculation? The fact is local prosecutors joining the investigation shattered the military's ability to tell fairy tales. This includes the autopsy report, which was changed from "accidental death" to "homicide." These show that third-party involvement is essential. But what Taoyuan prosecutors can do remains limited. They cannot uncover more facts. President Ma has personally promised the Hung family that he will get to the bottom of the case. But when it comes to act, Ma erects barriers in his own way. He appears unwilling to do what is necessary to resolve the case. This is truly regrettable.
The military must remove the "pixelation." It must respond candidly to questions raised by the public and by the Hung family. Only then can it allay public doubts and public anger. It must clarify certain key points. Only then can Hung Chung-chiu's family let go of their pain and resentment. Only then can the public conclude that Ministry of Defense "military reform" is more than empty lip service. The more the military conceals the truth, the more the public will be forced to take over the case. The harder the Ma administration will have to work to repair its image.
The victims of the Hung case are not confined to Hung Chung-chiu alone. They include innocent officers and enlisted men who have been implicated and punished unjustly. They include anxious soliders outside, who have been caught up in the "witch-hunt." They include the military as a whole, whose morale and image have suffered. If the government refuses to tell the truth, but admits only to what investigators uncover, then it is merely spouting hot air.
人們要的只是一個去馬賽克的真相
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.07.29 01:47 am
洪仲丘案已經四周，真相依然不白；最新進展之一，傳聞馬政府將以國防部長高華柱的下台作為「停損點」。若果真如此，這種盤算不僅過度廉價而老套，也錯估了民意。
高華柱的去留絕非本案的核心焦點，他去職，無助化解人們心頭的疑問，反而可能助長社會大眾對政府顢頇無能的憤怒。此案一開始，本報社論即說得很清楚：「沒有真相，沒有原諒」；人民期待知道的是此案的事實原委，而不是政府懲處名單多長、層級多高。對洪家人而言，他們渴盼的也只是還原洪仲丘生前最後數日的經過，何以被凌虐致死，而非意圖鬧到軍中不安不靜為止。也因此，不交代真相，卻以為國防部長下台即可「停損」，恐怕搞錯了方向。
馬總統對洪案高度關注，指示了相關部門針對「凌虐部屬移出軍法審判」及「軍法與刑事訴訟整合」提出檢討；國防部方面，也提出了十三項軍中興革措施。這些，都是長期必須修整的制度問題，殆無疑義。然而，放著火燒眉毛的具體問題不談，看著沒調查清楚的疑點在那裡懸空擺盪，卻顧左右而言他在那裡大唱長期改革的高調，如何不教人民覺得政府是在「莊孝維」？
簡單地說，人民要的是洪仲丘案的具體真相，政府回答的卻是要給你一個長期的改革保證；洪家要的是司法介入調查，不要任由軍檢在那裡自說自話，政府卻推說這得等修法改變體制才行。日復一日的宣示與調查，如果不能把更多真相帶給人民，這危機豈有止血的時刻？
我們之所以一再強調「要真相」，因為唯有真相大白，才能確定最終責任的公平處置，而不致使無辜官兵揹上「陪榜」、「連坐」之冤；也唯有真相大白，國防部才能對症下藥，深入改革弊端。目前軍方提出的報告，經過一修再修，再比對洪家自行調查及相關兵員的爆料，外界已大致可看出整起事件的模糊輪廓。而模糊的部分，有些是軍方未調查透徹，有些是故意對外隱去實情，因而在若干關鍵環節即形成了「馬賽克效應」，讓人們難以參透。軍方若要消釋外界疑慮，非得先將這幾個部位的「馬賽克」去除不可。
洪家和一般社會大眾最迫切想要知道的事實有四，這也是軍方應優先公開的部分：一、公布范佐憲主導旅部連「士評會」將洪仲丘移送禁閉的過程，並提示會議紀錄以昭公信；更高層級的「人評會」未召開審核會，是純屬疏怠或有人居中運作，也應作出說明；二、公布八一三醫院體檢報告過關的完整經手流程，並檢視內容有否造假，包括誰買了飲料；三、監視器黑畫面究竟是機器故障或線路不良，或有人趁隙下手刪除，須提出可昭公信的說明，甚至請管理監視器人員現身說明，民眾難以接受「陰錯陽差」這種含糊結論；四、說明洪仲丘在禁閉室最後幾小時的操練及搶救經過，必要時，邀相關人員說明佐證。
儘管偵辦中的案情無法悉數公開，但軍檢署檢察長曹金生曾配合民進黨立委召開記者會，此案延燒廿多日，政府若不公開有說服力的事實，如何杜悠悠眾口？事實上，在司法加入局部偵辦後，已打破了軍方「自說自話」的局面，包括驗屍報告由「意外」改為「他為」，都顯示第三方介入之必要；然而，桃檢所能過問的範圍仍極有限，無法探知更多真相。馬總統親口承諾洪家「管定了」洪案，行事卻自我拘礙，不知大破大立之道，令人遺憾。
為今之計，唯有軍方去除馬賽克，針對民眾和洪家關注的幾項疑點提出坦誠的說明，才有可能解除人們的疑惑與憤怒。我們也相信，唯有把關鍵事實交代清楚，洪仲丘家人才能放下心中的痛苦和怨恨，人民也才有可能相信國防部保證的「軍中改革」不是敷衍之詞。軍方越是隱瞞真相，只會越迫使人民自力辦案，馬政府受創的形象也就越難彌補。
必須提醒的是，洪案發展至此，受害者已不止洪仲丘一人，還包括那些無辜受到牽連記過的官兵，包括在外界「獵巫」氛圍下因遭到敵視或貶抑而焦慮不安的軍人，乃至整體國軍對外士氣和形象的挫折。政府若不攤開真相，卻反覆奢言「證據到哪就辦到哪」，都只是空口白話。
Thursday, July 25, 2013
The Easy and the Difficult in Cross-Strait Relations
The Easy and the Difficult in Cross-Strait Relations
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
July 26, 2013
Summary: The DPP is attempting to go from "refusing to recognize the 1992 consensus" to "determining how to deal with the 1992 consensus." Beijing meanwhile, has concluded that the 1992 consensus fails to provide a sufficiently secure political link between the two sides. Therefore it has begun promoting the "one China framework."
Full text below:
The DPP is attempting to go from "refusing to recognize the 1992 consensus" to "determining how to deal with the 1992 consensus." Beijing meanwhile, has concluded that the 1992 consensus fails to provide a sufficiently secure political link between the two sides. Therefore it has begun promoting the "one China framework."
During the June Wu Xi meeting, Wu Poh-hsiung reiterated his support for the 1992 consensus. But Xi Jinping has not mentioned the 1992 consensus since. Instead, he has emphasized the "one China framework." What sort of political message is he sending? That has yet to be determined.
Last November the CCP 18th Party Congress incorporated the 1992 consensus into ts Political Report. But this move was followed by a search for one China political links and talk of "exploring cross-Strait political relations under special circumstances in which the nation has yet to be reunified, and making reasonable arrangements." This is part of Beijing's quest for more secure political links. Apparently Beijing feels the political links provided by the 1992 consensus are inadequate. It wants to replace the 1992 consensus with the "one China framework."
In late June, Renmin University Professor Huang Jiashu told Frank Hsieh that "Beijing has never recognized one China, different interpretations." But this is incorrect. On March 26, 2008, George W. Bush and Hu Jintao spoke on the Beijing-Washington hotline. Hu said "The Chinese mainland and Taiwan will resume negotiations on the basis of the 1992 consensus. This means that both parties recognize that there is only one China, but agreed to define it differently, based on their own interpretations." Hu's statement was "one China, different interpretations." It was a key pillar for five straight years of cross-strait peaceful development. Beijing may wish to reconsider the pros and cons of the 1992 consensus and one China, different interpetations. But it cannot take back what it said, or renege on its promises.
Recent cross-strait peaceful development is undoubtedly based on the 1992 consensus and one China, different interpretations. Yet Beijing is now refusing to recognize "one China, different interpretations." It is stressing instead the 1992 consensus and the one-China principle. Beijing feels that "one China, different interpretations" fails to provide sufficiently robust political links between the two sides. Therefore it has floated the "one China framework."
In fact "one China, different interpretations" does provides political links. Since the 2012 Wu Hu meeting, authorities on both sides have agreed to use "each of the two parties' existing laws, regulations, and institutions" as the basis for cross-Strait exchanges. This means they consider the two sides' constitutions to be political links. During the Wu Xi meeting, Wu Poh-hsiung cited this as the basis for the "one China framework," The Constitution of the Republic of China is a "one China Constitution," with "one country, two regions." Therefore if Beijing publicly overthrows "one China, different interpretations," it is actually undermining support for the "one China framework."
The problem is that "One China, different interpretations" still implies "You are you. I am me." The "different interpretations" portion is a reality. But the two sides lack any consensus on "one China." Beijing may wish to use the "one China framework" as a replacement or supplement for the 1992 consensus. But the result would still be a "one China framework, different interpretations." It would not result in a more secure political connection.
Cross-strait relations are currently in shallow waters. Therefore "one China, different interpretations" may be sufficent. But if one wishes to enter deeper waters, an agreement must be reached on the meaning of "one China," above and beyond "one China, different interpretations." Only then can one establish more secure political connections. Deeper waters means we must cope with the following realities. . First, the nation has yet to be reunified. Secondly, its circumstances are special. Thirdly, the two sides of the Strait seek political relations. . Fourthly, the two sides of the Strait seek reasonable arrangements. In short, the Republic of China and the Peoples Republic of China should explore cross-strait political relations under special circumstances in which the nation has yet to be reunified, and make reasonable arrangements.
Beijing is switching from the "one China principle" to the "one China framework." But Beijing has not always been clear about what it means by the "one China principle" or the "one China framework." In fact, what Beijing means is that "One China is the People's Republic of China." Beijing thinks that the "One China framework means abolishing the Republic of China. Everything would then be included within the framework of the People's Republic of China. " But Beijing cannot say this. It dares not say this. Because it cannot achieve it. Even if it could, attempting to do so could lead to catastrophe, both for China and the world.
Therefore if one wishes to enter deeper waters, one must establish a one China framework, for circumstances in which the nation has yet to be reunified. This does not negate any longing for reunification. But one must establish a political connection that enables the PRC and the ROC to enter deeper waters.
What's the difference between deeper and shallower waters? A old poem says "Deep waters are difficult to cross, shallow waters are easy." Those crossing shallow waters need only roll up their trouser legs. Those crossing deeper waters have no choice but to dive in and get completely wet. Whether the water is deep or shallow, one must be prepared to respond as the situation requires.
Deeper waters involve two contrary factors. First, one can easily drown in deeper waters. Deeper waters are high-risk areas. If both sides drown in deeper waters, the result would be a major disaster for Chinese history and even human civilization. Secondly, deeper waters provide greater buoyancy. As long as one's intentions are true, there is no reason for the Republic of China and People's Republic of China not to make the attempt. The mainland would win. Taiwan would win. China as a whole would win. Global civilization would win.
The 1992 consensus and one China, different interpretations is shallow water. All one has to do is roll up one's pants legs. Today however, if one wishes to enter deeper waters, one should consider this newspaper's "big roof concept of China." One will have to dive in and get wet. One must take advantage of the buoyancy provided by the deeper waters. That way one will not drown.
The big roof concept of China states that under the big roof of China, the Taiwan Region is democratic China while the Mainland Region is socialist China. Both regions are part of China. Both belong under a big roof concept of China. In other words, "The two sides' sovereignty include each other. Together they form one China."
This is the "one China framework." Deeper waters are difficult to cross. Shallow waters are easy. Why not let the two sides give serious consideration to the "big roof concept of China?" Why not enter the deeper waters together?
深則厲，淺則揭：兩岸關係的深水區思維
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.07.26 03:42 am
正當民進黨欲從「否認九二共識」翻越到「如何處理九二共識」之時，北京卻似乎感到「九二共識」缺乏強固的「連結點」，而開始倡議「一中框架」。
六月的吳習會中，吳伯雄重申「九二共識」，卻未聞習近平再提「九二共識」，而僅強調「一中框架」。這是一個怎樣的政治訊息，尚待發展與解讀。
去年十一月，中共十八大將「九二共識」載入政治報告，但接著就開始強調要尋找並建立「一個中國」的「連結點」：並謂要「探討國家尚未統一特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係，作出合情合理的安排」，這也是一種「連結論」。此處顯示：北京覺得「九二共識」的「連結」不夠穩固，因而思以「一中框架」取代。
六月下旬，中國人民大學教授黃嘉樹對謝長廷說，「北京從來沒有承認『一中各表』」。此說或有謬誤。二○○八年三月二十六日，胡錦濤在布胡熱線說：「中國大陸和台灣將在九二共識的基礎上恢復談判，意即雙方皆承認只有一個中國，但同意對其定義各自表述。」胡錦濤此語即是「一中各表」，亦是五年來兩岸「和平發展」的主要支柱。如今，北京可以斟酌「九二共識／一中各表」的得失，卻不宜出爾反爾，自食諾言。
兩岸近年來的「和平發展」，無疑是建立在「九二共識／一中各表」之上；但北京卻諱言「一中各表」，而強調「九二共識／一個中國原則」。這是因為北京認為「一中各表」缺乏穩固的「連結點」，於是又有「一中框架」的提法。
其實，「一中各表」亦有「連結點」。自二○一二年三月吳胡會後，兩岸當局一致以「雙方各自現行的法律、規定與體制」為兩岸關係的基準，這即是認為可用雙方的憲法為「連結點」（吳伯雄在吳習會以此為「一中架構」的基準，因為中華民國憲法為「一國兩區」的「一中憲法」）。因而，北京若公然推翻「一中各表」，「一中架構」即失依託。
問題在於：「一中各表」仍是「爾為爾，我為我」，「各表」是現實，但何謂「一中」，卻無共識。如今，即使北京欲以「一中框架」取代或補充「九二共識」，但仍然是「一中框架／各自表述」，並未出現一個較現狀為佳的「連結點」。
目前在「淺水區」的兩岸關係，或許「一中各表」即可維持。但如果要進入「深水區」，就須在「一中各表」之上，建立對「一個中國」的共同定義，始有可能出現較佳的「連結點」。所謂深水區，就是必須：一、對國家尚未統一的，二、特殊情況下的，三、兩岸政治關係，四、作出合情合理的安排。也就是必須對「中華民國」與「中華人民共和國」尚未統一、特殊情況下的政治關係（連結點），作出合情合理的安排。
北京從「一中原則」換到「一中框架」，但始終未說清楚何謂「一中原則」與「一中框架」。其實，北京的心中想的是「一個中國就是中華人民共和國」，「一中框架就是消滅中華民國，一切納入中華人民共和國的框架」。但北京畢竟不能也不敢如此說，因為這是做不到的事，若勉強做到，即不無可能釀成世界文明及中國歷史的浩劫。
因而，深水區的主軸工程，即在建立「尚未統一」狀態下的「一中框架」；這並未否定「統一」的懸想，卻必須建立一個「連結點」，使中華人民共和國與中華民國一同渡過「深水區」。
「深水區」與「淺水區」有何不同？詩云：「深則厲，淺則揭。」（揭，音氣）意指：欲渡淺水者，撩起衣襬即可；但涉深水者，即只能穿著衣裳下水渡河。此謂：「深厲淺揭，隨時為義。」
「深水區」有兩種矛盾的能量。一、深水極易溺水，是災禍的高風險區；兩岸若在此區溺水，即可能造成人類文明與中國歷史的大悲劇。二、然而，深水區亦有較大的浮力，只要心術正大，未始不能找到一個共渡共濟中華人民共和國與中華民國的「大陸贏／台灣贏／中國贏／世界文明也贏」的四贏水道。
「九二共識／一中各表」是撩起衣襬渡淺水；如今倘若要進入深水，則應當思考以本報倡議的「大屋頂中國架構」來和衣渡河，如此始能善用深水的足夠浮力，而不致溺水。
大屋頂中國：在大屋頂中國下／中華民國是民主中國／中華人民共和國是社會主義中國／二者皆是一部分的中國／同屬「一個（大屋頂）中國」／亦即「兩岸主權相互含蘊並共同合成的一個中國」。
這就是「一中框架」，就是「一中架構」。深則厲，淺則揭，何不認真思考讓兩岸在「一個大屋頂中國框架」下共渡深水區。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
July 26, 2013
Summary: The DPP is attempting to go from "refusing to recognize the 1992 consensus" to "determining how to deal with the 1992 consensus." Beijing meanwhile, has concluded that the 1992 consensus fails to provide a sufficiently secure political link between the two sides. Therefore it has begun promoting the "one China framework."
Full text below:
The DPP is attempting to go from "refusing to recognize the 1992 consensus" to "determining how to deal with the 1992 consensus." Beijing meanwhile, has concluded that the 1992 consensus fails to provide a sufficiently secure political link between the two sides. Therefore it has begun promoting the "one China framework."
During the June Wu Xi meeting, Wu Poh-hsiung reiterated his support for the 1992 consensus. But Xi Jinping has not mentioned the 1992 consensus since. Instead, he has emphasized the "one China framework." What sort of political message is he sending? That has yet to be determined.
Last November the CCP 18th Party Congress incorporated the 1992 consensus into ts Political Report. But this move was followed by a search for one China political links and talk of "exploring cross-Strait political relations under special circumstances in which the nation has yet to be reunified, and making reasonable arrangements." This is part of Beijing's quest for more secure political links. Apparently Beijing feels the political links provided by the 1992 consensus are inadequate. It wants to replace the 1992 consensus with the "one China framework."
In late June, Renmin University Professor Huang Jiashu told Frank Hsieh that "Beijing has never recognized one China, different interpretations." But this is incorrect. On March 26, 2008, George W. Bush and Hu Jintao spoke on the Beijing-Washington hotline. Hu said "The Chinese mainland and Taiwan will resume negotiations on the basis of the 1992 consensus. This means that both parties recognize that there is only one China, but agreed to define it differently, based on their own interpretations." Hu's statement was "one China, different interpretations." It was a key pillar for five straight years of cross-strait peaceful development. Beijing may wish to reconsider the pros and cons of the 1992 consensus and one China, different interpetations. But it cannot take back what it said, or renege on its promises.
Recent cross-strait peaceful development is undoubtedly based on the 1992 consensus and one China, different interpretations. Yet Beijing is now refusing to recognize "one China, different interpretations." It is stressing instead the 1992 consensus and the one-China principle. Beijing feels that "one China, different interpretations" fails to provide sufficiently robust political links between the two sides. Therefore it has floated the "one China framework."
In fact "one China, different interpretations" does provides political links. Since the 2012 Wu Hu meeting, authorities on both sides have agreed to use "each of the two parties' existing laws, regulations, and institutions" as the basis for cross-Strait exchanges. This means they consider the two sides' constitutions to be political links. During the Wu Xi meeting, Wu Poh-hsiung cited this as the basis for the "one China framework," The Constitution of the Republic of China is a "one China Constitution," with "one country, two regions." Therefore if Beijing publicly overthrows "one China, different interpretations," it is actually undermining support for the "one China framework."
The problem is that "One China, different interpretations" still implies "You are you. I am me." The "different interpretations" portion is a reality. But the two sides lack any consensus on "one China." Beijing may wish to use the "one China framework" as a replacement or supplement for the 1992 consensus. But the result would still be a "one China framework, different interpretations." It would not result in a more secure political connection.
Cross-strait relations are currently in shallow waters. Therefore "one China, different interpretations" may be sufficent. But if one wishes to enter deeper waters, an agreement must be reached on the meaning of "one China," above and beyond "one China, different interpretations." Only then can one establish more secure political connections. Deeper waters means we must cope with the following realities. . First, the nation has yet to be reunified. Secondly, its circumstances are special. Thirdly, the two sides of the Strait seek political relations. . Fourthly, the two sides of the Strait seek reasonable arrangements. In short, the Republic of China and the Peoples Republic of China should explore cross-strait political relations under special circumstances in which the nation has yet to be reunified, and make reasonable arrangements.
Beijing is switching from the "one China principle" to the "one China framework." But Beijing has not always been clear about what it means by the "one China principle" or the "one China framework." In fact, what Beijing means is that "One China is the People's Republic of China." Beijing thinks that the "One China framework means abolishing the Republic of China. Everything would then be included within the framework of the People's Republic of China. " But Beijing cannot say this. It dares not say this. Because it cannot achieve it. Even if it could, attempting to do so could lead to catastrophe, both for China and the world.
Therefore if one wishes to enter deeper waters, one must establish a one China framework, for circumstances in which the nation has yet to be reunified. This does not negate any longing for reunification. But one must establish a political connection that enables the PRC and the ROC to enter deeper waters.
What's the difference between deeper and shallower waters? A old poem says "Deep waters are difficult to cross, shallow waters are easy." Those crossing shallow waters need only roll up their trouser legs. Those crossing deeper waters have no choice but to dive in and get completely wet. Whether the water is deep or shallow, one must be prepared to respond as the situation requires.
Deeper waters involve two contrary factors. First, one can easily drown in deeper waters. Deeper waters are high-risk areas. If both sides drown in deeper waters, the result would be a major disaster for Chinese history and even human civilization. Secondly, deeper waters provide greater buoyancy. As long as one's intentions are true, there is no reason for the Republic of China and People's Republic of China not to make the attempt. The mainland would win. Taiwan would win. China as a whole would win. Global civilization would win.
The 1992 consensus and one China, different interpretations is shallow water. All one has to do is roll up one's pants legs. Today however, if one wishes to enter deeper waters, one should consider this newspaper's "big roof concept of China." One will have to dive in and get wet. One must take advantage of the buoyancy provided by the deeper waters. That way one will not drown.
The big roof concept of China states that under the big roof of China, the Taiwan Region is democratic China while the Mainland Region is socialist China. Both regions are part of China. Both belong under a big roof concept of China. In other words, "The two sides' sovereignty include each other. Together they form one China."
