ECFA is Merely A Framework: Does It really Warrant a Referendum?

ECFA is Merely A Framework: Does It really Warrant a Referendum?
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 22, 2009

President Ma is standing pat. Everyone in the Ministry of Economic Affairs, from top to bottom, is promoting and studying ECFA. Meanwhile leaders of the opposition DPP have not been idle. They are aggressively pushing for a referendum. They hope to combine it with the year end county and municipal elections. First, they want to block the signing of any agreement. Secondly, they want to give a boost to Green Camp county and municipal election candidates. But so far, although the Ministry of Economic Affairs has held public hearings in the northern, central, southern, and eastern parts of the island, media coverage has been limited. Much of the dialogue has been "ministers talking to priests," i.e., shop talk between insiders. The public has a limited understanding of ECFA. It is insufficiently familiar with it. The Blue Camp doesn't know how to defend it. The Green Camp doesn't know how to attack it. The two sides "don't know what they're fighting for, or whom they are fighting for."

In fact, the specific content of ECFA is not yet clear. But based on similar agreements signed by other nations, we can discern ECFA's general outlines. Regional trade agreements signed by nations around the world, such as the European Union, North America Free Trade Agreement, ASEAN, were all made within the framework of the WTO. If the two sides of the Strait do sign ECFA, they are unlikely to violate WTO norms. One need only go online and read the global and regional economic and trade agreements, and Article 24 fo the WTO agreements, to understand the broad outlines of ECFA.

In general, the contents of regional trade agreements are tariff reductions (such as the Free Trade Agreement FTA), investment benefits, industrial cooperation, service sector benefits, and timetables for market liberalization. To actually negotiate so many items one by one would take at least three to five years. That being the case, why has President Ma openly declared that he hopes to sign it by the end of this year or the beginning of next year? Based on the above time line we can see that ECFA is probably a "two stage" affair. The government probably hopes to sign a framework before the end of the year. As for the substance within the framework, it must be negotiated and signed during the next phase. This is the only way one can sign by the end of the year, and talk about the details later.

Since ECFA negotiations are a two-stage affair, the government should explain the matter clearly, in plain language. It must prevent needless public misunderstanding and confrontation.

If the above mentioned "two-stage negotiations" framework is what it has in mind, then ECFA may be signed by the end of the year. After all, at this stage it is akin to a table of contents. A table of contents merely denotes the potential content of various chapters and sections. Once the author agrees to the table of contents, the next stage is to discuss the specific contents of each chapter, and to actually supply it. Only three to five years from now, after it is organized into a complete volume, will it be complete. In the above analogy, Taipei and Beijing are the co-authors of the chapters. They intend to use the next three to five years to fill in the various chapters with cross-Strait economic and trade content. Even if the table of contents indicates ten chapters, if negotiations reach an impasse, some chapters may not be completed. In the end, only six chapters may be completed. Therefore, negotiations over ECFA will address cross-Strait tax rates, industries, early harvests, and service industries. Each chapter may provoke controversies over the need for public oversight and feedback.

The Democratic Progressive Party proposes holding a referendum at the end of the year over ECFA. Its proposal, to approve or disapprove a book that contains only a table of contents, and blank pages in each of the chapters, is utterly pointless. The substantive content will be discussed in the future. One may, if one wishes, hold a referendum regarding future points of contention. But how can one hold a referendum over blank sheets of paper? Suppose the referendum fails to pass? Does that mean the ruling authorities can then sign any agreement they wish? Even one that might be detrimental to our interests? Suppose, on the other hand, the referendum passes, even though they have yet to discuss anything? Does that mean the DPP will refuse to engage in any form of negotiation or engagement whatsoever? How would that be any different from a blind "Closed Door" policy?" Is anyone concerned about "selling out Taiwan?" If so, doesn't that require substantive content within each chapter? So far all we have is a table of contents. So far there is nothing to sell.

Frankly the ruling authorities' are right to adopt a two-stage negotiation strategy. ASEAN plus three is ready to go. It will have an impact on Taiwan. Therefore Taipei must swiftly adopt a rough framework to address the disadvantages it will suffer as a result of ASEAN plus three. That is why ECFA involves two-stage negotiations. That is why its time frame is so protracted. Only then can the public on Taiwan have sufficient opportunity for dialogue. When the opposition DPP understands that ECFA involves a two-stage negotiation process, it should carefully consider whether there is any need to hold a referendum on the first phase table of contents. Does the DPP really want the public on Taiwan to hold a referendum to oppose the publication of any sort of book with any sort of content? If so, then the referendum will have no impact on the public whatsoever, other than reinforce prevailing stereotypes about the Democratic Progressive Party.

