TISA Concerns: Real and Phony

TISA Concerns: Real and Phony
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 4, 2013

Summary: The DPP must ask itself what it wants. It must think clearly. The DPP no longer opposes ECFA. Yet it persists in obstructing TISA, which opens markets ever so slightly. What exactly does the DPP advocate? Is it categorically opposed to any market openings? Is it determined to engage in Orwellian "effective management?" A responsible political party must not use popular unrest as a political tool. If it does, Ultimatetly it will be spurned by the public. The DPP must think before acting!

Full Text below:

The Cross-Strait Trade in Services Agreement, or TISA, has provoked an intense backlash. The opposition DPP is sharpening its knives. It hopes to kill the agreement in the legislature. The Ma administration has launched a comprehensive public relations war in response. Can this agreement, which involves ECFA policy, continue moving forward? Scrutinize these concerns, and one will encounter gross exaggerations about the agreement's impact on domestic industry. These concerns are clearly phony. But certain cross-strait concerns have provoked public discontent. These concerns are real. Therefore, one must understand the actual situation. Only then can one prescribe the proper medicine, and resolve the disputes effectively.

ECFA can be described as a cross-strait FTA, (Free Trade Agreement). Following the 2012 presidential election, the DPP reluctantly endorsed ECFA. It was compelled to do so, because it knew ECFA would enhance the competitiveness of Taiwan's economy. More importantly, it know ECFA would help Taiwan participate in regional economic integration. ECFA is merely a framework for negotiations. TISA by contrast, marks the beginning of substantive negotiations on cross-strait free trade. But examine TISA's content. TISA is merely a tiny step. It is hard to call TISA a real FTA.

On the surface, our side gave the Mainland side 64 market opening commitments. But compare TISA to Taipei's accession to the WTO (World Trade Organization) in 2002. We made 119 commitments. Most sensitive sectors were excluded. Among 64 commitments, 27 were already open to investment from the Mainland. They included tourist hotels, restaurants, wholesale herbs for Traditional Chinese Medicine, and automobile leasing. Newly opened businesses numbered fewer than 30, mostly in non-sensitive, general service industries. Most of them merely permitted foreign investment.

The other side did not complain about the discriminatory treatment it received. Instead, it made Taiwan 80 commitments that exceeded WTO requirements. These included finance, transportion, e-commerce, and cultural and creative industries. Taiwan business investments on the Mainland still face considerable uncertainty. But the Mainland has unquestionably been making concessions to Taiwan.

Compare the extent of the two sides' market openings. Our side opened its markets only a little. Yet we demanded more and gave less. The opening was lopsided. Had it been any more lopsided, the term "trade liberalization" would lost all meaning.

Consider the impact on industrial production. The impact of opening a market to goods, is completely different from opening a market to services. Foreign investment in certain specific services, may involve either new investments or mergers and acquisitions of existing businesses. But they take nothing from the service industry as a whole. At most they substitute one investor or one manager for another. In the service sector, local businesses have the advantage. If foreign operators hope to enter the market and base themselves on Taiwan, they will not necessarily be competitive. They may even inadvertently stimulate the long-term development of local service industries. As a result WTO rules do not include any damage compensation mechanisms. Some may denounce TISA as an abomination. They will overstate its impact. These concerns are phony. But they have unfortunately provoked widespread suspicion and unhealthy panic.

Meanwhile, there is another core issue must not be overlooked, one that the Ma administration must address. Suppose our government had signed a TISA type agreement with the United States or another country. The public reaction would have been very different. The controversy would not have been nearly so intense. Why has TISA provoked such intense anxiety? The answer is that the government has placed excessive emphasis on the Mainland concessions to Taiwan. It has neglected the contribution of free trade to national security.

The public has clear expectations about cross-Strait economic and trade relations. Most people are willing to accept gradual cross-Strait economic integration that enhances Taiwan's international competitiveness. But many worry about the vast differences in scale between the two sides' economic and political systems. Large numbers of Mainland businesses and Mainland personnel entering Taiwan could lead to variety of side effects. Many worry that Mainland markets, technicians, and professionals could exert a powerful gravitational force on Taiwan that could undermine its economic strength.

Therefore the Ma administration must communicate with the public. We do not mean it should hold various seminars, give speeches in front of temples, sponsor grassroots workshops, or trumpet the benefits for Taiwan. We do not mean it should provide compensation for local industries. We mean that the government must let the public know that it is aware of their concerns. It must create an all-inclusive mechanism to ensure that these public concerns about market opening do not become realities. The government must not put the cart before the horse. It must reassure the public. Only then will it be able to respond to future market openings.