This is the "one China framework." Deeper waters are difficult to cross. Shallow waters are easy. Why not let the two sides give serious consideration to the "big roof concept of China?" Why not enter the deeper waters together?
深則厲，淺則揭：兩岸關係的深水區思維
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.07.26 03:42 am
正當民進黨欲從「否認九二共識」翻越到「如何處理九二共識」之時，北京卻似乎感到「九二共識」缺乏強固的「連結點」，而開始倡議「一中框架」。
六月的吳習會中，吳伯雄重申「九二共識」，卻未聞習近平再提「九二共識」，而僅強調「一中框架」。這是一個怎樣的政治訊息，尚待發展與解讀。
去年十一月，中共十八大將「九二共識」載入政治報告，但接著就開始強調要尋找並建立「一個中國」的「連結點」：並謂要「探討國家尚未統一特殊情況下的兩岸政治關係，作出合情合理的安排」，這也是一種「連結論」。此處顯示：北京覺得「九二共識」的「連結」不夠穩固，因而思以「一中框架」取代。
六月下旬，中國人民大學教授黃嘉樹對謝長廷說，「北京從來沒有承認『一中各表』」。此說或有謬誤。二○○八年三月二十六日，胡錦濤在布胡熱線說：「中國大陸和台灣將在九二共識的基礎上恢復談判，意即雙方皆承認只有一個中國，但同意對其定義各自表述。」胡錦濤此語即是「一中各表」，亦是五年來兩岸「和平發展」的主要支柱。如今，北京可以斟酌「九二共識／一中各表」的得失，卻不宜出爾反爾，自食諾言。
兩岸近年來的「和平發展」，無疑是建立在「九二共識／一中各表」之上；但北京卻諱言「一中各表」，而強調「九二共識／一個中國原則」。這是因為北京認為「一中各表」缺乏穩固的「連結點」，於是又有「一中框架」的提法。
其實，「一中各表」亦有「連結點」。自二○一二年三月吳胡會後，兩岸當局一致以「雙方各自現行的法律、規定與體制」為兩岸關係的基準，這即是認為可用雙方的憲法為「連結點」（吳伯雄在吳習會以此為「一中架構」的基準，因為中華民國憲法為「一國兩區」的「一中憲法」）。因而，北京若公然推翻「一中各表」，「一中架構」即失依託。
問題在於：「一中各表」仍是「爾為爾，我為我」，「各表」是現實，但何謂「一中」，卻無共識。如今，即使北京欲以「一中框架」取代或補充「九二共識」，但仍然是「一中框架／各自表述」，並未出現一個較現狀為佳的「連結點」。
目前在「淺水區」的兩岸關係，或許「一中各表」即可維持。但如果要進入「深水區」，就須在「一中各表」之上，建立對「一個中國」的共同定義，始有可能出現較佳的「連結點」。所謂深水區，就是必須：一、對國家尚未統一的，二、特殊情況下的，三、兩岸政治關係，四、作出合情合理的安排。也就是必須對「中華民國」與「中華人民共和國」尚未統一、特殊情況下的政治關係（連結點），作出合情合理的安排。
北京從「一中原則」換到「一中框架」，但始終未說清楚何謂「一中原則」與「一中框架」。其實，北京的心中想的是「一個中國就是中華人民共和國」，「一中框架就是消滅中華民國，一切納入中華人民共和國的框架」。但北京畢竟不能也不敢如此說，因為這是做不到的事，若勉強做到，即不無可能釀成世界文明及中國歷史的浩劫。
因而，深水區的主軸工程，即在建立「尚未統一」狀態下的「一中框架」；這並未否定「統一」的懸想，卻必須建立一個「連結點」，使中華人民共和國與中華民國一同渡過「深水區」。
「深水區」與「淺水區」有何不同？詩云：「深則厲，淺則揭。」（揭，音氣）意指：欲渡淺水者，撩起衣襬即可；但涉深水者，即只能穿著衣裳下水渡河。此謂：「深厲淺揭，隨時為義。」
「深水區」有兩種矛盾的能量。一、深水極易溺水，是災禍的高風險區；兩岸若在此區溺水，即可能造成人類文明與中國歷史的大悲劇。二、然而，深水區亦有較大的浮力，只要心術正大，未始不能找到一個共渡共濟中華人民共和國與中華民國的「大陸贏／台灣贏／中國贏／世界文明也贏」的四贏水道。
「九二共識／一中各表」是撩起衣襬渡淺水；如今倘若要進入深水，則應當思考以本報倡議的「大屋頂中國架構」來和衣渡河，如此始能善用深水的足夠浮力，而不致溺水。
大屋頂中國：在大屋頂中國下／中華民國是民主中國／中華人民共和國是社會主義中國／二者皆是一部分的中國／同屬「一個（大屋頂）中國」／亦即「兩岸主權相互含蘊並共同合成的一個中國」。
這就是「一中框架」，就是「一中架構」。深則厲，淺則揭，何不認真思考讓兩岸在「一個大屋頂中國框架」下共渡深水區。
Wednesday, July 24, 2013
DPP Should First Accept, then Go Beyond the 1992 Consensus
DPP Should First Accept, then Go Beyond the 1992 Consensus
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
July 25, 2013
Summary: The Huashan Conference asked the question, "How should the DPP deal with the 1992 Consensus?" This suggests that the Democratic Progressive Party has ended its "There never was a 1992 Consensus" stage. The DPP lost the 2012 general election because it failed to properly deal with the 1992 Consensus. As it approaches the 2016 general election, will the DPP lose yet again because it failed to properly deal with the 1992 Consensus?
Full text below:
"How to Deal with 1992 Consensus?" This is the theme of today's DPP second round Huashan Conference. Our suggestion is: First accept it, then go beyond it.
Su Tseng-chang said that the DPP "can no longer turn back the clock and promote Taiwan independence." This should be the basis for DPP cross-Strait policy reform.
What is Taiwan independence? Taiwan independence is the refusal to recognize the Republic of China. It is the backdoor listing of the Republic of China, even as one refuses to recognize the Constitution of the Republic of China. It is the selective acceptance of the Constitution of the Republic of China, even as one refuses to recognize "one country, two regions" and the "one China Constitution." It is the refusal to recognize that the Republic of China is a "different interpretation" of "one China." It is the stubborn insistence that "One China is the Peoples Republic of China," which leads to the refusal to recognize the 1992 Consensus.
The DPP "cannot turn back the clock and promote Taiwan independence." Therefore it must reaffirm the Republic of China. It must reaffirm the Constitution of the Republic of China. It must reaffirm the one China framework. It must fight for "one China, different interpretations." It must not accept the claim that "One China is the People's Republic of China." Therefore it must support the 1992 Consensus.
Will the DPP accept the 1992 Consensus? That depends on whether the DPP intends to turn back the clock and promote Taiwan independence? If it does not intend to promote Taiwan independence, what reason does it have not to fight for the ROC Constitution's "one China framework," and "one China, different interpretations?" What reason does it have to maintain that "One China means the People's Republic of China?" How can it abandon the position that the Republic of China is "democratic China?" How can it not fight the CCP for the right to define the meaning of the term "China?"
On May 20, 2000, a newly elected President Chen Shui-bian championed the "five noes" in his inaugural speech. On June 27, he told foreign dignitaries that he did not accept the assertion that "One China is the People's Republic of China." He said he was willing to accept the "one China, different interpretations" premise of the 1992 Consensus.
Unfortunately he reneged on his position the very next day, when MAC chairwoman Tsai Ing-wen repudiated it in public. She said the two sides have never accepted the "one China principle." This marked the beginning of DPP refusal to recognize the 1992 Consensus. This refusal was later joined by the "rectification of names" campaign. Since then, the DPP has positioned itself as the "Taiwan independence party" within the Washington, Beijing, Taipei triangle.
Is the DPP "turning back the clock and promoting Taiwan independence?" The first clue will be whether the DPP returns to June 27, 2000 position, and reaffirms the 1992 Consensus and "one China, different interpretations."
Su Tseng-chang says, on the one hand, that the DPP "cannot turn back the clock and promote Taiwan independence." But on the other hand, Su "refuses to be included in the one China framework." This reflects the DPP's self-contradictory confusion on matters of cross-Strait policy, national identity, and constitutional allegiance.
The DPP may not be able to accept Beijing's terminology for the "one China framework." But it has already decided not to "turn back the clock and promote Taiwan independence." Therefore it cannot refuse to recognize the Constitution of the Republic of China, which includes the "one China framework." It must cite "one China, different interpretations" when dealing with the Chinese Communist regime. Conversely, if the DPP maintains that "One China is the People's Republic of China," then it must refuse to recognize the ROC Constitution's "one China framework." Can the DPP bring itself to recognize "one China, different interpretations?" If it cannot, then what alternative does it have, but to "turn back the clock and promote Taiwan independence?" Therefore, "not turning back the clock to promote Taiwan independence" and "refusing to be included in the one China framework," is self-contradiction.
DPP political hopefuls such as Su Tseng-chang, Tsai Ing-wen and Frank Hsieh have not said, "There never was a 1992 Consensus" or "I refuse to recognize the 1992 Consensus" for some time. Su Tseng-chang has retreated to the "Resolution on Taiwan's Future." But he cites only the portion that states, "according to the current constitution, Taiwan is referred to as the Republic of China." He ignores the fact that "the current constitution" is a "one China constitution." Frank Hsieh attempts to substitute "constitutional consensus" for the 1992 Consensus. But it has been mocked as a "pirated edition." Tsai Ing-wen and her followers attempt to use "human rights vs. sovereignty" rhetoric to downplay sovereignty and evade one China. These tactics are much ado about nothing. Not one of them allows the three to deal with the 1992 Consensus head on.
The DPP asks, "How should it deal with 1992 Consensus?" In fact the DPP is choosing between "recognizing the Republic of China" and "turning back the clock and promoting Taiwan independence." If the DPP no longer wishes to turn back the clock and promote Taiwan independence, it must first reognize the Republic of China. It must first recognize the Republic of China Constitution. It must first uphold the "One China Constitution" and fight for "one China, different interpretations." It must use "one China, different interpretations" to fight for the the right to define the term "China." This is the only way to establish a cross-Strait framework that transcends KMT vs. CCP rhetoric.
When the DPP evades the issue of "one China," it forces itself to promote Taiwan independence. It forces itself to relinquish its role in cross-Strait interaction. In fact, the "One China framework" provides considerable room for both offense and defense. If the DPP is willing to recognize the ROC Constitution, it could use the one-China framework and one China, different interpretations to go beyond the KMT and CCP.
The Huashan Conference asked the question, "How should the DPP deal with the 1992 Consensus?" This suggests that the Democratic Progressive Party has ended its "There never was a 1992 Consensus" stage. The DPP lost the 2012 general election because it failed to properly deal with the 1992 Consensus. As it approaches the 2016 general election, will the DPP lose yet again because it failed to properly deal with the 1992 Consensus?
先接受，再超越：民進黨如何處理九二共識
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.07.25 03:34 am
「如何處理九二共識」，這是今日民進黨第二場「華山會議」的主題。我們建議的答案是：先接受，再超越。
蘇貞昌說「不能再走回頭路搞台獨」，這應是民進黨兩岸政策轉型的基準。
什麼是台獨？台獨就是否定中華民國，或借殼上市接受中華民國的國號卻否定中華民國憲法，或部分接受中華民國憲法卻否定其為「一國兩區」的「一中憲法」，或否定中華民國是「各表」的「一中」，而認定「一中就是中華人民共和國」，因此也就必須否定「九二共識」。
但民進黨如今若稱「不走回頭路搞台獨」，就必須回到中華民國，必須回到中華民國憲法，必須回到一中架構，必須爭取「一中各表」，就不能接受「一中就是中華人民共和國」，因此當然也就必須支持「九二共識」。
所以，「民進黨要不要接受九二共識？」這個問題完全等於是問「民進黨要不要走回頭路搞台獨？」若不搞台獨，有何理由不以中華民國憲法的「一中架構」去爭取「一中各表」？又有何理由堅持「一個中國就是中華人民共和國」？更豈能放棄中華民國做為「民主中國」的地位，而不與對岸爭取對於「中國」的定義權？
其實，二○○○年五月二十日陳水扁在就職演說中楬櫫「四不一沒有」初任總統後，於六月二十七日接見外賓時即稱，不接受「一個中國就是中華人民共和國」，但願意接受「一個中國，各自表述」的「兩會共識」。
然而，此一立場次日即被時任陸委會主委的蔡英文公開推翻，指兩岸從來沒有「一中原則」的共識，這遂成了民進黨否定「九二共識」的開端。再加上後來「正名制憲」等風潮，民進黨遂在「美／陸／台」的三邊架構中自視為也被視為「台獨黨」迄今。
因此，民進黨是否「不再走回頭路搞台獨」，第一個指標，就要看民進黨是否回到二○○○年六月二十七日，重新接受「九二共識／一中各表」。
蘇貞昌一方面說「不再走回頭路搞台獨」，另一方面又稱「拒絕納入一中架構」，這其實反映了民進黨當前國憲認同與兩岸政策的一個根本性的矛盾。
因為，民進黨或許可以不接受「一中框架」的北京語彙，但若「不走回頭路搞台獨」，即不能否認中華民國憲法的「一中架構」，亦即不能不以「一中各表」與中共政權抗衡與周旋；反之，如果民進黨堅持「一個中國就是中華人民共和國」，即必須否定中華民國憲法的「一中架構」，即不可「一中各表」，那麼，除了「再走回頭路搞台獨」，民進黨還有什麼路可走？因此，「不再走回頭路搞台獨」與「拒絕納入一中架構」，是一自相矛盾的悖論。
民進黨中對自我的政治前景尚寄希望者，如蘇貞昌、蔡英文及謝長廷等，已經很久不說「根本沒有九二共識」或「否定九二共識」了。蘇貞昌退到了《台灣前途決議文》，但只引「台灣，固然依現行憲法稱為中華民國」一節，卻罔顧「現行憲法」其實是「一中憲法」；謝長廷欲以「憲法共識」取代「九二共識」，卻被稱作「山寨版」；蔡英文一系則想以「人權vs.主權」的論述來「降抑主權／迴避一中」。但是，這些恐怕皆是庸人自擾，無一可以成為「處理九二共識」的正辦。
民進黨「如何處理九二共識」，其實就是在「走中華民國的路」與「走回頭路搞台獨」之間作一選擇。民進黨若不再走回頭路搞台獨，而要走中華民國的路，就必須先回到中華民國憲法，護持「憲法一中」，爭取「一中各表」；然後再在「一中各表」之上爭取對於「中國」的定義權，如此始有可能建立一個超越國共兩黨的兩岸論述架構。
民進黨迴避「一中」，即是逼迫自己回到「台獨」，並使自己在兩岸互動中喪失角色。其實，對台灣而言，「一中架構」存有極大的政治攻守空間，倘若民進黨能回到中華民國憲法，即不無可能從「一中架構／各自表述」上找到超越國共兩黨的途徑。
華山會議終究出了一個「如何處理九二共識」的題目，這似乎顯示民進黨畢竟已結束了「根本沒有九二共識」的昏昧階段。二○一二大選，民進黨敗於未能正確處理九二共識；面對二○一六大選，民進黨會不會又因未能正確處理九二共識而再敗一次？
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
July 25, 2013
Summary: The Huashan Conference asked the question, "How should the DPP deal with the 1992 Consensus?" This suggests that the Democratic Progressive Party has ended its "There never was a 1992 Consensus" stage. The DPP lost the 2012 general election because it failed to properly deal with the 1992 Consensus. As it approaches the 2016 general election, will the DPP lose yet again because it failed to properly deal with the 1992 Consensus?
Full text below:
"How to Deal with 1992 Consensus?" This is the theme of today's DPP second round Huashan Conference. Our suggestion is: First accept it, then go beyond it.
Su Tseng-chang said that the DPP "can no longer turn back the clock and promote Taiwan independence." This should be the basis for DPP cross-Strait policy reform.
What is Taiwan independence? Taiwan independence is the refusal to recognize the Republic of China. It is the backdoor listing of the Republic of China, even as one refuses to recognize the Constitution of the Republic of China. It is the selective acceptance of the Constitution of the Republic of China, even as one refuses to recognize "one country, two regions" and the "one China Constitution." It is the refusal to recognize that the Republic of China is a "different interpretation" of "one China." It is the stubborn insistence that "One China is the Peoples Republic of China," which leads to the refusal to recognize the 1992 Consensus.
The DPP "cannot turn back the clock and promote Taiwan independence." Therefore it must reaffirm the Republic of China. It must reaffirm the Constitution of the Republic of China. It must reaffirm the one China framework. It must fight for "one China, different interpretations." It must not accept the claim that "One China is the People's Republic of China." Therefore it must support the 1992 Consensus.
Will the DPP accept the 1992 Consensus? That depends on whether the DPP intends to turn back the clock and promote Taiwan independence? If it does not intend to promote Taiwan independence, what reason does it have not to fight for the ROC Constitution's "one China framework," and "one China, different interpretations?" What reason does it have to maintain that "One China means the People's Republic of China?" How can it abandon the position that the Republic of China is "democratic China?" How can it not fight the CCP for the right to define the meaning of the term "China?"
On May 20, 2000, a newly elected President Chen Shui-bian championed the "five noes" in his inaugural speech. On June 27, he told foreign dignitaries that he did not accept the assertion that "One China is the People's Republic of China." He said he was willing to accept the "one China, different interpretations" premise of the 1992 Consensus.
Unfortunately he reneged on his position the very next day, when MAC chairwoman Tsai Ing-wen repudiated it in public. She said the two sides have never accepted the "one China principle." This marked the beginning of DPP refusal to recognize the 1992 Consensus. This refusal was later joined by the "rectification of names" campaign. Since then, the DPP has positioned itself as the "Taiwan independence party" within the Washington, Beijing, Taipei triangle.
Is the DPP "turning back the clock and promoting Taiwan independence?" The first clue will be whether the DPP returns to June 27, 2000 position, and reaffirms the 1992 Consensus and "one China, different interpretations."
Su Tseng-chang says, on the one hand, that the DPP "cannot turn back the clock and promote Taiwan independence." But on the other hand, Su "refuses to be included in the one China framework." This reflects the DPP's self-contradictory confusion on matters of cross-Strait policy, national identity, and constitutional allegiance.
The DPP may not be able to accept Beijing's terminology for the "one China framework." But it has already decided not to "turn back the clock and promote Taiwan independence." Therefore it cannot refuse to recognize the Constitution of the Republic of China, which includes the "one China framework." It must cite "one China, different interpretations" when dealing with the Chinese Communist regime. Conversely, if the DPP maintains that "One China is the People's Republic of China," then it must refuse to recognize the ROC Constitution's "one China framework." Can the DPP bring itself to recognize "one China, different interpretations?" If it cannot, then what alternative does it have, but to "turn back the clock and promote Taiwan independence?" Therefore, "not turning back the clock to promote Taiwan independence" and "refusing to be included in the one China framework," is self-contradiction.
DPP political hopefuls such as Su Tseng-chang, Tsai Ing-wen and Frank Hsieh have not said, "There never was a 1992 Consensus" or "I refuse to recognize the 1992 Consensus" for some time. Su Tseng-chang has retreated to the "Resolution on Taiwan's Future." But he cites only the portion that states, "according to the current constitution, Taiwan is referred to as the Republic of China." He ignores the fact that "the current constitution" is a "one China constitution." Frank Hsieh attempts to substitute "constitutional consensus" for the 1992 Consensus. But it has been mocked as a "pirated edition." Tsai Ing-wen and her followers attempt to use "human rights vs. sovereignty" rhetoric to downplay sovereignty and evade one China. These tactics are much ado about nothing. Not one of them allows the three to deal with the 1992 Consensus head on.
The DPP asks, "How should it deal with 1992 Consensus?" In fact the DPP is choosing between "recognizing the Republic of China" and "turning back the clock and promoting Taiwan independence." If the DPP no longer wishes to turn back the clock and promote Taiwan independence, it must first reognize the Republic of China. It must first recognize the Republic of China Constitution. It must first uphold the "One China Constitution" and fight for "one China, different interpretations." It must use "one China, different interpretations" to fight for the the right to define the term "China." This is the only way to establish a cross-Strait framework that transcends KMT vs. CCP rhetoric.
When the DPP evades the issue of "one China," it forces itself to promote Taiwan independence. It forces itself to relinquish its role in cross-Strait interaction. In fact, the "One China framework" provides considerable room for both offense and defense. If the DPP is willing to recognize the ROC Constitution, it could use the one-China framework and one China, different interpretations to go beyond the KMT and CCP.
The Huashan Conference asked the question, "How should the DPP deal with the 1992 Consensus?" This suggests that the Democratic Progressive Party has ended its "There never was a 1992 Consensus" stage. The DPP lost the 2012 general election because it failed to properly deal with the 1992 Consensus. As it approaches the 2016 general election, will the DPP lose yet again because it failed to properly deal with the 1992 Consensus?
