A New Definition of National Defense: Peace and Democracy

A New Definition of National Defense: Peace and Democracy
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 8, 2009

Recently, two military developments have made the news. These have underscored changes in the national defense posture. The first is that no live firing exercises have been held at the Fangshan Artillery Base for the past two years. The other is that the "Han Kuang Military Maneuveurs" will allegedly be renamed the "Cheng Chun Military Maneuveurs," and will be response to natural disasters or terrorism.

The first impression such news leaves one is that national defense has become more relaxed in attitude and less aggressive in substance. The live fire Fangshan Military Maneuveurs have allegedly been discontinued due to opposition from fishermen. The military estimates that the cessation of the Fangshan Military Maneuveurs has affected 15 air defense combat exercises. How serious is this? Is this the full exent of its impact? No solutions have been found for the past two years. Does the changed purpose of the military maneuveurs represent an overly optimistic assessment of the cross-Strait situation? Should this be a cause for concern?

Over the past sixty years, the national defense posture has undergone major changes. Why we are fighting and for whom we are fighting has changed with internal and external developments. The era of "Retaking the Mainland" and "Destroying the Communist Bandits," is over. The subsequent strategy of "seven tenths politics and three tenths military affairs," and the "Reunify China via the Three People's Principles" national defense posture remains unchanged. But cross-Strait hostility since the lifting of martial law has diminished. We no longer speak of a "Communist Rebellion." But on the other hand, cross-Strait hostility fluctuates. It is sometimes relaxed and sometimes tense. Because we failed to establish a new national defense posture, the Chen Shui-bian administration's "New Centrist Path" failed. The "Rectification of Names and the Authoring of a New Constitution" political project was revived. This left the armed forces of the Republic of China at the mercy of advocates of formal Taiwan independence, wondering what are we fighting for, and whom we are fighting for? This was a contradictory, dangerous, and confusing situation.

This confusion over the national defense posture has manifested itself in another form under the Ma administration. Over the past year the two sides have engaged in across the board exchanges. Direct flights have been established. Mainland tourists have visited Taiwan. No upper limit Mainland investments on Taiwan have made the daily headlines. Taipei has proposed a policy of "win/win" and "live and let live." Beijing has stressed its "framework for peaceful development." This situation has had a different impact on the national defense posture. Namely, how many troops do we need? Do we need additional arms purchases? What kind of military procurements do we need? We must engage in a completely different way of thinking. In particular, we have yet to resolve the national defense riddle of whom are we fighting for and what are we fighting for. This national defense dilemma, has remained unresolved since the lifting of martial law 21 years ago, and has manifested itself in different ways.

The affairs of the Republic of China Minister of Defense are virtually cross-Strait affairs. The Republic of China's national defense posture is undergoing fundamental change. Military confrontation has become democratic political and economic exchange. Cross-Strait issues are dealt with using democratic and economic, rather than military means. This national defense posture is consistent with the larger interests of the public on Taiwan. It reflects public expecations regarding democracy. Moreover, it goes hand in hand with the "framework for peaceful development" advocated by Beijing. In fact, today's relaxed cross-Strait situation is a kind of national defense achievement. Military factors have been downplayed. Economic and democratic factors have been emphasized. This will be our national defense posture for the forseeable future.

Nevertheless, the Republic of China needs to maintain a certain level of military defense. This is a symbol of its sovereignty and an expression of its democracy. It is also an essential bargaining chip in cross-Strait and international negotiations. The quantity and quality of military armanents may not be that difficult to determine. But what we are we fighting and whom we are fighting for remain questions that are difficult to answer but which must be answered.

Two new factors have emerged in national defense planning. First, cross-Strait trade, close cultural exchanges, and an atmosphere of reconciliation have diminished antipathy toward the CCP and the perception of the CCP as Communist rebels. That is why we no longer speak of the "Communist Rebellion." Secondly, the conscript military is now volunteer military. Troops no longer join the military out of national duty. They join the military in the capacity of government employees. These two new factors have had a major impact on the question of what we are fighting for and whom we are fighting for.

The military can be downsized. But national defense awareness must not be diminished. The cross-Strait situation has evolved. The national defense posture must be revised. The Republic of China's military defense is no longer for the purpose of "Counterattacking the Mainland and Eradicating the Bandits." Instead, it has a more fundamental and more important function. It must act as the guarantor of cross-Strait peace and the defender of democracy.

We may have a smaller military in the future. But this ought to be a "small is beautiful" military. If it is able to fulfill its self-proclaimed role as the guarantor of cross-Strait peace and defender of democracy, its officers and troops will feel a sense of honor, a sense of responsibility, a sense of direction, and a sense of idealism.

