NSC Appointments and the Dual Leadership Dilemma

NSC Appointments and the Dual Leadership Dilemma
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 24, 2010

Yesterday Su Chi, the outgoing Secretary-General of the National Security Council, turned over his job to successor Hu Wei-chen. Everyones' attention is now focused on the differences between the two appointees. But everyone has ignored the institutional problems behind the personnel change. Bluntly speaking, President Ma Ying-jeou's "dual executive system" is in trouble and must be rescued.

Su Chi said his phase of the mission is complete, and that he is resigning for reasons of health and family. This of course was a ruse. The real reasons for his resignation are the controversies over foreign relief during the 8/8 Floods and US beef imports. These were major issues among the public and within the administration. Su Chi refused to clarify matters or to brook criticism. He valued his own image, and resigned in a huff. One might say that Su Chi couldn't stand the heat, so he got out of the kitchen. But at a deeper level, the main reason was the failure of the dual executive system.

The dual executive system is a legacy of the French Fifth Republic. In fact the dual executive system, according to both the spirit and the letter of the law, has a single central government leader. When the presidency and the legislature are controlled by the same party, the president is the chief executive. When the presidency and the legislature are not controlled by the same party, the president appoints a premier supported by a legislative majority. This premier is the chief executive. Rather than referring to it as a dual executive system, it would be more accurate to refer to it as an executive power rechanneling system, or chief executive rechanneling system. In other words, under the Fifth Republic, the leader's unique role is integrated into the system, because it rechannels authority as part of its day to day operations.

Our constitution is nominally modeled on the Fifth Republic's. But it is a semi-finished, pale imitation. According to current legal provisions, the president is responsible for cross-Strait relations, foreign diplomacy, and national defense. But the MAC, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Defense are under the Executive Yuan. According to the constitution, the premier is the head of state. As a consequence, two problems have arisen. First, a dual executive system has arisen despite the rule of law. If the president presides over foreign affairs, why was foreign relief for the 8/8 Floods left up to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs? Conversely, if the Ministry of Foreign Affairs must consult the National Security Council over foreign relief, how can the Presidential Office evade responsibility for the decision, and blame the Ministry of Foreign Affairs? Secondly, problems have arisen over who formulates national policy. Take US beef imports. The National Security Council considers this a matter for presidential diplomacy. But the Department of Health must deal with its domestic political repercussions. When the National Security Council's decisions departed from the Department of Health's, a major political storm erupted. Nor was that all. During the US beef imports controversy, the Presidential Office, the cabinet, and the Executive Yuan House each found themselves on a different page. Eventually the KMT Chairman and the KMT legislative caucus amended the law, abrogating US beef import decisions made by the Presidential Office and the cabinet. What was this, if not a political circus?

Under the Lee Teng-hui regime, the dual-leadership system wreaked havoc. The public still recalls how Lee Teng-hui, speaking through Liu Tai-ying, humiliated Premier Vincent Siew. During the Chen Shui-bian era, Chen ignored the executive authority rechanneling system. His minority government stonewalled for eight years. Now Ma Ying-jeou is in office. He was elected president with a landslide 7.65 million votes. His party commands an absolute majority in the legislature. Yet he remains incapable of assuming "full authority and full responsibility." The Presidential Office, the cabinet, the Executive Yuan, and the party remain poorly coordinated. Deadlocks between the two executives are common. Su Chi's resignation underscores the seriousness of the problem.

France's dual executive system has already undergone transformation, to a rechanneling system. It should in fact be characterized as a single executive system. The legal provisions that assigned foreign diplomacy and national defense to the president have undermined the formulation of national policy, albeit not as seriously as the legal provisions that assigned cross-Strait issues, foreign diplomacy, and national defense to the president. As mentioned earlier, our dual executive system is a semi-finished, pale imitation of the French Fifth Republic's. It is a camel instead of a horse. Especially unfortunate is President Ma's leadership style. On the one hand, he adheres too rigidly to certain rules, in defiance of all logic. For example, he once declared that disaster preparedness measures and expressing sympathy for disaster victims, were the responsibility of the premier. On the other hand, President Ma lacks the ability to make things happen outside the institutional framework. The government and its policy-making system are fragmented. He lacks the ability to integrate the Presidential Office, the cabinet, the Executive Yuan, and the party, and assume "full authority and full responsibility." The inevitable result has been a dual executive system more akin to a camel than a horse.

