Washington-Beijing Relations following the Arms Sales to Taipei

Washington-Beijing Relations following the Arms Sales to Taipei
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 2, 2010

Barack Obama has announced that his administration will sell five types of military weapons to Taipei, totally nearly 6.4 billion USD. It will be the largest arms sale of the decade. Beijing repeatedly warned Washington not to make the sale. Following the announcement, it protested even more strongly. It has decided to suspend military exchanges and to impose sanctions against the companies involved. Observers await further actions.

Following Barack Obama's visit to Beijing late last year, Washington-Beijing relations appeared to be rosier than ever. But arms sales brought progress to a screeching halt. Why is Washington selling arms to Taipei? The high-minded answer is that Washington must maintain its commitments to Taipei's security. But the real answer is that Washington hopes to maintain its influence over Taipei.

For Washington to maintain its influence over Taipei, is both good and bad for Beijing. It is bad because international factors cannot be excluded from cross-Strait relations. When Barack Obama visited Beijing in November, Beijijng assumed the rules of the game were already clear. Washington would respect Beijing's sovereignty and core interests. Now it seems that is not the case. Since Washington is selling weapons to Taipei, Barack Obama will probably also meet with the Dalai Lama.

But from Beijing's perspective, Washington's influence over Taipei can also be good. When Chen Shui-bian was in power, Washington pulled him back from the brink, and prevented the cross-Strait situation from getting out of control. It is widely understood that Beijing is concerned about the direction of cross-Strait relations after the Ma Ying-jeou administration. It may still need to rely on Washington to maintain stability.

The way Washington maintains its influence over Taipei, can be seen from its policy toward Tokyo.

The United States Marine Corps Futenma Air Station has recently become a point of friction between the two governments. Washington insists that the Democratic Party government of Hatoyama abide by the agreements negotiated by the former LDP government, and move the base to another location on Okinawa. The Hatoyama government has run into objections from local residents as well as the the ruling Socialist Party coalition, and wants to postpone the decision. The two sides have dug in their heels. Tokyo feels that Washington doesn't understand its domestic political dilemma. Washington has made it known that it considers Tokyo even more troublesome than Beijing. Relations have degenerated to the point where the 50th anniversary celebration of the US-Japan Security Treaty was glossed over. In fact, many people in the US feel that if evem minor matters such as this cannot be dealt with, the US-Japan Security System exists in name only.

In fact, the Futenma Air Station dispute reflects the evolution of the triangular relationship between Washington, Beijing, and Tokyo. After the Democratic Party government took office, relations with Beijing became extraordinarily close. Washington has become extremely concerned. For Washington, the US-Japan Security Treaty is the cornerstone of Asia-Pacific security. At one time it was a response to the threat of the Soviet Union. After 1990, it became a response to the rise of Mainland China. If the rise of Mainland China becomes a threat to the U.S., the US-Japan Security Treaty will be Washington's most important hedge. Washington cannot allow Tokyo to lean toward Beijing.

Given a rising Mainland China, the first collision point is in the Taiwan Strait. Although Washington does not want to become embroiled in a conflict in the Taiwan Strait, neither is it willing to let go. It does not want to see Taipei "Finlandized," according to its strategic perception. It does not want Taipei to lose the ability and initiative to defend itself, and be incorporated into Beijing's sphere of influence. Under these circumstances, selling weapons to Taipei enables it to strengthen security ties.

Beijing's ire is currently directed entirely at Washington. It is adopting a cautious attitude toward Taipei, avoiding direct attacks to avoid upsetting the current relaxed atmosphere. But Beijing is unhappy, and has privately complained that the Ma administration is attempting to please both sides, and taking maximum advantage of its situation.

We must distinguish between the economic benefits Beijing offers us, and the security threat it poses for us. Beijing has demonstrated goodwill toward us with ECFA. But it has not budged an inch in terms of security threats. It has not promised not refrain from using force against us. It has not reduced the number of missiles it has deployed, or changed their locations. In other words, Beijing has made no effort to reduce the threat to Taipei. Therefore Taipei has no choice but to maintain the ability to defend itself.

Negotiations over economic agreements have begun. Beijing has urged Taipei to begin political dialogue as soon as possible. But it has not relinquished the use of force against Taipei. This is not helpful toward Taipei entering political negotiations. As President Ma Ying-jeou stressed, "Arms purchases will give Taiwan a greater sense of security and self-confidence, enabling it to increase its interactions with the Mainland." This is not mere lip service. The Republic of China has a democratic form of government. Its society is diverse. In order to enter negotiations, it must first establish a consensus. If Beijing blindly opposes arms sales to Taipei, it will merely convince people that Beijing wants to force Taipei to submit.