先接受，再超越：民進黨如何處理九二共識
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.07.25 03:34 am
「如何處理九二共識」，這是今日民進黨第二場「華山會議」的主題。我們建議的答案是：先接受，再超越。
蘇貞昌說「不能再走回頭路搞台獨」，這應是民進黨兩岸政策轉型的基準。
什麼是台獨？台獨就是否定中華民國，或借殼上市接受中華民國的國號卻否定中華民國憲法，或部分接受中華民國憲法卻否定其為「一國兩區」的「一中憲法」，或否定中華民國是「各表」的「一中」，而認定「一中就是中華人民共和國」，因此也就必須否定「九二共識」。
但民進黨如今若稱「不走回頭路搞台獨」，就必須回到中華民國，必須回到中華民國憲法，必須回到一中架構，必須爭取「一中各表」，就不能接受「一中就是中華人民共和國」，因此當然也就必須支持「九二共識」。
所以，「民進黨要不要接受九二共識？」這個問題完全等於是問「民進黨要不要走回頭路搞台獨？」若不搞台獨，有何理由不以中華民國憲法的「一中架構」去爭取「一中各表」？又有何理由堅持「一個中國就是中華人民共和國」？更豈能放棄中華民國做為「民主中國」的地位，而不與對岸爭取對於「中國」的定義權？
其實，二○○○年五月二十日陳水扁在就職演說中楬櫫「四不一沒有」初任總統後，於六月二十七日接見外賓時即稱，不接受「一個中國就是中華人民共和國」，但願意接受「一個中國，各自表述」的「兩會共識」。
然而，此一立場次日即被時任陸委會主委的蔡英文公開推翻，指兩岸從來沒有「一中原則」的共識，這遂成了民進黨否定「九二共識」的開端。再加上後來「正名制憲」等風潮，民進黨遂在「美／陸／台」的三邊架構中自視為也被視為「台獨黨」迄今。
因此，民進黨是否「不再走回頭路搞台獨」，第一個指標，就要看民進黨是否回到二○○○年六月二十七日，重新接受「九二共識／一中各表」。
蘇貞昌一方面說「不再走回頭路搞台獨」，另一方面又稱「拒絕納入一中架構」，這其實反映了民進黨當前國憲認同與兩岸政策的一個根本性的矛盾。
因為，民進黨或許可以不接受「一中框架」的北京語彙，但若「不走回頭路搞台獨」，即不能否認中華民國憲法的「一中架構」，亦即不能不以「一中各表」與中共政權抗衡與周旋；反之，如果民進黨堅持「一個中國就是中華人民共和國」，即必須否定中華民國憲法的「一中架構」，即不可「一中各表」，那麼，除了「再走回頭路搞台獨」，民進黨還有什麼路可走？因此，「不再走回頭路搞台獨」與「拒絕納入一中架構」，是一自相矛盾的悖論。
民進黨中對自我的政治前景尚寄希望者，如蘇貞昌、蔡英文及謝長廷等，已經很久不說「根本沒有九二共識」或「否定九二共識」了。蘇貞昌退到了《台灣前途決議文》，但只引「台灣，固然依現行憲法稱為中華民國」一節，卻罔顧「現行憲法」其實是「一中憲法」；謝長廷欲以「憲法共識」取代「九二共識」，卻被稱作「山寨版」；蔡英文一系則想以「人權vs.主權」的論述來「降抑主權／迴避一中」。但是，這些恐怕皆是庸人自擾，無一可以成為「處理九二共識」的正辦。
民進黨「如何處理九二共識」，其實就是在「走中華民國的路」與「走回頭路搞台獨」之間作一選擇。民進黨若不再走回頭路搞台獨，而要走中華民國的路，就必須先回到中華民國憲法，護持「憲法一中」，爭取「一中各表」；然後再在「一中各表」之上爭取對於「中國」的定義權，如此始有可能建立一個超越國共兩黨的兩岸論述架構。
民進黨迴避「一中」，即是逼迫自己回到「台獨」，並使自己在兩岸互動中喪失角色。其實，對台灣而言，「一中架構」存有極大的政治攻守空間，倘若民進黨能回到中華民國憲法，即不無可能從「一中架構／各自表述」上找到超越國共兩黨的途徑。
華山會議終究出了一個「如何處理九二共識」的題目，這似乎顯示民進黨畢竟已結束了「根本沒有九二共識」的昏昧階段。二○一二大選，民進黨敗於未能正確處理九二共識；面對二○一六大選，民進黨會不會又因未能正確處理九二共識而再敗一次？
The ROC Army Meets Its Waterloo in the Battle of Chung-chiu
The ROC Army Meets Its Waterloo in the Battle of Chung-chiu
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 24, 2013
Summary: The controversy over the death of ROC Army Corporal Hung Chung-chi has been raging for two weeks. The Ministry of Defense has become the object of hatred. So far it has not been able to stop the hemmoraging. Higher and higher ranking officials have offered apologies. The list of officials being punished and detained is growing longer. But the public remains unmoved. In this "Battle of Hung Chung-chiu," the army has suffered a crushing defeat. Its public image has suffered. Its internal morale has suffered as well.
Full text below:
The controversy over the death of ROC Army Corporal Hung Chung-chi has been raging for two weeks. The Ministry of Defense has become the object of hatred. So far it has not been able to stop the hemmoraging. Higher and higher ranking officials have offered apologies. The list of officials being punished and detained is growing longer. But the public remains unmoved. In this "Battle of Hung Chung-chiu," the army has suffered a crushing defeat. Its public image has suffered. Its internal morale has suffered as well.
From a military perspective, the debacle was the result of faulty internal management routines, of laxness in layer upon layer of control mechanisms. It was also the result of serious errors of judgment in the face of crisis. Opportunities were lost, again and again. Eventually the situation got completely out of hand. Internally, the army was guilty of three fatal shortcomings. The first was a distorted concept of discipline. The second was poor quality NCOs. The third was poor crisis management abilities.
Take the distorted concept of discipline. When an army is at war, it must stress obedience, discipline, and authority. It must cultivate this spirit during peacetime training. But harsh discipline is merely a means to victory. The underlying purpose of the military is for officers and soldiers to carry out battlefield tasks that may cost them their lives. This requires more exalted motives, including patriotism, pride, and esprit de corps. In other words, discipline requires incentives and penalties. It must lead by example. Discipline must be rooted in loyalty. Only this can instill a sense of shared misson among its members. The Hung Chung-chiu incident shows that the army has a surfeit of discipline, but a dearth of compassion. It lacks officers who truly understand leadership.
Take the uneven quality of NCOs. The role of non-commissioned officers is to execute orders from above, and to lead those below into battle. Commissioned officers are rotated frequently. NCOs, by contrast, serve long term, and are the backbone of the military. Superior NCOs facilitate smooth operations. Inferior NCOs may easily become closet bullies. The Hung Chung-chiu case apparently involved illegal confinement and fatal exertions, all imposed by non-commissioned officers. In particular, Sergeant Fan Cho-hsien was guilty of repeated misconduct and abuse of authority. He abused his authority, and revealed serious deficiencies in his character. His superiors are also to blame for failing to see what he was.
At the heart of the NCO ranks is "reserve NCO" graduates from NCO training programs. But for some time, NCO training programs have devolved into a final destination for slackers. As a result, the quality of non-commissioned officers has been unsatisfactory. This can easily result in hidden clashes with highly-educated conscripts. In recent years the NCO training programs have been upgraded. They are not at the level of secondary vocational schools. Candidates are volunteers, and are promoted on the basis of merit. This has improved the quality of non-commissioned officers. But a ten year illness cannot be eradicated by a three year cure. The Ministry of Defense faces an imminent problem. It must exercise discretion. It must eliminate the unfit while retaining the fit. It must avoid holding on to the dregs.
Finally, take the military's crisis management abilities. From the very beginning, the Ministry of Defense was slow to respond. It underestimated the seriousness of the case. It called for perfunctory administrative sanctions on personnel within the chain of command. But public resentment boiled over. It was compelled to hand down demerits to corps commanders and commanders of the army. It was even compelled to announce the abolition of the closed system. It assumed that such a major move would end the matter. But such moves merely revealed how little concern the military felt for the Hung family or the public, or for uncovering the cause of Hung Chung-chiu's death. Hung's higher ranking military leaders were not even included among those receiving demerits and reprimands. Hung's family members criticized their release from detention as "everyone fasting because one person choked on his food." The public concluded that the military was utterly insincere about soul searching. It was merely putting on a show. These bungled opportunities led to public demands for remedial investigations. The military never regained the podium.
The military was inexperienced in investigating major cases. The public lacked trust. The introduction of regular prosecutors may be the only way to salvage the investigation. Active duty military offenses still need to be handled by the military. But this case involves an ordinary criminal offenses -- destroying evidence. Therefore one viable solution is joint prosecution by an ad hoc military-civilian group. To everyones' surprise, Deputy Defense Minister Andrew Yang appeared before protestors and made them a promise, signed by the Ministry of Defence. Those present cheered it on. To everyones' equal surprise, President Ma, concerned about its legality, immediately vetoed it.
Actually, the destruction of evidence in the Hung case is already being investigated by the Taoyuan Prosecutors Office. The Taoyuan Prosecutors Office and military investigators must share information. This will ensure that the joint investigation is true to its name. Unfortunately, the authorities have not recognized an opportunity to rehabilitate their image. Instead they have dragged their feet, provoking even greater resentment. This has hurt the image of the Ministry of Defense, which "behaved capriciously," as well as President Ma, who "slapped his subordinates in the face."
A string of blunders and mistakes have turned the Hung case into a landslide undermining the image of the military. The task of recruiting is extremely difficult to begin with. It is bound to be made even more difficult by the Hung case. For the Ministry of Defense, the case was an example of major whistleblowing. Large-scale self-examination must lead to reform and innovation. The unfit must be removed. Only then will Hung Chung-chiu's death not be in vain.
國軍在「仲丘之役」慘敗
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.07.24 02:32 am
陸軍下士洪仲丘案延燒逾兩周，國防部成為過街老鼠，至今仍無法止血。儘管道歉層級愈來愈高，懲處與收押名單愈來愈長，卻絲毫得不到肯定。這場「洪仲丘之戰」，國軍一敗塗地，外部形象、內部士氣雙輸。
從兵法的角度看，國軍之所以慘敗，在於平日內部管理、節制機制層層鬆脫，面對危機又嚴重誤判局勢，戎機一失再失，終使局面不可收拾。就內在因素而言，此次國軍暴露的弊病有三：一是管教心態失當，二是士官階層素質欠佳，三是危機處理能力奇差。
先談管教心態的扭曲。軍隊為因應戰爭，自必須強調服從、紀律、威權，並從平日訓練中培養這些精神。但威權管理只是求勝的手段，軍隊存在的根本意義，是要官兵身處沙場時能執行可能犧牲性命的任務，這就需要仰賴更高層次的信念──如愛國心、榮譽感及袍澤之情來驅動。換言之，管理部隊必須恩威並施、以身作則，使紀律奠基於義氣之上，才能建立成員間生死與共的情懷。但從洪仲丘事件看來，國軍仍然充斥「嚴而無恩」、不懂領導三昧的幹部。
再談士官階層素質的參差。士官的角色，主要是承上執行軍官命令、對下領導士兵作戰；相較輪調頻繁的軍官，久任士官往往才是基層骨幹。問題在，優秀士官可讓部隊順暢運作，不良士官卻易成為欺下瞞上的地頭蛇。從洪仲丘案看來，違法關他禁閉、將他操練至死的，都是士官層級，尤其連遭不斷爆料涉及行為不檢及呼風喚雨的范佐憲上士，不僅流於濫權自恣，品格亦有嚴重問題，而上級軍官識人不明亦難辭其咎。
國軍士官階層的核心是士校畢業的「常備士官」，但過去很長一段時間，士校卻淪為國中「放牛班」的最後去處。結果，不僅士官素質甚不理想，更易與「升學勝利組」的高學歷義務役士兵潛藏衝突。近年國軍雖將士校學制提升到二專，又從志願役士兵中擇優拔擢，有助改善新進士官素質；但十年之病，終究不是「三年之艾」所能根除。面對即將到來的精進案，國防部更須謹慎對幹部汰弱留強，切忌淪為徒剩糟粕的局面。
最後，談軍方的危機處理能力。一開始，國防部即遲鈍泄沓，誤判案件的嚴重性，僅循例將「指揮鍊」相關人員行政處分；但隨著民怨沸騰，又將記過範圍擴張到軍團指揮官與陸軍司令，甚至宣布取消禁閉制度，以為如此「大動作」就能應付了事。這些舉措，顯示軍方全然不能體會洪家及社會所關心的主要是洪仲丘的死因真相；將根本不認識洪員的高階將領納入記過申誡，乃至連家屬都批評為「因噎廢食」的取消禁閉，皆坐實外界認為軍方「毫無誠意檢討」、「只重表面功夫」的印象。因貽誤了先機，導致後來連串補救偵辦都只能被輿論牽著鼻子走，再也抓不回發言權。
在軍檢偵辦重案經驗不足及社會普遍的不信任下，引進「一般」檢調，可謂拯救調查的唯一法門。誠然，現役軍人觸犯軍法，仍須由軍法體系處理；但本案同時涉及普通刑法的滅證罪，因此軍民檢方共組「專案小組」聯合偵查後各自起訴，不失為一可行之「巧門」。未料，國防部副部長楊念祖在遊行現場作出允諾，且代表國防部簽名為憑，引發現場一片叫好；不料，卻隨即被憂心「違法」的馬總統否決。
事實上，洪案的湮滅證據部分如今依法由桃檢偵辦，而桃檢與軍檢在調查上必須互通有無，如此一來，「聯合偵辦」的事實其實某種程度已存在。遺憾的是，當局不知利用契機扭轉形象，反在猶疑瞻顧之間製造更多民怨，讓「朝令夕改」的國防部與「打下屬耳光」的總統形象皆受損。
總之，一連串的疏失與錯誤，已讓洪案成為沖垮國軍形象的超級土石流；原本就極困難的募兵作業，勢必更雪上加霜。但對國防部而言，這也是一次徹底自我揭弊、自我反省的大演習；若能藉此整頓革新、掃除敗類，洪仲丘的犧牲才可謂「死有重於泰山」。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 24, 2013
Summary: The controversy over the death of ROC Army Corporal Hung Chung-chi has been raging for two weeks. The Ministry of Defense has become the object of hatred. So far it has not been able to stop the hemmoraging. Higher and higher ranking officials have offered apologies. The list of officials being punished and detained is growing longer. But the public remains unmoved. In this "Battle of Hung Chung-chiu," the army has suffered a crushing defeat. Its public image has suffered. Its internal morale has suffered as well.
Full text below:
The controversy over the death of ROC Army Corporal Hung Chung-chi has been raging for two weeks. The Ministry of Defense has become the object of hatred. So far it has not been able to stop the hemmoraging. Higher and higher ranking officials have offered apologies. The list of officials being punished and detained is growing longer. But the public remains unmoved. In this "Battle of Hung Chung-chiu," the army has suffered a crushing defeat. Its public image has suffered. Its internal morale has suffered as well.
From a military perspective, the debacle was the result of faulty internal management routines, of laxness in layer upon layer of control mechanisms. It was also the result of serious errors of judgment in the face of crisis. Opportunities were lost, again and again. Eventually the situation got completely out of hand. Internally, the army was guilty of three fatal shortcomings. The first was a distorted concept of discipline. The second was poor quality NCOs. The third was poor crisis management abilities.
Take the distorted concept of discipline. When an army is at war, it must stress obedience, discipline, and authority. It must cultivate this spirit during peacetime training. But harsh discipline is merely a means to victory. The underlying purpose of the military is for officers and soldiers to carry out battlefield tasks that may cost them their lives. This requires more exalted motives, including patriotism, pride, and esprit de corps. In other words, discipline requires incentives and penalties. It must lead by example. Discipline must be rooted in loyalty. Only this can instill a sense of shared misson among its members. The Hung Chung-chiu incident shows that the army has a surfeit of discipline, but a dearth of compassion. It lacks officers who truly understand leadership.
Take the uneven quality of NCOs. The role of non-commissioned officers is to execute orders from above, and to lead those below into battle. Commissioned officers are rotated frequently. NCOs, by contrast, serve long term, and are the backbone of the military. Superior NCOs facilitate smooth operations. Inferior NCOs may easily become closet bullies. The Hung Chung-chiu case apparently involved illegal confinement and fatal exertions, all imposed by non-commissioned officers. In particular, Sergeant Fan Cho-hsien was guilty of repeated misconduct and abuse of authority. He abused his authority, and revealed serious deficiencies in his character. His superiors are also to blame for failing to see what he was.
At the heart of the NCO ranks is "reserve NCO" graduates from NCO training programs. But for some time, NCO training programs have devolved into a final destination for slackers. As a result, the quality of non-commissioned officers has been unsatisfactory. This can easily result in hidden clashes with highly-educated conscripts. In recent years the NCO training programs have been upgraded. They are not at the level of secondary vocational schools. Candidates are volunteers, and are promoted on the basis of merit. This has improved the quality of non-commissioned officers. But a ten year illness cannot be eradicated by a three year cure. The Ministry of Defense faces an imminent problem. It must exercise discretion. It must eliminate the unfit while retaining the fit. It must avoid holding on to the dregs.
Finally, take the military's crisis management abilities. From the very beginning, the Ministry of Defense was slow to respond. It underestimated the seriousness of the case. It called for perfunctory administrative sanctions on personnel within the chain of command. But public resentment boiled over. It was compelled to hand down demerits to corps commanders and commanders of the army. It was even compelled to announce the abolition of the closed system. It assumed that such a major move would end the matter. But such moves merely revealed how little concern the military felt for the Hung family or the public, or for uncovering the cause of Hung Chung-chiu's death. Hung's higher ranking military leaders were not even included among those receiving demerits and reprimands. Hung's family members criticized their release from detention as "everyone fasting because one person choked on his food." The public concluded that the military was utterly insincere about soul searching. It was merely putting on a show. These bungled opportunities led to public demands for remedial investigations. The military never regained the podium.
The military was inexperienced in investigating major cases. The public lacked trust. The introduction of regular prosecutors may be the only way to salvage the investigation. Active duty military offenses still need to be handled by the military. But this case involves an ordinary criminal offenses -- destroying evidence. Therefore one viable solution is joint prosecution by an ad hoc military-civilian group. To everyones' surprise, Deputy Defense Minister Andrew Yang appeared before protestors and made them a promise, signed by the Ministry of Defence. Those present cheered it on. To everyones' equal surprise, President Ma, concerned about its legality, immediately vetoed it.
Actually, the destruction of evidence in the Hung case is already being investigated by the Taoyuan Prosecutors Office. The Taoyuan Prosecutors Office and military investigators must share information. This will ensure that the joint investigation is true to its name. Unfortunately, the authorities have not recognized an opportunity to rehabilitate their image. Instead they have dragged their feet, provoking even greater resentment. This has hurt the image of the Ministry of Defense, which "behaved capriciously," as well as President Ma, who "slapped his subordinates in the face."
A string of blunders and mistakes have turned the Hung case into a landslide undermining the image of the military. The task of recruiting is extremely difficult to begin with. It is bound to be made even more difficult by the Hung case. For the Ministry of Defense, the case was an example of major whistleblowing. Large-scale self-examination must lead to reform and innovation. The unfit must be removed. Only then will Hung Chung-chiu's death not be in vain.
國軍在「仲丘之役」慘敗
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.07.24 02:32 am
陸軍下士洪仲丘案延燒逾兩周，國防部成為過街老鼠，至今仍無法止血。儘管道歉層級愈來愈高，懲處與收押名單愈來愈長，卻絲毫得不到肯定。這場「洪仲丘之戰」，國軍一敗塗地，外部形象、內部士氣雙輸。
從兵法的角度看，國軍之所以慘敗，在於平日內部管理、節制機制層層鬆脫，面對危機又嚴重誤判局勢，戎機一失再失，終使局面不可收拾。就內在因素而言，此次國軍暴露的弊病有三：一是管教心態失當，二是士官階層素質欠佳，三是危機處理能力奇差。
先談管教心態的扭曲。軍隊為因應戰爭，自必須強調服從、紀律、威權，並從平日訓練中培養這些精神。但威權管理只是求勝的手段，軍隊存在的根本意義，是要官兵身處沙場時能執行可能犧牲性命的任務，這就需要仰賴更高層次的信念──如愛國心、榮譽感及袍澤之情來驅動。換言之，管理部隊必須恩威並施、以身作則，使紀律奠基於義氣之上，才能建立成員間生死與共的情懷。但從洪仲丘事件看來，國軍仍然充斥「嚴而無恩」、不懂領導三昧的幹部。
再談士官階層素質的參差。士官的角色，主要是承上執行軍官命令、對下領導士兵作戰；相較輪調頻繁的軍官，久任士官往往才是基層骨幹。問題在，優秀士官可讓部隊順暢運作，不良士官卻易成為欺下瞞上的地頭蛇。從洪仲丘案看來，違法關他禁閉、將他操練至死的，都是士官層級，尤其連遭不斷爆料涉及行為不檢及呼風喚雨的范佐憲上士，不僅流於濫權自恣，品格亦有嚴重問題，而上級軍官識人不明亦難辭其咎。
國軍士官階層的核心是士校畢業的「常備士官」，但過去很長一段時間，士校卻淪為國中「放牛班」的最後去處。結果，不僅士官素質甚不理想，更易與「升學勝利組」的高學歷義務役士兵潛藏衝突。近年國軍雖將士校學制提升到二專，又從志願役士兵中擇優拔擢，有助改善新進士官素質；但十年之病，終究不是「三年之艾」所能根除。面對即將到來的精進案，國防部更須謹慎對幹部汰弱留強，切忌淪為徒剩糟粕的局面。
最後，談軍方的危機處理能力。一開始，國防部即遲鈍泄沓，誤判案件的嚴重性，僅循例將「指揮鍊」相關人員行政處分；但隨著民怨沸騰，又將記過範圍擴張到軍團指揮官與陸軍司令，甚至宣布取消禁閉制度，以為如此「大動作」就能應付了事。這些舉措，顯示軍方全然不能體會洪家及社會所關心的主要是洪仲丘的死因真相；將根本不認識洪員的高階將領納入記過申誡，乃至連家屬都批評為「因噎廢食」的取消禁閉，皆坐實外界認為軍方「毫無誠意檢討」、「只重表面功夫」的印象。因貽誤了先機，導致後來連串補救偵辦都只能被輿論牽著鼻子走，再也抓不回發言權。
在軍檢偵辦重案經驗不足及社會普遍的不信任下，引進「一般」檢調，可謂拯救調查的唯一法門。誠然，現役軍人觸犯軍法，仍須由軍法體系處理；但本案同時涉及普通刑法的滅證罪，因此軍民檢方共組「專案小組」聯合偵查後各自起訴，不失為一可行之「巧門」。未料，國防部副部長楊念祖在遊行現場作出允諾，且代表國防部簽名為憑，引發現場一片叫好；不料，卻隨即被憂心「違法」的馬總統否決。
事實上，洪案的湮滅證據部分如今依法由桃檢偵辦，而桃檢與軍檢在調查上必須互通有無，如此一來，「聯合偵辦」的事實其實某種程度已存在。遺憾的是，當局不知利用契機扭轉形象，反在猶疑瞻顧之間製造更多民怨，讓「朝令夕改」的國防部與「打下屬耳光」的總統形象皆受損。
總之，一連串的疏失與錯誤，已讓洪案成為沖垮國軍形象的超級土石流；原本就極困難的募兵作業，勢必更雪上加霜。但對國防部而言，這也是一次徹底自我揭弊、自我反省的大演習；若能藉此整頓革新、掃除敗類，洪仲丘的犧牲才可謂「死有重於泰山」。
Monday, July 22, 2013
Abe's Total Government: Blessing or Nightmare?