The dual executive system is a "semi-finished product." It is deformed. Hence the need for a leadership better able to coordinate and repair the defects in the system. Given inadequate integration between the party and the government, Ma Ying-jeou must become a leader who assumes "full authority and full responsibility." He must ensure that his administration operates smoothly across the board.

從國安會人事交接看雙首長制的困局
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.02.24 03:29 am

新舊任國家安全會議秘書長昨日交接，蘇起下，胡為真上。一般人皆注目於新舊人選的比較，卻忽略了這次人事更易所反映的體制上的問題。直截而言，就是馬英九總統在「雙首長制」的操作上出現了鑿枘扞格，必須設法補救。

蘇起說，他的階段性任務已經完成，以健康及家庭因素而請辭，這當然是場面話。真正的原因是，八八水災是否徵求外援及美牛事件，不論在社會上或在政府內部，皆生重大爭議；蘇起既說不清楚，又不堪議論，顧惜羽毛，遂生倦勤之念。這可以說是蘇起耐不住廚房的熱，但深一層看，主因卻是「雙首長制」之操作失敗所致。

雙首長制緣自法國第五共和制。首須澄明：所謂「雙首長制」，在精神及法制上，其實只有一位中心「首長」。亦即，當總統與國會屬同一政黨時，總統是「首長」；當國會與總統不屬同一政黨時，總統即應任命國會多數所支持者為總理，並由總理擔任「首長」。因此，與其稱之為「雙首長制」，更符實情的稱呼應是「行政權換軌制」或「最高行政首長換軌制」。也就是說，在第五共和制中，首長的獨一地位及國政的整合性，皆因「換軌制」而在實務運作上得以維持。

我們的憲法宣稱是師法第五共和，卻是畫虎不成反類犬的「半成品」。根據我國現行法制，總統有兩岸、外交、國防之權；但是，陸委會、外交部及國防部卻在行政院轄下，而行政院長仍是憲法所規定的「最高行政首長」。於是，出現了兩大難題：一、在法制上，我國居然真正同時存在著「雙首長」。但若謂總統主持外交權，卻為何八八水災是否徵求外援竟據稱是由外交部決定？反過來說，倘若外交部曾請示國安會是否徵求外援，總統府又豈能將一度謝絕外援的決策責任歸咎於外交部？二、國政橫遭切割，整合出現問題。以美牛事件為例，國安會視此為總統的外交權，但在政治效應上必須面對社會的卻是衛生署。當國安會的決策面與衛生署的執行面出現巨大缺口，遂爆發了嚴重的政治風暴。尚不僅此，在美牛事件中，府閣院黨四大部門竟似完全解構，最後居然演出國民黨主席所領導的立院黨團，以修法廢約否決了府閣「雙首長」所制定的美牛決策。這寧非政治奇譚？

雙首長制在李登輝時代已經鬧得烏煙瘴氣，國人應仍記得李登輝借劉泰英之口羞辱行政院長蕭萬長的往事；到了陳水扁時代，則非但拒絕「行政權換軌」，更將「朝小野大」的亂局硬撐八年。如今換成馬英九，即使以七六五萬高票當選總統，在國會又佔絕對多數，卻非但不能「完全執政／完全負責」，且府閣院黨之間整合不佳，及「雙首長」之間鑿枘扞格的情事，亦屢屢出現。蘇起去職，更凸顯了問題的嚴重性。

法國的雙首長制，經由「換軌」的調度，其實可謂是單一首長；而法制由總統主持外交及國防之權，其造成國政切割的傷害，亦不如我國「兩岸／外交／國防」歸為總統權之嚴重。如前所述，我國現行的「雙首長制」，其實是拷貝法國第五共和制的「半成品」，因而畫虎不成反類犬。尤其不幸的是，馬總統的領導風格，一方面太過拘泥於法制上不合權力邏輯的規範，例如他甚至曾一度認為勘災及慰問災民是閣揆的責任；另一方面，馬總統又沒有能力運用體制內外的方法，將支離的政府體系及國政，在府閣院黨之間建立一個「完全執政／完全負責」的全局平台。因而，畫虎反類犬的「雙首長制」的弊害，遂致不可避免。

這個「半成品」的「雙首長制」是一個畸形體制，因而需要更有整合力的卓越領導加以彌縫補罅；面對當前府閣院黨整合欠佳的局面，馬英九應以「完全執政／完全負責」的最高首長自期，務使這個「全局平台」能平順運作！