Reconnection: Cross-Strait Face-Saver and Road to Prosperity

Reconnection: Cross-Strait Face-Saver and Road to Prosperity
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 20, 2010

This article concludes the editorial series, "From Reunification to Reconnection." It argues that "Reconnection" is a face saving measure that could break the cross-Strait impasse. It is also the cross-Strait road to prosperity.

As pointed out in our previous editorial, reunification is the toughest and riskiest alternative. Demanding "reunification" may mire Beijing in a "commitment trap." Beijing might find itself unable to retreat because it has overcommitted itself. Cross-Strait relations is a paradox. Demanding "reunification" effectively prolongs "separation." From the ruling CCP's perspective, leaving reunification unresolved sets hawks and doves at each others' throats, and creates a ticking time bomb. It makes it difficult for Beijing to answer to a public which has been led to expect "reunification no matter what."

The implosion of the Soviet Union had many causes, both remote and proximate. But a major cause was Moscow's "overcommitment" to the three Baltic states, which mired it in a "commitment trap." Suppose earlier that year Moscow had relaxed its commitment to the three Baltic states? Suppose it had engaged in timely "policy innovation," and chosen to deal with the three Baltic states differently than the other republics? Had it done so, these tiny states might not have been the dominoes that led to the Soviet Union's collapse. Cross-Strait relations are of course very different from the relationship between the Soviet Union and the three Baltic states. But this example illustrates the consequences of improper goals. Therefore, we must avoid becoming mired in a "commitment trap" when establishing new goals.

In fact, the Beijing authorities have been aware of the problem for some time. Its "yet to be reunified, but still part of one China" phraseology attempts to resolve this impasse and stabilize cross-Strait relations "prior to reunification." This is why we must seek goals besides "reunification." We must think instead about "reconnecting," in order to establish an "in progress form of One China."

From Taipei's perspective, consider this newspaper's "2010 Cross-Strait Relations Survey." If we simplify the results of the survey on "Taiwan's Future," we get three results. Advocates of immediate or eventual independence total 31%. Advocates of maintaining the statusq quo in perpetuity total 51%. Advocates of immediate or eventual reunification total 14%. As we can see, for some time into the future, "reunification" will not constitute "the will of the people." The same survey shows that the public hopes that cross-Strait relations can be improved and stabilized. The public wants to "reconnect" with the other side, without "substantially changing the status quo." The thinking behind "reconnecting" was proposed by this newspaper in its "glass theory." According to the glass theory, Taiwan is the water, the Republic of China is the glass. As long as the glass remains, the water remains. Once the glass is shattered however, the water is lost. By contrast, the goal of "reunification" [from Beijing's perspective] is to shatter the glass.

Cross-Strait relations require process-oriented "peaceful development." They require goal-oriented "peaceful resolutions." This newspaper's "Six New Year's Day Editorials" proposed "setting new goals, predicated upon rational processes." Process-orientation and goal-orientation are mutually complementary alternatives. Here are the four conclusions previously cited.

Since reunification is difficult, why not reconnect first? If reconnection is successful, reunification may be unnecessary. If reconnection is successful, , the result may be better than reunification. Once reconnection is successful, reunification is also a possibility.

These four conclusions are the theme of this article. In other words, reconnection is a face saving measure that could break the cross-Strait impasse. It is also the road to cross-Strait prosperity.

After World War II, four divided countries emerged. North and South Vietnam fought a bitter civil war, underwent regime change, but has yet to resolve its national difficulties. North and South Korea have arranged meetings between their heads of state. But bureaucratic obstacles still stand in the way of talks. East and West Germany were once separated by a wall. But their abruptly reunification left everyone unprepared. By comparison, Taiwan and the Mainland are blessed. We can take incremental steps to improve and stabilize relations. We may be able to find an "historic solution" that will serve as a model for divided countries around the world. China, which has also been divided into two parts, is different from the three other divided countries. The biggest difference is that we can use "reconnection" as a face saving measure and the road to prosperity.

Taipei and Beijing have a responsibility to make good use this face saving measure and road to prosperity. Especially Beijing. Taiwan has adopted democracy. Any high-level "connection," such as a peace agreement or a confederation, will require Beijing's initiative. Otherwise, allegations of "pandering to [Mainland] China and selling out Taiwan" will fly. But if Beijing were to promote a gradual scheme for "reconnecting," it could bypass partisan political struggles on Taiwan. It could appeal directly to the public on Taiwan. It could offer a proposal, similar to ECFA, that would immediately appeal the public on Taiwan. Taipei and Beijing would have a fait accompli on their hands. Of course, for Beijing to move from "reunification" to "reconnection," is easier said than done. After all, it has already found itself mired in a "commitment trap" for some time.

