The Party Chairmanship: Not Merely to Unify the Party and Administration

The Party Chairmanship: Not Merely to Unify the Party and Administration
China Times News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
June 11, 2009

After a month or two of advance planning, President Ma Ying-jeou has basically decided to assume the party chairmanship. President Ma will personally make the announcement. The matter has not been finalized. Nevertheless we would like to make a few predictions about what may happen to the the party and the government. We would also like offer some timely reminders and warnings.

We favor President Ma assuming the ruling party chairmanship for two reasons. One. The Legislative Yuan has abused its right to approve the vice presidential nominee for the Control Yuan and other appointed offices. They rejected several well-qualified nominees. Two. The KMT is apparently doing nothing as poorly qualified candidates are being nominated for the year end county magistrates and city mayors elections, based solely on the coat tail effect. These two developments have one thing in common. The public sentiment is abundantly clear. Yet the party behaves like an automaton utterly out of touch with public opinion. Under the circumstances, the president, who is responsible to over seven million voters, must come forward. He must assume total responsibility. He must take concrete action. He must assume the ruling party chairmanship.

We must however remind the president that he is assuming the party chairmanship only to prevent the party from engaging in underhanded practices. He must not create a party/state complex. Recent media reports claim that once President Ma takes over as party chairman, he will appoint Vincent Siew, Liu Chao-hsuan, and Wang Jing-pyng as Vice-Chairmen. If so, then one should indeed be concerned about the loss of checks and balances and the risk of authoritarian leadership. Such an arrangement should inspire second thoughts.

The key to a viable democracy, whether a parliamentary system or a presidential system, is checks and balances. The public detests special interests using the party to practice selfish patronage. But the public still hopes government institutions will provide oversight and act as gatekeeper. The Legislative Yuan must not defy public opinion and reject highly qualified nominees. Nor should it become the ruling party's rubber stamp. Suppose important presidential appointments are once again made as they were during the martial law era, during sessions of the KMT Central Standing Committee? Suppose the President of the Legislative Yuan expresses support in his capacity as Vice Chairman? Suppose the Convener of the Legislative caucus expresses support in his capacity as a Member of the Standing Committee? Any appointments will breeze through. Legislative consent will be meaningless. The system will be 100% authoritarian. By the same token, suppose the Vice-President's Financial Advisory Group objects? Suppose the Executive Yuan drafts a resolution, only to have the Vice Chairman report to the Central Standing Committee and issue a memorandum to KMT public functionaries? That will undermine the system and constitute a return to authoritarianism.

The value of democracy lies in dialogue, negotiations, and compromise. Dialogue is not confined to various groups within the same party, such as the executive and legislative branches. Dialogue between the ruling and opposition parties is also an important part of the interaction. The KMT Central Standing Committee is a very traditional entity, preoccupied with status, ritual, and grandeur. It is not a suitable venue for intraparty dialogue. If one incorporates officials of the executive branch, the legislative branch, the Vice President and other government heads into the Central Standing Committee, then the party will control the state. Everything will be decided by the Central Standing Committee. If this happens, the power of the legislature will shrink. This is something opposition parties will find intolerable. Intense social conflict will be inevitable. All disputes will be referred to the KMT Chairman. He will be no room to maneuver. We can't believe this is what President Ma wants.

The KMT is no stranger to presidents serving as party chairmen. For decades, under Chiang Kai-shek, Chiang Ching-kuo, Lee Teng-hui, this was the rule. If President Ma considers only past history, and ignores the exigencies of the moment, then he is blinding himself to reality. Under the Two Chiangs and Lee Teng-hui, the Republic of China was authoritarian. Opposition forces posed no real threat. The heads of the Executive Yuan and Legislative Yuan were Members of the Central Standing Committee. Even the head of the Judicial Yuan and Control Yuan, which are supposed to be neutral, often attended Central Standing Committee meetings. But times have changed. A president assuming the party chairmanship no longer means what it did before. Today's ruling party ought to be nothing more than a glorified campaign committee. It should curb Legislators' arrogance. It should ensure cooperation from local party leaders. But it must not prevent party functionaries from providing checks and balances against the party. The Republic of China's constitutional system is imperfect. Impose upon it an all powerful Central Standing Committee, and the consequences will be disastrous.

President Ma's willingness to assume responsibility for reform, and to assume the party chairmanship, is a good thing. But the integration of the ruling party and the ruling administration must be limited. It must not expand the power of a party/state complex. The safest approach is to have the party chairman control the campaign machinery. It is not necessary to make one's party functionaries Vice-Chairmen. The ruling party can encourage party functionaries to check and balance the party. It should prohibit the formation of factions seeking to expand their power. The Party Chairman's only weapon is his right to nominate candidates for office. This should not intrude upon the detailed process of checks and balances. Ensuring checks and balances may be difficult. But the machinery of democracy and the rule of law, must not be monopolized by the executive.