中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 　2009.06.22
社論－ECFA僅是框架目錄 要如何公投？
本報訊

在馬總統意志堅決表態下，經濟部上上下下都在緊鑼密鼓地研究ＥＣＦＡ的議題。另一方面，在野黨也沒閒著；他們積極動員推動ＥＣＦＡ公投，希望能在年底與縣市長選舉結合，一則擋下協定簽署，二則也為縣市長綠軍選將增添幾分氣勢。可是到目前為止，雖然經濟部在北、中、南、東各舉辦過一場座談會，但媒體報導有限，而現場對話又頗多「牧師對神父」的專家語言，社會大眾對ＥＣＦＡ所知甚為有限。也因為如此，ＥＣＦＡ議題的社會熱度始終不夠，藍軍不知要如何辯護、綠軍不知要如何攻擊，雙方都不知道要「為何而戰、為誰而戰」。

其實，雖然ＥＣＦＡ的具體內容還不清楚，但是觀諸世界各國簽署類似協定的內涵，我們也可以大略勾勒出ＥＣＦＡ的可能輪廓。此外，在概念上，全世界各國所簽的區域貿易協定（如歐盟、北美、東協等），都是在ＷＴＯ框架下的地區協定。故兩岸將來若要簽署ＥＣＦＡ，也斷難違反ＷＴＯ的規範。因此，大家只要上網查看世界其他區域經貿協定與ＷＴＯ廿四條等規定，即能了解ＥＣＦＡ的內容梗概。

一般而言，區域貿易協定所涵蓋的內容，不外乎關稅減免（如自由貿易協定ＦＴＡ）、投資互惠、產業合作、服務業互惠、自由化時程等項目。這麼多項目如果真要逐一談判，至少得花上三、五年的時間。既然如此，為什麼馬總統會公開宣示，希望今年底或明年初簽署呢？由以上敘述的時間鋪陳可知，兩岸簽署ＥＣＦＡ，應該是採取「兩階段」簽署法。政府可能是希望在年底先簽定框架（framework），至於框內的實質內容，則在下一個階段再逐步談判、簽署。只有在這種情況下，才有可能做到「年底簽署、細節慢談」的宣示進程。

我們認為，既然ＥＣＦＡ是兩階段談判的規畫，則政府就應該把事情用白話文講清楚，以免民間做無厘頭的虛耗式對話。

如果前述「兩階段談判」的架構屬實，則年底所可能簽署的ＥＣＦＡ，就如同只是一本書的「目錄」。目錄只是摘記各章的章名與可能的節次內容；一旦作者們同意了目錄的內涵，則在下一階段，作者就要逐章研議、撰寫內容，三、五年後集結成冊，才是書冊完整的內容。以上述比喻觀之，則台灣與中國大陸都是各章的共同作者；他們打算用未來三至五年的時間，填寫兩岸經貿的各章內容。在概念上，即使目錄中標示了十章，但若將來談不妥，則各章內容也可能從缺，最後也許只有六章完稿。因此，ＥＣＦＡ真正的談判關鍵，是將來兩岸稅率、產業、早期收穫、服務業等各章內涵，也許每一章都有不少爭議需要民意監督與回饋。

民進黨主張要在年底對ＥＣＦＡ進行公投，就如同要對一本「僅有目錄、內容厥如」的無字天書表示可否，恐怕是相當不切實際的。既然實質內容是要在未來慢慢談，要公投也該是對未來關鍵議題的爭議點公投才是，怎麼會要現在辦「空白公投」呢？萬一空白公投沒通過，難道表示執政當局可以簽署任何不利於台灣的協定？而如果什麼都還沒談公投就過了，這是否表示民進黨拒絕各種形式的談判與接觸？這與盲目鎖國又有什麼差別？如果有人擔心「賣台」，那也要靠章節的實質內容賣；單單是目錄，是沒有東西可賣的。

坦白說，我們認為執政當局採取兩階段談判的策略，是正確的決定。由於東協加三已箭在弦上，即將對台灣產生衝擊，故台灣唯有先在粗框架下簽得早期收穫條款，才可能迅速補給台灣在東協加三中的缺陷。也正因為ＥＣＦＡ是兩階段談判，時間拖得長，台灣社會才能有充分的對話機會。當在野黨了解ＥＣＦＡ是兩階段談判之後，實在應該仔細思索有沒有必要再對第一階段的目錄框架做公投。如果要台灣人民以公投方式「反對出版任何內容的書」，那麼除了坐實人民對民進黨的刻板印象外，恐怕收穫將十分有限。