Both sides of the Taiwan Strait know perfectly well that the past few years constitute a fleeting historical opportunity. If the overall situation undergoes further change, perhaps even "reconnection" will no longer be an option. This would once again plunge the two sides into a "commitment trap." Therefore, we propose that Mainland authorities encourage free discussion of "reconnection" by Mainland think-tanks. This will reduce the impasse. After all, one's ideas determine one's behavior. One's vision determines one's horizons.

「連結論」是兩岸的下台階與青雲路
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.09.20 04:10 am

本文是《從統一論到連結論》系列社論的收尾，想要強調：「連結論」是兩岸難題的下台階，但同時也是兩岸發展的青雲路。

前文指出，統一是難度最高、風險最大的解決方案。主張「統一」，可能使北京墜入「承諾的陷阱」；亦即可能被這個「過度的承諾」弄得無法下台。因為，就兩岸關係的弔詭與辯證情境而言，主張「統一」不啻就是延長「分裂」；就中共統治當局而言，則統一問題久懸未決，在內部就永遠是一顆鷹鴿反目的炸彈，且將如何向已被「非統一不可」洗腦的大陸人民交代？

舉例來說，蘇聯解體有諸多遠因近因，但當年莫斯科對波羅的海三小國的「過度政策」，使自己墜落「承諾的陷阱」，亦是重大原因；莫斯科當年若能及早降低放鬆對「三小國」的「政策承諾」，並及時「政策創新」，以與其他共和國切割處理，也許三小國不致成為蘇聯瓦解的第一張骨牌。兩岸關係當然大不同於蘇聯與三小國的關係，但由此可見，雙邊關係的「目標定位」是否準確，應當是政策風險的必要考量；因此，必須在陷入「承諾的陷阱」之時有所警覺，考慮「目標創新」。

其實，北京當局早有此種警覺，所謂「雖然尚未統一／仍是一個中國」之類的論述，皆是想要在「統一前」或「未統一」的情勢中，找到化解僵局、穩定兩岸關係的辦法。這就必須在「統一論」之外嘗試「目標創新」，朝往「連結論」的方向去思考，設法創造「現在進行式的一個中國」。

再就台灣方面言，從本報11日發表的「2010兩岸關係年度大調查」顯示，若將這次民調對「台灣前途」的主張簡化為三項，則急獨加緩獨佔31％，永遠維持現狀佔51％，急統加緩統為14％。可見，在未來相當時間內，「統一」並非「民之所欲」；而在同一民調所顯示的民眾對改善及穩定兩岸關係的期待卻顯示，若欲在兩岸之間建立各種「不大幅改變現狀」的「連結」，則相當符合民意。而「連結論」的基本思考即在本報所提出的「杯子理論」（台灣是水，中華民國是杯子；杯在水在，杯破水覆）；相對而言，「統一論」則是以砸破杯子為目標，豈堪想像？

兩岸關係必須「和平發展」（過程論），亦必須「和平解決」（目的論），此即本報《元旦六論》所主張的「從合理的過程到改善之目的」。關於「過程論」與「目的論」之間的互補及替代關係，前文曾舉出四個對子，茲再抄錄如下：

既然很難統一，何妨作好連結／如果作好連結，也就不必統一／只要作好連結，其實好過統一／連結通過考驗，統一也有可能。

這四個對子，即能反映出本文的題旨，那就是：連結論是兩岸難題的下台階，同時也是兩岸發展的青雲路。

二戰後，出現四個分裂國家。南北越打了一場慘烈的內戰，政權更替，但國家困境迄未解決；南北韓即使已進入元首會面的層次，但仍陷劍拔弩張的不可開交之局；東西德則昨天還是隔牆分治，第二天竟已實現統一，來個措手不及。相較而言，兩岸可謂何其幸運，如今能以漸層漸進的步驟改善並穩定關係，因而極可能在四個分裂國家中創造一個足稱「人類歷史典範」的解決方案；而兩岸與其他三個分裂國家的最大不同所在，正是因為我們可以用「連結論」作為下台階及青雲路。

如何善用這個下台階與青雲路，北京的責任應大於台北。因為，台灣的民主體制，對任何高層次的「連結」（如和平協議或邦聯），除非先由北京提出正面的方案，否則必然會因「傾中賣台」吵得不可開交；但如果北京能對漸層漸進的「連結」方案，跳過台灣的政黨鬥爭，直接面對台灣民眾，端出一出手就能說服台灣主流民意的提案（如ECFA），那兩岸就可能有一拍即合的效應。當然，大陸內部若要從「統一論」朝向「連結論」，恐怕也是一個不小的難題，畢竟已陷「承諾的陷阱」久矣。

兩岸皆知，這幾年是稍縱即逝的珍貴歷史機遇期。倘若大局再變，恐怕連「連結論」提出的空間都沒有了，兩岸就又再墜入「承諾的陷阱」之中。所以，我們特別建議，大陸當局應鼓勵內部智囊公開討論「連結論」，為困局鬆綁。畢竟，思路決定出路，眼界決定境界。