Deceive, Subsidize, Capture, Kill; Pretend, Take, Escape, Survive; Win/Win, Coexist

Deceive, Subsidize, Capture, Kill; Pretend, Take, Escape, Survive; Win/Win, Coexist
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 20, 2010

Both advocates and opponents of ECFA on Taiwan are wary of falling into a "deceive, subsidize, capture, kill" trap set by Beijing. Those who oppose ECFA are worried. But even those who favor ECFA have knots in their stomach.

As we noted previously, each side has its own "visible agenda" in today's cross-Strait wrestling match. Beijing's visible agenda is "deceive, subsidize, capture, and kill" the Republic of China government in Taipei. It is to use the vague language of the 1992 Consensus to deceive Taipei, to open direct links allowing Mainland tourists to visit Taiwan, to make large procurements subsidizing Taipei, to nurture a habit of dependency on the Mainland to capture Taipei, and finally, to kill the Republic of China government in Taipei. Taipei's "visible agenda" is "pretend, take, escape, survive": It is to use the "1992 Consensus" and other vague language to pretend to solve problems, without really getting to the bottom of the matter, to obtain nourishment from the Mainland, to use the nourishment to establish the primacy of the Republic of China, to escape from Beijing's trap, and to seek a symbiotic Win/Win relationship.

These agendas are not "hidden agendas." They are "visible agendas." Some people on Taiwan oppose ECFA. They are afraid of falling into Beijing's "deceive, subsidize, capture, kill" trap. Other people on Taiwan favor ECFA. They hope that Taiwan can "pretend, take, escape, survive."

In March, Mainland China experienced a 7.2 billion trade deficit, its first in six years. Its deficit with Taiwan was 7.9 billion. In other words, its deficit with Taiwan remains larger than its total deficit. The two sides are signing ECFA. Beijing's "share the wealth" policy panders to Taiwan's interests. As we can see, Beijing's policy of "deceive, subsidize" and Taipei's policy of "pretend, take" have reached a high point. This is why ECFA is currently raising alarms.

One of our recent editorials pointed out that the Republic of China has two issues for which there are no substitutes. First, there is no substitute for the geopolitical and cultural relationship between Taiwan and the Mainland. Secondly, there are no substitutes for the Republic of China's freedom and democracy. Therefore economic and trade activities under the Republic of China's system of freedom and democracy make it Impossible to ignore the Chinese Mainland, the world's factory and the world's market place. That is why the two sides' unique economic and trade relationship cannot be discontinued. The only difference is that for over a decade, Taipei was mired in the myth of "China's Coming Collapse." Had Taipei taken full advantage of its situation back then, it would be in a far better bargaining position today. It would have far less need to "pretend and take" in response to Beijing's "deceive and subsidize." The economic side of "pretend and take" and "deceive and subsidize" are understandable. What is worrisome is the political side. Can Beijing "capture and kill" Taipei? Can Taipei "escape and survive?"

Actually, ECFA may well be the magic talisman that breaks the spell of "deceive, subsidize, capture, kill" and "pretend, take, escape, survive." On the one hand, ECFA would make de jure Taiwan independence even more impossible. On the other hand, ECFA would dramatically reduce the urgency and necessity of de jure reunification. As noted in this paper's "Six New Year's Day Editorials," ECFA can facilitate the process of cross-Strait interactions, while easing any tensions generated by conflicting cross-Straits goals.

When discussing cross-Strait interactions, one will encounter the "first economics, then politics" thesis. But cross-Strait interactions have never been either purely economic, or purely political. They have always been both. ECFA has economic content, but it also has far reaching political repercussions. ECFA will have an enormous impact on cross-Strait interactions. The greatest of which is that the Mainland's economy will "capture" Taipei, while the Republic of China's democracy will "capture " Beijing. Beijing will use ECFA to shower Taipei with benefits, mainly in response to the Republic of China's democracy and public sentiment on Taiwan. Therefore behind the economic actions are political motivations. If ECFA can facilitate cross-Strait interactions, then economics can soften politics, and peace can replace military force. Violent and coercive goal orientation can be diminished, and replaced by a kinder, gentler process orientation, allowing the two sides to establish better goals. The basis of future interaction will be economics, peace, and democracy, enabling both sides to win and prosper.

ECFA will soon be signed. Beijing should forsake its agenda of "deceive, subsidize, capture, and kill." Because no matter what goals the two sides move toward in the future, Beijing cannot afford to "kill" the Republic of China's freedom and democracy. Beijing cannot afford to be accused of killing the Republic of China government in Taipei. If it were killed, Beijing would find it difficult to revive and govern the Taiwan region. This is why Beijing has adopted its "economics, peace, and democracy" policy toward Taipei. This is why we urge Beijing not to try to lure us into a trap, but instead invite us to a dance.

