Stable Taipei-Washington Relations are a Prerequisite for Stable Cross-Strait Relations

Stable Taipei-Washington Relations are a Prerequisite for Stable Cross-Strait Relations
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 3, 2010

Washington has announced that it will sell 6.4 billion USD worth of weapons to Taipei. Taipei-Washington relations remain stable. But warning signs have appeared. This enormous arms purchase does not include conventional submarines and F-16C/Ds for preemptive defense. It falls far short of our expectations. Frankly, Washington's arms sales to Taipei are on the decline. The Ma administration must be cautious. Because without stable Taipei-Washington relations, there can be no stable cross-Strait relations.
Warming cross-Strait relations have definitely contributed to cross-Strait peace and regional stability. But the relationship remains in the stage of trade and economics and business talks. Significant political differences remain. In particular Beijing has not renounced the use of force against Taipei. The two sides have yet to formally end hostilities. Therefore stable Taipei-Washington relations remain important. This is the result of history, but it is also an objective necessity.

President Ma has reiterated that arms procurements will give Taipei an increased sense of security and self-confidence, allowing it to increase its interaction with the mainland. In other words, without substantive power, cross-Strait negotiations will overwhelmingly favor Beijing. Cross-Strait consultations under such circumstances would never yield positive results. Contrast the Republic of China government and the Hong Kong government. One of the obvious differences is that the Republic of China government has a defensive capability. This gives it a considerably stronger hand at the negotiating table.

Arms sales are a key indicator of stability in Taipei-Washington relations. This particular arms sale accounts for 69% of Taipei's annual defense budget. This may sound frightening, but it is all part of an uncompleted arms purchase from the past. It is nothing new. Washington could have approved this arms purchase immediately, but it delayed for over half a year. This is unprecedented for Taipei-Washington arms sales, and suggests a warning sign. Some people are wondering: could this be the last major arms deal between Taipei and Washington?

Such concerns cannot be completely ruled out. Barack Obama has not been in office long. His advisers are familiar with Asian-Pacific Affairs and cross-Strait affairs. They also understand the Taiwan situation. But key staffers may not share their perceptions, particularly regarding Beijing. Obama's advisers appear to have made their own calculations. This may mean new changes to the future of Taipei-Washington relations.

According to the provisions of the Taiwan Relations Act, congress did not "obligate" the executive branch to sell arms to Taipei. It merely authorized it to sell defensive weapons to Taipei. Strictly speaking, it is non-binding. The real reason Washington is willing to provide Taipei with defensive weapons has nothing to do with the act itself. It has to do with its political commitment to the island's freedom. The Taiwan Relations Act may include security provisions. But Taipei-Washington arms sales still require Washington's political commitment.

Taipei-Washington arms sales does not amount to a black and white political commitment. Its strength depends upon whether the strategic interests of Taipei and Washington coincide. It is also influenced by the rise of Mainland China. Past US administrations have maintained a balance between Taipei and Beijing. If the Obama administration regards the latter as more important than the former, the Ma administration must beware. This would not be a matter of whether Washington "sells out Taiwan." This would be the inevitable result of strategic developments on the international stage.

Recently the mainstream media in the US, including the New York Times, gave prominent coverage to Washington's commitment to selling weapons to Taipei. The sale was a backlash against Bejing's aggressiveness over the past year. This backlash however, should not inspire schadenfreude. If relations between Washington and Beijing deteriorate, cross-Strait relations will not benefit. No matter which side Taipei takes, it will be in the wrong. If Taipei-Washington relations undergo a chill, confidence on Taiwan will collapse. The resultant chaos will make peaceful cross-Strait relations impossible.

Beijing's antipathy towards Washington's arms sales to Taipei is understandable. Arms sales affect the political relationship between Washington, Bejing, and Taipei. The arms sale may not be the same as cross-Strait politics, but it is definitely a case of "shelving disputes." Since the issue of arms sales can not be resolved in the short term, why not shelve it? Doing everything possible to block arms sales between Washington and Taipei will not help cross-Strait reconciliation. It can only heighten a sense of crisis ion Taiwan.

From a military perspective, Beijing is worried that Taipei will "resist reunification by force" or "maintain the status quo in perpetuity." Actually such concerns are superfluous. Washington has never sold offensive weapons to Taipei. Taipei lacks both strategic depth and defensive autonomy. It cannot withstand long-term ideological turmoil and risk. Its armaments are limited to the minimum required for defense. With the emergence of non-traditional security issues, the ROC military is undergoing restructuring. When the earthquake struck Haiti, Republic of China C-130 transport planes crossed the Pacific to provide disaster relief. The armed forces are undergoing transformation. What threat do they constitute?

Beijing has reiterated that following cross-Strait reunification, the ROC could retain its military. If Beijing means that the ROC military will be nothing more than a police force to maintain law and order, then it is badly lacking in sincerity. Military forces are military forces because they have specialized equipment, specialized training, and specialized tasks. These come mainly from the United States. To ban arms sales between Washington and Taipei is tantamount to cutting off the military's umbilical cord. Our military forces would no longer be military forces. How can Beijing justify such a position? It can only leave the public on Taiwan the impression that Beijing is engaged in a war of reunification.

