Liu Shih-chung's Revelations and Evasions

Liu Shih-chung's Revelations and Evasions 
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
September 14, 2010

In his new book, American scholar Jeremy J. Stone has revealed that when Chen Shui-bian became president in 2000, he initially hoped to hold talks with Beijing on the basis of the 1992 Consensus and the One China Principle. As Stone put it, former Chen Shui-bian presidential aide Liu Shih-chung's new book, "History's Knots," has proven correct. Liu Shih-chung said that Stone hoped Chen Shui-bian would reach out to Mainland China, that he would become "Taiwan's Nixon," and that Chen Shui-bian did indeed entertain such a notion.

Liu's book describes the situation in 2000, when Chen Shui-bian was first elected president. Chen Shui-bian aspired to be "Taiwan's Nixon." Not only did he announce his "Four Noes Policy," he considered negotiating a "future One China" with Beijing. He echoed the concept of "under one roof" advanced by many people on both sides of the Strait. He expressed a commitment to the possibility of "political integration." But the book concludes that two years after Chen left office, Washington remains haunted by the "Chen Shui-bian nightmare." It is terrified that if the Democratic Progressive Party returns to power, "another Chen Shui-bian" will appear.

Joseph Wu, former Chen administration Mainland Affairs Council Chief and Representative to the United States, wrote a preface to Liu's book. He said that when Chen Shui-bian was elected president in 2000, Liu Shih-chung became an Ah-Bian disciple and eventually a key staffer and a member of his brain trust. Therefore he was among the very few with a full understanding of Chen Shui-bian's policies and objectives. As a result of his role in the Chen administration, Joseph Wu participated in the pre-publication editing of Liu's book. That is why Liu Shih-chung's revelations and evaluations display an admirable frankness.

Liu's book describes Chen Shui-bian's policy background and evaluates his political moves, including "one country on each side," the "authoring of a new constitution," his "defensive referendum," his response to the "Anti-Secession Law," his "termination of the reunification process" and the "Referendum to join the UN." The book suggests that Chen made it impossible to initiate cross-Strait exchanges. Even worse, Washington viewed Chen Shui-bian with "hostility and mistrust," with "deep anger and resentment," and "lost all confidence in Chen Shui-bian." The result was the Democratic Progressive Party's election debacle in 2008.

Liu's book assesses Chen Shui-bian's policies outside the context of cross-Strait relations. It assesses them on the basis of their impact on Taipei/Washington relations. One might say that Liu's book is the diametric opposite of Chen Shui-bian's policies, which manipulated cross-Strait and Taipei/Washington relations entirely out of domestic election considerations. The blurb includes the following passages. "(Washington) took exception to (Chen Shui-bian's) habit of engaging only in domestic election moves, utterly ignoring their impact on cross-Strait relations." "The leader (Chen Shui-bian) ignored the need for consistency between election rhetoric and official statements. This made it difficult for Washington to trust Chen Shui-bian." The final result was that Stone's dreams of a "Taiwan's Nixon" was tranformed into a "Chen Shui-bian nightmare."

The book leaves the impression that Taiwan independence is just another election ploy incompatible with national survival and three-way coopetition between Washington, Beijing, and Taipei. This is the unintended implication of Liu's book. Liu's book states that the main reason the Chen Shui-bian regime failed was Chen Shui-bian's obstinate, hermetic, decision-making process, or his penchant for exploiting internal contradictions within the US bureaucracy. But these were merely tactical level problems. The real problem was at the strategic level. Eight agonizing years under the Chen Shui-bian regime confirmed that a Taiwan independence strategy is incompatible with a stable three-way Washington, Beijing, Taipei relationship. Chen Shui-bian knew this. As Liu's book notes, Ah-Bian clearly knew such a strategy was infeasible. He merely hoped to use Taiwan independence to divide the public for election advantage. He was utterly indifferent to the international repercussions on the three-way Washington, Beijing, Taipei relationship. He was only too happy to provoke the three parties for political gain. This is the most important revelation in Liu's book. It is also the point Liu Shih-chung has struggled hardest to conceal. The so-called "Chen Shui-bian nightmare" is really the "Taiwan independence nightmare."

