Taipei and Beijing: Is "Reconnection" Preferable to "Reunification?"

Taipei and Beijing: Is "Reconnection" Preferable to "Reunification?"
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 17, 2010

Summary: This newspaper's editorial page compared "reconnection" to "reunification." Our feeling is that the "roof theory," which entails reconnection, is preferable to "reunification." As we pointed out previously, "reunification" is the hardest and riskiest option. Reunification means one side swallowing up the other under a single national title. Is "reunification" really the best solution? Is there a better alternative to "reunification?" Might "reconnection" be preferable to "reunification?" Might the "roof theory" be preferable to "reunification?"

Full Text below:

On the 2nd, the 4th, the 12th of this month, this newspaper's editorial page compared "reconnection" to "reunification." Our feeling is that the "roof theory," which entails reconnection, is preferable to "reunification."

As we pointed out previously, "reunification" is the hardest and riskiest option. Reunification means one side swallowing up the other under a single national title. This raises three questions.

One. How should one reunify? If one wants to reunfy democratically, how long will that take? If one wishes to reunify forcibly, what will be the aftermath? Two. What governance issues will arise post-reunification? After all, the President and the Legislative Yuan of the Republic of China are democratically elected under a system of universal suffrage. Even if one succeeds in implementing "one country, two systems," it is unlikely one can turn the clock back. Consider one example. After "reunification" will Taiwan still permit the existence of a pro-independence political party? Allowing their existence is a governance issue. Not allowing their existence is also a governance issue. Three. Reunification is a goal that has remained long unresolved. If one equates "failure to reunify" with not being "one China," then until "one side swallows up the other," "reunification" will paradoxically divide the two sides. Cross-Strait relations will remain strained merely because the two sides have "yet to be reunified." Conversely, if one considers the "roof theory" consistent with the "one China principle," then the two sides can gradual implement an "in progress form of One China," under a "soft roof," "flexible roof," or "hard roof."

Therefore "reunification" is in fact destabilizing the "One China principle." The "roof theory," on the other hand, may be best way to gradually put past controversy to rest and resolve the problem. The distinction between "reunification" and "reconnection" has major relevance for internal politics, both on Taiwan and on the Mainland. If the "roof theory" and an "in progress form of One China" can be adopted, disputes between mainland hawks and doves can be moderated. Beijing will not be forced to deal with government policy wild cards merely because they have yet to achieve "reunification." Taipei meanwhile, may be able to substantially reduce the social divisions created by struggles over reunification vs. independence. Why must one single-mindedly pursue the target of "reunification?" Why not consider the "roof theory" as one's "new target?"

Is there a better alternative to "reunfication?" This is a question both the ruling and opposition parties should seriously contemplate. Taipei and Beijing should not stand in the way of such private sector discussions. They should encourage them. Beijing in particular should do so, and give itself and the Mainland public a break. The Beijing authorities have chained themselves and the Mainland public to a giant post named "reunification." They have made a difficult to fulfill commitment to the Mainland public. They are effectively sitting on a time bomb that may go off at any moment. Prevailing policy is both impractical and dangerous. That is why Beijing ought to consider "new targets."

The management field speaks of "commitment traps." These involve being trapped by one's own "over-commitments." One can neither fulfill one's commitments, nor clean up after reneging on those commitments. One is trapped. For example, a person vows to eat 500 dumplings in a single sitting. Ony two results are possible. One is to eat oneslef into the hospital. The other is knowing one cannot possible fulfill one's promises, and instead "eating one's words." This is a "commitment trap." Setting "new targets" means resetting the number of dumplings at a more reasonable number. Doing so enables one to escape the "commitment trap," instead of either rolling oneself up in a cocoon, or being forced to face public embarrassment.

A majority on Taiwan is "afraid of reunification." The Beijing authorities on the other hand are "afraid reunification might not happen." It is not hard to understand why a majority on Taiwan is "afraid of reunification." But the main reason the Beijing authorities are "afraid reunification may not happen," is their "commitment trap." Therefore if the two sides want "peaceful development," Taipei must allay public "fears of reunification." Beijing meanwhile, must not mire those in power and the Mainland public deeper in a commitment trap of "reunification at all cost." A feasible compromise would be for Taipei and Beijing to realize that the "roof theory" may be preferable to "reunjfication." Why not consider a "new target?"

Speaking of "new targets," just precisely what targets are realistic cross-Strait targets? The two sides should pursue a number of targets. One. They must not deviate from the "One China principle." Two. The Taiwan Region must not become a foreign country and a proxy for foreign powers. Three. The authorities on the two sides must not view each other with hostility. Four. The public on the two sides should look upon each other with goodwill and friendship. Five. The two sides should establish a mutually beneficial win-win relationship. Can such "targets" promote "reunification?" Or, conversely, will a single-minded commitment to "reunification" become a barrier to the pursuit of "real targets?" Will it mire us in a "commitment trap?" Are the two sides pursuing "reunification" as a "pro forma target?" Or are we pursuing the above mentioned "real target?"

