Sovereign Territory and Rare Earth: Diaoyutai and the DPP

Sovereign Territory and Rare Earth: Diaoyutai and the DPP
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 30, 2010

Global events are unpredictable. Who would have guessed that the Cheonan corvette sinking incident would trigger an international tug of war, and even become a footnote in the September Dioayutai incident?

Following the Cheonan incident, the US and the ROK held naval exercises in the Yellow Sea. These were followed by joint US/Vietnamese naval exercises. People cried that "The United States is returning to Asia," and is engaged in renewed efforts to contain Mainland China. Under the circumstances, Japan's detention of people at Diaoyutai, and Wen Jiabao's demand that Japan release them without conditions, was tantamount to a global game of chicken, a contest to see who would be the first to blink. In the end, the Japanese released the detainees. At this point, it is hard to say who won and who lost. But clearly Beijing has both the will and the way to defy the dictates of the United States and Japan.

Diaoyutai has long been a raw nerve on Taiwan's political scene. This time was no different. The Ma Administration's speech was nothing new. DPP Chairman Tsai Ing-wen's remarks however, were food for thought. Tsai Ing-wen said "Diaoyutai belongs to Taiwan." Although this quoted old Executive Yuan cases, coming from the mouth of Tsai Ing-wen, it was tantamount to a declaration of "quasi-Taiwan independence."

A full-fledged declaration of Taiwan independence would have quoted Lee Teng-hui, who said "Diaoyutai belongs to Japan." "Of course it belongs to Japan." When Lee Teng-hui said this, he had already stepped down. When President Chen Shui-bian took a boat to Pengjia Island, he declared that "Diaoyutai belongs to the Republic of China." This was another statement of position by a Green Camp leader regarding Diaoyutai.

Tsai Ing-wen's statement reveals her dilemma. On the one hand, she cannot echo Lee Teng-hui's declaration that "Diaoyutai belongs to Japan." If she were to make such a statement, the DPP would not have a leg to stand on. It would also find it difficult to mend relations with Beijing. On the other hand, she did not want to repeat Chen Shui-bian's declaration that "Diaoyutai belongs to the Republic of China." First, she had to mollify Taiwan independence elements. Secondly, invoking the Republic of China involves Diaoyutai in a "Greater China" struggle. But after all, there is no "Nation of Taiwan." Tsai's "Nation of Taiwan" is a fiction. If one hopes to assert sovereignty over Diaoyutai, what way is there but to assert that "Diaoyutai belongs to the Republic of China?"

The Taiwan independence movement would like to rid itself of Diaoyutai. It wants to rid itself of Diaoyutai in order to rid itself of Beijing. But Tsai Ying-wen dares not get rid of Diaoyutai. Clearly she is concerned about a backlash from Beijing. But if she cannot get rid of Diaoyutai, she cannot get rid of Beijing, even though she may have repudiated the "Republic of China." As we can see, she is trapped on the horns of a dilemma.

For Beijing the Diaoyutai incident involves two strategic elements: "sovereign territory" and "rare earth." This is where advocates of Taiwan independence within the DPP should focus their attention. The territorial issue is an issue of sovereignty. Beijing's tough stance on sovereignty needs no further comment. The issue of "rare earth" Beijing is tackling using economic means. Mainland China is already "the world's factory" and "the global marketplace." Japan cannot hold out in the long term. This is the main reason Japan felt compelled to release the detainees and swallow its pride. It effectively backed down under Beijing's economic threats. This should serve as a warning for the DPP.

Taipei is in coopetition with Beijing over two issues, "sovereignty" and "economics." On the issue of sovereignty, the DPP repudiates the "1992 Consensus" and "One China, Different Interpretations." It asserts that "the Republic of China is an alien regime." It attempts to promote "Taiwan independence" in a power struggle with Beijing." Is this a workable policy? On the issue of economics, the economy on Taiwan and the economy on Mainland China are inseparable. If the DPP returns to power and resumes its Taiwan independence path, Beijing may well nullify ECFA. How will the DPP cope with such a threat? This is a strategic possibility the DPP must anticipate. Actually, Beijing need only declare a "suspension of dealings between the two organizations." Any DPP-ruled central government would buckle under the impact. The 1992 Consensus allows the two sides to coexist. Taiwan's economy is inseparable from the Mainland's. If the DPP returns to power, but insists on repudiating the 1992 Consensus, the consequences will be unimagineable.

The political situation on Taiwan is changing. Some on the Mainland are even "pinning their hopes on the DPP." This tells us that if one day the DPP returns to power, but refuses to make a declaration even more explicit than the "five noes," Beijing will punish the DPP for promoting Taiwan independence. By applying economic pressure, it can exert complete control over Taiwan's political and economic systems. The DPP regime will become a fragile government, highly susceptible to extortion. Therefore in the eyes of the Beijing authorities, a DPP return to power may constitute a windfall opportunity to resolve the cross-Strait dilemma. Why shouldn't it look forward to a DPP return to power?