Abe's Total Government: Blessing or Nightmare?
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 23, 2013
Summary: Shinzo Abe led the Liberal Democratic Party to a victory in the parliamentary election. For Japan, this may be deeply gratifying. But for other countries, it is deeply worrisome. Will LDP total government take Japan down the highway towards national prospertiy, or down the blind alley towards militarism? Is a blessing for Japan, or a nightmare for Japan's neighbors? The answer depends on Abe, and his whims.
Full text below:
Shinzo Abe led the Liberal Democratic Party to a victory in the parliamentary election. For Japan, this may be deeply gratifying. But for other countries, it is deeply worrisome.
For Japan, this election ended the seven year anomaly known as the "Twisted Diet." It enabled Japan to extricate itself from the "short-lived cabinet" quagmire. This, coupled with a turnaround in the Japanese economy, may make Abe's "total government" feel like a blessing for the Japanese people. But other countries will probably see it as a nightmare. During his campaign, Abe trumpeted "territorial defense" and the overthrow of Japan's Peace Constitution. Abe has achieved total control of both upper and lower houses of parliament. His next move could inspire unprecedented region-wide anxiety.
There is only one Abe. But there are two interpretations of what Abe represents. These are derived mainly from two competing theses within Japan. One is the "wealthy nation thesis." The other is the "strong military thesis." The conflict between these two theses has resulted in two very different conclusions about the recent parliamentary election, at home and abroad.
The "wealthy nation thesis" argues that an end to the "Twisted Diet," and total LDP control over both houses is essential. Together, they will allow Abe to implement structural reforms and enable Japan's economy to experience a full recovery. Only a strong economy will enable Japan to reclaim its former glory as a great nation. In other words, the "wealthy nation thesis" views the parliamentary election as Japan's "revolving door" to major economic power status.
The "strong military thesis" views Abenomics as a prelude to Japan's "national normalization." It views the Japanese archipelago as a forward outpost against the Chinese mainland's eastward military advance. Abenomics will enable Japan's recovery. Japan can then engage in "territorial defense" and the fundamental work of constitutional revision. In other words, the "strong military thesis" views the parliamentary victory as a "stepping stone" for Japan's military buildup.
Both the revolving door and stepping stone require more than domestic support. They require international support. Abe clings to domestic support for the "wealthy nation thesis." He ignores the "strong military thesis" mindset. His endless invocation of the constitutional revision issue is purely for domestic consumption, to bolster his public support. No wonder Japanese animation master Hayao Miyazaki criticized Abe, saying that Abe's national normalization rhetoric targeted only domestic audiences. Every time Abe goes abroad, he changes his tune. Clearly the "strong military thesis" is a phony issue. Only the "wealthy nation thesis" is a true issue.
Unfortunately, with Abe waving the banner of territorial defense, national sovereignty, and ultranationalism, the "wealthy nation thesis" has gradually been marginalized. This has had a chilling effect on the "wealthy nation thesis" among the Japanese public. Ultranationalism has drugged the public. Imaginary "strong military policies" have become hot political topics. It has drugged Japanese right-wingers. It has drugged the LDP. It has even drugged Abe himself.
Abe has created two myths. First, he has falsely equated his parliamentary victory with public support for constitutional revision. In fact, the Japanese people supported the LDP in two successive elections, primarily to escape the nightmare of short-lived cabinets. They wanted to help Abe implement economic reforms. They did not necessarily support constitutional revision. According to an NHK poll, nearly 56% of the public wanted Abe to receive an absolute majority. But only 26% of the people want to revise the constitution. This sums it up.
Secondly, Able mistakenly concluded that Liberal Democratic Party "total government" meant it could revise the constitution as it pleased. the parliamentary victory gave the LDP control over half the seats in both the upper and lower houses. But that is a long way off from the two-thirds supermajority required for constitutional revision. The ruling coalition that the LDP belongs to includes the "New Komeito Party," which opposes constitutional revision. The "Japan Restoration Party" supports constitutional revision, but holds too few seats. Furthermore, even if the parliament revises the constitution, it must still be subjected to a national referendum. The public lacks consensus. Wanton promotion of constitutional revision would surely lead to a new wave of controversy and crises.
Abe's dream of constitutional revision is a long way from realization. But it has already become a nightmare for neighboring countries. The United States sees Abe's victory as Japanese public support for constitutional revision. Mainland China worries that once Abe achieves "total government," constitutional revision will become a runaway train. South Korea views increased Japanese military power as a tsunami that will upset the regional balance of power.
For Japanese nationals, the parliamentary victory is the end of the "Twisted Diet," and the beginning of economic reform. It is not necessarily the beginning of constitutional revision. Will LDP total government take Japan down the highway towards national prospertiy, or down the blind alley towards militarism? Is a blessing for Japan, or a nightmare for Japan's neighbors? The answer depends on Abe, and his whims.
安倍完全執政是恩典還是夢魘？
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.07.23 01:58 am
安倍所帶領的自民黨在這次參議院選舉大獲全勝，對日本來說，這或許是可喜之事；但對國際來說，卻是憂慮居多。
對日本而言，這次選舉終結長達七年「扭曲國會」的畸態，讓日本跳脫「短命內閣」的泥沼，加上日本經濟出現復甦的轉機，安倍的完全執政似乎是給日本的莫大恩典。但在國際看來，選前大肆宣揚護土、修憲的安倍，在參眾兩院都取得絕對主導權後，他的下一步行動，可能讓區域陷入前所未有的不安，安倍的完全執政極可能成為國際社會的夢魘。
一個安倍，卻出現兩種截然不同的解讀，主要是源自於日本國內出現「富國論」與「強兵論」兩種不同的路線之爭；而這兩條路線之爭，讓這次參院大選在國內與國際產生截然不同的政治想像。
「富國論」認為，唯有終結扭曲國會，讓自民黨在兩院取得完全的主導權，安倍才能強力主導經濟結構的改革，日本經濟才有完全復甦的可能，也唯有強大的經濟，才能讓日本重新找回昔日大國的風光。亦即，「富國論」是把這次參議院選舉當成是日本重回經濟大國的「旋轉門」。
「強兵論」則把安倍經濟學當成是日本「國家正常化」的首部曲，把日本列島當成是防禦中國大陸軍事力量東進的前哨站；在安倍經濟學讓日本復甦之後，接下來當然要開始進行護土、修憲的根本大業。亦即，「強兵論」是把這次的參院大選當成日本擴軍的「墊腳石」。
但不論是旋轉門或是墊腳石，除了需要國內民意的支持，還要能夠走出國門，得到國際的認同。而安倍緊抓住國民支持日本富國、不關心強兵的心理，不斷把修憲議題出口轉內銷，來壯大自己的民意支持。這也難怪日本動漫大師宮崎駿批評說：安倍的國家正常化論調，其實只是說給國內民眾聽的；因為每次只要一踏出國門，安倍便會開始改口。可見，「強兵論」只是一個假議題，「富國論」才是真議題。
遺憾的是，在安倍揮舞著領土、主權及建軍的民族主義大旗下，務實的富國議題逐漸被邊緣化，使抱持「富國論」者在日本輿論界噤若寒蟬；而在民族主義麻藥的操弄下，虛幻的強兵政見卻發展成熱門議題，不但麻醉了日本右翼，也麻醉了自民黨，更麻醉了安倍自己。
在這種情況下，安倍遂產生了兩個迷思。首先，是誤認參議院大選獲勝等同於民意贊同修憲。事實上，日本民眾之所以接連在兩次選舉中支持自民黨，主要是希望打破過去短命首相的惡夢，讓安倍能夠更安穩地推動經濟改革，這未必代表日本人民支持修憲。根據日本ＮＨＫ的民調，日本有將近五六％的民眾希望安倍政府過半，但只有廿六％的民眾希望修改憲法，由此可見一斑。
其次，是誤以為自民黨完全執政，便等同於可以恣意修憲。經過這次參議院大選，自民黨雖然在參、眾兩院同時取得過半席次，但距離三分之二的修憲門檻仍有相當差距；同時，與自民黨同屬執政聯盟的「公明黨」反對修憲，而支持修憲的「維新會」在參議院的席次又過少。進一步說，縱使國會通過修憲案，還要送交全民複決；在民意缺乏共識下，若恣意推動修憲案，勢必引發新一波的朝野對決危機。
安倍的修憲大夢，雖然離實現還有很長的一段距離，但卻已成為周邊國家揮之不去的夢魘了。美國將這次安倍的勝選，視為日本民眾對修憲議題投下贊成票；而中國大陸則擔心安倍在取得完全執政之後，修憲問題將會如脫韁野馬般一發不可收拾；韓國方面，更把日本軍事強國化視為攪動區域平衡的大海嘯。
由此看來，這次參議院大選，對日本國民來說，只能視為「扭曲國會」的終結，是啟動經濟改革的起點，卻未必是啟動修憲的起點。而這次自民黨的完全執政，究竟會把日本帶向富國之路，還是走回昔日強兵的歧途；它究竟是日本的恩典，還是會變成國際的夢魘，全繫乎安倍的一念之間。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 23, 2013
Summary: Shinzo Abe led the Liberal Democratic Party to a victory in the parliamentary election. For Japan, this may be deeply gratifying. But for other countries, it is deeply worrisome. Will LDP total government take Japan down the highway towards national prospertiy, or down the blind alley towards militarism? Is a blessing for Japan, or a nightmare for Japan's neighbors? The answer depends on Abe, and his whims.
Full text below:
Shinzo Abe led the Liberal Democratic Party to a victory in the parliamentary election. For Japan, this may be deeply gratifying. But for other countries, it is deeply worrisome.
For Japan, this election ended the seven year anomaly known as the "Twisted Diet." It enabled Japan to extricate itself from the "short-lived cabinet" quagmire. This, coupled with a turnaround in the Japanese economy, may make Abe's "total government" feel like a blessing for the Japanese people. But other countries will probably see it as a nightmare. During his campaign, Abe trumpeted "territorial defense" and the overthrow of Japan's Peace Constitution. Abe has achieved total control of both upper and lower houses of parliament. His next move could inspire unprecedented region-wide anxiety.
There is only one Abe. But there are two interpretations of what Abe represents. These are derived mainly from two competing theses within Japan. One is the "wealthy nation thesis." The other is the "strong military thesis." The conflict between these two theses has resulted in two very different conclusions about the recent parliamentary election, at home and abroad.
The "wealthy nation thesis" argues that an end to the "Twisted Diet," and total LDP control over both houses is essential. Together, they will allow Abe to implement structural reforms and enable Japan's economy to experience a full recovery. Only a strong economy will enable Japan to reclaim its former glory as a great nation. In other words, the "wealthy nation thesis" views the parliamentary election as Japan's "revolving door" to major economic power status.
The "strong military thesis" views Abenomics as a prelude to Japan's "national normalization." It views the Japanese archipelago as a forward outpost against the Chinese mainland's eastward military advance. Abenomics will enable Japan's recovery. Japan can then engage in "territorial defense" and the fundamental work of constitutional revision. In other words, the "strong military thesis" views the parliamentary victory as a "stepping stone" for Japan's military buildup.
Both the revolving door and stepping stone require more than domestic support. They require international support. Abe clings to domestic support for the "wealthy nation thesis." He ignores the "strong military thesis" mindset. His endless invocation of the constitutional revision issue is purely for domestic consumption, to bolster his public support. No wonder Japanese animation master Hayao Miyazaki criticized Abe, saying that Abe's national normalization rhetoric targeted only domestic audiences. Every time Abe goes abroad, he changes his tune. Clearly the "strong military thesis" is a phony issue. Only the "wealthy nation thesis" is a true issue.
Unfortunately, with Abe waving the banner of territorial defense, national sovereignty, and ultranationalism, the "wealthy nation thesis" has gradually been marginalized. This has had a chilling effect on the "wealthy nation thesis" among the Japanese public. Ultranationalism has drugged the public. Imaginary "strong military policies" have become hot political topics. It has drugged Japanese right-wingers. It has drugged the LDP. It has even drugged Abe himself.
Abe has created two myths. First, he has falsely equated his parliamentary victory with public support for constitutional revision. In fact, the Japanese people supported the LDP in two successive elections, primarily to escape the nightmare of short-lived cabinets. They wanted to help Abe implement economic reforms. They did not necessarily support constitutional revision. According to an NHK poll, nearly 56% of the public wanted Abe to receive an absolute majority. But only 26% of the people want to revise the constitution. This sums it up.
Secondly, Able mistakenly concluded that Liberal Democratic Party "total government" meant it could revise the constitution as it pleased. the parliamentary victory gave the LDP control over half the seats in both the upper and lower houses. But that is a long way off from the two-thirds supermajority required for constitutional revision. The ruling coalition that the LDP belongs to includes the "New Komeito Party," which opposes constitutional revision. The "Japan Restoration Party" supports constitutional revision, but holds too few seats. Furthermore, even if the parliament revises the constitution, it must still be subjected to a national referendum. The public lacks consensus. Wanton promotion of constitutional revision would surely lead to a new wave of controversy and crises.
Abe's dream of constitutional revision is a long way from realization. But it has already become a nightmare for neighboring countries. The United States sees Abe's victory as Japanese public support for constitutional revision. Mainland China worries that once Abe achieves "total government," constitutional revision will become a runaway train. South Korea views increased Japanese military power as a tsunami that will upset the regional balance of power.
For Japanese nationals, the parliamentary victory is the end of the "Twisted Diet," and the beginning of economic reform. It is not necessarily the beginning of constitutional revision. Will LDP total government take Japan down the highway towards national prospertiy, or down the blind alley towards militarism? Is a blessing for Japan, or a nightmare for Japan's neighbors? The answer depends on Abe, and his whims.
安倍完全執政是恩典還是夢魘？
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.07.23 01:58 am
安倍所帶領的自民黨在這次參議院選舉大獲全勝，對日本來說，這或許是可喜之事；但對國際來說，卻是憂慮居多。
對日本而言，這次選舉終結長達七年「扭曲國會」的畸態，讓日本跳脫「短命內閣」的泥沼，加上日本經濟出現復甦的轉機，安倍的完全執政似乎是給日本的莫大恩典。但在國際看來，選前大肆宣揚護土、修憲的安倍，在參眾兩院都取得絕對主導權後，他的下一步行動，可能讓區域陷入前所未有的不安，安倍的完全執政極可能成為國際社會的夢魘。
一個安倍，卻出現兩種截然不同的解讀，主要是源自於日本國內出現「富國論」與「強兵論」兩種不同的路線之爭；而這兩條路線之爭，讓這次參院大選在國內與國際產生截然不同的政治想像。
「富國論」認為，唯有終結扭曲國會，讓自民黨在兩院取得完全的主導權，安倍才能強力主導經濟結構的改革，日本經濟才有完全復甦的可能，也唯有強大的經濟，才能讓日本重新找回昔日大國的風光。亦即，「富國論」是把這次參議院選舉當成是日本重回經濟大國的「旋轉門」。
「強兵論」則把安倍經濟學當成是日本「國家正常化」的首部曲，把日本列島當成是防禦中國大陸軍事力量東進的前哨站；在安倍經濟學讓日本復甦之後，接下來當然要開始進行護土、修憲的根本大業。亦即，「強兵論」是把這次的參院大選當成日本擴軍的「墊腳石」。
但不論是旋轉門或是墊腳石，除了需要國內民意的支持，還要能夠走出國門，得到國際的認同。而安倍緊抓住國民支持日本富國、不關心強兵的心理，不斷把修憲議題出口轉內銷，來壯大自己的民意支持。這也難怪日本動漫大師宮崎駿批評說：安倍的國家正常化論調，其實只是說給國內民眾聽的；因為每次只要一踏出國門，安倍便會開始改口。可見，「強兵論」只是一個假議題，「富國論」才是真議題。
遺憾的是，在安倍揮舞著領土、主權及建軍的民族主義大旗下，務實的富國議題逐漸被邊緣化，使抱持「富國論」者在日本輿論界噤若寒蟬；而在民族主義麻藥的操弄下，虛幻的強兵政見卻發展成熱門議題，不但麻醉了日本右翼，也麻醉了自民黨，更麻醉了安倍自己。
在這種情況下，安倍遂產生了兩個迷思。首先，是誤認參議院大選獲勝等同於民意贊同修憲。事實上，日本民眾之所以接連在兩次選舉中支持自民黨，主要是希望打破過去短命首相的惡夢，讓安倍能夠更安穩地推動經濟改革，這未必代表日本人民支持修憲。根據日本ＮＨＫ的民調，日本有將近五六％的民眾希望安倍政府過半，但只有廿六％的民眾希望修改憲法，由此可見一斑。
其次，是誤以為自民黨完全執政，便等同於可以恣意修憲。經過這次參議院大選，自民黨雖然在參、眾兩院同時取得過半席次，但距離三分之二的修憲門檻仍有相當差距；同時，與自民黨同屬執政聯盟的「公明黨」反對修憲，而支持修憲的「維新會」在參議院的席次又過少。進一步說，縱使國會通過修憲案，還要送交全民複決；在民意缺乏共識下，若恣意推動修憲案，勢必引發新一波的朝野對決危機。
安倍的修憲大夢，雖然離實現還有很長的一段距離，但卻已成為周邊國家揮之不去的夢魘了。美國將這次安倍的勝選，視為日本民眾對修憲議題投下贊成票；而中國大陸則擔心安倍在取得完全執政之後，修憲問題將會如脫韁野馬般一發不可收拾；韓國方面，更把日本軍事強國化視為攪動區域平衡的大海嘯。
由此看來，這次參議院大選，對日本國民來說，只能視為「扭曲國會」的終結，是啟動經濟改革的起點，卻未必是啟動修憲的起點。而這次自民黨的完全執政，究竟會把日本帶向富國之路，還是走回昔日強兵的歧途；它究竟是日本的恩典，還是會變成國際的夢魘，全繫乎安倍的一念之間。
安倍完全執政是恩典還是夢魘？
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.07.23 01:58 am
安倍所帶領的自民黨在這次參議院選舉大獲全勝，
對日本來說，
這或許是可喜之事；
但對國際來說，
卻是憂慮居多。
對日本而言，
這次選舉終結長達七年「扭曲國會」的畸態，
讓日本跳脫「短命內閣」的泥沼，
加上日本經濟出現復甦的轉機，
安倍的完全執政似乎是給日本的莫大恩典。
但在國際看來，
選前大肆宣揚護土、
修憲的安倍，
在參眾兩院都取得絕對主導權後，
他的下一步行動，
可能讓區域陷入前所未有的不安，
安倍的完全執政極可能成為國際社會的夢魘。
一個安倍，
卻出現兩種截然不同的解讀，
主要是源自於日本國內出現「富國論」與「強兵論」兩種不同的路線之爭；
而這兩條路線之爭，
讓這次參院大選在國內與國際產生截然不同的政治想像。
「富國論」認為，
唯有終結扭曲國會，
讓自民黨在兩院取得完全的主導權，
安倍才能強力主導經濟結構的改革，
日本經濟才有完全復甦的可能，
也唯有強大的經濟，
才能讓日本重新找回昔日大國的風光。
亦即，「富國論」是把這次參議院選舉當成是日本重回經濟大國的「旋轉門」。
「強兵論」則把安倍經濟學當成是日本「國家正常化」的首部曲，
把日本列島當成是防禦中國大陸軍事力量東進的前哨站；
在安倍經濟學讓日本復甦之後，
接下來當然要開始進行護土、
修憲的根本大業。
亦即，「強兵論」是把這次的參院大選當成日本擴軍的「墊腳石」。
但不論是旋轉門或是墊腳石，
除了需要國內民意的支持，
還要能夠走出國門，
得到國際的認同。
而安倍緊抓住國民支持日本富國、
不關心強兵的心理，
不斷把修憲議題出口轉內銷，
來壯大自己的民意支持。
這也難怪日本動漫大師宮崎駿批評說：
安倍的國家正常化論調，
其實只是說給國內民眾聽的；
因為每次只要一踏出國門，
安倍便會開始改口。
可見，「強兵論」只是一個假議題，
「富國論」才是真議題。
遺憾的是，
在安倍揮舞著領土、
主權及建軍的民族主義大旗下，
務實的富國議題逐漸被邊緣化，
使抱持「富國論」者在日本輿論界噤若寒蟬；
而在民族主義麻藥的操弄下，
虛幻的強兵政見卻發展成熱門議題，
不但麻醉了日本右翼，
也麻醉了自民黨，
更麻醉了安倍自己。
在這種情況下，
安倍遂產生了兩個迷思。
首先，是誤認參議院大選獲勝等同於民意贊同修憲。
事實上，日本民眾之所以接連在兩次選舉中支持自民黨，
主要是希望打破過去短命首相的惡夢，
讓安倍能夠更安穩地推動經濟改革，
這未必代表日本人民支持修憲。
根據日本ＮＨＫ的民調，
日本有將近五六％的民眾希望安倍政府過半，
但只有廿六％的民眾希望修改憲法，
由此可見一斑。
其次，是誤以為自民黨完全執政，
便等同於可以恣意修憲。
經過這次參議院大選，
自民黨雖然在參、
眾兩院同時取得過半席次，
但距離三分之二的修憲門檻仍有相當差距；
同時，與自民黨同屬執政聯盟的「公明黨」反對修憲，
而支持修憲的「維新會」在參議院的席次又過少。
進一步說，
縱使國會通過修憲案，
還要送交全民複決；
在民意缺乏共識下，
若恣意推動修憲案，
勢必引發新一波的朝野對決危機。
