Five Cities Elections: KMT Nominations Most Critical

Five Cities Elections: KMT Nominations Most Critical
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 5, 2010

For the sake of the Five City Elections, the KMT recently changed the staff of its local party headquarters. It actively began recruiting private sector talent. It is making a genuine effort. But its organizational reform efforts may not yield results in time. A short term backlash may undercut its campaign momentum. Most important of all, its nominees must be acceptable to grass-roots voters. The candidates may not be deficient in any respect. They must boast both clean images and governing ability. Only then can they create synergy during the election.

After years of thinning out, KMT party strength is considerably diminished at the grassroots. Compared to its early years, the KMT has fewer human resources, less equipment, and is smaller in scale. When party officials conducted field visits in the past, it was all pomp and circumstance. They were the equals of county executives and city mayors. Their decisions were final. County executives and city mayors could only nod. Even central and local level elected officials were at their beck and call. But the golden age for authoritarian political parties has passed. Today when party officials conduct field visits, they must bow and scrape, and often get the cold shoulder. When nominees for local elections find themselves at loggerheads, they ask central party officials to mediate, not always with success.

Times have changed. Officials from party headquarters have become a nightmare for party workers. They may have devoted a lifetime to the party. But the highest level to which they can probably rise, is local party headquarters chairman. But their positions have now become crosses to bear. In recent years, such positions have become a place to put party officials out to pasture. Outgoing legislators who want to run but who are unelectable, candidates who were pressured to withdraw, and anyone who unsuccessfully sought office, can be placed in these support positions. Such support positions are sources of friction due to post election grievances and local or clan interests. Mediating between the heads of local factions Is even more difficult.

During the January legislative election, the first thing KMT Secretary-General Ching Pu-chung did was to fine tune personnel assignments at local party headquarters. His intention was clear. Swap out unsuitable party officials. Replace them with new people who don't hold old grudges. The advantage is that without old grudges they need not consider personal feelings. The disadvantage is they have no name recognition. They couldn't appeal to peoples' feelings even if they wanted to. But at least old hatreds will not be directed at the new officials. How much front line fighting ability will the newly appointed officials actually demonstrate? We will have to wait and see. Ching Pu-chung should plan for the worst. Local party mediation is a hands-on process. It is unnecessary to trouble the party chairman.

Next, Ching Pu-chung recruited outsiders to conduct an evaluation of the party's use of human resources, and to recruit campaign volunteers for the Five Cities Elections. Judging by past elections, the Democratic Progressive Party, whether it was in the opposition or in office, made far better use of volunteers than the KMT. Young DPP volunteers wrote songs, choreographed dances, and set up websites. Old DPP volunteers engaged in word of mouth campaigning through radio and television talk shows, in the parks, and local farmers markets. These volunteers were campaign workers during the election, and party supporters after the election. They do not seek official assignments. While the KMT was in the opposition for eight years, it began studying this approach. But it never got the hang of it. To recruit older volunteers it always had to mobilize. The most spontaneous of volunteers were older women. But even they were recruited through womens' groups. Youth groups were once an important force behind KMT strength. Youth groups shone at public relations during the Kuan Chung era. But it is far more difficult for young people to rise through the ranks of the KMT than the DPP. The most successful example of a volunteer effort in recent years was the Red Shirt Army. But that was a spontaneous movement. The Chen corruption case outraged the public, creating a supportive social climate. When the Chen corruption case ended, the Red Shirt Army lost its rallying point. Its supporters each had their own political preferences. This political force is unlikely to play a key role in the future.

Ching Pu-chung hopes to use outside forces to transform the party, and to consolidate its volunteer forces. This is an important part of the KMT's effort to change itself into a "campaign machine." This is forward and creative thinking. It is also more in line with the new social and political climate. The reason it has led to criticism has to do with Ching Pu-chung's nominees. They are too controversial. Their character, values, and personal styles have led to fault-finding. Ching Pu-chung has only himself to blame for not investigating his nominees in advance. He must ask these "party outsiders" to talk less and do more, and let the results speak for themselves.

But no matter how one changes one's organizational structure, they remain internal political party matters. Strengthening party efficiency does not equate with election success. The KMT must strengthen itself as an election machine. Election victory must be its highest goal. If one cannot win elections and remain in office, then any party transformation loses its significance. Therefore in the face of any election, the party's nominations remain the key to its success. Loss of political momentum because legislators fought each other during the legislative by-elections is not a major problem. The Five Cities Elections are a far more serious matter. Winning or losing will immediately affect the 2012 Presidential Election.

The DPP is slighter weaker in the central Taiwan region. But it is stronger in the two southern cities. It has many strong candidates. In the north its "Princes" are readying for battle. By contrast, the KMT has no heavy hitters in the south. The New Taipei City Mayor may have trouble winning re-election. The party is unaccustomed to internal debate. It is unable to put forth qualified candidates. Even pollsters are having trouble taking the political temperature. The nomination process and candidates may be flexible. But for the sake of momentum it would be better to present its roster of candidates, and engage in public debate. Election controversy is nothing to fear. Only lively public debate can create momentum. In order to win the Five Cities Elections, the third and most important thing the KMT must do is encourage its leading candidates. The "Princes" of the party must have to the courage to say: I stand behind you!