In recent years, the global situation and cross-Strait situation have undergone dramatic changes. The Diaoyutai issue has also undergone changes, both internationally and across the Strait. The Diaoyutai issue involves both "sovereign territory" and "rare earth." Cross-Strait issues will as well. Tsai Ing-wen has attempted to get rid of Diaoyutai. Instead she has repudiated the Republic of China. Her attempt has merely exposed the shortcomings of her strategy.

Beijing's "sovereignty/economics" strategy has been applied not just to Diaoyutai, but to the Taiwan Strait. This is precisely why Beijing is pinning its hopes on a DPP return to power.

領土與稀土 釣魚台與民進黨
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.09.30 03:15 am

世局變化莫測，誰曾料到三月天安艦事件觸發的一連串國際角力，竟然會在九月由釣魚台事件作了註腳？

天安艦事件後，美韓黃海演習，接著美越南海演習，「美國重返亞洲」之說甚囂塵上，一種針對中國的「新圍堵」儼然上演；在這種情勢下，日本在釣魚台扣船押人，及溫家寶要求日本無條件放人，不啻是在世人面前進行「懦夫博弈」（chicken game），看誰先撐不住而跳車，最後以日本放人收場。事態發展至此，雖然難謂勝負輸贏，但北京有意志及有力量拒絕接受美日等國所定義的局勢，則為有目共睹。

釣魚台早已成為牽動台灣政治神經的鋼絲，此次亦然。馬政府這次的發言並無新意，反而是民進黨主席蔡英文的談話頗可推敲。蔡英文說：「釣魚台列嶼的主權屬於台灣。」這雖是引據行政院的舊案，但此際出自蔡英文之口，卻儼然可謂是「半個台獨」的論述。

真正的台獨立場，應如李登輝所說：「釣魚台的主權屬於日本。」「當然是日本的。」說此話時，李登輝已經卸任總統。另一種綠營領袖的表述形式是陳水扁任總統時，乘船至彭佳嶼海域，宣示「釣魚台的主權屬於中華民國」。

蔡英文的說法顯示她陷於兩難之境。一方面，她不可能如李登輝那樣說「釣魚台是日本的」；她若這樣說，民進黨非但在台灣難以立足，此後也難與北京修復關係。另一方面，她又不願像陳水扁那樣說「釣魚台是中華民國的」，一者是要照顧獨派的感情，二者是因思及中華民國使釣島問題捲入「大中國」的糾纏中。但是，畢竟「台灣國」仍是子虛烏有，台灣若要主張釣島的「主權」，除了說「釣魚台的主權是中華民國的」，難道還有其他方法？

台獨想要甩掉釣魚台，主要是想以甩掉釣魚台來甩掉北京。但蔡英文不敢甩掉釣魚台，顯然是顧忌北京的反彈；然她未甩掉釣魚台，也甩不掉北京，卻竟否定了「中華民國」，可見已陷兩難的矛盾中。

北京在此次釣魚台事件中的兩大戰略要素是：領土與稀土。這是民進黨主張台獨路線者宜應觀察的重點。領土問題就是主權問題，北京立場之強硬不待贅論。稀土問題則泛指北京以經濟手段作為折衝主力，而日本對於已成「世界工廠」及「世界市場」的中國，不能不寄以久遠，這應是日本這次唾面自乾、放人息事的主因，可謂是在北京的經濟威脅下讓步。此一情勢，對民進黨應當有所啟示。

台灣與北京政權的競合關係，其實也在「主權」與「經濟」兩大項目。就主權論，民進黨否定「九二共識」、「一中各表」，認為「中華民國是外來政權」，而欲以「台獨建國」與北京進行「主權」角力，這是否可行的政策？再就經濟論，台灣經濟絕無可能與中國隔離，民進黨若再執政而仍採台獨路線，將如何面對北京可能停廢ＥＣＦＡ等威脅，這也是不能不有所預防的戰略思考。其實，屆時恐怕只消北京宣布暫停「兩會來往」，主持中央政府的民進黨就必承受不起。民進黨若在主權上仍否認猶可與北京分庭抗禮的「九二共識」，且台灣在經濟上又擺脫不了中國，則民進黨再執政將是何等不堪想像的危境？

隨著台灣內部政治情勢變化，大陸方面甚至已出現了「寄希望於民進黨」的思考。此說認為，如果另日民進黨主政，不作出比「四不一沒有」更明確的宣示，北京即以民進黨主張台獨進行政治施壓，又以經濟利害相脅迫，就能完全操控台灣的政經神經，而民進黨政府將成為極易受挾持及極脆弱的政府。因而，在北京當局眼中，民進黨若再執政，儼然即是解決兩岸問題的另一個更佳的「機遇期」，何不寄希望於民進黨再執政？

近年來，世界局勢與兩岸競合關係皆有了巨大變化，釣魚台問題的性質在國際及兩岸間亦告變化。釣魚台問題未來仍將循「領土／稀土」的路徑發展，兩岸關係亦然；蔡英文這種甩不掉釣魚台卻反而否定了中華民國的手法，其實只是自暴其短。

北京「主權／經濟」的戰略，不僅施於釣魚台，也施於台灣海峽；這也正是北京有人寄希望於民進黨再執政的原因所在。