安倍的修憲大夢，
雖然離實現還有很長的一段距離，
但卻已成為周邊國家揮之不去的夢魘了。
美國將這次安倍的勝選，
視為日本民眾對修憲議題投下贊成票；
而中國大陸則擔心安倍在取得完全執政之後，
修憲問題將會如脫韁野馬般一發不可收拾；
韓國方面，
更把日本軍事強國化視為攪動區域平衡的大海嘯。
由此看來，
這次參議院大選，
對日本國民來說，
只能視為「扭曲國會」的終結，
是啟動經濟改革的起點，
卻未必是啟動修憲的起點。
而這次自民黨的完全執政，
究竟會把日本帶向富國之路，
還是走回昔日強兵的歧途；
它究竟是日本的恩典，
還是會變成國際的夢魘，
全繫乎安倍的一念之間。
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.07.23 01:58 am
安倍所帶領的自民黨在這次參議院選舉大獲全勝，
對日本來說，
這或許是可喜之事；
但對國際來說，
卻是憂慮居多。
對日本而言，
這次選舉終結長達七年「扭曲國會」的畸態，
讓日本跳脫「短命內閣」的泥沼，
加上日本經濟出現復甦的轉機，
安倍的完全執政似乎是給日本的莫大恩典。
但在國際看來，
選前大肆宣揚護土、
修憲的安倍，
在參眾兩院都取得絕對主導權後，
他的下一步行動，
可能讓區域陷入前所未有的不安，
安倍的完全執政極可能成為國際社會的夢魘。
一個安倍，
卻出現兩種截然不同的解讀，
主要是源自於日本國內出現「富國論」與「強兵論」兩種不同的路線之爭；
而這兩條路線之爭，
讓這次參院大選在國內與國際產生截然不同的政治想像。
「富國論」認為，
唯有終結扭曲國會，
讓自民黨在兩院取得完全的主導權，
安倍才能強力主導經濟結構的改革，
日本經濟才有完全復甦的可能，
也唯有強大的經濟，
才能讓日本重新找回昔日大國的風光。
亦即，「富國論」是把這次參議院選舉當成是日本重回經濟大國的「旋轉門」。
「強兵論」則把安倍經濟學當成是日本「國家正常化」的首部曲，
把日本列島當成是防禦中國大陸軍事力量東進的前哨站；
在安倍經濟學讓日本復甦之後，
接下來當然要開始進行護土、
修憲的根本大業。
亦即，「強兵論」是把這次的參院大選當成日本擴軍的「墊腳石」。
但不論是旋轉門或是墊腳石，
除了需要國內民意的支持，
還要能夠走出國門，
得到國際的認同。
而安倍緊抓住國民支持日本富國、
不關心強兵的心理，
不斷把修憲議題出口轉內銷，
來壯大自己的民意支持。
這也難怪日本動漫大師宮崎駿批評說：
安倍的國家正常化論調，
其實只是說給國內民眾聽的；
因為每次只要一踏出國門，
安倍便會開始改口。
可見，「強兵論」只是一個假議題，
「富國論」才是真議題。
遺憾的是，
在安倍揮舞著領土、
主權及建軍的民族主義大旗下，
務實的富國議題逐漸被邊緣化，
使抱持「富國論」者在日本輿論界噤若寒蟬；
而在民族主義麻藥的操弄下，
虛幻的強兵政見卻發展成熱門議題，
不但麻醉了日本右翼，
也麻醉了自民黨，
更麻醉了安倍自己。
在這種情況下，
安倍遂產生了兩個迷思。
首先，是誤認參議院大選獲勝等同於民意贊同修憲。
事實上，日本民眾之所以接連在兩次選舉中支持自民黨，
主要是希望打破過去短命首相的惡夢，
讓安倍能夠更安穩地推動經濟改革，
這未必代表日本人民支持修憲。
根據日本ＮＨＫ的民調，
日本有將近五六％的民眾希望安倍政府過半，
但只有廿六％的民眾希望修改憲法，
由此可見一斑。
其次，是誤以為自民黨完全執政，
便等同於可以恣意修憲。
經過這次參議院大選，
自民黨雖然在參、
眾兩院同時取得過半席次，
但距離三分之二的修憲門檻仍有相當差距；
同時，與自民黨同屬執政聯盟的「公明黨」反對修憲，
而支持修憲的「維新會」在參議院的席次又過少。
進一步說，
縱使國會通過修憲案，
還要送交全民複決；
在民意缺乏共識下，
若恣意推動修憲案，
勢必引發新一波的朝野對決危機。
安倍的修憲大夢，
雖然離實現還有很長的一段距離，
但卻已成為周邊國家揮之不去的夢魘了。
美國將這次安倍的勝選，
視為日本民眾對修憲議題投下贊成票；
而中國大陸則擔心安倍在取得完全執政之後，
修憲問題將會如脫韁野馬般一發不可收拾；
韓國方面，
更把日本軍事強國化視為攪動區域平衡的大海嘯。
由此看來，
這次參議院大選，
對日本國民來說，
只能視為「扭曲國會」的終結，
是啟動經濟改革的起點，
卻未必是啟動修憲的起點。
而這次自民黨的完全執政，
究竟會把日本帶向富國之路，
還是走回昔日強兵的歧途；
它究竟是日本的恩典，
還是會變成國際的夢魘，
全繫乎安倍的一念之間。
Sunday, July 21, 2013
Tsai Ing-wen: Seize Opportunity to Promote Cross-Strait Mutual Prosperity
Tsai Ing-wen: Seize Opportunity to Promote Cross-Strait Mutual Prosperity
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 22, 2013
Summary: The ruling and opposition parties on Taiwan must reach a consensus. Otherwise genuine reconciliation between Taiwan and the Mainland will be impossible. Both sides must benefit and prosper. The Blue Camp alone cannot ensure cross-Strait communication. DPP cross-Strait policy reform must not be an election ploy. It affects the future of Taiwan. As a DPP candidate, Tsai Ing-wen must act in her own interest, and in Taiwan's interest as well. She must bear the heavy burden of DPP policy reform.
Full text below:
Former DPP Chairman Tsai Ing-wen recently invited Mainland Chinese scholar Cao Yuanzheng to visit Taiwan to discuss the RMB issue. She referred to the discussion as "Understanding China [sic] from a Professional Perspective." She deliberately used the term "China" instead of "Mainland China." She was fearful people would conclude that the DPP was "colluding" with the CCP. One thing is certain. The DPP and CCP may not be conducting normalized exchanges in the foreseeable future. But Tsai Ing-wen has at least held out the possibility of bridge-building. This will be of crucial importance, both to the future of Taiwan, and to the future of the DPP.
Cross-Strait relations have long been the DPP's Achilles Heel. Previous DPP elders have attempted to change DPP thought. But all they did was get themselves expelled from the party. The DPP has clung to its Taiwan Independence Party Platform. Every word, every deed, reeks with hatred for "China," i.e., Mainland China. This may delight Deep Green extremists. But it has never gained the trust of swing voters. Worse still, it has frightened away economically motivated voters. The Democratic Progressive Party lost the presidential election last year, by a three percent margin. The key to its defeat was the DPP's cross-Strait policy.
The DPP faces a turning point. As a presidential candidate, Tsai Ing-wen must be deeply concerned. In her concession speech she said the DPP "lost during the home stretch." She was even more blunt in the DPP's follow up election defeat report. "The DPP has long faced an extremely tough problem -- how to deal with [Mainland] China. How to deal with cross-Strait issues more energetically and capably. Only by doing so can the DPP gain the pubilc trust." The DPP has only recently acknowledged this problem. Can it gain the ROC electorate's trust? The most important precondition is a robust cross-Strait policy acceptable to the Mainland side.
Unfortunately, after last year election loss, the DPP refused to follow Tsai Ing-wen's course. Instead it resolved that once Su Tseng-chang took office in 2016, it must aggressively solicit the support of Taiwan independence extremists. Everyone looked forward to the DPP's formation of a long-awaited "China Affairs Committee." But the newly formed committee was restricted to policy research and forbidden to communicate with the Mainland. Frank Hsieh visited the Mainland last September, on his "ice-breaking journey." He proposed a "shared constitutional consensus." But Su Tseng-chang slapped Hsieh down, saying that Hsieh "was not speaking for the DPP." This ended further discussion within the party.
We can be thankful for one thing. The DPP may have no intention of taking the lead in cross-Strait policy reform. But cross-Strait policy is too important. Even within the Green Camp, Su cannot single-handedly lay down the law. Su's path is conservative. Frank Hsieh by contrast, has visited the Mainland twice this year. He has conversed directly with Taiwan Affairs Office Director Zhang Zhijun.
Tsai Ing-wen falls somewhere between Su and Hsieh. She does not reject exchanges. But so far she has avoided dialogue with Mainland officials responsible for Taiwan affairs. Her "Xiaoying Foundation" has invited scholars from the Mainland to visit Taiwan. She wants swing voters to know she is not a Taiwan independence extremist. She is letting the Mainland know where she stands, and is keeping open channels of communication.
Tsai Ing-wen is seeking progress amidst stabilty. But she must do more. Tsai Ing-wen is likely to run for president in 2016. By then, Tsai and Beijing must have established channels of communication. They must have a basis for mutual trust. More importantly, they must prevent miscalculations. The best and fastest way to build trust with the Mainland is for Tsai Ing-wen to visit. As Tsai Ing-wen has stressed, "Cross-strait issues cannot be solved by sitting at home. To deal with cross-Strait issues, we must understand the Chinese mainland. To understand the Chinese mainland, we must interact with it." Tsai Ing-wen is interested in "Letting grass-roots party members better understand the Mainland individually." Party members should strive to better understand the Mainland. This is especially true for Tsai Ing-wen, who could become the nation's leader.
The DPP and the CPP are communicating. Frank Hsieh has been leading the way. He and senior Mainland officials have dialogued with each other, and confronted each other. They have not been accused of "selling out Taiwan." They have instead been perceived as partners in dialogue. Elders have blazed the way. Cross-Strait exchanges are nothing to fear. Tsai and Hsieh are friendly with each other. If Tsai Ing-wen wants to improve communications with the Mainland, she can be assured of Frank Hsieh's support.
Take another matter, cross-Strait economic and trade policy. Tsai Ing-wen must jettison her overly cautious demeanor. Three years ago, Ma Ying-jeou and Tsai Ing-wen took part in a major debate over ECFA. Tsai Ing-wen said the DPP would approach the Chinese mainland only in step with the rest of the world. She criticized the KMT for approaching the Chinese mainalnd before the rest of the world, arguing that the risk was too high.
Three years later, the two sides have signed TISA. Recently the ROC and New Zealand signed a trade and economic cooperation agreement. This was the first time the ROC has ever signed a cooperation agreement with a nation with which it lacks diplomatic ties. The ROC is also about to sign an agreement with Singapore, another nation with which it lacks diplomatic ties. Last month the Economist affirmed the rightness of the ROC's direction. Ma administration policies are working, across the Strait and around the the world. Tsai Ing-wen vowed to let the ROC join the world. Ma Ying-jeou exposed the fallacy of Tsai Ing-wen's "globalization without the Chinese mainland." It defied global trends and was strategically unfavorable to Taiwan.
Former National Security Council Secretary-General Su Chi put it well. The ruling and opposition parties on Taiwan must reach a consensus. Otherwise genuine reconciliation between Taiwan and the Mainland will be impossible. Both sides must benefit and prosper. The Blue Camp alone cannot ensure cross-Strait communication. DPP cross-Strait policy reform must not be an election ploy. It affects the future of Taiwan. As a DPP candidate, Tsai Ing-wen must act in her own interest, and in Taiwan's interest as well. She must bear the heavy burden of DPP policy reform.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2013.07.22
社論－蔡英文應掌握兩岸互利共榮的契機
本報訊
民進黨前主席蔡英文日前邀請大陸重量級學者曹遠征討論人民幣議題，她雖然刻意定調為「從專業了解中國」，不願有民共交流的聯想；但可以確定的是，即使民共交流常態化遙遙無期，但蔡英文對於建立起兩岸溝通橋梁，至少保留了些許想像空間，這一點對台灣的未來、民進黨的未來，都攸關重要。
兩岸關係向來是民進黨的罩門，過去，多位有意努力促成轉型的大老，最後都落到壯烈退黨的下場；民進黨死抱台獨黨綱、一言一行無不仇中的結果是，他們雖討好了深綠陣營，但是卻無法得到中間選民的信任，更嚇跑了關鍵的經濟選民；換言之，民進黨在去年總統大選以百分之三的差距功敗垂成，最重要的關鍵就是民進黨的兩岸政策。
對於這樣的戲劇性轉折，作為總統候選人的蔡英文想必感受深刻，她在發表敗選感言時坦承，民進黨正是「輸在最後一哩路」，接下來，更透過民進黨的敗選報告中直言，「民進黨在過去以致到將來，都要面對一個很嚴酷問題，就是要如何面對中國大陸，要如何加強處理兩岸問題的能量與能力，才會得到社會對民進黨的信賴。」可以說，民進黨到此時才認知到，是否得到台灣選民的信任，最重要的條件是一個穩健、對岸可以接受的兩岸政策。
遺憾的是，民進黨在去年敗選之後，並未延續蔡英文的路線，志在二○一六的蘇貞昌上任後，為了鞏固黨權，積極拉攏黨內獨派，各界期盼的民進黨中國事務委員會千呼萬喚始出來，卻只能政策研究而無交流功能；謝長廷去年九月赴陸進行破冰之旅，提出憲法共識，蘇貞昌一句「不能代表民進黨」，就將黨內討論的契機完全打斷。
值得慶幸的是，現在的民進黨雖然無意成為兩岸轉型的領頭羊，但兩岸政策太重要了，即使是綠營，也不是蘇貞昌個人說了算。相對於蘇貞昌的保守路線，謝長廷今年二度赴陸，直接與國台辦主任張志軍等人對話。
蔡英文則介於蘇謝之間，她並不排斥交流，但至目前為止，仍迴避與涉台事務官員對話，而是以「小英基金會」的名義邀請大陸重量級學者來台，不但讓中間選民知道她不是死硬台獨，也趁機向對岸表態，保留未來溝通的可能。
蔡英文的作法雖然是穩定中有進展，但仍可再進一步。蔡英文角逐二○一六大位的可能性不低，屆時，蔡英文團隊和北京之間，一定要能建立起溝通管道，更要有互信基礎，以免遇事誤判，而和對岸建立互信管道，最好最快的方法，就是蔡英文訪陸，一來，正如蔡英文曾經強調的，「處理兩岸問題不是坐在家裡想要怎麼處理，要處理兩岸問題必需要了解中國大陸，要了解中國大陸必須要在互動中去了解。」蔡英文更有意「讓黨員與基層可以去更了解對岸」，黨員都該親自到對岸深入了解，更何況有機會成為國家領導人的蔡英文！
如今，民共交流的路途中，前方已有謝長廷帶路，他和對岸高層官員對話、交鋒，不但完全沒有出賣台灣的疑慮，更被視為可以對話的對手，前方已有大老先行，兩岸交流實不足懼，而且，蔡謝關係友好，蔡英文若有意和對岸加強交流，可以放心的任由謝長廷作後盾。
另一方面，兩岸經貿政策方面，蔡英文也必須擺脫過度謹慎的特性。猶記得三年前馬英九與蔡英文那一場ＥＣＦＡ大辯論中，蔡英文表示，民進黨是跟著世界一齊走向中國大陸，她批評國民黨是透過大陸走向世界，風險太高。
事隔三年，在兩岸簽訂服貿協定後，日前，台灣與紐西蘭簽訂經濟貿易合作協定，這是第一次有非邦交國與台灣簽合作協定，另一個非邦交國新加坡的簽約時程也箭在弦上，上一期的《經濟學人》肯定，馬政府從兩岸到世界的政策似乎奏效，而且，自許要讓台灣走向世界的蔡英文，也不能落入馬英九的口實，只要「沒有中國大陸的全球化」，這絕對是違反世界潮流、也對台灣不利的戰略。
前國安會祕書長蘇起說得好，台灣的朝野如果不能達成共識，兩岸之間不可能真正和解，兩岸要能互利共榮，不可能在藍營獨握兩岸溝通之鑰下完成；可以說，民進黨的兩岸轉型不只是選舉策略而已，也攸關台灣的未來，身為民進黨內的政治人物，蔡英文就算不為了她自己，為了台灣，也必須擔下轉型的重責。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 22, 2013
Summary: The ruling and opposition parties on Taiwan must reach a consensus. Otherwise genuine reconciliation between Taiwan and the Mainland will be impossible. Both sides must benefit and prosper. The Blue Camp alone cannot ensure cross-Strait communication. DPP cross-Strait policy reform must not be an election ploy. It affects the future of Taiwan. As a DPP candidate, Tsai Ing-wen must act in her own interest, and in Taiwan's interest as well. She must bear the heavy burden of DPP policy reform.
Full text below:
Former DPP Chairman Tsai Ing-wen recently invited Mainland Chinese scholar Cao Yuanzheng to visit Taiwan to discuss the RMB issue. She referred to the discussion as "Understanding China [sic] from a Professional Perspective." She deliberately used the term "China" instead of "Mainland China." She was fearful people would conclude that the DPP was "colluding" with the CCP. One thing is certain. The DPP and CCP may not be conducting normalized exchanges in the foreseeable future. But Tsai Ing-wen has at least held out the possibility of bridge-building. This will be of crucial importance, both to the future of Taiwan, and to the future of the DPP.
Cross-Strait relations have long been the DPP's Achilles Heel. Previous DPP elders have attempted to change DPP thought. But all they did was get themselves expelled from the party. The DPP has clung to its Taiwan Independence Party Platform. Every word, every deed, reeks with hatred for "China," i.e., Mainland China. This may delight Deep Green extremists. But it has never gained the trust of swing voters. Worse still, it has frightened away economically motivated voters. The Democratic Progressive Party lost the presidential election last year, by a three percent margin. The key to its defeat was the DPP's cross-Strait policy.
The DPP faces a turning point. As a presidential candidate, Tsai Ing-wen must be deeply concerned. In her concession speech she said the DPP "lost during the home stretch." She was even more blunt in the DPP's follow up election defeat report. "The DPP has long faced an extremely tough problem -- how to deal with [Mainland] China. How to deal with cross-Strait issues more energetically and capably. Only by doing so can the DPP gain the pubilc trust." The DPP has only recently acknowledged this problem. Can it gain the ROC electorate's trust? The most important precondition is a robust cross-Strait policy acceptable to the Mainland side.
Unfortunately, after last year election loss, the DPP refused to follow Tsai Ing-wen's course. Instead it resolved that once Su Tseng-chang took office in 2016, it must aggressively solicit the support of Taiwan independence extremists. Everyone looked forward to the DPP's formation of a long-awaited "China Affairs Committee." But the newly formed committee was restricted to policy research and forbidden to communicate with the Mainland. Frank Hsieh visited the Mainland last September, on his "ice-breaking journey." He proposed a "shared constitutional consensus." But Su Tseng-chang slapped Hsieh down, saying that Hsieh "was not speaking for the DPP." This ended further discussion within the party.
We can be thankful for one thing. The DPP may have no intention of taking the lead in cross-Strait policy reform. But cross-Strait policy is too important. Even within the Green Camp, Su cannot single-handedly lay down the law. Su's path is conservative. Frank Hsieh by contrast, has visited the Mainland twice this year. He has conversed directly with Taiwan Affairs Office Director Zhang Zhijun.
Tsai Ing-wen falls somewhere between Su and Hsieh. She does not reject exchanges. But so far she has avoided dialogue with Mainland officials responsible for Taiwan affairs. Her "Xiaoying Foundation" has invited scholars from the Mainland to visit Taiwan. She wants swing voters to know she is not a Taiwan independence extremist. She is letting the Mainland know where she stands, and is keeping open channels of communication.
Tsai Ing-wen is seeking progress amidst stabilty. But she must do more. Tsai Ing-wen is likely to run for president in 2016. By then, Tsai and Beijing must have established channels of communication. They must have a basis for mutual trust. More importantly, they must prevent miscalculations. The best and fastest way to build trust with the Mainland is for Tsai Ing-wen to visit. As Tsai Ing-wen has stressed, "Cross-strait issues cannot be solved by sitting at home. To deal with cross-Strait issues, we must understand the Chinese mainland. To understand the Chinese mainland, we must interact with it." Tsai Ing-wen is interested in "Letting grass-roots party members better understand the Mainland individually." Party members should strive to better understand the Mainland. This is especially true for Tsai Ing-wen, who could become the nation's leader.
The DPP and the CPP are communicating. Frank Hsieh has been leading the way. He and senior Mainland officials have dialogued with each other, and confronted each other. They have not been accused of "selling out Taiwan." They have instead been perceived as partners in dialogue. Elders have blazed the way. Cross-Strait exchanges are nothing to fear. Tsai and Hsieh are friendly with each other. If Tsai Ing-wen wants to improve communications with the Mainland, she can be assured of Frank Hsieh's support.