中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 　2009.06.11
社論－兼黨主席不只是為了黨政一統
本報訊

經過了一兩個月的布局，馬英九總統兼任黨主席一事應該大致底定，並由馬總統親自對外宣布。此事雖已行將定案，我們仍要對於爾後黨政局勢的發展做些預測，並做若干的提醒與警示。

我們當初支持馬總統兼任執政黨主席，主要是基於兩方面的觀察。其一，是立法院對監察院副院長等人事同意權操作醜陋，使一些社會形象不差的被提名人中箭落馬。其二是年底若干縣市長提名作業，國民黨黨部似乎坐觀其變，任令民意形象極差、或裙帶關係曖昧的人霸王硬上弓。這兩件事都有一共通點：民意偏好極為清楚，但黨部卻有如自走炮，完全與民意脫節。面對這種情況，身上承擔七百多萬選票民意壓力的總統，就必須要挺身而出、概括承受，而具體的做法，就是由總統兼任黨主席。

然而，我們也要特別提醒，總統兼任黨主席其實是為矯治黨部掣肘之弊，而非為了一統黨政運作。近日媒體報導，馬總統在接任黨主席之後，將安排蕭萬長、劉兆玄、王金平等人接任副主席。果真如此，那就確有虛化制衡、威權領導的疑慮，這樣的安排也就值得三思。

在民主國家，不論是內閣制或總統制，最核心的關鍵就是「制衡」二字。總統提名的人事案，人民雖然討厭有心人結黨營私地予以蓄意杯葛，但絕對還是希望民意機關能夠嚴格審查、確實把關。立法院不能悖離民意將好人封殺，但更不宜變成橡皮圖章，淪為政黨背書的立法局。如果將來重要人事案都如戒嚴時代一樣，改在國民黨中常會拍板定案，而立法院院長以副主席名義支持、立院黨團召集人以中常委身分表態，然後就行禮如儀照案通過，那麼同意權就形同虛設，是百分之百的威權體制。同樣的，如果副總統財經顧問小組的意見或行政院提案以後都由副主席提報中常會，再發文「從政同志」執行，那就是紊亂體制、重返威權的象徵。

換個角度來看，民主制度的可貴就在於它的對話、折衝與妥協。這些對話折衝不只存在同一政黨各個團體（如行政與立法部門）之間，更是朝野政黨互動的重要一環。國民黨中常會是個極為傳統的會議，階級禮儀氣氛濃厚，法相莊嚴，卻絕不是一個適合黨內對話的場所。如果將行政、立法、副元首等各方霸主都涵納於黨務會議之下，那就很難不重蹈當年以黨領政的老路，一切的一切都以中常會定奪。果如此，當立法權在黨的體制下限縮了運作空間，則在野黨絕對會難以忍受，激烈的社會衝突恐怕就在所難免，而且所有紛爭的矛頭都將指向國民黨主席，再無迴旋空間。我們相信，這絕對不是馬總統所樂見的局面。

國民黨對於總統兼黨主席一事並不陌生；數十年來蔣中正、蔣經國、李登輝莫不如此。但馬總統如果只參看先前歷史卻忽略當前局勢，恐怕會產生相當的盲點。不論是兩位蔣總統或李登輝總統時代，台灣都還時處威權，而當時的在野勢力根本不成氣候。在那樣的時代背景下，不但行政立法院長是中常委，甚至連理當中立的司法、監察首長也經常赫然出席中常會。但是時代不同了，總統兼黨主席的布局也該有所不同。現在的執政黨，只適合以選舉機器的最終掌握權，去抑制立法委員的囂張、遙控地方首長的配合度，而不能把各路從政同志盡納麾下，壓縮制衡的空間。台灣的憲政體制原已不盡完善，若再加上一個太上中常會，其後果可能不堪設想。

總之，馬總統願意承擔改革責任、兼任黨主席，那是好事。但政與黨的結合應該僅止於減少掣肘，而不宜擴大為黨政一統。最安全的做法，則是黨主席掌握選舉機器，但不必將各路從政同志納為副主席。執政黨可以鼓勵各部門的從政同志扮演制衡角色，僅僅禁止結派營私式的擁權自重。黨主席唯一的制裁工具，只是選舉提名，卻不涉入制衡機構間的操作細節。我們要提醒的是：效率與制衡之間的分寸拿捏或許不易，但是民主法制的機制，是絕不能被行政效率所凌越的。