Chopsticks Theory: Interpreting Public Opinion on Cross-Strait Relations

Chopsticks Theory: Interpreting Public Opinion on Cross-Strait Relations
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 15, 2010

Last Saturday this newspaper published a public opinion survey on cross-Strait relations in 2010. It found that when asked whether the two sides are friends or foes, most people feel the two sides are warming up to each other. When asked about their position on reunification vs. independence, most want to maintain the status quo (51%), most have a negative impression of the Mainland government (54%), and a minority have a negative impression of Mainlanders in general (47%). A third however, would like to work on the Mainland. Nearly 30% want their children to study on the Mainland. And 63% do not think the Mainland's growing strength constitutes a threat to Taiwan, and are happy to see the Mainland continue growing.

Our survey reached the following conclusions. One. The public is largely content with the cross-Strait status quo. In three out of five major areas, social, political, and economic relations, the public feels cross-Strait relations are "warming." Even in areas such as military relations and diplomatic relations, cross-Strait relations are merely considered slightly "tense or competitive." Military relations were rated at 6.1, only 0.1 above "warming." Diplomatic relations were rated at 6.3, only 0.3 above "warming." Most people consider this the payoff of two years of cross-Strait reconciliation.

Two. The public on Taiwan has clear reservations about cross-Strait political integration. Fifty-one percent proposed "maintaining the status quo in perpetuity." They constitute a majority. Immediate independence plus gradual independence advocates (maintain the status quo for now, declare independence later) constitute 31%. Immediate reunification plus gradual reunification advocates (maintain the status quo for now, reunify later) constitute 14%. Again, pro independence advocates outnumber pro reunification advocates.

These two poll results show that the public on Taiwan approves of cross-Strait reconciliation, but does not advocate "reunification." This however must not be misinterpreted. It does not mean that advocates of Taiwan independence outnumber advocates of reunification. Because in such questionnaires the definition of "Taiwan independence" varies with the respondent. If "Taiwan independence" is defined more precisely, it could change how the respondent answers. Besides, advocates of Taiwan independence may number roughly 30%. But they are unlikely to increase to where they constitute mainstream public opinion and weild mainstream political clout. The 2007 legislative elections and 2008 presidential elections proved that.

These attitudes can be explained by the "chopsticks theory." A majority of the public wants Taiwan and the Mainland to act like a pair of chopsticks, joined at certain spots, but separated at others. This way the two can pick up food. They do not feel the two chopsticks should be either bound together (reunified) or separated (independent). Either way would defeat the purpose of chopsticks.

Twenty years ago, the chief editor of this newspaper met with then AIT Director Nat Bellochi, and mentioned the "chopsticks theory." He suggested that the two sides could be like a pair of chopsticks, neither completely bound together, nor completely kept apart. They should be joined at certain points, but separated at others. During recent political debates on Taiwan, political rhetoric reminscent of the chopsticks theory has emerged. In 1997, the DPP suggested that Taiwan is neither at the center, nor at the periphery. Instead, it is a dynamic, thoughtful, and creative bridge between the land and the sea It is a "bridge between the East and West," and an "interface between sea and land." It is neither at the center, nor at the periphery. This is reminiscent of the "chopsticks model." One might say that "great minds think alike." The current poll reveals that the "chopsticks model," which "wants exchanges but not to be tied down" did not arise yesterday. It has been a long time coming. It will also represent the majority view for the forseeable future.

A majority on Taiwan wants "no [immediate] reunification and no independence, both reunification and independence" and the "chopsticks model." It advocates maintaining the status quo, and proceeding from there. This ought to provide inspiration for all three political parties on both sides of the Strait. For the KMT, the current poll results mean the Ma administration's policy of "no reunification, no independence, and no war" has paid off. But as cross-Strait relations become even closer, some may wish to moderate the pace of reconciliation. This is also a characteristic of the "chopsticks phenomenon," which involves alternately coming together and separating. This may explain why the success of cross-Strait policy may not help the Blue Camp in the five cities elections.

The DPP claims that the 31% "Taiwan independence elements" constitute the Democratic Progressive Party's core support. Perhaps it does. But it is also the DPP's biggest stumbling block. The Democratic Progressive Party can use hard-core pro-independence elements to inflame political passions during election season. But it cannot transform Taiwan independence into the majority perspective on Taiwan. Still less can it maintain stable relations between Washington, Beijing, and Taipei, on a Taiwan independence premise. Taiwan independence is not a viable option for Taiwan's future. The only solution is a return to the "chopsticks theory" and the theory of "a bridge between East and West, an interface between sea and land."

For the CCP, such attitudes on Taiwan are insufficient to justify talk of reunification. But by the same token, such attitudes hardly represent support for Taiwan independence. Therefore when the Beijing authorities attempt to interpret this poll, they should give the last two years of cross-Strait policy a positive evaluation. The public on Taiwan has a somewhat negative opinion of the Mainland, due in part to stereotypes, in part to a lack of understanding, and due in part to a need for improvement by the Mainland. The survey showed that the main factor determining whether cross-Strait relations become friendlier or more hostile is not merely physical issues such as military or political pressure, but psychological issues such as democracy, culture, society, and civilization.

