The Republic of China: No Realistic Alternatives

The Republic of China: No Realistic Alternatives
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 15, 2010

Is there an alternative to the Cross-Strait Economic Agreement (ECFA)? Before we attempt to answer this question, we must first answer another question. Is there an alternative to the Republic of China?

The DPP says signing ECFA is evidence of "Ma Tong" (the Green Camp's coarse epithet for President Ma) "pandering to [Mainland] China and selling out Taiwan." Clearly the DPP is treating the ECFA controversy as a struggle over national identity and the meaning of the constitution. Therefore it is impossible to understand the ins and outs of ECFA without first understanding the controversy over national identity and the meaning of the constitution.

The Ma administration's thinking behind ECFA begins with the Republic of China. The Republic of China has a One China Constitution. This leads logically to One China, Different Interpretations, No [immediate] Reunification, No Independence, and No Military Conflict, Expansion of Cross-Strait Exchanges, Direct Links and Direct Flights, the Institutionalization of Economic and Trade Exchanges, and ECFA. Put simply, the institutionalization of cross-Strait economic and trade exchanges is the natural consequence of upholding the Republic of China's Constitution and its definition of national identity.

By contrast, those who advocate Taiwan independence and nation building, oppose the One China Constitution, One China, Different Interpretations, and No Reunification, No Independence, No Military Conflict. They will naturally oppose Direct Links and Direct Flights, obstruct the expansion of cross-Strait exchanges, and of course ECFA. After all, the closer cross-Strait exchanges become, the lower the likelihood of Taiwan independence and nation building. The Green Camp has long advocated Taiwan independence and nation building, as well as the rectification of names and the authoring of a new constitution. That is why it advocates "Avoid Haste, Be Patient," opposes Direct Links and Direct Flights, and of course ECFA. In other words, opposition to ECFA is the logical consequence of support for Taiwan independence. Alas, consistent logic is hardly the same as correct policy.

In the final analysis, the dispute between the Blue and Green political camps on Taiwan has always boiled down to a single question: Is there an alternative to the Republic of China?

One side advocates preserving the Republic of China. The other side advocates Taiwan independence and nation building, and replacing the Republic of China with a "Nation of Taiwan." Is there an alternative to ECFA? Actually, if one examines the controversy in this light, the real question is whether there is an alternative to the Republic of China.

Whether there is an alternative to the Republic of China depends on whether the proposed alternative works. Take food for example. Noodles are an alternative to rice because they work. Poison, on the other hand, is not an alternative to rice, because it does not work. This comparison is admittedly extreme. Perhaps halting construction on the Number Four Nuclear Plant is a better example. Invoking a "nuclear-free homeland" to justify halting construction on the Number Four Nuclear Plant could be considered idealistic. It is not categorically unworkable. It is workable, providing one is willing to spend more money, live with more pollution, and hamper economic development. But we face a dilemma. Economical non-nuclear power generation is not yet a reality. Complete reliance on conventional energy generation poses its own problems. If we cease using nuclear power, halting construction on the Number Four Nuclear Plant in pursuit of a "nuclear-free homeland" may not be categorically unworkable. But one must first ask oneself whether society is able to bear the cost.

There are two basic reasons why a "Nation of Taiwan" cannot be considered a workable alternative to the Republic of China. One. The geopolitical and cultural relationship between Taiwan and Mainland China, and Mainland China's status as the world's factory and the world's marketplace. The United States, Japan, and Southeast Asia cannot replace Mainland China. Two. the free and democratic system on Taiwan. One cannot forcibly impose restrictions on cross-Strait economic and trade exchanges, and on cultural and social exchanges. Under a free and democratic system, unless one is willing to impose martial law, money will walk. These two reasons make any other political and economic path far too difficult.

Globally, bilaterall, and internally, Taiwan independence may be an ideal of sorts, but one that is unworkable. You may not like the meal in front of you, but poison is never an alternative. There may be alternatives to ECFA. just as there are alternatives to nuclear power generation. If one is determined to reject nuclear power generation or ECFA, one can halt nuclear power plant construction. For example, one Green oriented think-tank suggests seeking a six to nine percent reduction in tariffs for exports to the Mainland. It suggests encouraging companies from Taiwan to first set up plants in Southeast Asia, then transfer them to Mainland China. But this is nothing new. Over the past two decades, the two sides have habitually used third locations as alternatives to direct flights. Such roundabout methods are "alternatives" of a sort. But at what cost? And to what end?

The Green Camp refuses to sign ECFA because it wishes to establish a "Taiwan independence homeland." But will refusing to sign ECFA really enable them to establish a "Taiwan independence homeland?" Where is the rationality in refusing to sign ECFA, and forcing Taiwan into economic marginalization, all for the sake of an unattainable "Taiwan independence homeland?"