ECFA is still being drafted. We recommend that One China, Different Interpretations be added to its table of contents.

騙養套殺 裝吃閃活 雙贏共生
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.04.20 02:24 am

在台灣，不論是否贊成簽定ＥＣＦＡ（兩岸經協）者，心中皆有可能陷入中國「騙／養／套／殺」陷阱的疑慮。反對簽ＥＣＦＡ者固有此想，贊成者的心裡其實也不免有一粒大疙瘩。

我們曾經指出，兩岸今日角力，各有一套「陽謀」。北京方面的陽謀是「騙／養／套／殺」：用「九二共識」之類的籠統語言「騙」住台灣，再以開放三通、陸客來台、大筆採購等「養」台灣，在建立傾斜的依賴關係後「套」住台灣，最後則生殺由之。台灣方面的陽謀則是「裝／吃／閃／活」：對「九二共識」等籠統語言「裝」作解決了問題而不深究，然後設法「吃」大陸供應的養分，再用養分來建立台灣的主體地位以「閃」避北京的套結，進而謀求兩岸雙贏共生的「活」路。

以上這些，在兩岸皆不是「陰謀」，而是「陽謀」。如今，台灣一部分民意之所以反對簽ＥＣＦＡ，就是恐懼會墜入「騙養套殺」的陷阱；而另一部分民意之所以支持簽ＥＣＦＡ，就是寄望台灣能「裝吃閃活」。

中國大陸在三月出現六年來首見的外貿逆差，達七十二億，其中對台灣逆差是七十九億；亦即，對台逆差尚大於總逆差。此刻，兩岸正在洽簽ＥＣＦＡ，北京的「讓利」政策，亦使利益向台灣傾斜；由此可見，北京的「騙／養」，與台灣的「裝／吃」皆已進入高峰階段。這正是ＥＣＦＡ引發疑慮之處。

日前社論指出，台灣有兩項基本因素不具「替代性」。一、台灣與中國大陸的地緣及人文關係不具替代性；二、台灣的自由民主不具替代性。因而，台灣在自由民主體制下的經貿活動，絕無可能與作為世界工廠與世界市場的中國大陸切割，所以雙方的「經貿養分交流」關係也殊無可能禁絕。只是，台灣若在十幾年前未陷於「中國崩潰論」的幻想，而能及時操持優勢及主動地位的話，今日「騙／養」及「裝

／吃」的情勢，理應不至於像現今傾斜得如此嚴重。準此以論，「騙／養」及「裝／吃」的經濟面皆屬可以理解，其顧慮則是在政治面。亦即：北京會不會「套／殺」？台灣能不能「閃／活」？

其實，ＥＣＦＡ或許正是破解「騙養套殺／裝吃閃活」魔咒的法器。主要的理由是：ＥＣＦＡ一方面將使「法理台獨」變成更不可能，且ＥＣＦＡ同時亦使「法理統一」急遽降低了急迫性與必要性。若以本報《元旦六論》系列社論的語言來說，ＥＣＦＡ可使「過程論」更形穩健，亦使尖銳的「目的論」趨於緩和。

兩岸互動，有所謂「先經後政」之說；但經濟與政治在兩岸互動中，從來未曾涇渭分明，而是始終交雜纏繞。ＥＣＦＡ有其經濟內涵，但亦有極大的政治效應。我們認為，ＥＣＦＡ對兩岸互動最大的影響將是：大陸用經濟「套」住台灣，台灣則用民主「套」住大陸。北京藉ＥＣＦＡ對台大幅讓利，主要是在回應台灣的民主與民意；因而，與其說是經濟面的動作，不如說是政治面的思維。也就是說，ＥＣＦＡ倘若能確立兩岸互動「以經濟柔化政治／以和平取代武力」的基本準則，即應當可以降低暴力性與強制性的「目的論」之抬頭，而能較平穩地走在「過程論」之中，並共同趨向「改善之目的」。如此，在未來以「經濟／和平／民主」為準則的長期互動過程中，應當有「雙贏共生」的成就可期。

在ＥＣＦＡ即將簽訂之際，北京應忘掉「騙養套殺」。因為，不論兩岸未來將走向何種「目的」，北京皆不能「殺」死台灣的自由與民主；「中國」不能承受「殺」死台灣的罪名，被「殺」死的台灣也很難在「中國」復活，亦非「中國」所能治理。這正是北京如今改採「經濟／和平／民主」對台政策的原因，也就是我們曾經說的：不要請君入甕，而要與卿共舞。

準此，我們建議，在ＥＣＦＡ不成文的早收清單之上，再加列一個項目：一中各表。