Take another matter, cross-Strait economic and trade policy. Tsai Ing-wen must jettison her overly cautious demeanor. Three years ago, Ma Ying-jeou and Tsai Ing-wen took part in a major debate over ECFA. Tsai Ing-wen said the DPP would approach the Chinese mainland only in step with the rest of the world. She criticized the KMT for approaching the Chinese mainalnd before the rest of the world, arguing that the risk was too high.
Three years later, the two sides have signed TISA. Recently the ROC and New Zealand signed a trade and economic cooperation agreement. This was the first time the ROC has ever signed a cooperation agreement with a nation with which it lacks diplomatic ties. The ROC is also about to sign an agreement with Singapore, another nation with which it lacks diplomatic ties. Last month the Economist affirmed the rightness of the ROC's direction. Ma administration policies are working, across the Strait and around the the world. Tsai Ing-wen vowed to let the ROC join the world. Ma Ying-jeou exposed the fallacy of Tsai Ing-wen's "globalization without the Chinese mainland." It defied global trends and was strategically unfavorable to Taiwan.
Former National Security Council Secretary-General Su Chi put it well. The ruling and opposition parties on Taiwan must reach a consensus. Otherwise genuine reconciliation between Taiwan and the Mainland will be impossible. Both sides must benefit and prosper. The Blue Camp alone cannot ensure cross-Strait communication. DPP cross-Strait policy reform must not be an election ploy. It affects the future of Taiwan. As a DPP candidate, Tsai Ing-wen must act in her own interest, and in Taiwan's interest as well. She must bear the heavy burden of DPP policy reform.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2013.07.22
社論－蔡英文應掌握兩岸互利共榮的契機
本報訊
民進黨前主席蔡英文日前邀請大陸重量級學者曹遠征討論人民幣議題，她雖然刻意定調為「從專業了解中國」，不願有民共交流的聯想；但可以確定的是，即使民共交流常態化遙遙無期，但蔡英文對於建立起兩岸溝通橋梁，至少保留了些許想像空間，這一點對台灣的未來、民進黨的未來，都攸關重要。
兩岸關係向來是民進黨的罩門，過去，多位有意努力促成轉型的大老，最後都落到壯烈退黨的下場；民進黨死抱台獨黨綱、一言一行無不仇中的結果是，他們雖討好了深綠陣營，但是卻無法得到中間選民的信任，更嚇跑了關鍵的經濟選民；換言之，民進黨在去年總統大選以百分之三的差距功敗垂成，最重要的關鍵就是民進黨的兩岸政策。
對於這樣的戲劇性轉折，作為總統候選人的蔡英文想必感受深刻，她在發表敗選感言時坦承，民進黨正是「輸在最後一哩路」，接下來，更透過民進黨的敗選報告中直言，「民進黨在過去以致到將來，都要面對一個很嚴酷問題，就是要如何面對中國大陸，要如何加強處理兩岸問題的能量與能力，才會得到社會對民進黨的信賴。」可以說，民進黨到此時才認知到，是否得到台灣選民的信任，最重要的條件是一個穩健、對岸可以接受的兩岸政策。
遺憾的是，民進黨在去年敗選之後，並未延續蔡英文的路線，志在二○一六的蘇貞昌上任後，為了鞏固黨權，積極拉攏黨內獨派，各界期盼的民進黨中國事務委員會千呼萬喚始出來，卻只能政策研究而無交流功能；謝長廷去年九月赴陸進行破冰之旅，提出憲法共識，蘇貞昌一句「不能代表民進黨」，就將黨內討論的契機完全打斷。
值得慶幸的是，現在的民進黨雖然無意成為兩岸轉型的領頭羊，但兩岸政策太重要了，即使是綠營，也不是蘇貞昌個人說了算。相對於蘇貞昌的保守路線，謝長廷今年二度赴陸，直接與國台辦主任張志軍等人對話。
蔡英文則介於蘇謝之間，她並不排斥交流，但至目前為止，仍迴避與涉台事務官員對話，而是以「小英基金會」的名義邀請大陸重量級學者來台，不但讓中間選民知道她不是死硬台獨，也趁機向對岸表態，保留未來溝通的可能。
蔡英文的作法雖然是穩定中有進展，但仍可再進一步。蔡英文角逐二○一六大位的可能性不低，屆時，蔡英文團隊和北京之間，一定要能建立起溝通管道，更要有互信基礎，以免遇事誤判，而和對岸建立互信管道，最好最快的方法，就是蔡英文訪陸，一來，正如蔡英文曾經強調的，「處理兩岸問題不是坐在家裡想要怎麼處理，要處理兩岸問題必需要了解中國大陸，要了解中國大陸必須要在互動中去了解。」蔡英文更有意「讓黨員與基層可以去更了解對岸」，黨員都該親自到對岸深入了解，更何況有機會成為國家領導人的蔡英文！
如今，民共交流的路途中，前方已有謝長廷帶路，他和對岸高層官員對話、交鋒，不但完全沒有出賣台灣的疑慮，更被視為可以對話的對手，前方已有大老先行，兩岸交流實不足懼，而且，蔡謝關係友好，蔡英文若有意和對岸加強交流，可以放心的任由謝長廷作後盾。
另一方面，兩岸經貿政策方面，蔡英文也必須擺脫過度謹慎的特性。猶記得三年前馬英九與蔡英文那一場ＥＣＦＡ大辯論中，蔡英文表示，民進黨是跟著世界一齊走向中國大陸，她批評國民黨是透過大陸走向世界，風險太高。
事隔三年，在兩岸簽訂服貿協定後，日前，台灣與紐西蘭簽訂經濟貿易合作協定，這是第一次有非邦交國與台灣簽合作協定，另一個非邦交國新加坡的簽約時程也箭在弦上，上一期的《經濟學人》肯定，馬政府從兩岸到世界的政策似乎奏效，而且，自許要讓台灣走向世界的蔡英文，也不能落入馬英九的口實，只要「沒有中國大陸的全球化」，這絕對是違反世界潮流、也對台灣不利的戰略。
前國安會祕書長蘇起說得好，台灣的朝野如果不能達成共識，兩岸之間不可能真正和解，兩岸要能互利共榮，不可能在藍營獨握兩岸溝通之鑰下完成；可以說，民進黨的兩岸轉型不只是選舉策略而已，也攸關台灣的未來，身為民進黨內的政治人物，蔡英文就算不為了她自己，為了台灣，也必須擔下轉型的重責。
Thursday, July 18, 2013
Sixteen Years Later South Korea Remains Determined to Recover Chun Doo Hwan's Illicit Assets
Sixteen Years Later South Korea Remains Determined to Recover Chun Doo Hwan's Illicit Assets
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 19, 2013
Summary: Chun Doo Hwan trumpeted anti-corruption rhetoric. But as soon his power was consolidated, he wantonly engaged in plunder. When the story came to light, he pleaded not guilty. He engaged in all manner of evasion. He secretly transferred vast sums of money abroad or to his children and their families. Compare this to former ROC President Chen Shui-bian's corruption and imprisonment. His family members continue to live in the lap of luxury. The two differ little, if any.
Full text below:
The South Korean State Prosecutor's Office recently dispatched personnel to 17 locations. It conducted large scale raids on the homes and offices of former President Chun Doo Hwan and his children. It attempted to track down Chun's hidden assets. Prosecutors confiscated nearly 200 expensive paintings, porcelains, and other art items. They also forbade Chun Doo Hwan's three children from leaving the country.
Chun Doo Hwan was convicted in 1997, over 16 years ago. The South Korean legal system and the public have never ceased their quest to recover South Korean President Chun Doo Hwan's illegally obtained assets. Last month South Korea passed a "Confiscation Regulations Act" directed at civil servants. It extended the statute of limitations for the prosecution of civil servants who illegally acquire assets. It expands the scope of recovery to third parties. The law is nicknamed after Chun Doo Hwan and targets him in particular. The old law providing for the recovery of assets would have lapsed in October of this year. The amended law will allow the recovery of assets until 2020.
The South Korean prosecutors' raid on Tuesday was conducted under the aegis of the new law. Prosecutors believe Chun Doo Hwan evaded government asset recovery efforts. They believe he transferred vast sums of illegal assets to family members and friends. As a result, the social networking company operated by Chun Jeon Jae, the eldest son of Chun Doo Hwan, and companies and property owned by his two other sons and two daughters were searched. The problem now is how to determine what assets were hidden by Chun Doo Hwan.
Chun Doo Hwan's reign lasted from 1980 until 1988. South Korean political history refers to this period as the "Fifth Republic." Chun Doo Hwan and his successor Roh Tae-woo ruled for 13 years. They colluded with private industry and misappropriated funds. After Kim Yong Sam took office, the Chun and Roh became targets of investigation. In 1997 Chun Doo Hwan was convicted by the South Korean Grand Court of staging a military coup, fomenting domestic strife, corruption, bribery, and other crimes punishable by life imprisonment. This was the trial of the century. The two outgoing presidents, dressed in prison uniforms, faces solemn, stood before the court and awaited their sentences. These were images the Korean people will not soon forget.
The court sentenced Chun Doo Hwan to life imprisonment. It fined him 220.5 billion won, approximately 5.8 billion NT. But Chun Doo Hwan received a presidential pardon from Kim Dae Jun. The following year, Chun was released from prison. Over the past 16 years, Chun Doo Hwan has paid back only 53.300 billion won. The lion's share, 167.2 billion won, approximately 4.4 billion NT, remains unpaid. In 2003, he was asked to declare his assets. Chun Doo Hwan claimed that "My savings account contains only 290,000 won." He adopted a "I intend to stonewall" attitude. Prosecutors were at a loss. But last fall, Chun Doo Hwan teed off at a newly opened golf course. He sipped fine wine with friends in a party-like atmosphere. The images were made public. People were outraged. They demanded a thorough investigation into his illicit assets. The South Korean media believes Chun Doo Hwan transferred illicit assets to his children. They estimate the total at one trillion won.
The statute of limitations on the recovery of illicit assets from Chun Doo Hwan was about to run out in October of this year. But the South Korean legislature amended the law in late June. It extended the statute of limitations for civil servants' illicit assets. It expanded the scope of the law to cover third parties. Upon taking office, President Park Geun-hye aggressively promoted the bill, in response to public outrage over corruption. For the South Korean Prosecutor's Office, it was an opportunity to ride a wave of public sentiment. It launched a massive search operation. It even brought in metal detectors. It was determined to communicate the government's resolve to recover public assets from a corrupt president.
On the day Chun Doo Hwan's residence was searched, Chun told investigators, "As a former President, the public spectacle has made it impossible for me to show my face in public." But his remark is likely to make South Koreans even more disgusted. Time and again, the people gave Chun the opportunity to repent. Yet he hypocritically went through the motions, and never honestly confronted his wrongdoing.
Chun Doo Hwan came from a military background. But his corruption was no different from that of the typical politician. During his term, he trumpeted anti-corruption rhetoric. He vowed to eliminate corruption. But as soon his power was consolidated, he began to manipulate his situation, and wantonly engaged in plunder. When the story came to light, he pleaded not guilty. He engaged in all manner of evasion. He secretly transferred vast sums of money abroad or to his children and their families. Compare this to former ROC President Chen Shui-bian's corruption and imprisonment. His family members continue to live in the lap of luxury. The two differ little, if any.
After Chun Doo Hwan was pardoned, he and his wife retreated to Baekdamsa Temple in the mountains of South Korea. He expressed repentance. He lived for two years without water or electricity, He lived on "bread and water." He affected a monastic lifestyle. But in fact he did not engage in serious soul-searching. Once he returned to secular life, his extravagance only intensified. South Korean prosecutors suspect that his methods for dealing with illicit funds were even more devious
History shows that corrupt individuals who genuinely repent are few and far between.
十六年了，南韓仍全力追討全斗煥資產
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.07.19 03:41 am
南韓檢察廳最近兵分十七路，對前總統全斗煥及其子女的住所和辦公處所進行了大規模搜索，以追查他隱匿未繳償的非法資產。檢方沒收了高價名畫、瓷器和各類藝品等近兩百件物品，並限制全斗煥的三名子女出境。
從一九九七年全斗煥被定罪至今，已逾十六年，南韓司法和民意追究貪腐總統全斗煥的行動始終未曾停止。韓國上月通過了一項針對公務員犯罪的「沒收條例法」修正案，除延長追徵公務員非法所得財產的時效，並把追討範圍擴大到第三方；這項被稱為「全斗煥追徵法」的修正案，正是針對他而來。舊法對全斗煥資產的追討只到今年十月即告失效，經過修法，追討時效將延至二○二○年十月。
南韓檢方周二的搜索，即是根據新法而採取的行動。檢方認為，全斗煥為躲避政府追討資產，把巨額非法所得轉移到家人以及親友名下；也因此，全斗煥的長子全宰國所經營的「時空社」，以及其他二子二女所經營的各項企業和擁有的私產，都同步遭到搜索。後續的問題，則需確認哪些財產是來自全斗煥所隱匿。
全斗煥執政時期為一九八○到一九八八年，南韓政治史上稱為「第五共和」；在金泳三執政後，全斗煥及其繼任者盧泰愚任內十三年的官商勾結及侵吞政治資金等情節遭到調查，全斗煥在一九九七年被南韓大法院以軍事叛亂、內亂和貪汙受賄等罪判處無期徒刑。那場世紀大審，兩位卸任總統穿著囚衣面無表情地站在法庭等待宣判的畫面，韓國人民至今仍難以忘卻。
當時，法院除判處全斗煥無期徒刑，並判決追繳其二二○五億韓元（約五十八億新台幣）。但那年全斗煥獲金大中總統特赦，並於次年獲釋出獄；十六年過去，全斗煥應繳償的金額卻僅繳交了五三三億韓元，尚有一六七二億韓元（約四十四億台幣）未繳。二○○三年被要求公開財產清單時，全斗煥聲稱「我的存摺裡只有廿九萬韓元」；一副打算狡賴到底的姿態，檢方亦無計可施。但去年秋天，全斗煥在一家新開張的高爾夫球場打完球後，與朋友舉行高級洋酒派對的景象曝光，再度激起民眾不滿，要求徹查其非法資產的呼聲空前高漲。南韓媒體分析，全斗煥的非法資產皆已轉移其子女名下，預估達一兆韓元。
正因如此，對全斗煥追繳非法資產的時效原僅到今年十月止，但六月底南韓國會通過修法，延長對公務員非法資產的追查時效，並將追查對象擴大到第三方。這項法案，正是朴槿惠總統上任後，因應民意對貪腐總統的憤怒未消，而採取的積極作為。對韓國檢察廳而言，這也是一個「民氣可用」的機會，遂發動大規模搜查行動，甚至動用了金屬探測器，務必要讓民眾感受到政府追討貪腐總統的強烈意志。
當天全斗煥住所被搜查時，全斗煥還對搜查人員說：「作為前任總統，讓國民看到這樣的一幕，實在無臉見人。」不過，南韓人民對這句話恐怕只會愈發產生反感；因為民眾三番兩次給他悔過的機會，但他只是一味虛偽敷衍，從未曾誠實以對。
全斗煥出身軍旅，但他的貪腐之路，和一般傳統政客出身者並無二致：在甫上任之初，他也曾高唱反貪論調，並聲言致力掃除貪腐；但俟手中權力穩固，即開始上下其手，肆無忌憚地搜刮。等到內情被揭發後，他拒不認罪，並百般推托，暗中卻將大量資金轉移國外，或輾轉脫手給子女和家人。對照台灣前總統陳水扁涉貪入獄，其家人卻風光享受無限餘溫的景象，兩者實無二致。
全斗煥曾在獲特赦後，偕妻子在南韓深山中的百潭寺靜修，對外表達他的悔過之意，並過了兩年沒水沒電、粗茶淡飯及暮鼓晨鐘的生活。事實上，他完全沒有真正反省，回到世俗生活後，奢侈揮霍反而更變本加厲；他處理非法資金的手法，也被南韓檢方懷疑更形純熟。
歷史證明，貪腐之人而能真心悔過者，幾稀！
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 19, 2013
Summary: Chun Doo Hwan trumpeted anti-corruption rhetoric. But as soon his power was consolidated, he wantonly engaged in plunder. When the story came to light, he pleaded not guilty. He engaged in all manner of evasion. He secretly transferred vast sums of money abroad or to his children and their families. Compare this to former ROC President Chen Shui-bian's corruption and imprisonment. His family members continue to live in the lap of luxury. The two differ little, if any.
Full text below:
The South Korean State Prosecutor's Office recently dispatched personnel to 17 locations. It conducted large scale raids on the homes and offices of former President Chun Doo Hwan and his children. It attempted to track down Chun's hidden assets. Prosecutors confiscated nearly 200 expensive paintings, porcelains, and other art items. They also forbade Chun Doo Hwan's three children from leaving the country.
Chun Doo Hwan was convicted in 1997, over 16 years ago. The South Korean legal system and the public have never ceased their quest to recover South Korean President Chun Doo Hwan's illegally obtained assets. Last month South Korea passed a "Confiscation Regulations Act" directed at civil servants. It extended the statute of limitations for the prosecution of civil servants who illegally acquire assets. It expands the scope of recovery to third parties. The law is nicknamed after Chun Doo Hwan and targets him in particular. The old law providing for the recovery of assets would have lapsed in October of this year. The amended law will allow the recovery of assets until 2020.
The South Korean prosecutors' raid on Tuesday was conducted under the aegis of the new law. Prosecutors believe Chun Doo Hwan evaded government asset recovery efforts. They believe he transferred vast sums of illegal assets to family members and friends. As a result, the social networking company operated by Chun Jeon Jae, the eldest son of Chun Doo Hwan, and companies and property owned by his two other sons and two daughters were searched. The problem now is how to determine what assets were hidden by Chun Doo Hwan.
Chun Doo Hwan's reign lasted from 1980 until 1988. South Korean political history refers to this period as the "Fifth Republic." Chun Doo Hwan and his successor Roh Tae-woo ruled for 13 years. They colluded with private industry and misappropriated funds. After Kim Yong Sam took office, the Chun and Roh became targets of investigation. In 1997 Chun Doo Hwan was convicted by the South Korean Grand Court of staging a military coup, fomenting domestic strife, corruption, bribery, and other crimes punishable by life imprisonment. This was the trial of the century. The two outgoing presidents, dressed in prison uniforms, faces solemn, stood before the court and awaited their sentences. These were images the Korean people will not soon forget.
The court sentenced Chun Doo Hwan to life imprisonment. It fined him 220.5 billion won, approximately 5.8 billion NT. But Chun Doo Hwan received a presidential pardon from Kim Dae Jun. The following year, Chun was released from prison. Over the past 16 years, Chun Doo Hwan has paid back only 53.300 billion won. The lion's share, 167.2 billion won, approximately 4.4 billion NT, remains unpaid. In 2003, he was asked to declare his assets. Chun Doo Hwan claimed that "My savings account contains only 290,000 won." He adopted a "I intend to stonewall" attitude. Prosecutors were at a loss. But last fall, Chun Doo Hwan teed off at a newly opened golf course. He sipped fine wine with friends in a party-like atmosphere. The images were made public. People were outraged. They demanded a thorough investigation into his illicit assets. The South Korean media believes Chun Doo Hwan transferred illicit assets to his children. They estimate the total at one trillion won.
The statute of limitations on the recovery of illicit assets from Chun Doo Hwan was about to run out in October of this year. But the South Korean legislature amended the law in late June. It extended the statute of limitations for civil servants' illicit assets. It expanded the scope of the law to cover third parties. Upon taking office, President Park Geun-hye aggressively promoted the bill, in response to public outrage over corruption. For the South Korean Prosecutor's Office, it was an opportunity to ride a wave of public sentiment. It launched a massive search operation. It even brought in metal detectors. It was determined to communicate the government's resolve to recover public assets from a corrupt president.
On the day Chun Doo Hwan's residence was searched, Chun told investigators, "As a former President, the public spectacle has made it impossible for me to show my face in public." But his remark is likely to make South Koreans even more disgusted. Time and again, the people gave Chun the opportunity to repent. Yet he hypocritically went through the motions, and never honestly confronted his wrongdoing.
Chun Doo Hwan came from a military background. But his corruption was no different from that of the typical politician. During his term, he trumpeted anti-corruption rhetoric. He vowed to eliminate corruption. But as soon his power was consolidated, he began to manipulate his situation, and wantonly engaged in plunder. When the story came to light, he pleaded not guilty. He engaged in all manner of evasion. He secretly transferred vast sums of money abroad or to his children and their families. Compare this to former ROC President Chen Shui-bian's corruption and imprisonment. His family members continue to live in the lap of luxury. The two differ little, if any.
After Chun Doo Hwan was pardoned, he and his wife retreated to Baekdamsa Temple in the mountains of South Korea. He expressed repentance. He lived for two years without water or electricity, He lived on "bread and water." He affected a monastic lifestyle. But in fact he did not engage in serious soul-searching. Once he returned to secular life, his extravagance only intensified. South Korean prosecutors suspect that his methods for dealing with illicit funds were even more devious
History shows that corrupt individuals who genuinely repent are few and far between.
