Globalization without China: Is It Possible?

Globalization without China: Is It Possible?
United Daily News editorial editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 26, 2010

The key controversy during the Two Yings Debate was over globalization, specifically "Is globalization possible without Mainland China?"

Chairman Tsai Ing-wen said the DPP's policy was to "move closer to the rest of the world, then move toward [Mainland] China together with the rest of the world." She said that the KMT's policy is to "move closer to the rest of the world through Mainland China." President Ma Ying-jeou retorted the DPP's globalization was "globalization without Mainland China."

One should not look only at the areas of disagreement between the Two Yings. This debate also highlighted the main area of agreement between the KMT and the DPP. Both the KMT and DPP agreed that Taiwan must confront globalization and cannot avoid interaction with the Mainland. This the Two Yings agree upon. Their disagreement is over how to globalize and how to interact with the Mainland.

Alas it is impossible to talk about globalization without talking about the Mainland. Taiwan has geographical and cultural links to the Mainland. Globalization without the Mainland is impossible. One reason is that Mainland China is both the world's marketplace, and the world's factory. No government in the world can globalize without Mainland China. Besides, Taipei is subject to political constraints from Beijing. If Beijing is hostile to Taipei, Taipei cannot globalize by going around Mainland China. President Ma said that of course we must not put all our eggs in one basket. But Mainland China is undeniably "the biggest of all the baskets."

President Ma Ying-jeou did not press Tsai Ying-wen for alternatives. He was apparently afraid Tsai Ying-wen might have something up her sleeve. He was afraid to walk into a trap. Instead he waited for Chairman Tsai to offer alternatives on her own. He avoided responding to a proposal advanced by Green oriented think tanks to "move plants for high tariff industries to Mainland China or Southeast Asia." He knew it would be difficult to present a convincing case. Actually, Tsai Ying-wen's "move closer to the rest of the world, then move toward Mainland China along with the rest of the world" concept is old hat. It is the tired old "indirect transit" concept, and hardly qualifies as a "workable alternative." Tsai floated one alternative after another, including talking to the United States, Japan, EU, and ASEAN through channels such as the WTO and APEC. None of these alternatives were anything more than wishful thinking. They were all a waste of time, lacking in feasibility and persuasiveness.

The two sides arrived at another important consensus. Interactions between Taipei and Beijing entail considerable political risk. Chairman Tsai repeatedly stressed the importance of strategic and political risk awareness. President Ma meanwhile, declared said he knew perfectly well Beijing's goal was "peaceful reunification" and "one country, two systems." Of course he knew the risks. Since both of them understood the risks, the only difference was how to respond to the risks. Chairman Tsai wanted to evade and procrastinate. President Ma wanted to confront the risks head on. Nothing ventured nothing gained. In other words, Ma and Tsai differed only in their policies, not in whether they want to "sell out Taiwan."

Chairman Tsai said Taiwan must avoid bringing about a "China-centered East Asian political and economic structure," and reiterated the strategic and political risk. Is Chairman Tsai contending that Taipei should assume the role of "preventing the rise of China?" To begin with, the rise of Mainland China is not necessarily detrimental to cross-Strait peaceful development. If anything, the danger posed by the rise of Mainland China is less than that posed by its collapse. Furthermore, is the rise of [Mainland] China something that Taipei should rush to prevent? Is the rise of [Mainland] China something that Taipei even has the wherewithal to prevent? Chairman Tsai is surely aware that over the past decade or so the Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian regimes predicated their rule on the "Coming Collapse of China Theory." They brought the nation to its current state. Does Chairman Tsai really want us to dedicate ourselves to "preventing the rise of [Mainland] China?"

This debate had important political repercussions. For the first time, the major parties have explored cross-Strait policy qua policy, rather than as "pandering to [Mainland] China and selling out Taiwan" or other populist irrelevancies. In fact, given our predicament, there is no such thing as a "risk free Mainland policy," any more than there is "globalization without [Mainland] China." Tsai accused Ma of rashness, and said that was not the answer. Ma asked Tsai whether evasion and procrastination were the answer. Ma and Tsai each had their own policy perspectives. Tsai was defensive. Ma was aggressive. Each complemented the other. If cross-Strait policy ceases to be characterized as "pandering to [Mainland] China and selling out Taiwan," then the ruling and opposition parties should be able to find a middle ground.

Unfortunately the debate may not ease social frictions. It may even intensify them. Why? Because the DPP insists on seeing the debate as an internal political struggle. It has no real desire to seek a cross-Strait policy consensus. Especially since yesterday Tsai Ing-wen did not perform as well as expected. The debate may touch off infighting within the DPP, with some arguing "What's the use of reasoning?" To moderate infighting, the DPP will inevitably fall back on rhetoric about "pandering to [Mainland] China and selling out Taiwan," exacerbating social frictions and confrontation.

In fact, the debate may have a greater impact on power struggles inside the DPP, than on power struggles between the Blue and Green camps. Pundits initially assumed that if Tsai did well in the debate, the "Princes of the DPP" might feel threatened. Since Tsai did not perform as well as expected, the debate was a setback for her. In the short term, the Princes of the DPP and Taiwan independence elements may pressure Tsai to run for Xinbei City Mayor, in the hope of undermining her power and authority. But Tsai Ing-wen will not willingly walk into their trap. In sum, Tsai Ing-wen failed to gain any political points from the debate. Instead, the DPP lost its commanding advantage. Yesterday Tsai demanded a rematch, showing she knew she had lost.