The "Two Yings Debate" has provoked controversy because information has been neither transparent nor symmetrical. We feel that the most opaque aspect of the Blue vs. Green political struggle is the Democratic Progressive Party's definition of national identity and the nation's constitution. Is their definitino of national identity and the nation's constitution contained in their Taiwan Independence Party Platform? Is it contained in their Resolution on the Future of Taiwan? Is it contained in their Resolution for a Normal Nation? Or is it contained in their Platform for the Coming Decade? Each time the Green Camp holds a protest march, "Nation of Taiwan" flags and banners fill the air. If the Democratic Progressive Party refuses to tell us whether it advocates Taiwan independence and nation building, it no longer has any criteria by which it can debate ECFA.

Only when the DPP allows the public to see what it is offering as an "alternative to the Republic of China," can the public evaluate the DPP's "alternative to ECFA."

中華民國有沒有替代方案
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.04.15 01:27 am

ECFA（兩岸經濟協議）有沒有「替代方案」？在解答這個問題以前，似乎應當先回答另一個問題：中華民國有沒有「替代方案」？

民進黨說，簽訂ECFA是「馬統」在「傾中賣台」；可見根本是將ECFA的爭議，視為國家認同與憲政定位的鬥爭。因而，若不弄清國家認同與憲法定位的爭議，就無法弄清ECFA的是非得失。

馬政府主張簽訂ECFA的政策思維是：中華民國→一中憲法→一中各表→不統不獨不武 →兩岸擴大各種層面的交流→三通直航→經貿交流法制化→簽ECFA。簡單地說，就是在國家認同及憲法定位上主張維持中華民國，面對全球競爭及區域化經濟整合的現實，才有了為兩岸經貿交流簽定法制框架的決策。

相對而言，倘若是主張台獨建國，反對一中憲法，反對一中各表，反對「不統／不獨／不武」中的「不獨／不武」，那就非但必須反對三通直航，也應設法阻滯兩岸擴大各種層面的交流，更應反對簽ECFA。因為，兩岸交流愈緊密，台獨建國的可能性就愈低。由於綠營一直主張台獨建國、正名制憲，所以主張戒急用忍，反對三通直航，因而也就反對簽ECFA。也就是說，反對ECFA，是台獨政策邏輯上的必然結論。但邏輯正確，卻未必代表政策正確。

其實，追根究柢，台灣的藍綠黨爭一向只有一個題目：中華民國有無替代方案？

一方主張維持中華民國；另一方主張台獨建國，以台灣國為中華民國的替代方案。如今在表象上看似在爭論ECFA有無替代方案，其實在骨子裡爭議的卻是中華民國有無替代方案？

有無替代方案，要看有無可行性。例如食物，麵是米的替代方案，因為有可行性；但毒藥不是米的替代方案，因為沒有可行性。這樣的類比可能比較極端，核四停建也許是較佳事例。用「非核家園」作「停建核四」的替代方案，當然具有理想性，也不是完全沒有可行性（只要花更大成本，承受更大汙染，或放慢經濟發展即可）；但在非核的主流能源尚未出現，而又不宜全賴傳統能源的兩難下，若以停用核能、停建核四來追求「非核家園」，不是完全不可行，而是要考慮社會能否承受其代價。

台灣有兩項基本因素是不具「替代性」的。一、台灣與中國大陸的地緣及人文關係不具替代性，因而中國大陸在世界工廠及世界市場的磁吸力亦不具替代性，美國、日本、東南亞皆不可能替代。二、台灣的自由民主制度不具替代性，因而要強行限制阻擾兩岸經貿、文化及社會交流也就絕無可能；在自由民主制度下，鈔票是會走路的，除非回過頭去實施戒嚴。由於這兩項絕對「不具替代性」的因素，台灣在整個國家政經路線上，也就不易採行太過逆勢操作的「替代方案」。

無論就世界、兩岸，及台灣內部的大局發展而論，台獨雖具理想性，但不具可行性；猶如毒藥不是食物的替代方案，縱使你不滿意眼前的膳食。不過，ECFA卻未必絕對沒有替代性，猶如核電廠，若是打定主意不用核能（不簽ECFA），也不是完全不可廢核電。比如說，綠色智囊建議，為爭取登陸減免六％至九％的關稅，可以鼓勵台灣廠商拔根赴東南亞投資設廠，然後再「轉進」中國大陸。這其實不是什麼新的「替代方案」。過去二十年，兩岸曾以「中轉第三地」作為「直航」的替代方案；這樣的周折，替代是可替代，但代價可怕，意義何在？

何況，倘若是為了建立「台獨家園」而反對簽ECFA；但不簽ECFA，就能實現「台獨家園」嗎？那麼，若是為了不可能實現的「台獨家園」，而反對簽 ECFA，使台灣面臨邊緣化的危機，這樣的決策理性何在？

雙英辯論正在為「資訊不透明」、「資訊不對稱」而生爭議。我們認為，在現今藍綠政爭中，最「不透明」的資訊，就是民進黨的國家認同與憲法定位；究竟應以台獨黨綱、國家前途決議文、正常國家決議文，或十年政綱為準？綠營的遊行隊伍裡仍見台灣國的旌旗招展，民進黨這一回若不說清楚是否主張台獨建國，則對 ECFA的辯論即失去判準。

因為，國人必須先看到民進黨所提出的「中華民國的替代方案」，才能評價ECFA的替代方案。