十六年了，南韓仍全力追討全斗煥資產
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.07.19 03:41 am
南韓檢察廳最近兵分十七路，對前總統全斗煥及其子女的住所和辦公處所進行了大規模搜索，以追查他隱匿未繳償的非法資產。檢方沒收了高價名畫、瓷器和各類藝品等近兩百件物品，並限制全斗煥的三名子女出境。
從一九九七年全斗煥被定罪至今，已逾十六年，南韓司法和民意追究貪腐總統全斗煥的行動始終未曾停止。韓國上月通過了一項針對公務員犯罪的「沒收條例法」修正案，除延長追徵公務員非法所得財產的時效，並把追討範圍擴大到第三方；這項被稱為「全斗煥追徵法」的修正案，正是針對他而來。舊法對全斗煥資產的追討只到今年十月即告失效，經過修法，追討時效將延至二○二○年十月。
南韓檢方周二的搜索，即是根據新法而採取的行動。檢方認為，全斗煥為躲避政府追討資產，把巨額非法所得轉移到家人以及親友名下；也因此，全斗煥的長子全宰國所經營的「時空社」，以及其他二子二女所經營的各項企業和擁有的私產，都同步遭到搜索。後續的問題，則需確認哪些財產是來自全斗煥所隱匿。
全斗煥執政時期為一九八○到一九八八年，南韓政治史上稱為「第五共和」；在金泳三執政後，全斗煥及其繼任者盧泰愚任內十三年的官商勾結及侵吞政治資金等情節遭到調查，全斗煥在一九九七年被南韓大法院以軍事叛亂、內亂和貪汙受賄等罪判處無期徒刑。那場世紀大審，兩位卸任總統穿著囚衣面無表情地站在法庭等待宣判的畫面，韓國人民至今仍難以忘卻。
當時，法院除判處全斗煥無期徒刑，並判決追繳其二二○五億韓元（約五十八億新台幣）。但那年全斗煥獲金大中總統特赦，並於次年獲釋出獄；十六年過去，全斗煥應繳償的金額卻僅繳交了五三三億韓元，尚有一六七二億韓元（約四十四億台幣）未繳。二○○三年被要求公開財產清單時，全斗煥聲稱「我的存摺裡只有廿九萬韓元」；一副打算狡賴到底的姿態，檢方亦無計可施。但去年秋天，全斗煥在一家新開張的高爾夫球場打完球後，與朋友舉行高級洋酒派對的景象曝光，再度激起民眾不滿，要求徹查其非法資產的呼聲空前高漲。南韓媒體分析，全斗煥的非法資產皆已轉移其子女名下，預估達一兆韓元。
正因如此，對全斗煥追繳非法資產的時效原僅到今年十月止，但六月底南韓國會通過修法，延長對公務員非法資產的追查時效，並將追查對象擴大到第三方。這項法案，正是朴槿惠總統上任後，因應民意對貪腐總統的憤怒未消，而採取的積極作為。對韓國檢察廳而言，這也是一個「民氣可用」的機會，遂發動大規模搜查行動，甚至動用了金屬探測器，務必要讓民眾感受到政府追討貪腐總統的強烈意志。
當天全斗煥住所被搜查時，全斗煥還對搜查人員說：「作為前任總統，讓國民看到這樣的一幕，實在無臉見人。」不過，南韓人民對這句話恐怕只會愈發產生反感；因為民眾三番兩次給他悔過的機會，但他只是一味虛偽敷衍，從未曾誠實以對。
全斗煥出身軍旅，但他的貪腐之路，和一般傳統政客出身者並無二致：在甫上任之初，他也曾高唱反貪論調，並聲言致力掃除貪腐；但俟手中權力穩固，即開始上下其手，肆無忌憚地搜刮。等到內情被揭發後，他拒不認罪，並百般推托，暗中卻將大量資金轉移國外，或輾轉脫手給子女和家人。對照台灣前總統陳水扁涉貪入獄，其家人卻風光享受無限餘溫的景象，兩者實無二致。
全斗煥曾在獲特赦後，偕妻子在南韓深山中的百潭寺靜修，對外表達他的悔過之意，並過了兩年沒水沒電、粗茶淡飯及暮鼓晨鐘的生活。事實上，他完全沒有真正反省，回到世俗生活後，奢侈揮霍反而更變本加厲；他處理非法資金的手法，也被南韓檢方懷疑更形純熟。
歷史證明，貪腐之人而能真心悔過者，幾稀！
Wednesday, July 17, 2013
A Single Word Can Destroy a Nation: "Japanese Occupation" vs. "Japanese Governance"
A Single Word Can Destroy a Nation: "Japanese Occupation" vs. "Japanese Governance"
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 18, 2013
Summary: Leave aside any elevated debates about "Chinese History" or "Republic of China history." The fact is the Textbook Committee members are championing Pan Green Taiwan independence pseudo-history, rather than a true and honest history of Taiwan. A single word can destroy a nation. The facts of history must not be misrepresented.
Full text below:
Three publishing houses have prepared three versions of a high school history textbook. The Ministry of Education Textbook Committee has forbidden their publication. It has ordered them "reedited" because they include the term "Japanese occupation" instead of "Japanese governance" or "Japanese rule."
This is a long-standing controversy. In order to sell books, publishers have previously kowtowed to the Textbook Committee's authority. But in this instance, the authors and publishers have refused to allow history textbooks to misrepresent the nation's constitution and the nation's history, They have complained to the Control Yuan. They have refused to yield to political pressure. They have refused to teach pseudo-history
The dispute over "Japanese occupation" vs. "Japanese governance" has enormous symbolic significance. As the expression goes, "A single word can destroy a nation." From the perspective of Republic of China national history and the Republic of China Constitution, there can be no doubt. The correct term is "Japanese occupation." If the Textbook Committee wants publishers to use the the term "rule" or "governance," it should ask them to use the term "Japanese colonial rule," rather than "Japanese governance," especially not in textbooks. In particular, the Textbook Committee must not compel the use of the term "Japanese rule," even as it prohibits the use of the term "Japanese occupation."
Those who demand the use of "Japanese rule" argue that in 1895, when the Qing dynasty was defeated, it ceded Taiwan to Japan. Therefore Japan did not forcibly occupy Taiwan. Therefore Japan's actions should not be referred to as "Japanese occupation." But how can a naked war of aggression, initiated by Japan, that imposes an unequal treaty and occupies another nation's territory, be termed anything but a "Japanese occupation?" When, since the dawn of recorded history, have there been "historians" of this ilk, who fawn over their own oppressors?
Particularly perplexing is how those currently demanding the use of "Japanese governance," previously used the term "Japanese occupation" in their own master works. Now however, on their own initiative, they have concocted the term "Japanese governance." Now however, they have the effrontery to forbid others from using the term "Japanese occupation." Their chutzpah does not end here.
The fact is, the controversy over the term "Japanese occupation" and "Japanese governance" represents the conflict between the real history of the Republic of China and Taiwan independence pseudo-history. The history of the Republic of China records that during the First and Second Sino-Japanese Wars, Japan was the invading nation and China was the invaded nation. Hence the terms "Japanese occupation" and "Taiwan retrocession." Taiwan independence pseudo-history attempts to prettify Japanese colonial rule. Therefore it refers to the Republic of China as a "foreign regime." It euphemistically refers to Japanese occupation as "Japanese governance" and "Japanese surrender" as the "Conclusion of the War." This is plain and simple "History for Japanese Imperial Subjects." This is not Chinese History. This is not Republic of China History.
According to Taiwan independence pseudo-history, "Chinese history" and "Taiwanese history" are different. This has led to the so-called "Ming Zheng" controversy. The Ming dynasty was a Chinese dynasty. Taiwan independence pseudo-history yearns to sever the historical umbilical cord linking Taiwan to the Chinese mainland. Therefore it yearns to sever the relationship between the Ming dynasty and Zheng Chenggong, aka, Koxinga. Therefore it has banned the term "Ming Zheng." Instead, it mandates the term "era of Zheng rule." But even Japanese author Yomono Akara, in his eulogy to Zheng Chenggong wrote, "Zheng's loyalty was for naught. China eventually fell to the Tartars." As we can clearly see, Zheng's mission to "defeat the Qin and restore the Ming" was a defense of China, specifically Ming dynasty China. Moreover, Zheng represented Chinese orthodoxy. Taiwan independence pseudo-history would thoroughly "de-Sinicize" Zheng Chenggong. But what is that, other than blanking out the memory of one's ancestors?
The history of the Republic of China notes that in 1894, Japan launched a war of aggression against China. In 1945, China prevailed, and Japan retroceded Taiwan to China. Hence the intervening 50 years are referred to as the "era of Japanese occupation." The Constitution of the Republic of China is a "one China constitution." As Frank Hsieh proclaimed, Chinese people on both sides of the Strait share the same language. The terms "Chinese history," "Republic of China history," and "Taiwanese history," all refer to the history of a single country -- China. The terms "Chinese history" and "Taiwanese history" cannot be viewed as separate categories. Therefore, Zheng Chenggong "Ming Zheng." The Sino-Japanese War was a "war of aggression." Japanese aggression was followed by "Japanese occupation." Taiwan's eventual restoration to China was "Taiwan retrocession." The Chinese Civil War led to "cross-Strait divided rule." From beginning to end, "Chinese history" and "Taiwanese history" have been one and the same. They have been aspects of a single, indivisible nation's history. Therefore let us hear no more of "Japanese governance" pseudo-history, which would have us believe that Japan did not forcibly occupy Taiwan.
Taiwan independence pseudo-history and Taiwan independence spin control regarding the ROC Constitution, attempts to depict the Mainland and Taiwan as separate. But no one can turn back the clock. Realistically, the demands of Taiwan's survival make Taiwan independence impossible. Taiwan can survive only if it acknowledges China and the Republic of China. It can survive only if it acknowledges Chinese history and Republic of China history. Do Taiwan independence advocates really think they can rescue Taiwan independence from the ashes by banning the term "Japanese occupation?"
The facts of history must not be misrepresented. The United States and Japan have already substituted the term "sex slaves" for the euphemism "comfort women." They have replaced the terminology of the invaders with the terminology of those invaded. Yet some on Taiwan are demanding that "Japanese occupation" be changed to "Japanese governance." They are attempting to forbid any reference to "Japanese occupation" in the history texts. They are attempting to teach the official history of the aggressor nation, Japan. They are attempting to help the aggressor nation whitewash its aggression by means of pseudo-history. . Does the Textbook Committee include Shintaro Ishihara and Toru Hashimoto among its members?
The Textbook Committee argues that Chen family corruption has yet to be proven, therefore the Red Shirt movement must not be included in the history books. The Ministry of Education Textbook Committee may wish to conclude that Chen is not guilty by virtue of the fourth trial. But can it really use this as a pretext to censor the history of the Red Shirts? Leave aside any elevated debates about "Chinese History" or "Republic of China history." The fact is the Textbook Committee members are championing Pan Green Taiwan independence pseudo-history, rather than a true and honest history of Taiwan.
A single word can destroy a nation. The facts of history must not be misrepresented.
一字喪邦：「日據」與「日治」之正辨
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.07.18 04:35 am
三家出版社編寫了三個版本的高中歷史教科書，教育部的教科書審定委員會以書中稱「日據」而不稱「日治」等理由，命其「重編」，不准出版。
這已是一個爭吵多年的題目，前已有版本迫於審定委員會的權威，為了賣書而屈從；但此次編寫者及出版者認為不能在歷史教科書中扭曲憲法及篡改歷史，一狀告到監察院，拒絕在政治壓迫下用教科書傳授偽史。
「日據」與「日治」之爭，涉及「一字喪邦」的微言大義。我們的看法是：站在中華民國的「本國史」立場上，也站在中華民國憲法的立場上，毫無疑問應當用「日據」。若用「日治」，則應言明是「日本殖民統治」的簡稱，唯不宜在教科書中逕用「日治」。尤其不可強制規定只准用「日治」，而不可用「日據」。
「日治派」認為，一八九五年清帝國戰敗，而割讓台灣給日本，所以日本並非莫名強據，因此不可稱「日據」。但用侵略戰爭以不平等的勒索條款佔據他國領土，尚不准謂其為「日據」，請問：人類自有歷史以來，有幾個如此諂媚侵略者的「歷史學家」？
尤其莫名其妙的是，這些「日治派」自己在過去的宏文巨著中，皆稱「日據」，如今卻無端炮製出「日治」一詞，且竟不再准他人使用「日據」。斯文掃地，莫甚於此。
「日據觀」與「日治觀」的爭論，其實根本是「中華民國史觀」與「台獨史觀」的分辨。中華民國史觀，將甲午戰爭至八年抗日戰爭，皆視作日本為侵略國而中國為被侵略國的關係，因此稱「日據」與「光復」。台獨史觀則欲美化日本的殖民統治，且將之與「中華民國」同等視為「外來政權」，因此美稱為「日治」與「終戰」。但這根本是日本皇民的日本史觀，而不是中國史觀，也不是中華民國史觀。
在這一套台獨史觀之下，「中國」（中國史）與「台灣」（台灣史）被分割為兩個體系，因此教科書又有可否稱作「明鄭」的爭論。明代為中國正統，台獨史觀欲切斷台灣與中國的歷史臍帶，於是欲將鄭成功與明代的關係切斷，因此不准稱「明鄭」，而強定只准稱「鄭氏統治時期」。但是，連日人四方赤良給鄭成功的悼詞亦曰「忠義空傳國姓爺，終看韃靼奪中華」；可見，以「反清復明」自期的鄭成功，非但代表「中國」（明），且是「中國」的正統。台獨史觀如此清洗鄭成功，豈不是數典忘祖？
從中華民國的「本國史」史觀言，一八九四年的甲午戰爭是日本侵略中國的戰爭，而在一九四五年抗日戰爭勝利則「光復」了台灣；因此，這個五十年為「日據時期」。再就中華民國憲法的「憲法一中」言，中國史或中華民國史與台灣史，本是「同源共文」（謝長廷語）的「本國史」，而不能分割成「中國史」與「台灣史」兩個體系；因此，鄭成功為「明鄭」，甲午是「侵略戰爭」，於是有了「日據」，又有了「光復」，又有了「兩岸分治」。自始至終，「中國史」與「台灣史」仍在同一體系中，皆是「本國史」；於是，就不會出現「日治」（謂日本並非強據台灣）的史識、史觀與史德。
台獨史觀欲在歷史淵源及國憲論述上，將中國與台灣切開。但姑且莫說，誰也不可能倒撥時鐘或命時鐘停止；即使以台灣在現實上的生存戰略言，台獨已經顯然絕無可能，台灣唯有在「中國／中華民國」及「中國史／中華民國史」上，始可能尋求生路。如今，難道僅憑「日『據』」一個字，就欲使「台獨」從灰燼中重燃？
春秋之筆，不可荒唐。美國與日本已將「慰安婦」改稱「性奴」，這或許是將侵略者的用詞，改為被侵略者的語彙；台灣卻吵著欲將「日據」改稱「日治」，竟不准「日據」入史，這卻是將被侵略者的正史，篡改成了為侵略者粉飾的偽史。難道教科書審定委員會中也有石原慎太郎與橋下徹？
審定委員會又說，扁家貪汙尚未定案，因此不可在歷史課本寫紅衫軍運動。但即使教育部教科書審定委員會是判決陳水扁無罪的第四審，也不能在歷史上抹去紅衫軍。由此可見，暫且不說到「中國史」或「中華民國史」的那種高度，審定委員會主張的根本是綠色的台獨史觀，而絕非真實無欺的台灣史。
一字喪邦。春秋之筆，不可荒唐。
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 18, 2013
Summary: Leave aside any elevated debates about "Chinese History" or "Republic of China history." The fact is the Textbook Committee members are championing Pan Green Taiwan independence pseudo-history, rather than a true and honest history of Taiwan. A single word can destroy a nation. The facts of history must not be misrepresented.
Full text below:
Three publishing houses have prepared three versions of a high school history textbook. The Ministry of Education Textbook Committee has forbidden their publication. It has ordered them "reedited" because they include the term "Japanese occupation" instead of "Japanese governance" or "Japanese rule."
This is a long-standing controversy. In order to sell books, publishers have previously kowtowed to the Textbook Committee's authority. But in this instance, the authors and publishers have refused to allow history textbooks to misrepresent the nation's constitution and the nation's history, They have complained to the Control Yuan. They have refused to yield to political pressure. They have refused to teach pseudo-history
The dispute over "Japanese occupation" vs. "Japanese governance" has enormous symbolic significance. As the expression goes, "A single word can destroy a nation." From the perspective of Republic of China national history and the Republic of China Constitution, there can be no doubt. The correct term is "Japanese occupation." If the Textbook Committee wants publishers to use the the term "rule" or "governance," it should ask them to use the term "Japanese colonial rule," rather than "Japanese governance," especially not in textbooks. In particular, the Textbook Committee must not compel the use of the term "Japanese rule," even as it prohibits the use of the term "Japanese occupation."
Those who demand the use of "Japanese rule" argue that in 1895, when the Qing dynasty was defeated, it ceded Taiwan to Japan. Therefore Japan did not forcibly occupy Taiwan. Therefore Japan's actions should not be referred to as "Japanese occupation." But how can a naked war of aggression, initiated by Japan, that imposes an unequal treaty and occupies another nation's territory, be termed anything but a "Japanese occupation?" When, since the dawn of recorded history, have there been "historians" of this ilk, who fawn over their own oppressors?
Particularly perplexing is how those currently demanding the use of "Japanese governance," previously used the term "Japanese occupation" in their own master works. Now however, on their own initiative, they have concocted the term "Japanese governance." Now however, they have the effrontery to forbid others from using the term "Japanese occupation." Their chutzpah does not end here.
The fact is, the controversy over the term "Japanese occupation" and "Japanese governance" represents the conflict between the real history of the Republic of China and Taiwan independence pseudo-history. The history of the Republic of China records that during the First and Second Sino-Japanese Wars, Japan was the invading nation and China was the invaded nation. Hence the terms "Japanese occupation" and "Taiwan retrocession." Taiwan independence pseudo-history attempts to prettify Japanese colonial rule. Therefore it refers to the Republic of China as a "foreign regime." It euphemistically refers to Japanese occupation as "Japanese governance" and "Japanese surrender" as the "Conclusion of the War." This is plain and simple "History for Japanese Imperial Subjects." This is not Chinese History. This is not Republic of China History.
According to Taiwan independence pseudo-history, "Chinese history" and "Taiwanese history" are different. This has led to the so-called "Ming Zheng" controversy. The Ming dynasty was a Chinese dynasty. Taiwan independence pseudo-history yearns to sever the historical umbilical cord linking Taiwan to the Chinese mainland. Therefore it yearns to sever the relationship between the Ming dynasty and Zheng Chenggong, aka, Koxinga. Therefore it has banned the term "Ming Zheng." Instead, it mandates the term "era of Zheng rule." But even Japanese author Yomono Akara, in his eulogy to Zheng Chenggong wrote, "Zheng's loyalty was for naught. China eventually fell to the Tartars." As we can clearly see, Zheng's mission to "defeat the Qin and restore the Ming" was a defense of China, specifically Ming dynasty China. Moreover, Zheng represented Chinese orthodoxy. Taiwan independence pseudo-history would thoroughly "de-Sinicize" Zheng Chenggong. But what is that, other than blanking out the memory of one's ancestors?
The history of the Republic of China notes that in 1894, Japan launched a war of aggression against China. In 1945, China prevailed, and Japan retroceded Taiwan to China. Hence the intervening 50 years are referred to as the "era of Japanese occupation." The Constitution of the Republic of China is a "one China constitution." As Frank Hsieh proclaimed, Chinese people on both sides of the Strait share the same language. The terms "Chinese history," "Republic of China history," and "Taiwanese history," all refer to the history of a single country -- China. The terms "Chinese history" and "Taiwanese history" cannot be viewed as separate categories. Therefore, Zheng Chenggong "Ming Zheng." The Sino-Japanese War was a "war of aggression." Japanese aggression was followed by "Japanese occupation." Taiwan's eventual restoration to China was "Taiwan retrocession." The Chinese Civil War led to "cross-Strait divided rule." From beginning to end, "Chinese history" and "Taiwanese history" have been one and the same. They have been aspects of a single, indivisible nation's history. Therefore let us hear no more of "Japanese governance" pseudo-history, which would have us believe that Japan did not forcibly occupy Taiwan.
Taiwan independence pseudo-history and Taiwan independence spin control regarding the ROC Constitution, attempts to depict the Mainland and Taiwan as separate. But no one can turn back the clock. Realistically, the demands of Taiwan's survival make Taiwan independence impossible. Taiwan can survive only if it acknowledges China and the Republic of China. It can survive only if it acknowledges Chinese history and Republic of China history. Do Taiwan independence advocates really think they can rescue Taiwan independence from the ashes by banning the term "Japanese occupation?"
The facts of history must not be misrepresented. The United States and Japan have already substituted the term "sex slaves" for the euphemism "comfort women." They have replaced the terminology of the invaders with the terminology of those invaded. Yet some on Taiwan are demanding that "Japanese occupation" be changed to "Japanese governance." They are attempting to forbid any reference to "Japanese occupation" in the history texts. They are attempting to teach the official history of the aggressor nation, Japan. They are attempting to help the aggressor nation whitewash its aggression by means of pseudo-history. . Does the Textbook Committee include Shintaro Ishihara and Toru Hashimoto among its members?
The Textbook Committee argues that Chen family corruption has yet to be proven, therefore the Red Shirt movement must not be included in the history books. The Ministry of Education Textbook Committee may wish to conclude that Chen is not guilty by virtue of the fourth trial. But can it really use this as a pretext to censor the history of the Red Shirts? Leave aside any elevated debates about "Chinese History" or "Republic of China history." The fact is the Textbook Committee members are championing Pan Green Taiwan independence pseudo-history, rather than a true and honest history of Taiwan.
A single word can destroy a nation. The facts of history must not be misrepresented.