As "peaceful development" proceeds, the "chopsticks theory" is perhaps the one that best conforms to public expectations.

筷子理論：解讀兩岸關係民意大調查
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.09.15 01:39 am

本報在上周六發表2010兩岸關係年度民意大調查，主要的發現是：在兩岸敵友量表上，大致認為兩岸關係傾向和緩；在民意統獨取向上，以維持現狀為主流（51％）；對大陸政府的印象不好（54％），也對大陸人民的印象不好（47％）；但有三分之一願赴大陸工作，近三成想讓子女赴大陸念書；且六成三不認為大陸國力強盛會危及台灣，並樂見大陸持續發展。

此項大調查所顯示的民意樣態可以解讀為：一、民意對兩岸關係現狀大致滿意。五大領域中，對社會、政治及經貿，皆認為「和緩」；甚至對軍事及外交領域，也認為只是低度的「緊張或競爭」。其中，軍事領域的量表分數是6.1，只差0.1就可降至「和緩」的刻度內；外交則是6.3，若降0.3就成「和緩」。一般認為，這是兩年來兩岸和解政策所反映的正面成果。

二、但是，台灣民意對兩岸若進一步進行政治整合，卻持明顯的保留態度。51％主張「永遠維持現狀」，這應是主流民意。此外，急獨與緩獨（先維持現狀再獨立）相加為31％，急統與緩統（先維持現狀再統一）相加為14％，又可見獨大於統。

以上兩項解讀顯示：台灣民意贊同兩岸和解、和緩，卻不主張「統一」。但是，這也不能過度推論為主張獨立者壓過主張統一者；因為，在此類問卷中，「台獨」一詞只憑受訪者的直覺來定義，若將台獨的準確涵義及因果加入考量，就有可能改變受訪者的看法；再者，縱使仍有三成左右主張台獨者，也難超越主流社會的民意比重及政治勢位。2007立委選舉及2008的總統大選即是顯證。

這樣的民意樣態，可用「筷子理論」來解釋。主流民意所期待的兩岸關係，似乎是希望台灣與大陸像一雙操作中的筷子一樣，有些地方接合，有些地方分開，這樣才能挾菜扒飯；而不認為兩隻筷子應綁在一起（統一），或將兩隻筷子遙分兩處（獨立），畢竟，這樣就都不再有筷子的功能了。

本報主筆於20年前晤見當時的AIT理事主席白樂崎時，提出「筷子理論」；認為兩岸可如一雙筷子一樣，不應完全綁在一起，也不能完全切割，有分有合，始能靈動自如。在台灣的政治辯論中，最近似筷子理論的政治論述，應是民進黨在1997年所提出的：台灣不是中心，也不是邊陲；而是一個有活力、有反省力及有創造力的海陸介面與東西橋樑。所謂「東西橋樑」、「海陸介面」，不是中心、不是邊陲，儼然就是「筷子理論」的圖象；可謂是英雄所見略同。而此次民意調查呈現出「希望交流／不願綁住」的「筷子圖象」，其實亦並非形成於今日，而是長久以來，也將是長久以後的主流民意樣態。

台灣主流民意可視為一種「不統／不獨／亦統／亦獨」的「筷子圖象」，也就是主張兩岸維持現狀及在現狀上發展。這對兩岸三黨皆應有所啟發。對國民黨言，此次民意調查的結果，可以視為馬政府「不統／不獨／不武」政策已見成效。但是，在兩岸關係愈加緊密時，民間希望放慢放緩的心情可能升高；這也是一種分合輪動的「筷子現象」，或許可以解釋為何兩岸政策成功卻未必有益藍軍的五都選情。

對民進黨言，31％的「獨派」，是民進黨的基本盤；卻也是民進黨轉型蛻變的絆腳石。民進黨可以利用鐵桿獨派來激盪選舉熱情，但不可能使台獨成為台灣的主流民意，更不可能用台獨來處理美中台三邊關係，亦即不可能將台獨當作台灣的生路。回到「東西橋樑／海陸介面」的「筷子理論」，或許才是出路。

對中共而言，這樣的台灣民意，不足與言統一；但這樣的台灣民意也不會贊同台獨。所以北京當局在解讀此項民調時，應當對近兩年來的兩岸政策給予正面評價。至於台灣民意對大陸印象稍差，一部分緣於刻板印象，一部分出於缺乏瞭解，另一部分則大陸確有改善空間。這樣調查也顯示：牽動兩岸關係敵友變化的主要因素，絕不只是一個物理問題（軍事、政治的壓力），而更是一個心理的問題（民主、文化、社會、文明）。

其實，在兩岸的「和平發展期」中，「筷子理論」可能正是最合宜的民意期待。