Public attention is currently focused on who won or lost. But Ma or Tsai won a two and a half hour verbal joust. Nothing more. Will Taiwan's economy be a winner or loser? Will Taiwan's economy prosper or decline? Can we find a way out of our current dilemma? That will not be decided by a Two Yings Debate. That will be decided by the grim struggle that is to follow. The strategic future of Taiwan, the Mainland, and the world as a whole, will be decided by whether the public on Taiwan can present a united front to the outside world.

有無可能實現「沒有中國大陸的全球化」？
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.04.26 04:09 am

雙英辯論的核心爭議是：對於台灣來說，有無可能實現一個「沒有中國大陸的全球化」？

蔡英文主席說：民進黨的政策是「走向世界，跟隨世界走向中國」，國民黨的政策則是「透過中國走向世界」。馬英九總統回說：民進黨的全球化是「沒有中國大陸的全球化」。

不要只看到雙英的歧見，其實這段辯論卻點出了國、民兩黨的主要共識，那就是：台灣必須面對全球化，也無可避免與中國互動。這是雙英皆同意的共識，雙方的歧見只是在如何全球化及如何與中國互動。

然而，現在談全球化，沒有不談中國的；尤其以台灣與大陸的地緣及人文關係，更無可能排除中國大陸而談全球化。原因之一是中國已是世界市場及世界工廠，全世界談全球化皆不可能不處理與中國的互動關係；再者，台灣確實受到北京在政治上的牽制，更不可能在與中國敵對下，繞過中國而談全球化。馬總統說，當然不能把所有的雞蛋放在同一個籃子裡，但中國大陸卻是「最大的籃子」。

馬總統並未逼問蔡英文有何「替代方案」，似乎顧慮蔡備有奇招，唯恐引蛇出洞。等到蔡主席自己道出了若干「替代方案」，卻避過了綠色智囊所主張的「高關稅產業移至中國或東南亞設廠」等主張，顯然知道難登大雅之堂；而她所謂的「跟隨世界走向中國」，其實仍是過去「中轉間接通航」的思維模式，難謂是有效的「替代方案」；至於她所提出的經由WTO或APEC等機制逐項與美、日、歐盟、東協談判，則屬一廂情願、曠日費時，亦欠缺可行性與說服力。

雙方的另一重要共識是：台灣與中國大陸互動，有極高的政治風險。蔡主席幾度提及應有戰略及政治上的風險意識；馬總統則乾脆明白指出，北京的目標是「和平統一／一國兩制」，並強調他當然知道這種風險。既然雙英皆有風險意識，歧見在於因應風險的對策。蔡主席主張迴避、拖延，而馬總統則主張積極迎對，不入虎穴焉得虎子。也就是說，馬蔡歧見只在政策觀點的異同，而不是「賣台」與否。

蔡主席說，台灣必須注意，不要促成一個「以中國為中心的東亞政治經濟架構」，此即蔡幾度強調的戰略與政治風險。這樣的觀點，是認為台灣應當對「阻止中國崛起」承當起國際角色；然而，一則「中國崛起」未必不利兩岸「和平發展」（比中國崩潰對台灣的威脅小），二則中國崛起難道應由台灣率先出頭阻擋，又難道是台灣阻擋得了的？蔡主席應知，過去十餘年李扁二任政府以「中國崩潰論」為治國憑藉，以致誤國至今日田地，如今難道要改以「阻擋中國崛起」為治國依據？

這場辯論會所創造的最重要的政治效應是，兩黨首度將兩岸議題作為一個「政策」來探討，而不在「傾中賣台」那樣的民粹語言中糾纏。其實，就台灣的艱困情勢而言，幾乎沒有一種「沒有風險的大陸政策」，如同也不會有一個「沒有中國大陸的全球化」；蔡指馬的冒進不是辦法，馬則說蔡的躲與拖何嘗是辦法？然而，馬蔡二人的政策觀點，蔡的防備，與馬的進取，誠多可以相互補充之處。如果不再將兩岸議題操作成「傾中賣台」那般的內部鬥爭，則台灣應當可以在「進取」與「防備」之間找到一條出路與活路。

但是，這場辯論恐怕未必能使社會對立趨於緩和，反而可能更趨尖銳。因為，民進黨認定這場辯論乃是一場台灣內部的政治鬥爭，而不是真正要為兩岸政策來凝聚認同及建立共識。特別是蔡英文昨日的表現不如預期，將使民進黨內掀起「說理有什麼用」的內鬥；為消化內鬥，自難免重新祭起「傾中賣台」的大旗，升高放大社會的對立與鬥爭。

其實，這場辯論對民進黨內部權力與路線鬥爭的影響，也許尚大於對藍綠角力的影響。原本想像，倘若蔡在辯論中表現優異，可能使黨內天王感受威脅；如今蔡的表現卻不如預期，對天王而言，則是重挫蔡英文的契機。立即發生的效應或許是，天王及獨派催迫蔡投入新北市長選舉以耗損其聲勢的動作可能升高，而蔡英文不願墜入陷阱的警覺心也相對加強。總括而言，蔡英文並未由這場辯論獲得政治紅利，反而在黨內失去了原本居高臨下的優勢；她昨天馬上主張再辯一次，顯現了她的失落感。

社會視聽的焦點如今集中在辯論雙方誰輸誰贏的問題，唯不論是馬贏蔡，或蔡贏馬，這畢竟只是一場兩個半小時的辯論而已；然而台灣的出路與生路問題，卻絕不止是一場雙英辯論的輸贏這麼簡單的事，而是整個台灣與兩岸新局及世界新局的一場嚴峻搏鬥，台灣在這場慘烈搏鬥中的輸贏，才是真正的輸贏。而台灣致勝的前提，是必須將無休無止的內鬥，轉為共同一致對外尋求出路與活路。