Taipei and Beijing Should Establish New Goals

Taipei and Beijing Should Establish New GoalsUnited Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 2, 2010

Lai Hsing-yuan recently issued a statement in the United States. Li Yafei flew to Taiwan and issued a response. Since then, cross-Strait relations appear to have undergone a subtle change. Beijing appears unhappy with the Ma administration's slow progress or even back-sliding on cross-Strait policy. Even worse, Beijing appears to be losing faith in the Ma administration's sincerity vis a vis cross-Strait policy. The latter is of course far more worrisome than the former.

Let us first address the issue of trust. The Republic of China government on Taiwan has adopted democracy. Therefore, it is more difficult for whoever is in power to strike a political balance between cross-Strait and internal policy. The Ma administration upholds the One China Constitution. Strategically it upholds a policy of One China, Different Interpretations. It still upholds a One China Constitution. Tactically it upholds a policy of "no reunification, no independence, and no war." This also involves upholding a One China Constitution, and lays a foundation for cross-Strait "peaceful development." It also forms the consitutional and legal basis for the Ma administration's rule on Taiwan. Therefore what reason would anyone have to think he would ever abandon the One China Constitution?

Does the One China Constitution violate the One China Principle? Does the One China Constitution, preclude the One China Principle? If not, how can anyone claim that cross-Strait relations have changed? On Taiwan, some people think the "Republic of China" that Ma Ying-jeou upholds is no longer the original "Republic of China." Some say he has gradually hollowed out the 1992 Consensus to where even One China, Different Interpretations is tantamount to Taiwan independence or an independent Taiwan under the name of the Republic of China. Meanwhile the Green Camp accuses Ma Ying-jeou of "pandering to [Mainland] China, selling out Taiwan, and advocating ultimate reunification." As we can see, whoever is in power on Taiwan is going to find it difficult to strike a balance across the political spectrum when it comes to cross-Strait policy. But no one can plausibly accuse Ma Ying-jeou of violating the One China Constitution, or advocating Taiwan independence or an independent Taiwan. The One China Constitution is the constitutional and legal foundation of the Republic of China and the Taiwan region. We do not believe the Ma administration would undermine the very basis of its own rule.

Now let us address the pace of progress. More progress has been made during the two years since 2008, than any other time over the past 60 years. Progress over the past two years has been the most intensive and concentrated ever, and has yielded the most results. On this no one can have any doubts. Some feel progress has been so rapid it ought to be slowed down. Others feel it is still not fast enough. The biggest disagreement is over when major political issues should be addressed. On this issue, different parties hold different views. This leads to at least two questions. One. Are "political issues" really "reunification issues?" Are reunification issues the only issues? If so, naturally one is going to be impatient and eager to pick up the pace. Two. Isn't progress on issues such as ECFA an equally important indicator of progress? If so, why the big hurry on "political issues?" One might even be inclined to moderating the pace.

Cross-Strait trust and the pace of cross-Strait progress are linked. To understand how, one must define what one means by "political issues." This newspaper published a series of "Six New Year's Day Editorials" on cross-Strait relations. We pointed out that the two sides should "establish clearer goals by beginning with a rational process." We pointed out that a more rational process would accelerate the pace of cross-Strait progress. and that the establishment of clearer goals would increase cross-Strait trust. To clarify our common goals, we must increase our mutual trust. If clarifying our common goals becomes difficult, progress will naturally slow.

Taiwan independence is clearly no longer feasible. Therefore the One China Constitution and the One China Principle are national standards that no Republic of China administration can abandon. Therefore, in cross-Strait relations, mutual trust should no longer be a problem, and no longer the cause of trouble. The real problem is how to clarify our common goals. This requires mutual trust. The real problem is how to establish a rational process. This will have a direct impact on the pace of progress.

Yesterday the cross-Strait edition of this newspaper reported a highly instructive development. Zhou Zhihuai, Deputy Director of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Institute of Taiwan Studies, said that perhaps the two sides should seek a link between the One China Constitution and the One China Framework. The two sides should attempt to consolidate their consensus and establish shared values. We would like to emphasize something Zhou Zhihuai said, namely that if the two sides wish to introduce policy innovations, they must first make conceptual innovations.

Zhou Zhihuai spoke of policy innovations. This newspaper's "Six New Year's Day Editorials" spoke of "goal clarifications," or "goal innovations." Zhou spoke of finding a link between the One China Constitution and the One China Framework. This newspaper referred to it as the "roof theory plus the glass theory."

Let us return to "goal clarification." Is the ultimate goal for the two sides "reunification" and nothing else? Does "reunification" mean the elimination of the Republic of China? Is cross-Strait innovation possible? Is a more pragrmatic alternative possible? One that does not exact so high a price for so little political gain? As Zhou Zhihuai put it, is cross-Strait policy innovation possible? In other words, can we establish a link between the One China Constitution and the One China Framework? Actually, this is what many Mainland scholars mean when they speak of "positioning the Republic of China." Clearly Zhou Zhihuai is not the only one thinking along these lines.

