Direct Government to Government Links: Accelerate the "Fourth Link"

Direct Government to Government Links: Accelerate the "Fourth Link"
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 23, 2010

Central government officials have appeared at cross-Strait events with increasing frequency. Mainland Culture Minister Cai Wu met with our own Council for Cultural Affairs (CCA) Minister Emile Sheng. Our own Government Information Office (GIO) Chief Chiang Chi-chen met with Mainland Deputy Director of Press and Publication Administration Wu Shulin. Our own Minister of Education (MOE) Wu Ching-chi attended the same ribbon-cutting ceremony as Shaanxi Provincial Governor Chao Zhengtong. Our own APEC Affairs Council Chairperson Wang Ju-hsuan attended the Beijing Conference on Human Development, and was photographed next to Mainland President Hu Jintao.

These phenomena remind one of cross-Strait shipping and its transition from "indirect" to "direct." Over the years, the two sides have used Hong Kong and Ishigaki Island as shipping "buffers." This led to "changing the voyage number without changing the ship" and other gimmicks. These gimmicks however, backfired, especially after Hong Kong's retrocession in 1997. Voyages and flights between Taiwan and Hong Kong were already "direct." Never mind that we engaged in self-deception by pretending they were still "indirect." In December 2008, following the implementation of direct flights, we finally stopped using Hong Kong as a "buffer."

Current cross-Strait exchanges also rely on "buffers." The Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF), and the Association for Relations across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS), are just such "buffers." Therefore the aforementioned phenomenon of central government officials meeting directly has already gone from "indirect" exchanges, to "direct government to government" exchanges. This should be considered a valuable "fourth link" in the wake of the "three links."

The two sides are currently negotiating a cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Commission. This would help promote "direct government to government" links. Negotiations are nominally under the aegis of the SEF and ARATS. But the delegations will be led on both sides by vice ministerial level officials. The buffers have already been set aside, and are now merely for show.

This is a positive and welcome trend. Representatives from the two sides were often faced with a dilemma. They were required to tap dance around whether they were "not in disagreement" or "in agreement." Direct contact by central government officials would enable them to sidestep such theoretical or rhetorical obstacles. In other words, the theoretical and rhetorical justifications for cross-Strait exchanges have fallen behind real world practice and action. Therefore it makes sense to allow practice to guide theory.

In the past, contacts between Mainland and Taiwan officials were limited to the local government level. The authorities in Beijing and central government officials on Taiwan were leery of higher level contacts. The most obvious example was ARATS President Chen Yunlin's meeting with Ma Ying-jeou. For one, Chen Yunlin was not an official but merely a "buffer." Furthermore, Chen Yunlin addressed President Ma as "you." The reason for this was difficulties over "mutual recognition." Now however, central government officials from both sides have made direct contact. It is now possible to modify the theoretical justifications for "mutual non-denial" or "mutual recognition."

The two sides "recognize each other," or at least "do not repudiate each other." This may have developed out of Lien Chan's 2005 visit to the Mainland. Beijing recognized Lien Chan as Chairman of the KMT. In effect, it recognized his status as the chairman of the opposition party of the Republic of China. Next, Beijing recognized Wu Po-hsiung as chairman of the KMT. In effect, it recognized his status as the chairman of the ruling party of the Republic of China. Furthermore, Beijing was originally willing to recognize officials from Taiwan only at the county and municipal level. But without a Republic of China central government, where did its county and municipal governments come from? Today, central government officials from the two sides are meeting directly. The two sides' ministerial level officials must of course answer to "heads of state" above them. How can anyone deny this? As we can see, practice has outstripped theory. Theory has lagged behind action. In fact, recognizing county chiefs and city mayors, or recognizing ministerial level officials, all implicitly require recognizing the existence of the central governments. The logic is above reproach. It was merely that our political practices deviated from it in the past.

Now officials on both sides look forward to a meeting between President Ma Ying-jeou and President Hu Jintao. This also poses "theoretical" obstacles. But if the two sides can refer to each other by their official titles, the possibility of a meeting is great. If the two sides wish to see a Ma/Hu meeting, they need to create a mutually acceptable "theoretical basis" for any such meeting.

In the past, Beijing associated "repudiating the Republic of China" with "reunification." But in fact these are two entirely separate issues. If Beijing recognizes the Republic of China, does that really mean we cannot reunify? East and West Germany recognized each other as "nations," but not as "foreign nations." Were they not reunified in the end? The cross-Strait status quo is merely the legacy of a civil war. What is this, if not the theoretical basis for two governments, either warring or negotiating a peace treaty, under the premise of "One China?" What is the alternative? Taipei can hardly sign a peace agreement with Beijing under the name of the "Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu Separate Customs Territory." Besides, the two sides are undergoing "peaceful development." "Reconnecting" should take precedence over "reunification." "Direct government to government links" would be a powerful connection extremely difficult to reverse, hence something both worthwhile and welcome.

