One China, Different Interpretations, Revisited

One China, Different Interpretations, Revisited
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 4, 2010

Cross-Strait negotiations must undergo a rational process. This will allow the two sides to arrive at clearer objectives. This is what makes so-called "process orientation" different from past "goal orientation."

From a goal oriented perspective, four outcomes are possible. 1. Taiwan independence. 2. Maintenance of the status quo. 3. A Roof Theory political affiliation, such as a confederation or the European Union model. 4. Reunification. These four goals all require a process, namely, "One China, Different Interpretations."

Take independence. The Taiwan independence movement is a parasite in need of a host. Without a One China Constitution to hide behind, the Taiwan independence movement would be a parasite without a host. The Taiwan independence movement, including Chen Shui-bian's eight year long Taiwan independence regime, were parasites inside the Republic of China. They were afraid to jettison the Republic of China, the talisman they knew was sheltering them. Furthermore, given macro level developments globally, on the Chinese Mainland, and on Taiwan, Taiwan independence cannot possibly become the common goal for Taipei and Beijing. The Taiwan independence movement can do nothing, other than reside parasitically within the Republic of China, provoking internal strife.

Now take the other three possible goal oriented outcomes. Maintaining the status quo may be process oriented. The Roof Theory and reunification may be goal oriented. But they still require some sort of process. These processes should be consistent with peace and democracy, and acceptable to the international community. They must establish a civilized example consistent with mankind's expectations. The process will be time-consuming. Without "One China, Different Interpretations," such a process would be difficult to sustain.

Maintaining the status quo means maintaining both the Republic of China and the Peoples Republic of China. It means maintaining the status quo stipulated in the One China Constitution. The existence of the status quo is actually quite straightforward. The real dispute is over Different Interpretations. The two sides have yet to establish a protocol for expressing what they mean by Different Interpretations. Therefore whether the "Republic of China" is "part of China" has yet to be settled. Therefore whether "Taiwanese" are "Chinese" has yet to be settled. If these two major political identity issues cannot be settled, even maintaining the cross-Strait status quo will be difficult. The goal oriented Roof Theory and reunification will be more difficult still.

As mentioned earlier, any goal oriented program must be peaceful and democratic. Before embarking on any goal oriented program, the public on Taiwan must establish what they mean by "China" and "Chinese." Otherwise, how can they work toward any goal oriented objective? Can the vast majority of the public on Taiwan make the leap from the "Republic of China" to the Roof Theory, or a Third Concept of China? Can they make the leap to any standardized definition of "China," as the basis of their political identity? Without a process, there can be no goals to speak of.

The problem wioth goal orientation is its over-emphasis on a "future One China." It offers no solutions to how to deal with One China today. Process orientation focuses on ongoing processes. It seeks a rational process in order to arrive at clearer goals.

In fact, in 1997, former ARATS chairman Wang Daohan spoke of "One China, In Progress." This was the first time process orientation appeared in cross-Strait dialogue. One need only point to his One China, In Progress to understand Wang's ideological position. He said, "One China does not mean the People's Republic of China. Nor does it mean the Republic of China. It means a unified China created by compatriots on both sides." This is the Roof Theory, the One China, Different Interpretations Theory. Wang said, "The so-called one China, is a yet to be reunified China, a unified China that we are both moving towards." This is the Roof Theory, the One China, Different Interpretations Theory, and process orientation. Wang even said that One China is not present tense, because it is difficult to achieve in the present. But neither is it future tense, because that would reduce One China to a remote destination whose path is riddled with obstacles. Therefore why not refer to it as One China, In Progress? This again is process orientation, One China, Different Interpretations, and the Roof Theory. Suddenly One China has become One China, In Progress.

One China, Different Interpretations is One China, In Progress. One China, In Progress is One China, Different Interpretations. We already have what we need. Why look elsewhere?

Looking back today, Wang had the reputation, the position, and the status. When he put forth his One China, In Progress, his vision was advanced, and his thinking flexible. The horizons he offered were broad, and the road he opened was wide. He was far ahead of his juniors. As we can see, those in the know understood the problems bedeviling Taipei and Beijing. But when it came to Different Interpretations, their views were as different as night and day. In recent years, some in Beijing have said: "Although the two sides have yet to be reunified, they are still part of One China." In March 2008, Hu Jintao spoke of One China, Different Interpretations on the hotline with George W. Bush. This was a variation on Wang's theory. But he apparently experienced a failure of nerve. He stopped referring to it. He retracted it. He hesitated, concerned about the implications. As a result the One China, Different Interpretations and One China, In Progress argument was not given adequate support. Process orientation also lost ground. Under the circumstances how can the two sides seek clearer goals? Ten years ago, Wang could be so open and enterprising. Ten years later, why have we become so closed and timid?

