The ROC Army Meets Its Waterloo in the Battle of Chung-chiu

The ROC Army Meets Its Waterloo in the Battle of Chung-chiu
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
July 24, 2013

Summary: The controversy over the death of ROC Army Corporal Hung Chung-chi has been raging for two weeks. The Ministry of Defense has become the object of hatred. So far it has not been able to stop the hemmoraging. Higher and higher ranking officials have offered apologies. The list of officials being punished and detained is growing longer. But the public remains unmoved. In this "Battle of Hung Chung-chiu," the army has suffered a crushing defeat. Its public image has suffered. Its internal morale has suffered as well.

Full text below:

The controversy over the death of ROC Army Corporal Hung Chung-chi has been raging for two weeks. The Ministry of Defense has become the object of hatred. So far it has not been able to stop the hemmoraging. Higher and higher ranking officials have offered apologies. The list of officials being punished and detained is growing longer. But the public remains unmoved. In this "Battle of Hung Chung-chiu," the army has suffered a crushing defeat. Its public image has suffered. Its internal morale has suffered as well.

From a military perspective, the debacle was the result of faulty internal management routines, of laxness in layer upon layer of control mechanisms. It was also the result of serious errors of judgment in the face of crisis. Opportunities were lost, again and again. Eventually the situation got completely out of hand. Internally, the army was guilty of three fatal shortcomings. The first was a distorted concept of discipline. The second was poor quality NCOs. The third was poor crisis management abilities.

Take the distorted concept of discipline. When an army is at war, it must stress obedience, discipline, and authority. It must cultivate this spirit during peacetime training. But harsh discipline is merely a means to victory. The underlying purpose of the military is for officers and soldiers to carry out battlefield tasks that may cost them their lives. This requires more exalted motives, including patriotism, pride, and esprit de corps. In other words, discipline requires incentives and penalties. It must lead by example. Discipline must be rooted in loyalty. Only this can instill a sense of shared misson among its members. The Hung Chung-chiu incident shows that the army has a surfeit of discipline, but a dearth of compassion. It lacks officers who truly understand leadership.

Take the uneven quality of NCOs. The role of non-commissioned officers is to execute orders from above, and to lead those below into battle. Commissioned officers are rotated frequently. NCOs, by contrast, serve long term, and are the backbone of the military. Superior NCOs facilitate smooth operations. Inferior NCOs may easily become closet bullies. The Hung Chung-chiu case apparently involved illegal confinement and fatal exertions, all imposed by non-commissioned officers. In particular, Sergeant Fan Cho-hsien was guilty of repeated misconduct and abuse of authority. He abused his authority, and revealed serious deficiencies in his character. His superiors are also to blame for failing to see what he was.

At the heart of the NCO ranks is "reserve NCO" graduates from NCO training programs. But for some time, NCO training programs have devolved into a final destination for slackers. As a result, the quality of non-commissioned officers has been unsatisfactory. This can easily result in hidden clashes with highly-educated conscripts. In recent years the NCO training programs have been upgraded. They are not at the level of secondary vocational schools. Candidates are volunteers, and are promoted on the basis of merit. This has improved the quality of non-commissioned officers. But a ten year illness cannot be eradicated by a three year cure. The Ministry of Defense faces an imminent problem. It must exercise discretion. It must eliminate the unfit while retaining the fit. It must avoid holding on to the dregs.

Finally, take the military's crisis management abilities. From the very beginning, the Ministry of Defense was slow to respond. It underestimated the seriousness of the case. It called for perfunctory administrative sanctions on personnel within the chain of command. But public resentment boiled over. It was compelled to hand down demerits to corps commanders and commanders of the army. It was even compelled to announce the abolition of the closed system. It assumed that such a major move would end the matter. But such moves merely revealed how little concern the military felt for the Hung family or the public, or for uncovering the cause of Hung Chung-chiu's death. Hung's higher ranking military leaders were not even included among those receiving demerits and reprimands. Hung's family members criticized their release from detention as "everyone fasting because one person choked on his food." The public concluded that the military was utterly insincere about soul searching. It was merely putting on a show. These bungled opportunities led to public demands for remedial investigations. The military never regained the podium.

The military was inexperienced in investigating major cases. The public lacked trust. The introduction of regular prosecutors may be the only way to salvage the investigation. Active duty military offenses still need to be handled by the military. But this case involves an ordinary criminal offenses -- destroying evidence. Therefore one viable solution is joint prosecution by an ad hoc military-civilian group. To everyones' surprise, Deputy Defense Minister Andrew Yang appeared before protestors and made them a promise, signed by the Ministry of Defence. Those present cheered it on. To everyones' equal surprise, President Ma, concerned about its legality, immediately vetoed it.

Actually, the destruction of evidence in the Hung case is already being investigated by the Taoyuan Prosecutors Office. The Taoyuan Prosecutors Office and military investigators must share information. This will ensure that the joint investigation is true to its name. Unfortunately, the authorities have not recognized an opportunity to rehabilitate their image. Instead they have dragged their feet, provoking even greater resentment. This has hurt the image of the Ministry of Defense, which "behaved capriciously," as well as President Ma, who "slapped his subordinates in the face."