Actually, both sides have many clear-headed people. One must not be confused by foolish people raising alarms about trust and the pace of progress. We must begin with a rational process, and use it to clarify our goals. We must begin with a rational process, and use it to think creatively. We hope the two sides can find new goals. We believe the two sides will find new goals.

兩岸應當共策「目標創新」

【聯合報╱社論】
2010.09.02


從賴幸媛在美談話及李亞飛來台發言以來，兩岸關係似乎出現了微妙的變化。一方面，北京彷彿對馬政府兩岸政策的進度太慢（甚至認為似有倒退），表達不耐；另一方面，北京對馬政府兩岸政策的信任亦彷彿出現動搖。後者當然比前者更值得注意。

先談兩岸信任。台灣實施民主制度，因此主政者在維持兩岸政策的國際、兩岸及國內的平衡上較為困難。馬政府在維持「一中憲法」的原則下，在戰略上「一中各表」（仍是一中憲法），在戰術上「不統／不獨／不武」（還是一中憲法）；這非但是維持兩岸「和平發展」的底線，也是馬政府對內執政正當性的基礎。然則，有何理由認為馬英九會捨棄「一中憲法」的根本立場？

除非北京認為「一中憲法」違反「一中原則」，或「一中憲法」不容於「一中原則」，否則豈能謂兩岸信任關係已生變化？至於台灣內部，也有人認為馬英九所主張的「中華民國」已非原本的「中華民國」，又謂「九二共識」已漸空洞化，甚至將「一中各表」等同於台獨或獨台，相對於綠營之指馬英九為「傾中賣台／終極統一」，皆可見台灣主政者在民主光譜上維持兩岸政策平衡之不易，但恐怕都不至於可到指控馬英九違反一中憲法或變成台獨或獨台的地步。「一中憲法」是中華民國與台灣的生存根本，我們不相信馬政府會自毀長城。

再談進度的快慢。○八後兩年來的兩岸發展進度，其實是六十年來發展最快、最密集、最濃縮、最具正面成果的兩年，此點無人可以置疑。至於有人認為應當暫時慢下來，或有人認為還不夠快，主要皆是對於何時應當處理政治議題的緩急見仁見智所致。這方面至少可有兩種思考：一、所謂「政治議題」，是否就是「統一議題」，或只有「統一議題」？倘若認為如此，當然會感不耐，因此也會傾向主張加急加快進度。二、其他議題，例如簽成ＥＣＦＡ，難道不也是及已是一個重要的政治進度與成就？如果認為是，就不會對「政治議題」太急切，也就可能傾向將進度放緩。

要明白前述「信任問題」及「快慢問題」的糾結所在，必須先對「政治議題」的定義與內涵進行釐清。本報《元旦六論》系列社論指出：兩岸關係應當「從合理的過程到改善之目的」。若以本文題旨而論，「合理的過程」牽涉到「快慢問題」，「改善之目的」則牽涉到「信任問題」。目的若改善，信任就會加強；目的若太困難，進度必然慢下來。

由於台獨已經絕不可行，所以「一中憲法」（一個中國的原則）是中華民國主政者絕無可能否棄的國家準據；亦因此，兩岸關係的「信任問題」可以說不是問題，實在不必因杯弓蛇影而藉以惹是生非。問題在於：如何用「改善之目的」（信任問題），來調節「合理的過程」（快慢問題）。

昨日本報兩岸版的一則報導頗具啟發性。報導稱，中國社會科學院台灣研究所副所長周志懷發表個人看法說：兩岸也許需要在「一中憲法」和「一中框架」之間找到一個連結；可以進一步細化兩岸的共識，構建一個共同的價值觀。我們想強調的重點是，周志懷說：兩岸要「政策創新」，理念上要更有創意。

用本報《元旦六論》的語彙來說，周志懷所說的「政策創新」，就是我們所說的「改善之目的」，也就是「目標創新」；而他說的「在『一中憲法』和『一中框架』之間找到一個連結」，也可能就是我們所說的「屋頂理論加杯子理論」。

回頭來說兩岸的「改善之目的」。兩岸的終極「目的」是否一定只有「統一」一途？而「統一」是否就是消滅中華民國的意思？有無可能兩岸共同「創新」一個比「統一」更有實現的可能性且付出負面代價較小的「政治目的」或「政治目標」？也就如周志懷所問：有無可能「政策創新」？亦即有無可能在「一中憲法」與「一中框架」之間建立一個連結？其實，這也就是許多大陸學者所提出的「中華民國的定位問題」，可見不止周志懷有此想像。

兩岸其實有許多頭腦清醒的人，不要被那些糊塗人用「信任／進度」來混淆了視聽。從合理的過程到改善之目的，從合理的過程到創新之目標；我們期望亦相信，兩岸應能及必能共策「目標創新」。