The Two Yings Meeting: Both a Debate and a Discussion

The Two Yings Meeting: Both a Debate and a Discussion
United Daily News editorial
A Translation
April 1, 2010

Differences have arisen over whether the "Two Yings Meeting" between Ma Ying-jeou and Tsai Ing-wen should be a "debate" or a "discussion." We feel as long as it is a "dialogue on national policy," it makes no difference whether it is a "debate" or a "discussion."

Yesterday the United Daily News editorial column "In Black and White" weighed in on the so-called debate. It said that the format proposed by the president was too restrictive. Each side would have six minutes to present their views, three minutes to answer four to five questions, and six minutes to make any concluding remarks. Such a format might create dramatic confrontation, but would stress tactical skills at the expense of strategic significance. Such a format is essentially that of a martial arts "grudge match." It might be appropriate for an election debate, but it might not be ideal for the Two Yings Meeting.

The Two Yings Meeting should not be viewed as a martial arts grudge match. The issue being addressed might be cross-strait economic agreements such as ECFA. The issue might be the personality differences between Ma Ying-jeou and Tsai Ing-wen. But the public has a right to expect a dialogue on national policy and not a martial arts grudge match.

Let's begin by looking at the Two Yings' character traits. Ma is a Juris Doctor from Harvard University. Tsai Ing-wen is a Doctor of Law from the London School of Economics. Both are qualified to be professors. They have both gone into politics, but many still address them as "Professor Ma" and "Professor Tsai." Based on their qualifications, to replicate the political equivalent of a martial arts grudge match would not be difficult. But it would squander an opportunity for in-depth dialogue. If one adopts the format of a "dialogue on national policy" the two may be less bound by the format of a martial arts grudge match. The two sides could alleviate the pressure to "pin one's opponent in three minutes." They could create space for rational debate and analysis.

Furthermore, ECFA is not an issue that ought to be dealt with using the format of a martial arts grudge match. ECFA has profound and far-reaching national policy implications. One of the most important questions is: Should we sign ECFA? The answer involves constitutional strategy issues such as "maintaining the status quo," "One China, Different Interpretations," or "Taiwan independence," the "Rectification of Names and Authoring of a New Constitution." It involves issues of global economic strategy, such as how to respond to ASEAN plus N, and the marginalization of Taiwan's economy. Another important question is, How should we go about signing ECFA? The answer involves defense mechanisms, an early harvest list, protection for small and medium enterprises (SME) and agriculture, a Sunset Clause, and prohibitions against Mainland workers coming to Taiwan. In other words, even if the Two Yings Meeting addresses only two questions: "Should we sign ECFA?" and "How should we go about signing ECFA?" the two questions will still require additional analysis and debate. If one's conclusion is that one must not sign ECFA, then it is pointless to talk about how to go about signing ECFA. Any debate would be pointless as well. Conversely, if one is talking about "How should we go about signing ECFA?" then the "debate" need not preclude the possibility of a "discussion."

In fact, the political deadlock on Taiwan is a result of a lack of dialogue between the ruling Blues and the opposition Greens. All we have is name-calling and even cursing. In fact, the political issues that demand a dialogue between the government and the political opposition are hardly confined to ECFA. For the sake of the public welfare, in order to find a way out of political deadlock, ruling and opposition party leaders should sit down and talk about national identity, the constitution, cross-Strait issues, community relations (erroneously referred to as "ethnic relations"), responses to globalization, economic and trade policies, and social security. Alas the ruling and opposition parties' standard operating procedure is invariably confrontation. Some politicians even stoop to inciting social divisions. Sadly, the ruling and opposition parties' refusal to dialogue has turned the entire nation into their hostages. Not only are the ruling and opposition parties unable to dialogue, they aren't even aware of the need to dialogue.

As mentioned earlier, given both Ma and Tsai's character traits, there is little need to replicate any martial arts grudge match. Instead, they should establish a dialogue on national policy. ECFA is a topic with profound and far-reaching implications at all levels, including constitutional strategy and the day to day welfare of ordinary citizens. If the Two Yings clarified these issues, it would be the first time anyone on Taiwan ever got to the bottom of these matters. Their contribution to the nation and the public welfare would be inestimable.

Some have asked, why does Ma Ying-jeou object to a debate? Others have asked, why does Tsai Ing-wen object to a discussion? In fact seeing a "debate" and a "discussion" as mutually exclusive is fundamentally wrong. Any "dialogue" would necessarily include both "discussion" and "debate." Besides, what the public is seeking with ECFA is not the theatrics of a martial arts "grudge match." What they seek is an earnest, rational, and pragmatic dialogue on national policy regarding the future of the Republic of China. Hopefully we can set an agenda that takes into account the Big Picture. Hopefully the Two Yings will engage in a one day, two session or a two day, four session "summit on national policy."