一字喪邦：「日據」與「日治」之正辨
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.07.18 04:35 am
三家出版社編寫了三個版本的高中歷史教科書，教育部的教科書審定委員會以書中稱「日據」而不稱「日治」等理由，命其「重編」，不准出版。
這已是一個爭吵多年的題目，前已有版本迫於審定委員會的權威，為了賣書而屈從；但此次編寫者及出版者認為不能在歷史教科書中扭曲憲法及篡改歷史，一狀告到監察院，拒絕在政治壓迫下用教科書傳授偽史。
「日據」與「日治」之爭，涉及「一字喪邦」的微言大義。我們的看法是：站在中華民國的「本國史」立場上，也站在中華民國憲法的立場上，毫無疑問應當用「日據」。若用「日治」，則應言明是「日本殖民統治」的簡稱，唯不宜在教科書中逕用「日治」。尤其不可強制規定只准用「日治」，而不可用「日據」。
「日治派」認為，一八九五年清帝國戰敗，而割讓台灣給日本，所以日本並非莫名強據，因此不可稱「日據」。但用侵略戰爭以不平等的勒索條款佔據他國領土，尚不准謂其為「日據」，請問：人類自有歷史以來，有幾個如此諂媚侵略者的「歷史學家」？
尤其莫名其妙的是，這些「日治派」自己在過去的宏文巨著中，皆稱「日據」，如今卻無端炮製出「日治」一詞，且竟不再准他人使用「日據」。斯文掃地，莫甚於此。
「日據觀」與「日治觀」的爭論，其實根本是「中華民國史觀」與「台獨史觀」的分辨。中華民國史觀，將甲午戰爭至八年抗日戰爭，皆視作日本為侵略國而中國為被侵略國的關係，因此稱「日據」與「光復」。台獨史觀則欲美化日本的殖民統治，且將之與「中華民國」同等視為「外來政權」，因此美稱為「日治」與「終戰」。但這根本是日本皇民的日本史觀，而不是中國史觀，也不是中華民國史觀。
在這一套台獨史觀之下，「中國」（中國史）與「台灣」（台灣史）被分割為兩個體系，因此教科書又有可否稱作「明鄭」的爭論。明代為中國正統，台獨史觀欲切斷台灣與中國的歷史臍帶，於是欲將鄭成功與明代的關係切斷，因此不准稱「明鄭」，而強定只准稱「鄭氏統治時期」。但是，連日人四方赤良給鄭成功的悼詞亦曰「忠義空傳國姓爺，終看韃靼奪中華」；可見，以「反清復明」自期的鄭成功，非但代表「中國」（明），且是「中國」的正統。台獨史觀如此清洗鄭成功，豈不是數典忘祖？
從中華民國的「本國史」史觀言，一八九四年的甲午戰爭是日本侵略中國的戰爭，而在一九四五年抗日戰爭勝利則「光復」了台灣；因此，這個五十年為「日據時期」。再就中華民國憲法的「憲法一中」言，中國史或中華民國史與台灣史，本是「同源共文」（謝長廷語）的「本國史」，而不能分割成「中國史」與「台灣史」兩個體系；因此，鄭成功為「明鄭」，甲午是「侵略戰爭」，於是有了「日據」，又有了「光復」，又有了「兩岸分治」。自始至終，「中國史」與「台灣史」仍在同一體系中，皆是「本國史」；於是，就不會出現「日治」（謂日本並非強據台灣）的史識、史觀與史德。
台獨史觀欲在歷史淵源及國憲論述上，將中國與台灣切開。但姑且莫說，誰也不可能倒撥時鐘或命時鐘停止；即使以台灣在現實上的生存戰略言，台獨已經顯然絕無可能，台灣唯有在「中國／中華民國」及「中國史／中華民國史」上，始可能尋求生路。如今，難道僅憑「日『據』」一個字，就欲使「台獨」從灰燼中重燃？
春秋之筆，不可荒唐。美國與日本已將「慰安婦」改稱「性奴」，這或許是將侵略者的用詞，改為被侵略者的語彙；台灣卻吵著欲將「日據」改稱「日治」，竟不准「日據」入史，這卻是將被侵略者的正史，篡改成了為侵略者粉飾的偽史。難道教科書審定委員會中也有石原慎太郎與橋下徹？
審定委員會又說，扁家貪汙尚未定案，因此不可在歷史課本寫紅衫軍運動。但即使教育部教科書審定委員會是判決陳水扁無罪的第四審，也不能在歷史上抹去紅衫軍。由此可見，暫且不說到「中國史」或「中華民國史」的那種高度，審定委員會主張的根本是綠色的台獨史觀，而絕非真實無欺的台灣史。
一字喪邦。春秋之筆，不可荒唐。
Tuesday, July 16, 2013
Rejection of Partial Sovereignty is the Key to Taiwan's Survival
Rejection of Partial Sovereignty is the Key to Taiwan's Survival
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 14, 2013
Summary: Our position is "A ruler must never accept partial sovereignty over his nation. He must remain aggressive and never hesitate." We must be aggressive in the face international challenges. Chiang Ching-kuo said, "take a step back and survive." Opening up Taiwan means giving up something. Being aggressive means gaining something. This is the key to Taiwan's economic policy. Reject this and we are lost.
Full text below:
During the Three Kingdoms era, Kong Ming, aka Zhuge Liang, launched six campaigns against the Kingdom of Wei from Qishan. He never achieved his dream. But his ringing declaration that "Heroes and villains cannot share power. A ruler must never accept partial sovereignty over his nation." has echoed down through the ages.
Zhuge Liang knew that the Three Kingdoms struggle meant that either Shu would annihilate Wei or Wei would annihilate Shu. Many within the Kingdom of Shu disagreed. But Kong Ming embarked on his Northern Expedition nevertheless. He knew that if Shu resigned itself to sovereignty over only part of the country, that would lead to its downfall. History proves that Zhuge Liang was right.
Consider today's Taiwan. Consider its geography and population. Consider the ROC's national strength. Compare it to the Kingdom of Shu, which faced relatively fewer challenges. The Kingdom of Shu was protected by natural barriers. It was an agriculture-based society. It enjoyed self-sufficiency. The time and place were different. Today's Taiwan faces dangers greater, more complex, and more varied than those faced by the Kingdom of Shu.
Therefore what is the key to Taiwan's survival? Zhuge Liang argued that "Heroes and villains cannot share power. A ruler must never accept partial sovereignty over his nation." He was speaking politically. But Mr. Zhuge's wisdom applies economically as well. Our implicit strategy must be "A ruler must never accept partial sovereignty over his nation. He must remain aggressive and never hesitate."
"A ruler must not accept partial sovereignty over his nation." Taipei and Beijing have signed FTAs with each other and with foreign governments. They have also signed a TISA. These agreements are manifestations of our refusal to accept partial sovereignty over our nation. We must refuse to accept partial sovereignty over our nation. We must actively seek FTAs with foreign countries and the Mainland. If we accept partial sovereignty over our nation, we will inevitably fall victim to great danger.
Beginning in 2000, many countries signed intercontinental or regional FTAs. We worried about our economy becoming marginalized. These fears were warranted. We are not like the Kingdom of Shu. We cannot close our doors and ignore the outside world. We cannot adopt an ostrich, head in the sand mentality in the face of international trade integration. If we do, we will lose business. We will lose in the international marketplace. Our people will face death or destitution. They will not be able to live and propsper.
"A ruler must never accept partial sovereignty over his nation. He must remain aggressive and never hesitate." That is easy to say but hard to do. Every FTA we sign requires us to give something up to get something in return. This is why the position that "A ruler must never accept partial sovereignty over his nation." is so difficult to uphold. Has any FTA, signed anywhere in the world, ever allowed on to only take and not give? The answer is no. Both parties must give something. They must also gain something. Only such a Free Trade Agreement is a fair trade agreement.
If one party gains something while losing nothing, then that is an unequal treaty. Therefore losing something is essential to any trade agreement. We must not focus on a single point but lose sight of the Big Picture.
Some say the recent TISA agreement may impact the beauty parlor and hairdressing industries. Will a massive influx of Mainland businesses impact the industry? That remains unknown. But Japanese, Korean, Hong Kong, Singaporean, American, and European companies have been operating beauty salons on Taiwan for some time. Taiwan is already a venue for global industry competition. Can Mainland hairdressers on Taiwan really displace international and local companies? Will allowing Mainland companies in this sector to operate on Taiwan really have a catastrophic impact? The answer should be clear.
As we can see, the impact should not be that great. But other businesses may still be affected. This possibility must not be ruled out. Therefore signing a TISA with the Mainland, a GAT with New Zealand, or an FTA with Singapore should be the same as joining the WTO and committing to open markets. We must first be psychologically prepared to give something up. Those industries that will be most seriously impacted must make advance preparations. They must be provided with the necessary trade relief, grants, or assistance, These are commonly used government countermeasures. Since Taiwan joined the WTO, we have had years of experience with trade remedies. This is something we can handle.
In early 2002, Taiwan formally joined the WTO. This move had the full support of the nation. As we can see, refusal to accept partial sovereignty over one's nation is the high road that will ensure our long term economic survival. As matters stand, multilateral WTO negotiations on international agreements have been blocked. Taipei cannot join the TPP or RCEP overnight. The situation is complex. The aforementioned bilateral trade agreement is an important agreement that does not require us to accept partial sovereignty over our nation.
Our position is "A ruler must never accept partial sovereignty over his nation. He must remain aggressive and never hesitate." We must be aggressive in the face international challenges. Chiang Ching-kuo said, "take a step back and survive." Opening up Taiwan means giving up something. Being aggressive means gaining something. This is the key to Taiwan's economic policy. Reject this and we are lost.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2013.07.14
社論－進取不偏安 才是台灣生存之道
本報訊
三國時代，孔明六出祁山伐魏，最後雖壯志未酬，但他「漢賊不兩立、王業不偏安」的一席話，留傳千古。
諸葛亮當時深知，三國之爭，不是蜀亡魏，就是魏亡蜀，故其北伐之策雖在當時蜀國內有不小雜音，但仍勉力而行，因為他知道，偏安的結果就是國家的覆亡，歷史也印證諸葛亮的看法。
爾今台灣，我們不論就地理位置、國力與人口數來說，比起三國時的蜀國所面臨者更是相對上小了許多；再加上，當時的蜀國有天險可守，蜀國的經濟在當時農業為主的社會下，能自給自足，這些時空環境下的不同，亦可對比出現今台灣所面對的情形，實較三國時代下的蜀國不但差很大、復又險很多。
若此，台灣的生存之道何在？諸葛亮的漢賊之說是政治上的觀點與語言，若從經濟的角度而言，諸葛先生的智慧與方略仍可適用，我們或可將其方略引伸成「王業不偏安，進取不遲疑」。
而所謂王業不偏安的道理，就台灣目前與各國乃至中國大陸所簽的各個自由貿易協定與服務業貿易協議，都是我們不偏安的最好實踐與註解。若是我們偏安，不積極地與各國乃至中國大陸洽簽各相關貿易協定，其結果將會落入偏安必不可得的險境中。
在二○○○年之後，世界各國間不論是跨洲際的，或是區域內的自由貿易協定蜂湧而至，為此，常擔心我們在經濟上很可能被邊緣化，這個擔心是正確的，因為，我們並不是當年的蜀國能關起門來過日子，相反的，若是我們以鴕鳥心態關起門來不參與國際經貿整合時，必將快速的失去訂單、失去國際市場，卒至民生凋敝，若此台灣將無安身立命之所。
「不偏安、求進取」這樣的策略說的容易，但做起來困難，因為，每個自貿協定我們都要捨一些，才能得一些，但這也是不偏安的重要之處與困難之處。試問，世界任何兩兩自貿協定間，有哪一方是只有得而沒有失的，答案是沒有。兩方間一定是各有所失，也一定各有所得，這才是公平的貿易協定。
否則若只有一方有得而沒有任何失時，那肯定是強權下的不平等條約了。所以「失」一定是任何一個貿易協定下的必然，我們不必、也不能單點無限放大，而至全盤皆輸。
以這次服貿協議中常被提及可能受衝擊的美容、美髮業而言，大陸該行業的業者將來會不會大舉入境猶未可知，然事實是，現今不論是日本、韓國、香港、新加坡，或是美歐的業者早已可在台灣從事美容美髮業，台灣已是世界各國業者角逐的場所，若此，則大陸美容美髮業者真能在台灣打敗上述各國業者及本國業者嗎？開放大陸業者來台經營此一行業就會有很不得了的衝擊了嗎？答案應是清楚的。
以上述的例子來說，它的衝擊應不是很大的，但其他業者是否仍可能受到衝擊，這個可能性仍不能被排除，故不論與大陸所簽服貿協議或是與紐西蘭、新加坡所簽的自由貿易協定，就如同當年我們在進入ＷＴＯ的貿易協定中承諾要開放市場般，我們須先有須捨、能捨的心理準備，當然，對於可能會受到真正衝擊的業者，也要及早因應，並積極進行相關的貿易救濟，給與輔助及協助也是可行，亦是各國常用的應對之策，我們台灣自ＷＴＯ簽訂後，已有許多年的貿易救濟上的施行經驗，相信定能妥善處理的。
於二○○二年初時，從台灣正式加入ＷＴＯ，當時舉國上下全力支持，足可說明，不偏安是台灣經濟上生存的王道。事值今日，國際間ＷＴＯ多邊協定談判受阻，台灣在加入ＴＰＰ或ＲＣＥＰ復又一蹴不可及的情況下，上述各雙邊的貿易協定就是現階段不偏安政策的重要試金石。
且讓我們以「王業不偏安、進取不遲疑」的態度，積極地面對國際間的各種挑戰，因為，也正如當年經國先生所說的「退一步即無死所」般，開放（捨）與進取（得）是台灣在經濟上最重要的策略，捨此已無它矣。
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 14, 2013
Summary: Our position is "A ruler must never accept partial sovereignty over his nation. He must remain aggressive and never hesitate." We must be aggressive in the face international challenges. Chiang Ching-kuo said, "take a step back and survive." Opening up Taiwan means giving up something. Being aggressive means gaining something. This is the key to Taiwan's economic policy. Reject this and we are lost.
Full text below:
During the Three Kingdoms era, Kong Ming, aka Zhuge Liang, launched six campaigns against the Kingdom of Wei from Qishan. He never achieved his dream. But his ringing declaration that "Heroes and villains cannot share power. A ruler must never accept partial sovereignty over his nation." has echoed down through the ages.
Zhuge Liang knew that the Three Kingdoms struggle meant that either Shu would annihilate Wei or Wei would annihilate Shu. Many within the Kingdom of Shu disagreed. But Kong Ming embarked on his Northern Expedition nevertheless. He knew that if Shu resigned itself to sovereignty over only part of the country, that would lead to its downfall. History proves that Zhuge Liang was right.
Consider today's Taiwan. Consider its geography and population. Consider the ROC's national strength. Compare it to the Kingdom of Shu, which faced relatively fewer challenges. The Kingdom of Shu was protected by natural barriers. It was an agriculture-based society. It enjoyed self-sufficiency. The time and place were different. Today's Taiwan faces dangers greater, more complex, and more varied than those faced by the Kingdom of Shu.
Therefore what is the key to Taiwan's survival? Zhuge Liang argued that "Heroes and villains cannot share power. A ruler must never accept partial sovereignty over his nation." He was speaking politically. But Mr. Zhuge's wisdom applies economically as well. Our implicit strategy must be "A ruler must never accept partial sovereignty over his nation. He must remain aggressive and never hesitate."
"A ruler must not accept partial sovereignty over his nation." Taipei and Beijing have signed FTAs with each other and with foreign governments. They have also signed a TISA. These agreements are manifestations of our refusal to accept partial sovereignty over our nation. We must refuse to accept partial sovereignty over our nation. We must actively seek FTAs with foreign countries and the Mainland. If we accept partial sovereignty over our nation, we will inevitably fall victim to great danger.
Beginning in 2000, many countries signed intercontinental or regional FTAs. We worried about our economy becoming marginalized. These fears were warranted. We are not like the Kingdom of Shu. We cannot close our doors and ignore the outside world. We cannot adopt an ostrich, head in the sand mentality in the face of international trade integration. If we do, we will lose business. We will lose in the international marketplace. Our people will face death or destitution. They will not be able to live and propsper.
"A ruler must never accept partial sovereignty over his nation. He must remain aggressive and never hesitate." That is easy to say but hard to do. Every FTA we sign requires us to give something up to get something in return. This is why the position that "A ruler must never accept partial sovereignty over his nation." is so difficult to uphold. Has any FTA, signed anywhere in the world, ever allowed on to only take and not give? The answer is no. Both parties must give something. They must also gain something. Only such a Free Trade Agreement is a fair trade agreement.
If one party gains something while losing nothing, then that is an unequal treaty. Therefore losing something is essential to any trade agreement. We must not focus on a single point but lose sight of the Big Picture.
Some say the recent TISA agreement may impact the beauty parlor and hairdressing industries. Will a massive influx of Mainland businesses impact the industry? That remains unknown. But Japanese, Korean, Hong Kong, Singaporean, American, and European companies have been operating beauty salons on Taiwan for some time. Taiwan is already a venue for global industry competition. Can Mainland hairdressers on Taiwan really displace international and local companies? Will allowing Mainland companies in this sector to operate on Taiwan really have a catastrophic impact? The answer should be clear.
As we can see, the impact should not be that great. But other businesses may still be affected. This possibility must not be ruled out. Therefore signing a TISA with the Mainland, a GAT with New Zealand, or an FTA with Singapore should be the same as joining the WTO and committing to open markets. We must first be psychologically prepared to give something up. Those industries that will be most seriously impacted must make advance preparations. They must be provided with the necessary trade relief, grants, or assistance, These are commonly used government countermeasures. Since Taiwan joined the WTO, we have had years of experience with trade remedies. This is something we can handle.
In early 2002, Taiwan formally joined the WTO. This move had the full support of the nation. As we can see, refusal to accept partial sovereignty over one's nation is the high road that will ensure our long term economic survival. As matters stand, multilateral WTO negotiations on international agreements have been blocked. Taipei cannot join the TPP or RCEP overnight. The situation is complex. The aforementioned bilateral trade agreement is an important agreement that does not require us to accept partial sovereignty over our nation.
Our position is "A ruler must never accept partial sovereignty over his nation. He must remain aggressive and never hesitate." We must be aggressive in the face international challenges. Chiang Ching-kuo said, "take a step back and survive." Opening up Taiwan means giving up something. Being aggressive means gaining something. This is the key to Taiwan's economic policy. Reject this and we are lost.
中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 2013.07.14
社論－進取不偏安 才是台灣生存之道
本報訊
三國時代，孔明六出祁山伐魏，最後雖壯志未酬，但他「漢賊不兩立、王業不偏安」的一席話，留傳千古。
諸葛亮當時深知，三國之爭，不是蜀亡魏，就是魏亡蜀，故其北伐之策雖在當時蜀國內有不小雜音，但仍勉力而行，因為他知道，偏安的結果就是國家的覆亡，歷史也印證諸葛亮的看法。
爾今台灣，我們不論就地理位置、國力與人口數來說，比起三國時的蜀國所面臨者更是相對上小了許多；再加上，當時的蜀國有天險可守，蜀國的經濟在當時農業為主的社會下，能自給自足，這些時空環境下的不同，亦可對比出現今台灣所面對的情形，實較三國時代下的蜀國不但差很大、復又險很多。
若此，台灣的生存之道何在？諸葛亮的漢賊之說是政治上的觀點與語言，若從經濟的角度而言，諸葛先生的智慧與方略仍可適用，我們或可將其方略引伸成「王業不偏安，進取不遲疑」。
而所謂王業不偏安的道理，就台灣目前與各國乃至中國大陸所簽的各個自由貿易協定與服務業貿易協議，都是我們不偏安的最好實踐與註解。若是我們偏安，不積極地與各國乃至中國大陸洽簽各相關貿易協定，其結果將會落入偏安必不可得的險境中。
在二○○○年之後，世界各國間不論是跨洲際的，或是區域內的自由貿易協定蜂湧而至，為此，常擔心我們在經濟上很可能被邊緣化，這個擔心是正確的，因為，我們並不是當年的蜀國能關起門來過日子，相反的，若是我們以鴕鳥心態關起門來不參與國際經貿整合時，必將快速的失去訂單、失去國際市場，卒至民生凋敝，若此台灣將無安身立命之所。
「不偏安、求進取」這樣的策略說的容易，但做起來困難，因為，每個自貿協定我們都要捨一些，才能得一些，但這也是不偏安的重要之處與困難之處。試問，世界任何兩兩自貿協定間，有哪一方是只有得而沒有失的，答案是沒有。兩方間一定是各有所失，也一定各有所得，這才是公平的貿易協定。
否則若只有一方有得而沒有任何失時，那肯定是強權下的不平等條約了。所以「失」一定是任何一個貿易協定下的必然，我們不必、也不能單點無限放大，而至全盤皆輸。
以這次服貿協議中常被提及可能受衝擊的美容、美髮業而言，大陸該行業的業者將來會不會大舉入境猶未可知，然事實是，現今不論是日本、韓國、香港、新加坡，或是美歐的業者早已可在台灣從事美容美髮業，台灣已是世界各國業者角逐的場所，若此，則大陸美容美髮業者真能在台灣打敗上述各國業者及本國業者嗎？開放大陸業者來台經營此一行業就會有很不得了的衝擊了嗎？答案應是清楚的。
以上述的例子來說，它的衝擊應不是很大的，但其他業者是否仍可能受到衝擊，這個可能性仍不能被排除，故不論與大陸所簽服貿協議或是與紐西蘭、新加坡所簽的自由貿易協定，就如同當年我們在進入ＷＴＯ的貿易協定中承諾要開放市場般，我們須先有須捨、能捨的心理準備，當然，對於可能會受到真正衝擊的業者，也要及早因應，並積極進行相關的貿易救濟，給與輔助及協助也是可行，亦是各國常用的應對之策，我們台灣自ＷＴＯ簽訂後，已有許多年的貿易救濟上的施行經驗，相信定能妥善處理的。
於二○○二年初時，從台灣正式加入ＷＴＯ，當時舉國上下全力支持，足可說明，不偏安是台灣經濟上生存的王道。事值今日，國際間ＷＴＯ多邊協定談判受阻，台灣在加入ＴＰＰ或ＲＣＥＰ復又一蹴不可及的情況下，上述各雙邊的貿易協定就是現階段不偏安政策的重要試金石。
且讓我們以「王業不偏安、進取不遲疑」的態度，積極地面對國際間的各種挑戰，因為，也正如當年經國先生所說的「退一步即無死所」般，開放（捨）與進取（得）是台灣在經濟上最重要的策略，捨此已無它矣。
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