We are delighted to see central government officials from the two sides accelerate the "fourth link." This will allow the public on the two sides to become accustomed to "direct government to government links." This will allow the two sides to gain a better understanding of cross-Strait relations from "direct government to government links." This will allow "practical innovation" to lead "theoretical innovation" and "policy innovation." Perhaps this precious historical opportunity will enable the heads of the MAC and the Taiwan Affairs Office visit each other, premiers on the two sides each other, and even Ma and Hu meet each other in an official, earth-shaking, world class summit.

政府直通：加速發展「第四通」
【聯合報╱社論】 2010.09.23

中央政府官員出現在兩岸場合的鏡頭頻密公開。大陸文化部長蔡武會見我文建會主委盛治仁，我新聞局長江啟臣接見大陸新聞出版總署副署長鄔書林，我教育部長吳清基與陝西省長趙正永同場剪綵，勞委會主委王如玄出席北京ＡＰＥＣ人力發展會議，與中國國家主席胡錦濤「合影」……。

這些現象令人想起兩岸航運由「中轉」變「直航」的過程。多年來兩岸一直透過香港、石垣島為「白手套」進行通航，因此發展出「換班次不換載具」等模式；但這些模式只是自作自受，尤其在九七香港回歸大陸後，台港其實已經是「直航」，卻仍要藉它「中轉」，更是自欺欺人。二○○八年十二月實施直航後，終於脫掉了香港這副白手套。

現在，兩岸政府的往來，也靠「中轉」，海基、海協兩會就是「白手套」；因而，前述中央官員直接會面的現象，已由「中轉」漸變為「政府直通」，可以視為「三通」之後，值得期待的「第四通」。

兩岸正在議商的經濟合作委員會，應是促進「政府直通」的關鍵作為；雖仍掛名在兩會之下，但雙邊皆將以次長級官員領軍，白手套已擺在桌邊作樣子。

這是一個值得肯定與期待的發展趨勢。而且，當兩岸正在「互不否認」，或「相互承認」的困局中左右為難之際，中央政府官員的直接接觸，可謂是超越了理論或論述的領先作為；也就是說，在這個時候，兩岸交往的理論及論述，已見落後於實踐與行動的發展。然而，「以實踐帶動理論發展」，也許正是一個好辦法。

過去，大陸與台灣官員接觸，只停留在地方政府層級，北京當局對與台灣中央政府官員會面有所避忌。最明顯的例子是海協會長陳雲林見馬英九總統，一者陳雲林不是官員而是白手套，再者陳雲林以「您」稱呼馬總統；此中皆涉及了是否「相互承認」的爭議。現在，兩岸中央政府官員直接接觸，「互不否認」或「相互承認」的理論，似有可待發展的空間。

兩岸的相互承認或不否認，也許可由二○○五年連戰訪問大陸談起。北京承認了連戰為中國國民黨主席的身分，其實也就是承認其為中華民國反對黨主席的身分；接著，北京承認了吳伯雄為中國國民黨主席的身分，其實也就是承認其為中華民國執政黨主席的身分。再者，北京起初只承認台灣縣市長的身分，但若沒有中華民國的中央政府，何來這些縣市長？如今，又見兩岸中央政府官員「直通」，但不能否認兩岸這些部長的上面都有一位「國家元首」。可見，實踐已超越理論，理論已落後於行動。其實，接受了縣市長，或接受了部長，便皆不能否認中央政府，其邏輯「一以貫之」，只是一直被政治操作切斷罷了。

如今存在於兩岸的最大想像之一，是馬英九總統與胡錦濤主席有無可能見面；這也牽涉到「理論」的問題。倘若雙方能以正式職銜互相稱呼，會面的機會就很大。兩岸若對馬胡會皆有憧憬，即必須共創一套彼此皆可接納的「理論」。

北京過去將「否認中華民國」與「統一」綁在一起；但這其實可以是兩回事。若承認了中華民國，難道就一定不能「統一」？如東西德相互承認為「非外國的國家」，最後還不是「統一」了？既稱兩岸現狀就是內戰的遺留，這豈不正是相互為「一個中國」下的兩個交戰或議和政府的現成「理論」？否則，難道要用「ＴＰＫＭ個別關稅領域」來簽訂「和平協議」？何況，兩岸在「和平發展期」中，「連結」比「統一」優先；而「政府直通」則是相當強固且難以逆轉的「連結」，因此應可寄以肯定及期待。

我們樂見兩岸中央政府官員加速加強「第四通」，俾使兩岸人民習於「政府直通」的運作，亦可從「政府直通」中重新理解兩岸關係，並以「實踐創新」來帶動「理論創新」及「政策創新」。倘能如此，或許在這珍貴的歷史機遇期中，兩岸人民將可見到陸委會與國台辦首長的互訪，行政院長與國務院總理的會面，以及馬胡二人以正式職稱舉行轟動世界的高峰會。