As for the DPP, it must ask itself what it wants. It too must think clearly. The DPP no longer opposes ECFA. Yet it persists in obstructing TISA, which opens markets ever so slightly. What exactly does the DPP advocate? Is it categorically opposed to any market openings? Is it determined to engage in Orwellian "effective management?" A responsible political party must not use popular unrest as a political tool. If it does, Ultimatetly it will be spurned by the public. The DPP must think before acting!

兩岸服貿協議之辨正：假議題及真議題
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.07.04 04:35 am

「兩岸服務貿易協議」引發強力反彈聲浪，在野黨磨刀霍霍，欲在立法院攔下該協議，馬政府則全面啟動文宣戰反制。這項協議攸關ＥＣＦＡ政策能否繼續向前推進，審視其間爭議，有過度誇大、渲染對國內產業衝擊的假議題，也有因兩岸關係特殊性導致民間不安的真議題；故此，必須辨清其中虛實，才能掌握問題對症下藥，有效化解爭議。

ＥＣＦＡ可說是兩岸間的ＦＴＡ（自由貿易協定），經過二○一二年總統大選，民進黨事實上已為ＥＣＦＡ作了背書。這不僅是因為ＥＣＦＡ有助提升台灣經濟競爭力，更重要的，是可以打通台灣參與區域經濟整合的任督二脈。ＥＣＦＡ只是一個談判架構，兩岸服貿協議才是啟動兩岸自由貿易的關鍵一步。但從協議內容看，這一步其實跨得極小，很難稱得上是服務貿易ＦＴＡ。

表面上，我方給予大陸六十四項市場開放承諾，但和二○○二年我國加入ＷＴＯ（世界貿易組織）所作一百一十九項開放承諾相較，多數敏感行業均已排除在外。而六十四項承諾中，有二十七項是已開放陸資來台投資項目，包括觀光旅館、餐飲、中藥材批發、小汽車租賃等。新開放項目，不過三十多項，多屬非敏感性、一般性的服務行業，且多數是准許僑外投資的項目。

反倒是對岸，不計較我方加諸的歧視性待遇，仍給予台灣八十項高於ＷＴＯ的開放承諾，範圍涵蓋金融、運輸、電子商務、文創等。儘管台商投資利基仍有很多不確定性，但確實是對台「讓利」的思維。

亦即，從市場相對開放來看，我方開放規模不大，而且是台灣「要多」、「讓少」的不對稱開放，若再限縮，就失去貿易自由化的意義了。

從產業衝擊面看，服務市場開放和貨品進口的影響完全不同。因為外來服務業投資特定行業，無論是新增投資、併購既有企業，不會減損整體服務業產值，充其量只是投資或經營階層換人。而服務業發展原本就有在地優勢，外來業者若能進入並立足台灣市場，必然具有競爭力，對本土服務業長期發展反具刺激作用。也因此，在ＷＴＯ規範，並無服務業損害補償機制的設計。部分人士將兩岸服貿協議視為洪水猛獸，過度誇大其衝擊。這是個假議題，但卻造成各行各業杯弓蛇影，人心惶惶，不是健康現象。

但另一方面，也有一個被輕忽的核心議題，馬政府必須正視。假設今天我簽訂服貿協議的對象是美國或其他國家，社會反應必定截然不同，爭議也不會那麼高；那麼，何以兩岸服貿協議會引發那麼強烈的疑慮？追根究柢，癥結就在政府過度重視大陸對台灣「讓利」，卻忽略推動自由貿易應有的國安思維和配套作為。

民間對兩岸經貿關係的期待非常清楚，大多數人願意接受兩岸經濟漸進整合，以提升台灣國際競爭力；但是，也有很多人擔心兩岸經濟規模的巨大差距及政經體制的截然不同，若放任大量陸企及大陸人士進入台灣，可能引發各種後遺症。很多人也擔心，大陸市場對台灣資金、技術及專業人才的強大磁吸效應，可能削弱台灣經濟實力。

有鑑於此，馬政府需要和社會溝通的，並不在辦理各種形式的研討會、廟口開講、基層講習，或強力宣導協議對台灣有多少好處，乃至政府能對受衝擊的產業提供什麼補償；而是要針對民心不安的癥結作出有力宣示，並建構一套完善機制，防止開放市場可能衍生的各種社會憂慮問題。政府切勿本末倒置，須拿出強有力的作為來安定民心，才足以因應未來更廣泛的市場開放。

至於民進黨究竟想要如何，也必須想清楚。民進黨既已不反對ＥＣＦＡ，卻又要抵制自由化程度極有限的服貿協議，那麼，民進黨究竟有何主張？是徹底反對開放市場，還是希望有效管理？作為一個負責任的政黨，若只是利用民心不安大作政治投機，最後必遭反噬而為民意所唾棄。請三思而後行！