Expedite ECFA: Keep It Simple, Tackle Fewer Issues

Expedite ECFA: Keep It Simple, Tackle Fewer Issues
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
April 6, 2010

The second formal consultation over the cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) was held last week. The two sides' official remarks sounded good. But the public detected a whiff of impatience among negotiators. The public sensed that the negotiations were rather trying, and that the two sides wanted to "expedite the signing by keeping the agreement simple and tackling fewer issues."

Chiang and Chen met four times and signed the cross-Strait tax agreement. The two sides reached a consensus. Nevertheless they ran into more than a few roadblocks. Therefore the decision to "expedite the signing by keeping the agreement simple and tackling fewer issues" may be applied not merely to the "early harvest," but also to ECFA as a whole. Only then can cross-Strait economic and trade negotiations continue.

The Mainland's negotiator for ECFA is Tang Wei, head of the Department of Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao Affairs under the Mainland's Ministry of Commerce. On the very first day of consultations he suggested expediting tariff reductions and exemptions by keeping the agreement simple and tackling fewer issues. As he explained in an interview, if one wishes to expedite the signing, one simply cannot cover every issue. His remark triggered concern that the 500 items proposed by our side may be cut down. The next day, the two sides explained their conclusions. Minister of Economic Affairs Liang Kuo-hsing remained vague, saying "All we ought to demand we have demanded. All we ought to retain we have retained." The two sides reiterated that farmers on Taiwan, ordinary people, and small and medium businesses will be taken care of, and that negotiations over place of origin rules would soon begin. But information remained fragmentary. The public still does not know what was demanded and what was retained. Rumors proliferated. Unknown variables may lead to repeated changes in the early harvest list.

Meanwhile, negative developments have emerged that may impede consultations. One development concerns the wording of the ECFA preamble, whether Taipei would be explicitly permitted to "participate in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation organization." This is part of our attempt to sign regional free trade agreements (FTAs) with other Asia-Pacific countries. If this is incorporated into ECFA, it will mean Beijing has formally agreed not to prevent us from signing FTAs with other countries. This would enable the Republic of China's economy to become more closely integrated with the global economy, and prevent our marginalization. The two sides have yet to reach a consensus.

The second negative development is that the other side wants the "normalization of cross-Straits economic and trade relations" and "full liberalization." Our side has not agreed. According to the ECFA liberalization timetable, our side would no longer have any reason to refuse to open our markets to sensitive products from the Mainland, including the disparity in the size of our markets. Full liberalization would involve the financial services industry and other service industries. It would drag in more complex bilateral problems. Even if we hope to liberalize ten years from now, this cannot be decided now. As a result, consultations remain stuck.

The failure to determine which items will be on the early harvest list may be merely the result of haggling between the negotiators. The items may need further study before they can be announced. We need not read too much into the failure. But the government must help people understand the principles by which the early harvest list was created, and the benefits each side will offer the other. The Mainland is giving Taiwan tariff reductions and exemptions. We are giving the Mainland similar treatment for some of its products. Which items did the Mainland mention? Which industries on Taiwan will be affected? The government must explain and put the public's mind at ease. We believe the government's decisions about what to ask for, what to give, how much to ask for, and how little to give were based on the Ministry of Economics' best calculations of what in our interest. Nevertheless the government must explain its thinking to the public.

Other, more complex issues may create obstacles to ECFA. Should decisions be made during the initial stages of consultation? The government can conduct a reevaluation. After all, ECFA is an agreement to promote cross-Strait economic and trade liberalization. The two sides have agreed to gradual, not instant liberalization. First stage consultation should follow the principle of "expedite the signing by keeping the agreement simple and tackling fewer issues." We must first establish a framework, a preamble, a liberalization procedure, an early harvest list, economic cooperation projects, a defense mechanism, and a termination mechanism. The details can be dealt with once ECFA has been signed. One item can be signed at a time. This is reminiscent of ASEAN talks with the Mainland. Liberalization will be accelerated, decelerated, or even halted altogether, based on the economic situation. This will prevent negotiations from becoming stalled over any particular issue.

Academia Sinica scholar Chu Ching-yi and National Taiwan University economics professor Lin Chuan recently published a book entitled, "A New Vision of Economics." They note that the impact of regional trade organizations has yet to fully emerge. Only by acting here and now, can we avoid disaster. Therefore, signing ECFA is not merely about normalizing cross-Strait trade. It is also about responding and preparing for regional economic eventualities. The Republic of China must seize this opportunity. It can no longer delay.