A string of blunders and mistakes have turned the Hung case into a landslide undermining the image of the military. The task of recruiting is extremely difficult to begin with. It is bound to be made even more difficult by the Hung case. For the Ministry of Defense, the case was an example of major whistleblowing. Large-scale self-examination must lead to reform and innovation. The unfit must be removed. Only then will Hung Chung-chiu's death not be in vain.

國軍在「仲丘之役」慘敗

【聯合報╱社論】

2013.07.24 02:32 am

陸軍下士洪仲丘案延燒逾兩周，國防部成為過街老鼠，至今仍無法止血。儘管道歉層級愈來愈高，懲處與收押名單愈來愈長，卻絲毫得不到肯定。這場「洪仲丘之戰」，國軍一敗塗地，外部形象、內部士氣雙輸。

從兵法的角度看，國軍之所以慘敗，在於平日內部管理、節制機制層層鬆脫，面對危機又嚴重誤判局勢，戎機一失再失，終使局面不可收拾。就內在因素而言，此次國軍暴露的弊病有三：一是管教心態失當，二是士官階層素質欠佳，三是危機處理能力奇差。

先談管教心態的扭曲。軍隊為因應戰爭，自必須強調服從、紀律、威權，並從平日訓練中培養這些精神。但威權管理只是求勝的手段，軍隊存在的根本意義，是要官兵身處沙場時能執行可能犧牲性命的任務，這就需要仰賴更高層次的信念──如愛國心、榮譽感及袍澤之情來驅動。換言之，管理部隊必須恩威並施、以身作則，使紀律奠基於義氣之上，才能建立成員間生死與共的情懷。但從洪仲丘事件看來，國軍仍然充斥「嚴而無恩」、不懂領導三昧的幹部。

再談士官階層素質的參差。士官的角色，主要是承上執行軍官命令、對下領導士兵作戰；相較輪調頻繁的軍官，久任士官往往才是基層骨幹。問題在，優秀士官可讓部隊順暢運作，不良士官卻易成為欺下瞞上的地頭蛇。從洪仲丘案看來，違法關他禁閉、將他操練至死的，都是士官層級，尤其連遭不斷爆料涉及行為不檢及呼風喚雨的范佐憲上士，不僅流於濫權自恣，品格亦有嚴重問題，而上級軍官識人不明亦難辭其咎。

國軍士官階層的核心是士校畢業的「常備士官」，但過去很長一段時間，士校卻淪為國中「放牛班」的最後去處。結果，不僅士官素質甚不理想，更易與「升學勝利組」的高學歷義務役士兵潛藏衝突。近年國軍雖將士校學制提升到二專，又從志願役士兵中擇優拔擢，有助改善新進士官素質；但十年之病，終究不是「三年之艾」所能根除。面對即將到來的精進案，國防部更須謹慎對幹部汰弱留強，切忌淪為徒剩糟粕的局面。

最後，談軍方的危機處理能力。一開始，國防部即遲鈍泄沓，誤判案件的嚴重性，僅循例將「指揮鍊」相關人員行政處分；但隨著民怨沸騰，又將記過範圍擴張到軍團指揮官與陸軍司令，甚至宣布取消禁閉制度，以為如此「大動作」就能應付了事。這些舉措，顯示軍方全然不能體會洪家及社會所關心的主要是洪仲丘的死因真相；將根本不認識洪員的高階將領納入記過申誡，乃至連家屬都批評為「因噎廢食」的取消禁閉，皆坐實外界認為軍方「毫無誠意檢討」、「只重表面功夫」的印象。因貽誤了先機，導致後來連串補救偵辦都只能被輿論牽著鼻子走，再也抓不回發言權。

在軍檢偵辦重案經驗不足及社會普遍的不信任下，引進「一般」檢調，可謂拯救調查的唯一法門。誠然，現役軍人觸犯軍法，仍須由軍法體系處理；但本案同時涉及普通刑法的滅證罪，因此軍民檢方共組「專案小組」聯合偵查後各自起訴，不失為一可行之「巧門」。未料，國防部副部長楊念祖在遊行現場作出允諾，且代表國防部簽名為憑，引發現場一片叫好；不料，卻隨即被憂心「違法」的馬總統否決。

事實上，洪案的湮滅證據部分如今依法由桃檢偵辦，而桃檢與軍檢在調查上必須互通有無，如此一來，「聯合偵辦」的事實其實某種程度已存在。遺憾的是，當局不知利用契機扭轉形象，反在猶疑瞻顧之間製造更多民怨，讓「朝令夕改」的國防部與「打下屬耳光」的總統形象皆受損。

總之，一連串的疏失與錯誤，已讓洪案成為沖垮國軍形象的超級土石流；原本就極困難的募兵作業，勢必更雪上加霜。但對國防部而言，這也是一次徹底自我揭弊、自我反省的大演習；若能藉此整頓革新、掃除敗類，洪仲丘的犧牲才可謂「死有重於泰山」。