Washington-Taipei arms sales are the touchstone for stable Taipei-Washington relations. Cross-Strait relations have improved. The defensive needs of the ROC can be adjusted and its armed forces restructured accordingly. But Taipei-Washington relations must not be terminated because of threats. Experience has shown that without stable Taipei-Washington relations, there can be no stable cross-Strait relations. The Ma administration in particular needs to have a sense of proportion. It must not paint itself into a corner.

中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 　2010.02.03
台美關係穩定 兩岸關係才穩定
本報訊

儘管美國政府宣布售台六十四億美元軍備，印證台美關係持續穩定，卻也出現某種警訊，如此大筆軍費竟排除常規潛艦和Ｆ-16Ｃ/Ｄ等主動防禦性能的主戰裝備，遠不及我方的預期。老實說，美台軍售已經出現「弱化」趨向，馬政府須謹慎以對，因為沒有穩定的台美關係，就不會有穩定的兩岸關係。

不可否認，近期兩岸關係緩和確實為兩岸和平發展與地區穩定做出貢獻，但這種關係仍處經貿階段和事務性商談，在政治領域尚存巨大分歧，尤其在對岸未承諾放棄對台動武、兩岸未正式結束敵對狀態之前，台美關係的穩定就顯得極為重要，這既是歷史造成，更有其客觀需要。

馬總統多次表示，軍購讓台灣更有安全感與自信心，從而與大陸有更多的互動。換言之，沒有實力做基礎，兩岸協商將一面倒向對岸，不可能出現近期兩岸協商所取得的豐碩成果。拿台灣和香港做比較，一個明顯的差異在於台灣有防衛能力，至少在談判桌前還有底氣。

軍售是台美關係穩定的關鍵指標。這次軍售金額高占台灣今年國防預算六九％，聽起來或許嚇人，但都屬於多年遺留未決的軍備，並無新意。按理說，美方可以很快通過這筆軍購，卻推遲長達半年以上，台美軍售史上從所未見，由此似乎透露出某種警訊。有人開始擔心，這會不會是最後一次且最大一筆的美台軍售？

這種憂慮，確實不能完全排除。美國歐巴馬總統上任不久，他的亞太事務策士熟悉兩岸事務，對台灣處境亦有相當理解，但其核心幕僚未必有相同認知，尤其對中國的看法，歐巴馬身邊的謀士似乎另有盤算，這為今後台美關係增添變數也不無可能。

按《台灣關係法》條文，美國國會並未「責成」行政部門對台軍售，美國同意對台出售防禦性武器，嚴格說也不具強制力，而美國願意對台提供防禦性武器，真正的力道不在法本身，而在於對台灣自由堅定的政治承諾，即便《台灣關係法》有安全條款，美台軍售仍需要美方的政治承諾作為支撐才行。

美台軍售的微妙之處，就在於這種難以訴諸文字的「政治承諾」，它的強弱除取決於台美戰略利益是否一致，同時也深受中國崛起的影響。美國歷屆政府都極盡可能維持其中的平衡，如果歐巴馬政府視後者比前者重要，馬政府就要小心了，這和美國是否出賣台灣無關，而是國際形勢使然的結果。

日前美國主流媒體如《紐約時報》，大篇幅報導美國堅持對台軍售，是對中國過去一年過於強勢而做出的反擊。看到這樣的分析，我們無權幸災樂禍，因為美中關係交惡，對兩岸關係沒有好處，台灣站在哪一邊都不對；如同台美關係疏離，台灣心防潰散，亂局將使兩岸關係無從和平發展。

中共反對美台軍售我們完全理解。在政治層面上，軍售涉及美、中、台三邊關係，其屬性雖和兩岸政治定位不同，但絕對是「擱置爭議」的範疇，軍售問題既然在短期內解決不了，何不將其擱置。對岸極盡全力封殺美台軍售，不但無助於兩岸和解，反而增加台灣的危機感。

從軍事上說，對岸擔心台灣由此而「以武拒統」或「永遠維持現狀」。其實，這樣的疑慮大可不必，美國從未出售攻勢裝備給台灣，台灣既無戰略縱深，國防又不能自主，禁不起意識形態上的長期折騰和冒險，軍備僅止於最低限度的防禦。隨著非傳統安全議題的出現，台灣軍隊開始轉型，海地強震發生後，台灣Ｃ-一三○運輸機飛越太平洋賑災，即為軍隊轉型的例證，何來威脅。

對岸曾多次表示，兩岸統一後，台灣可以擁有軍隊，如果視其為警察維護治安，就太沒有誠意了。軍隊之所以是軍隊，就有不同於一般的裝備、訓練和任務，而這些主要來自美國，封殺美台軍售，無異於切斷國軍的臍帶，軍不成軍，對岸如何自圓其說，徒增台灣人民對統戰的印象而已。

美台軍售是台美關係穩定的試金石，隨著兩岸關係改善，它可以按台灣的防禦需要和軍隊轉型而做調整，但決不能因威脅而終止。經驗顯示，沒有穩定的台美關係，就不會有穩定的兩岸關係，馬政府尤其需要掌握其分寸，以免進退失據。