We must struggle on behalf of cross-Strait peace. But just in case, we must know what we are fighting for, and whom we are fighting for.

國防新義：和平後盾‧民主衛士
【聯合報╱社論】
2009.06.08 03:21 am

最近有兩則軍事消息，令人感覺國防情態的變化。一是枋山防砲基地已有兩年未見實彈射擊訓練；一是漢光兵推據稱將改為「政軍兵推」，以天災或反恐為主題。

這類消息給人的第一個印象是：在精神上及實務上，國防的經營有否趨於鬆弛或不積極的跡象？枋山實彈射擊據謂是因漁民反對而停擺，而軍方自估已影響了十五的防空戰力（這還不嚴重嗎？僅是如此嗎？），但兩年來卻未拿出解決辦法。至於一年一度的兵推主題改變，是否顯示當局對兩岸情勢的評價懷有一廂情願的樂觀，也令人關切。

六十年來，國防情勢經歷重大變化；為何而戰與為誰而戰的國防主題，亦隨內外情勢而變遷。最早年的「反攻大陸」、「消滅共匪」，已成過去；後來的「七分政治／三分軍事」及「三民主義統一中國」，雖是國防觀念的丕變，但仍是以兩岸敵對為架構；至解嚴後，一方面終止「動員戡亂」，但另一方面兩岸敵對情勢卻時弛時張，因而未能建立一個新的國防主題；再至扁政府主政，「新中間路線」失敗，正名制憲的政治操作大興，更使中華民國的軍隊掌握在主張「法理台獨」的主政者手中，究竟將為誰而戰、為何而戰？可謂矛盾已極、凶險已極、困惑已極。

這樣的「國防主題困惑」，至馬政府主政，似乎又以另一種面貌呈現。兩岸在這一年來儼然出現全面和解交流的局面，直航、陸客來台，「上不封頂」的大陸「熱單」日日皆成頭條新聞；我方主張「雙贏共生」，對岸標榜「和平發展框架」。這樣的情勢，對國防主題自是另一種情勢的衝擊；要維持多少武裝部隊？要不要軍購？軍購何種項目？在在進入全然不同的思維頻道之中。尤其，解嚴二十一年來，迄未解決的「為何而戰、為誰而戰」的「國防主題困惑」，更以另一種面貌呈現。

台灣的國防政務，其實幾乎就等於兩岸政務。中華民國的國防情態，正在發生並已經發生根本性的變化。「國防」的基本架構，已經由軍事對立，轉移至民主政治及經濟交流；亦即以民主及經濟的基調來處理兩岸問題，而避免訴諸軍事。此一「國防」路線，符合台灣的總體利益，反映了台灣的民主期待，何況也與北京當局所主張並維繫的「和平發展框架」並行不悖。今日兩岸情勢的和緩，其實正是一種「國防」成就。而軍事元素降低，經濟及民主的因素上升，亦是未來「國防」的必趨必至之勢。

雖然如此，中華民國仍須維持一定數量及實質的「軍事國防」。這是「主權」的象徵，也是民主主體性的表彰；當然也是在兩岸及國際折衝中不能不備的籌碼。然而，軍事武備的數量規模與質量規格應如何規劃，這或許並非難事；但「為何而戰／為誰而戰」的「國防主題困惑」，仍是不易解決而必須解決的難題。

現今的國防規劃已出現兩個新元素。一、兩岸因經貿、文化交流頻密，和解的氛圍日升，「動員戡亂」的「仇匪恨匪意識」行將愈趨消減，這也是終止「動員戡亂」的必然變化；二、徵兵制改募兵制，兵員由「國民義務」變成「僱傭關係」。這兩個新元素，皆將對「為何而戰／為誰而戰」的「國防主題困惑」發生重大衝擊。

國防的軍備可以縮編，但國防的意識不能迷亂。兩岸情勢演化至今，「國防的主題」亦須有新的創設。中華民國的軍事國防，已不再是為「反攻大陸／消滅共匪」；然而，我們認為，卻有一更基本及更重大的責任，那就是：為兩岸和平作後盾，為民主政治作衛士。

今後，或許我們將有一支編製較小的軍隊；但這應是一支「小而美」的軍隊。倘若能以「和平後盾／民主衛士」自期自命，將士們的榮譽感、責任心就有了寄託，方向感與理想性也有了基礎。

我們應以兩岸和平不開戰為努力目標；但在萬一之際，我們亦當知為何而戰、為誰而戰。