ECFA「快易少」可以有新解
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.04.06 02:38 am

兩岸經濟合作架構協議（ECFA）上周舉行第二次正式協商。不容諱言，雙方檯面上的話雖說得好聽，但社會大眾卻完全嗅不到彼岸代表所稱「快易少」的氣氛，反而覺得這是場談得頗為辛苦的硬仗。

或許，就跟四次江陳會緩簽兩岸租稅協議一樣，雙方雖有簽署的共識，但一時卻跨不過若干路障。因而，「快易少」似不只適用於早期收穫清單，或也可適用於整體 ECFA架構的議定；這樣，兩岸的經貿協商才走得下去。

ECFA的大陸協商代表商務部台港澳司長唐煒在協商第一天，就先為提早減免關稅的早期收穫清單協商定調為「快易少」，並在接受媒體訪問時解釋，早收清單要好簽、快簽，就不可能面面俱到，也因而引發我方提出的五百項清單可能再縮水的疑慮。到了第二天雙方說明結論時，經濟部次長梁國新則含混地說：「該要都要了，該守都守住」；雙方並重申會照顧台灣農民、基層民眾及中小企業，及啟動原產地規則協商。然而，從這些片段資訊中，其實民間還是不知道守住了什麼、又要到了什麼，企業界耳語滿天飛，而未知的協商變數也可能讓清單一改再改。

相對的，卻傳出了一些可能阻礙協商進展的負面訊息。其一是ECFA協議文本的序言用字，是否要明言「參與亞太經濟合作機制」。這是我方企圖以此做為與亞太國家洽簽區域自由貿易區協定（FTA）的安排，如獲寫入文本，意謂北京至少在形式上同意不再阻礙我方與其他國家簽FTA，以利台灣經濟得以與全球經濟緊密接軌，突破邊緣化危機。然而，這段用字似未立獲共識。

其二則是彼岸要求寫入文本的「兩岸經貿正常化」及「全面自由化」等用語，我方未接受；因其意謂在達到ECFA設定的自由化時間表時，我方無法再以雙方經濟規模差距懸殊等理由，拒絕對大陸開放敏感性產品的市場；而且，全面自由化的範疇尚涉及金融等服務貿易市場，這又將擴及雙方人員流動等更複雜的問題，即使是遠在十年以後才要開放，也非現在就能決定。於是，相關的協商又卡住。

有關早期收穫清單的協商結果不明，可能只是兩岸代表討價還價，還要再攜回研究，一時難以宣布，倒也不必過度解讀；但政府應該讓民眾了解，早期收穫清單的選定原則與相互提供的待遇，亦即大陸給予台灣早收項目的關稅減免優惠，我們也同樣要回饋大陸產品相同的待遇，而大陸到底提出那些項目、台灣那些產業會受到影響，政府必須以清楚的解說讓社會安心。我們相信政府在決定那些要、那些給、那些多要、那些少給時，是依據外部經濟利益最大化的考量，但還是須有明確的交代。

至於可能讓ECFA協商遇阻的其他更複雜的問題，是否要在此一架構性協商的初始階段就做出決定，政府可以再做評估，畢竟ECFA是兩岸相互推展經貿自由化的架構性協議，雙方也已同意是分階段推進自由化，而不是一次到位；第一階段的協商宜應秉持「快易少」的原則，先搭好架子，例如序言、自由化進程、早期收穫清單、經濟合作項目、防衛機制及中止機制等，再於簽署ECFA後分項細談，然後一項項簽署分項協議，就如同東協與中國大陸的談判模式，依當時的經濟情境加快或放慢自由化進度，甚至可以叫停，以免因特定議題喬不定而原地踏步。

中研院院士朱敬一與台大經濟系教授林全的新書「經濟學的新視野」指出，區域性貿易組織的衝擊其實尚未完全浮現，但也唯有此時此刻，才可能及早預習以求避禍；因此，簽署ECFA的意義，不只是為了兩岸經貿正常化，而是可藉由ECFA學習應對區域經濟的知能，並作前置的準備，台灣必須抓住這個機會，不能再耽擱了。