Is "reunification" really the best solution? Is there a better alternative to "reunification?" Might "reconnection" be preferable to "reunification?" Might the "roof theory" be preferable to "reunification?"

兩岸解藥：「連結論」好過「統一論」
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.09.17 02:35 am

本報二日、四日、十二日社論探討「連結論」與「統一論」之比較，認為「屋頂理論」（連結）是較「統一」為佳的選擇。

前文指出，「統一」是難度最高及風險最大的選項。「統一」就是「誰吃掉誰」，併吞在一個國號之下；這關係到三個方面的問題：

一、如何統一的問題。若要民主統一，河清何日？若是武力統一，如何善後？二、統一後的治理問題。畢竟中華民國已是直選總統及普選國會的民主政體，即使實施「一國兩制」，恐怕也不應開倒車；在此僅舉一例，「統一」後的台灣還容許存在一個主張台獨的政黨嗎？容許存在是一個治理問題，不容許存在也是一個治理問題。三、統一目標久懸未決的問題。如果認定「不統一」就不是「一個中國」，則在「誰吃掉誰」之前，「統一」就反而成了兩岸分裂的因素，兩岸關係亦因「未統一」而長久陷於緊張；反過來說，倘若認為「屋頂理論」也符合「一個中國原則」，則兩岸在軟屋頂、巧屋頂或硬屋頂（見前文）之下，即可漸層漸進地體現「現在進行式的一個中國」。準此以論，「統一」其實是使得「一個中國原則」不能安頓的因素，而「屋頂理論」則可將之漸層漸進地提早止息爭議，解決問題。此一差異對兩岸各自的內部政治亦有重大關聯，如果能確認「屋頂理論」及「現在進行式的一個中國」，大陸方面的鷹鴿之爭即可緩和，北京當局將不致因長久無法兌現「統一」的政策目標而使政權存有難測因素，而台灣方面亦可望大幅降低統獨鬥爭的社會傷害。然則，為何非要偏執「統一」的目標，又為何不能思考以「屋頂理論」為「目標創新」？

有沒有比「統一」更好的辦法？這是兩岸朝野皆應嚴肅思考的問題，至少兩岸當局不應阻止而應鼓勵這類的民間討論；北京當局尤應如此，給自己鬆綁，也給大陸民間鬆綁。北京政權如今將自己及整個大陸社會綁在「統一」的大柱上，一方面永遠欠大陸人民一個「很難實現／即使實現了也很難收拾」的承諾，另一方面也在統治圈內部永遠埋著一個鷹鴿反目的炸彈，這種政策未免太不實際也相當危險。所以，應當考慮「政策創新」。

管理學上有一種說法叫做「承諾的陷阱」（commitment trap），意思是說一個人被自己的「過度承諾」所陷害；用一個無法實現或實現後無法收拾的承諾，使自己陷於危境。例如，一個人若發誓要一口氣吃五百顆水餃，只會有兩種結果：一種是吃到送醫院；另一種是明知後果而根本不能兌現承諾，只能「食言」。這即是「承諾的陷阱」，所謂「目標創新」，可說就是要將水餃的數量重訂在一個合情合理的標準；使發出承諾者不致墜落「承諾的陷阱」，而作繭自縛或下不了台。

當下的「統一」問題，在台灣民意是「怕統一」，在北京當局則是「怕不統一」。台灣民意「怕統一」，不難理解；而北京當局「怕不統一」，主要原因之一就是已陷「承諾的陷阱」之中。因而，兩岸若要「和平發展」，在台灣須化解「怕統一」的民意憂慮，在北京當局則是不宜使主政者及大陸人民在「非要統一」的「承諾陷阱」中愈陷愈深。折衷之道是：兩岸若認為「屋頂理論」可有優於「統一」之處，何不共策「目標創新」？

談到「目標創新」，應先認定「兩岸目標」的「實質追求」究竟是什麼？兩岸追求的實質目標應當是：一、不要偏離「一個中國原則」。二、台灣不要成為他國對抗中國的外國代理人。三、兩岸政權不相仇視敵對。四、兩岸人民相互親善友愛。五、兩岸互利雙贏。這樣的「目標追求」是否唯有「統一」後始能實現？或者，反過來說，太過偏執於「統一」的「承諾」，有無可能反而成為追求這些「實質目標」的阻障，而陷於「承諾的陷阱」中？我們必須想清楚：兩岸追求的究竟是「統一」的「形式目標」？或是前述的「實質目標」？

「統一」真是最佳方案嗎？有沒有比「統一」更好的辦法？「連結論」會不會較「統一論」更佳？「屋頂理論」會不會比「統一」更好？