DPP Should First Accept, then Go Beyond the 1992 Consensus

DPP Should First Accept, then Go Beyond the 1992 Consensus
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China)
A Translation
July 25, 2013

Summary: The Huashan Conference asked the question, "How should the DPP deal with the 1992 Consensus?" This suggests that the Democratic Progressive Party has ended its "There never was a 1992 Consensus" stage. The DPP lost the 2012 general election because it failed to properly deal with the 1992 Consensus. As it approaches the 2016 general election, will the DPP lose yet again because it failed to properly deal with the 1992 Consensus?

Full text below:

"How to Deal with 1992 Consensus?" This is the theme of today's DPP second round Huashan Conference. Our suggestion is: First accept it, then go beyond it.

Su Tseng-chang said that the DPP "can no longer turn back the clock and promote Taiwan independence." This should be the basis for DPP cross-Strait policy reform.

What is Taiwan independence? Taiwan independence is the refusal to recognize the Republic of China. It is the backdoor listing of the Republic of China, even as one refuses to recognize the Constitution of the Republic of China. It is the selective acceptance of the Constitution of the Republic of China, even as one refuses to recognize "one country, two regions" and the "one China Constitution." It is the refusal to recognize that the Republic of China is a "different interpretation" of "one China." It is the stubborn insistence that "One China is the Peoples Republic of China," which leads to the refusal to recognize the 1992 Consensus.

The DPP "cannot turn back the clock and promote Taiwan independence." Therefore it must reaffirm the Republic of China. It must reaffirm the Constitution of the Republic of China. It must reaffirm the one China framework. It must fight for "one China, different interpretations." It must not accept the claim that "One China is the People's Republic of China." Therefore it must support the 1992 Consensus.

Will the DPP accept the 1992 Consensus? That depends on whether the DPP intends to turn back the clock and promote Taiwan independence? If it does not intend to promote Taiwan independence, what reason does it have not to fight for the ROC Constitution's "one China framework," and "one China, different interpretations?" What reason does it have to maintain that "One China means the People's Republic of China?" How can it abandon the position that the Republic of China is "democratic China?" How can it not fight the CCP for the right to define the meaning of the term "China?"

On May 20, 2000, a newly elected President Chen Shui-bian championed the "five noes" in his inaugural speech. On June 27, he told foreign dignitaries that he did not accept the assertion that "One China is the People's Republic of China." He said he was willing to accept the "one China, different interpretations" premise of the 1992 Consensus.

Unfortunately he reneged on his position the very next day, when MAC chairwoman Tsai Ing-wen repudiated it in public. She said the two sides have never accepted the "one China principle." This marked the beginning of DPP refusal to recognize the 1992 Consensus. This refusal was later joined by the "rectification of names" campaign. Since then, the DPP has positioned itself as the "Taiwan independence party" within the Washington, Beijing, Taipei triangle.

Is the DPP "turning back the clock and promoting Taiwan independence?" The first clue will be whether the DPP returns to June 27, 2000 position, and reaffirms the 1992 Consensus and "one China, different interpretations."

Su Tseng-chang says, on the one hand, that the DPP "cannot turn back the clock and promote Taiwan independence." But on the other hand, Su "refuses to be included in the one China framework." This reflects the DPP's self-contradictory confusion on matters of cross-Strait policy, national identity, and constitutional allegiance.

The DPP may not be able to accept Beijing's terminology for the "one China framework." But it has already decided not to "turn back the clock and promote Taiwan independence." Therefore it cannot refuse to recognize the Constitution of the Republic of China, which includes the "one China framework." It must cite "one China, different interpretations" when dealing with the Chinese Communist regime. Conversely, if the DPP maintains that "One China is the People's Republic of China," then it must refuse to recognize the ROC Constitution's "one China framework." Can the DPP bring itself to recognize "one China, different interpretations?" If it cannot, then what alternative does it have, but to "turn back the clock and promote Taiwan independence?" Therefore, "not turning back the clock to promote Taiwan independence" and "refusing to be included in the one China framework," is self-contradiction.

DPP political hopefuls such as Su Tseng-chang, Tsai Ing-wen and Frank Hsieh have not said, "There never was a 1992 Consensus" or "I refuse to recognize the 1992 Consensus" for some time. Su Tseng-chang has retreated to the "Resolution on Taiwan's Future." But he cites only the portion that states, "according to the current constitution, Taiwan is referred to as the Republic of China." He ignores the fact that "the current constitution" is a "one China constitution." Frank Hsieh attempts to substitute "constitutional consensus" for the 1992 Consensus. But it has been mocked as a "pirated edition." Tsai Ing-wen and her followers attempt to use "human rights vs. sovereignty" rhetoric to downplay sovereignty and evade one China. These tactics are much ado about nothing. Not one of them allows the three to deal with the 1992 Consensus head on.

The DPP asks, "How should it deal with 1992 Consensus?" In fact the DPP is choosing between "recognizing the Republic of China" and "turning back the clock and promoting Taiwan independence." If the DPP no longer wishes to turn back the clock and promote Taiwan independence, it must first reognize the Republic of China. It must first recognize the Republic of China Constitution. It must first uphold the "One China Constitution" and fight for "one China, different interpretations." It must use "one China, different interpretations" to fight for the the right to define the term "China." This is the only way to establish a cross-Strait framework that transcends KMT vs. CCP rhetoric.