中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 　2010.02.05
社論－國民黨五都選舉 提名最關鍵
本報訊

國民黨最近為了布局五都選舉，不僅調整地方黨部人事，也積極延攬民間人力公司長才，確實用心良苦。然而，組織結構改革的效能，未必是一時半刻能反映出成績，甚至有可能因為短期反彈直接損傷選舉戰力；最重要的，還是在於披戰袍之人選，能否得到基層民眾認可，參選人從形象到治理能力，缺一不可，輔選才能發揮事半功倍之效。

國民黨基層黨務，經過多年黨務精實，人力資源的配備與規模，相應於早年，縮減甚多。過去黨部主委出門，陣仗與權威，形同縣市首長，黨部主委拍板定案的事，不要說縣市首長只能點頭，從中央到地方民代還得奔走請託；威權政黨的黃金歲月早成歷史，如今黨部主委行走地方，求爺爺告奶奶，還不大有人搭理，地方選舉爭議相持不下，總得請出黨中央出馬，才有機會協調，還不一定擔保成功。

時移勢往，黨部主委已成黨工的夢魘。儘管一輩子奉獻給黨，十之八九最大就做個地方黨部主委，但如今坐上這個位子卻成為人見人嫌的苦差事。尤其最近幾年，這個職務經常成為黨政人事的疏洪道，卸任立委、想選卻選不上者、選舉協調落榜者，但凡坐轎不成者，都可能轉個彎成為扛轎者，這樣的扛轎人在地方，鮮少政通人和，相反的，因為背著選舉恩怨、地方（或家族）利益，想打通地方派系在內的各方山頭，做好調和鼎鼐的工作，就更難了。

國民黨秘書長金溥聰在元月立委補選後，第一樁事就是先微調地方黨部人事，用意很清楚，換掉人地不宜的主委，改派沒有舊恩怨包袱者上任。沒包袱的好處是不必講情面，壞處是：沒人認得你，講情面也沒用，但至少舊仇不至於衝著新人發飆。至於新上任的主委們到底能展現多少第一線作戰指揮官的本事？只能留待觀察，金溥聰應該早做好最壞打算，地方協調之事只能事必躬親，非必要不麻煩黨主席出馬。

接下來，金溥聰延攬外人進入黨部做人力資源再評估，組建五都選舉志工。從歷年選戰觀察，民進黨不論在野或執政，都比國民黨更擅於運用志工，年輕志工寫歌編舞搞網路，老年志工電台公園市場搞耳語，這群志工都是選舉任務編組，選後成為支持者，全無人事負擔；國民黨在野八年，開始學這套辦法，總是學不入味，老年志工還是要靠組織動員，最自動自發的婆婆媽媽，背後多數都還有個婦女會，青年團還是國民黨早年鞏固政權的重要力量，文宣青年軍早在關中時代就發揚光大，但是年輕人想在國民黨出頭，遠比在民進黨裡難多了。晚近搞志工最成功的反而是紅衫軍，但這屬自發性運動，且有扁案的社會大氣候支撐，扁案進入尾聲，紅衫軍也無從依附，對政治人物又各有偏好，這股力量在未來的政治大局中，很難集結扮演關鍵角色。

在這種情況下，如果金溥聰能以外力改造，並強化志工隊伍，對國民黨想轉型成所謂的「選舉機器」，當然是非常重要的環節。這個想法既前進，又創意，更合乎社會與政治變遷後的新情勢；之所以引發批評，實在是因為金挑的人選本身爭議太大，從人品、價值觀到秀型風格，都被人拿著實例挑剔，金溥聰只能怪自己事前沒做過人事調查，然後要求這個「黨的外人」少說多做，拿出成績再說。

但是，不論在組織上如何調整改造，都屬政黨內部事務，強化黨的效能不表示能與勝選畫上等號，國民黨既要調整成選舉機器，勝選就是最高目標，若無法延續勝選延續政權，黨的精實改造就失去意義。因此，面對任何選舉，提名就是黨成敗的關鍵。立委補選輸贏拚氣勢，問題不大；五都選戰就嚴肅多了，輸贏立刻牽動二○ 一二總統大選。

民進黨除中都稍弱外，南部二都戰力雄厚，戰將蜂湧，北部二都都有天王備戰；相對的，國民黨南部二都尚無強棒，新北市還有現任者連任與否困擾，黨內又無熱烈討論的文化，人選端不出檯面，連民調都測不出水溫，儘管提名時程、甚至人選者可以視對手策略彈性因應，但就黨的氣勢而言，寧可人選備出，眾說紛云，選舉不怕爭議，熱烈討論才能造成聲勢，國民黨拚五都，要做的第三件、可能也是最重要的事，就是鼓勵戰將、天王勇敢說出：我願意為黨披上戰袍！