Following the announcement of the arms sales, we see unanimous support from both the Blue and Green Camps, proving that when it comes to national security, the mainstream on Taiwan is of one opinion. Current political disputes often provoked blind opposition. Arms sales is a refreshing exception. We hope the ruling and opposition parties can find increased common ground on cross-Strait policy. Only then can the Republic of China's real interests find expression.

中時電子報 新聞
中國時報 　2010.02.02
軍售後的美中台關係 難題待解
本報訊

美國歐巴馬政府日前宣布對台五項軍售，總額近六十四億美元，是近十年來最大的一筆。中國政府之前已經多次警告，宣布後更強烈抗議，決定暫停軍事交流以及對參與軍售公司制裁等，外界都在觀察會不會有進一步行動。

去年底歐巴馬訪問北京後，美中關係似乎呈現出從來沒有過的榮景，但是軍售卻讓情勢急轉直下。首先要問的是，美國為什麼要賣？冠冕堂皇的回答當然是，華府必須維持對台灣安全承諾；但是實際上，則是美國希望繼續維持在台灣的影響力。

美國維持影響力，其實對北京，有好也有壞。壞處在於，兩岸情勢發展總也排除不了「國際因素」，十一月歐巴馬在北京時，中國原本以為基本原則確立，美國會尊重中國的主權與核心利益；現在看起來，並不是那麼一回事，美國既然賣給台灣武器，歐巴馬一定也會與達賴見面。

但美國對台灣的影響力，從北京觀點來看，也有好的部分。陳水扁當政期間，是靠美國的約束才懸崖勒馬，不致讓兩岸情勢失控；眾所週知，目前北京擔心後馬英九時代的兩岸走向，可能還是需要靠美國才穩得住。

美國要維持對台灣的影響力，其戰略意圖從近來對日本的政策，可以得到更完整的圖像。

沖繩的美國海軍陸戰隊普天間基地，最近是兩國衝突的焦點。美國堅持鳩山的民主黨政府必須按照先前自民黨政府談妥的協議，把基地遷移到沖繩另一處地點；鳩山政府礙於當地居民反對，加上執政聯盟的社會黨反對，希望延後決定。雙方交涉時，都動了情緒。日方認為美國沒有體諒國內的政治困難；而美國則放話，說日本比中國還難搞。雙方甚至連美日安保締約五十周年慶祝，都草草應付了事。事實上，美國許多人認為，連這點小事都搞不定，美日安保體制已經名存實亡。

普天間基地爭議所反映的，其實是美中日的三角關係演變。民主黨政府上台後，與中國的關係超乎尋常的親密，美國方面對此非常憂心。對華盛頓來說，美日安保是亞太安全的基石。之前是應對蘇聯的威脅，九零年代後，則是應對中國的崛起；如果崛起的中國對美國造成威脅，美日安保會是最重要的避險機制，美國不能任憑日本傾往中國那邊。

而崛起的中國，第一個碰撞點就在台海。美國雖然不願意自己被捲入台海衝突，但同樣不能放手；從自己的戰略利益考慮，也不希望台灣逐步被芬蘭化，喪失防衛自己的能力與主動權，從而被納入中國勢力範圍。在這個考慮下，出售武器可以拉緊與台灣政府的安全紐帶。

大陸指責的炮火，目前都在美國；對台灣當局採取審慎的態度，避免直接攻擊，以免傷及目前和緩的氣氛。但是北京心理是不高興的，私下埋怨馬政府在美中兩邊討好，佔盡便宜。

然而在區分大陸對台的經濟利益與安全威脅後，我們可以發現，雖然在ＥＣＦＡ協議上，大陸展現出善意，可是在安全威脅上，卻是一步未讓，不僅沒有承諾不對台動武，部署的飛彈也沒有減少或是遷移。換句話說，大陸並沒有做出減少對台灣威脅的努力，讓台灣沒有選擇，不得不仍要維持自衛的能力。

在經濟協議開始談判之際，大陸敦促台灣應及早進入政治對話，但卻沒有放棄以武力解決，這對期待台灣進入政治談判，是沒有助益的。此外，馬英九總統強調：「軍購可以讓台灣更有安全感與自信心，從而與大陸有更多互動」，並不是敷衍托辭。台灣是民主政體，社會有多元意見，要進入談判必須建立共識，中國一味反對軍售，只會令許多人擔心，中國硬要逼台灣訂城下之盟而已。

軍售決定宣布後，我們看到藍綠一致表示支持，這證明在國家安全上，台灣大多數的主流看法是一致的。在現今流於盲目反對的政策爭議下，軍售是個清新的例外；我們也期待在未來的兩岸政策上，朝野能夠有更多的交集，台灣真正的共同利益才能夠形塑出來。