When the DPP evades the issue of "one China," it forces itself to promote Taiwan independence. It forces itself to relinquish its role in cross-Strait interaction. In fact, the "One China framework" provides considerable room for both offense and defense. If the DPP is willing to recognize the ROC Constitution, it could use the one-China framework and one China, different interpretations to go beyond the KMT and CCP.

The Huashan Conference asked the question, "How should the DPP deal with the 1992 Consensus?" This suggests that the Democratic Progressive Party has ended its "There never was a 1992 Consensus" stage. The DPP lost the 2012 general election because it failed to properly deal with the 1992 Consensus. As it approaches the 2016 general election, will the DPP lose yet again because it failed to properly deal with the 1992 Consensus?

先接受，再超越：民進黨如何處理九二共識
【聯合報╱社論】
2013.07.25 03:34 am

「如何處理九二共識」，這是今日民進黨第二場「華山會議」的主題。我們建議的答案是：先接受，再超越。

蘇貞昌說「不能再走回頭路搞台獨」，這應是民進黨兩岸政策轉型的基準。

什麼是台獨？台獨就是否定中華民國，或借殼上市接受中華民國的國號卻否定中華民國憲法，或部分接受中華民國憲法卻否定其為「一國兩區」的「一中憲法」，或否定中華民國是「各表」的「一中」，而認定「一中就是中華人民共和國」，因此也就必須否定「九二共識」。

但民進黨如今若稱「不走回頭路搞台獨」，就必須回到中華民國，必須回到中華民國憲法，必須回到一中架構，必須爭取「一中各表」，就不能接受「一中就是中華人民共和國」，因此當然也就必須支持「九二共識」。

所以，「民進黨要不要接受九二共識？」這個問題完全等於是問「民進黨要不要走回頭路搞台獨？」若不搞台獨，有何理由不以中華民國憲法的「一中架構」去爭取「一中各表」？又有何理由堅持「一個中國就是中華人民共和國」？更豈能放棄中華民國做為「民主中國」的地位，而不與對岸爭取對於「中國」的定義權？

其實，二○○○年五月二十日陳水扁在就職演說中楬櫫「四不一沒有」初任總統後，於六月二十七日接見外賓時即稱，不接受「一個中國就是中華人民共和國」，但願意接受「一個中國，各自表述」的「兩會共識」。

然而，此一立場次日即被時任陸委會主委的蔡英文公開推翻，指兩岸從來沒有「一中原則」的共識，這遂成了民進黨否定「九二共識」的開端。再加上後來「正名制憲」等風潮，民進黨遂在「美／陸／台」的三邊架構中自視為也被視為「台獨黨」迄今。

因此，民進黨是否「不再走回頭路搞台獨」，第一個指標，就要看民進黨是否回到二○○○年六月二十七日，重新接受「九二共識／一中各表」。

蘇貞昌一方面說「不再走回頭路搞台獨」，另一方面又稱「拒絕納入一中架構」，這其實反映了民進黨當前國憲認同與兩岸政策的一個根本性的矛盾。

因為，民進黨或許可以不接受「一中框架」的北京語彙，但若「不走回頭路搞台獨」，即不能否認中華民國憲法的「一中架構」，亦即不能不以「一中各表」與中共政權抗衡與周旋；反之，如果民進黨堅持「一個中國就是中華人民共和國」，即必須否定中華民國憲法的「一中架構」，即不可「一中各表」，那麼，除了「再走回頭路搞台獨」，民進黨還有什麼路可走？因此，「不再走回頭路搞台獨」與「拒絕納入一中架構」，是一自相矛盾的悖論。

民進黨中對自我的政治前景尚寄希望者，如蘇貞昌、蔡英文及謝長廷等，已經很久不說「根本沒有九二共識」或「否定九二共識」了。蘇貞昌退到了《台灣前途決議文》，但只引「台灣，固然依現行憲法稱為中華民國」一節，卻罔顧「現行憲法」其實是「一中憲法」；謝長廷欲以「憲法共識」取代「九二共識」，卻被稱作「山寨版」；蔡英文一系則想以「人權vs.主權」的論述來「降抑主權／迴避一中」。但是，這些恐怕皆是庸人自擾，無一可以成為「處理九二共識」的正辦。

民進黨「如何處理九二共識」，其實就是在「走中華民國的路」與「走回頭路搞台獨」之間作一選擇。民進黨若不再走回頭路搞台獨，而要走中華民國的路，就必須先回到中華民國憲法，護持「憲法一中」，爭取「一中各表」；然後再在「一中各表」之上爭取對於「中國」的定義權，如此始有可能建立一個超越國共兩黨的兩岸論述架構。

民進黨迴避「一中」，即是逼迫自己回到「台獨」，並使自己在兩岸互動中喪失角色。其實，對台灣而言，「一中架構」存有極大的政治攻守空間，倘若民進黨能回到中華民國憲法，即不無可能從「一中架構／各自表述」上找到超越國共兩黨的途徑。

華山會議終究出了一個「如何處理九二共識」的題目，這似乎顯示民進黨畢竟已結束了「根本沒有九二共識」的昏昧階段。二○一二大選，民進黨敗於未能正確處理九二共識；面對二○一六大選，民進黨會不會又因未能正確處理九二共識而再敗一次？