Ma and Tsai each have their own peculiar character traits. Before the two can engage in a dialogue, certain conditions must be met. ECFA is an appropriate subject for just such a dialogue. In fact the Two Yings need not engage in a "cock-fight." We expect the two to participate in a dialogue on national policy that includes both debate and discussion, all for the sake of the public. We hope our expectations do not turn out to be mere wishful thinking.

雙英對話：既有辯論 也有討論
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.04.01 01:50 am

雙英會以「辯論」或「討論」的方式為宜，出現歧見。我們認為：若能以「國政對話」為目標，即可既有辯論，又有討論。

昨日「黑白集」指出，所謂「辯論」，似是指總統政見辯論會那種方式，申論六分鐘、答覆四五個問題各三分鐘、結論六分鐘；此種方式，形式束縛較大，因此較能製造針鋒相對的戲劇性效果，但其缺憾則是常以「戰術」表現為能事，對「戰略」的探討則不易深入。這種方式，其實是「政治擂台」，適用於競選場合的捉對角力；但未必是此次雙英會的最佳形式。

不宜用「打擂台」的心態來看雙英會。無論就兩岸經濟協議（ECFA）這個議題而論，或以馬英九及蔡英文兩人的人格特質而言，國人皆有權利期待二人進行一場有別於「辯論擂台」的「國政對話」。

先談雙英的人格特質。馬英九是美國哈佛大學法學博士，蔡英文是倫敦政經學院法學博士，二人皆有教授資格，從政後仍有「馬教授」與「蔡教授」的稱號；以二人的資質，去複製一場「辯論擂台」應非難事，卻是完全糟蹋了二人可能進行深入對話的才具。若採「國政對話」的方式進行，二人可較不受「辯論擂台」的形式束縛，雙方皆可卸下「三分鐘內撂倒你」的戰術壓力，始有可能出現理性辯析的寬闊空間。

再者，ECFA這個議題，也不宜採用「辯論擂台」的形式。ECFA是一個既深又廣的國策議題。其中一大主題是：為何要簽訂ECFA？牽涉到憲法戰略的問題（要「維持現狀」、「一中各表」，或「台獨建國」、「正名制憲」）；又涉及全球化經濟戰略的問題（如何因應東協加N及台灣經濟可能邊緣化）。另一大主題是：如何簽訂ECFA？包括防衛機制、早收清單、中小企業及農業的保護、「終止條款」、禁止陸勞來台等。也就是說，雙英會僅就「是否簽訂ECFA」或「如何簽訂ECFA」二大主題，即須詳加析論。若是根本「反對簽」ECFA，即不必談「如何簽」，那麼「辯論」也沒有用；反之，若是要談「如何簽」，則「辯論」亦無須排斥「討論」。

其實，台灣政治的死結，就是朝野藍綠沒有開誠布公的「對話」，而只有相互辱罵，甚至相互詛咒。然而，台灣理當進行朝野「對話」的政治議題，又何止ECFA 而已？諸如國家認同、憲法定位、兩岸問題、族群關係、因應全球化、經貿政策、社會安全機制等等，無一不需朝野高層「坐下來好好談」，為國計民生尋找出路。但是，朝野兩方卻始終以「衝突」為操作手法，有些政客更以撕裂為能事；可悲的是，因為朝野兩黨拒絕「對話」，進而使全體國人受到藍綠分別挾持，非但不能「對話」，甚至亦不知應當「對話」。

如前所述，以馬蔡二人的人格特質，大可不必複製等而下之的「政治擂台」，其實可以開創一場「國政對話」的典範。再以ECFA這個議題的廣深而言，可謂覆蓋了自憲法戰略至基層民生的所有層面，雙英若能藉此把方方面面談清楚，即不啻是台灣一次刨根挖底、伐毛洗髓的深思猛省，其有益國脈民命不言可喻。

有人問：馬英九為何反對辯論？有人問：蔡英文為何反對討論？其實，將「辯論」與「討論」視為相互排斥的概念，在根本上就是錯誤的；因為，「對話」就能同時包括「討論」與「辯論」。何況，對於ECFA這個議題，國人追求的絕對不是一場「辯論擂台」的戲劇性效果，而是藉此對「中華民國何去何從」進行一場真誠、理性、務實的「國政對話」。若能安排出一個關照全局的對話題綱，期待雙英為國人進行一次一天兩場或兩天四場的「國政巔峰對話」，亦非異想天開。

馬蔡二人的人格特質有「對話」的條件，ECFA又是一個適合「對話」的題材；雙英其實不必演出一場「鬥雞式」的辯論，期待他們為國人推出一場有既有辯論、也有討論的「國政對話」，難道竟是天方夜譚？