Without a rational process, we cannot clarify our goals. If Beijing will not accept the idea that the "Republic of China is part of China," how can the public on Taiwan accept "China" and consider themselves "Chinese?"

再論兩岸應採「一中各表」
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.02.04 03:26 am

我們主張，兩岸關係應當由「合理的過程」，達到「改善之目的」。此即所謂的「過程論」，以有別於過去的「目的論」。

想像中，兩岸未來的「目的方案」有四種可能：一、台獨、二、維持現狀、三、屋頂理論的政治聯結（如邦聯或歐盟模式）、四、統一。這四種「目的」，無一不需以「一中各表」為「過程」。

先說台獨。台獨活動若無「一中憲法」的中華民國為屏障，將連賴以寄生的寄主都沒有。現今的台獨，包括曾經執政八年的陳水扁台獨政府，既寄生在中華民國，也不敢撕去中華民國的護符。何況，如今不論從世界、中國大陸、台灣內部及兩岸關係發展的大局大勢看，台獨皆已無可能作為兩岸關係的「目的方案」；而只是寄生在中華民國的內鬥工具而已。

再談其他三個「目的方案」。維持現狀固然就是要維持一個「過程」；屋頂理論及統一雖是「目的」，但亦仍需有一「過程」。且倘若此一「過程」應當符合和平、民主、國際接納，並能創造文明典範、增添人類價值成就等期待；那就必將是一個很細膩，而且耗時很長的「過程」。因而，若無「一中各表」，此一「過程」即難以維持。

所謂「維持現狀」，就是要維持「中華民國」與「中華人民共和國」皆主張「憲法一中」的「現狀」。「現狀」的事實原本如此簡明，問題卻在為如何「表述」而生爭議。由於「一中各表」的「表述程式」在兩岸間未能確立，所以「中華民國」是否「一部分的中國」亦不能確立，以至於「台灣人」是不是「中國人」也不能確立；但若這兩大政治認同皆不能確立，兩岸連「維持現狀」已屬不易，更遑論通往屋頂理論或統一之「目的」？

如前所述，欲實現任何「目的方案」，皆應當符合和平、民主等「過程」。倘若在進入任何「目的方案」前，台灣人對「中國」及「中國人」的認同皆不能建立，將憑何實現「目的方案」？絕大多數的台灣人難道有可能跳過「中華民國」，而直接將屋頂理論的「第三概念中國」或任何統一後的「中國」作為自己的政治認同目標嗎？沒有「過程」，豈有「目的」可言？

「目的論」的偏差，在過度強調「未來的一個中國」；因此對兩岸在「現在進行式」中如何處理「一個中國」的問題沒有對策。「過程論」則是注重「現在進行式」，注重「過程」；期望以「合理的過程」達到「改善之目的」。

其實，一九九七年，前海協會會長汪道涵就曾提出「現在進行式的一個中國」的說法。這可視為兩岸間最早出現的「過程論」。只要節述「現在進行式的一個中國」，即可看出汪道涵的思想體系。他說：「一個中國不等於中華人民共和國，也不等於中華民國，而是兩岸同胞共同締造統一的中國。」（這是屋頂理論、一中各表與過程論）又說：「所謂一個中國，應是一個尚未統一的中國，共同邁向統一的中國。」（也是屋頂理論、一中各表與過程論）不僅如此，汪道涵又說：「一個中國」不是「現在式」，因為目前很難；也不是「未來式」，因為可望不可及，夜長夢多。因此，何不用「現在進行式的一個中國」？（又是過程論、一中各表及屋頂理論）正是：驀然回首，「一個中國」已是「現在進行式」。

「一中各表」就是「現在進行式的一個中國」，「現在進行式的一個中國」就是「一中各表」。已在手中，何勞外求？

如今回顧，以汪道涵的人望、身分與地位，他當年提出「現在進行式的一個中國」，其眼界之寬廣、思路的靈活，與所呈現的境界高遠及出路開闊，竟是如今的後人晚輩所遠遠不能企及。可見，有識者其實皆看到了兩岸的難題，但對如何「表述」卻在思路及境界上竟可別如天壤。近幾年來，北京方面，雖曾有「雖然尚未統一／仍是一個中國」，及胡錦濤在二○○八年三月布胡熱線一度承認「一中各表」等表述，可謂皆是汪道涵論述的折射，但皆惜乎膽識不足，欲言又止，欲放又收，猶豫瞻顧，使「一中各表」的「現在進行式的一個中國」未能凸顯；因此，「過程論」亦失重要憑藉，更遑論兩岸將如何通向「改善之目的」？十餘年前汪道涵能如此開放進取，何以十餘年後今人反而如此閉鎖退縮？

不能維持「合理的過程」，即無可能通往「改善之目的」。如果北京不接受「中華民國是一部分的中國」，台灣人如何認同「中國」，又如何自我認同為「中國人」？