According to Liu Shih-chung, when Chen Shui-bian is being good, he submits his inaugural speech to Washington for advance review. He consults personally with Washington on how to hold a referendum. But when he being bad, he responds to Washington's "punishment and retaliation" by embarking on a "Voyage to Nowhere" and "virtually becomes an enemy of the United States." When Chen Shui-bian is clear-headed, he favors "political integration." But when he goes off on a tangent, he announces "Four Demands and One No," (we demand independence, we demand the rectification of names, we demand a new constitution, we demand development, we have no left vs. right conflict, only reunification vs. independence conflict.) Does Chen bear the slightest resemblance to a president? To the leader of a nation? Or does he more closely resemble a drunk driver?

Liu Shih-chung helped Chen Shui-bian hide the truth. For example, when Chen Shui-bian announced his "Four Demands and One No," and "Referendum for UN membership," Liu Shih-chung spun it as Chen's aspirations for a political legacy after leaving office. He distorted the truth to protect Ah-Bian. The simple fact is that when Chen's corruption was exposed, he swiftly racheted up his Taiwan independence rhetoric. His goal was to lay claim to spiritual leadership of the Taiwan independence movement, thereby evading criminal prosecution once he stepped down from office. The March 19 Shooting Incident further undermined the legitimacy of the Chen regime. This led to Chen's subsequent desperation and brinksmanship. Liu's book glosses over this as well.

Liu's book aspires to be a reference source for future Democratic Progressive Party rulers. But it treats a national tragedy as if it were Chen Shui-bian's personal failure. It covers up the real reason for Chen's failure, the fact that Taiwan independence is utterly infeasible. For example, Liu's book implies that Chen Shui-bian's "Five Noes" left himself bound hand and foot. But given cross-Strait developments, even assuming the Democratic Progressive Party returned to power, what else could it do but reaffirm the "Five Noes?" What policy other than the "Five Noes" could allow the three way relationship between Washington, Beijing, and Taipei to continue?

Chen Shui-bian was mistaken. Liu's book makes this crystal clear. The Taiwan independence movement was even more mistaken. Liu's book attempts to tap dance around this fact. But as long as the Taiwan independence movement exists, as long as the Democratic Progressive Party rules, they will produce another desperado in the pattern of Chen Shui-bian.

劉世忠的坦率與隱諱
【聯合報╱社論】
2010.09.14

美國學者史東（Jeremy J. Stone）在新書揭露，陳水扁在2000年就任總統之初，曾同意在「九二共識」的基礎上，以「一個中國」的原則與北京進行會談。這段敘述，在扁政府前總統府幕僚劉世忠的新著《歷史的糾結》（以下稱《劉著》）中獲得證實。劉世忠說：史東當時期許陳水扁打開中國大門，成為「台灣的尼克森」，而陳水扁確懷此一夢想。

《劉著》描寫2000年陳水扁首次當選總統時的情況：心懷成為「台灣的尼克森」的阿扁，不但宣示「四不一沒有」，且又不排除與對岸共同討論「未來一個中國」的問題，再又呼應兩岸「同處一個屋簷下」的說法，承諾「政治統合」的可能性。然而，到了此書收尾時的評論則是：（陳水扁）下台兩年多，華府卻普遍仍對「陳水扁夢魘」有揮之不去的恐慌，深怕民進黨重新執政會出現「第二個陳水扁」。

在扁政府曾任陸委會主委及駐美代表的吳釗燮為《劉著》作序稱：劉世忠自2000年陳水扁當選總統之後，就跟隨阿扁，後來成為「重要幕僚與文膽」，因此對阿扁的政策談話內容與目標，是極少數能有全盤掌握者……。再由於以吳釗燮的角色身分，曾在《劉著》付梓前參與校訂；因此，劉世忠這本書所揭露的史實與對這些史實所作的評價，其心態之坦率令人敬佩。

《劉著》的內容，主要在敘述及評價陳水扁對「一邊一國」、「催生新憲」、「防禦性公投」、「反分裂國家法」、「終統」及「入聯公投」等的決策背景及操作手法。全書給人的印象是：非但最後鬧到兩岸關係不可開交，美國對陳水扁也「敵視與不信任」、「深感憤怒與不滿」、「對陳水扁的信任蕩然無存」，在國內則以民進黨2008年大敗收場。

《劉著》是從台灣外部的兩岸關係及台美關係效應，來評價陳水扁的政策；此於陳水扁完全從國內選舉的考量來操作兩岸及台美關係，堪謂完全背道而馳。簡錄幾段內文：「（華府）對其（陳水扁）只顧國內選舉操作而罔顧兩岸可能風險的作法不予苟同。」「領導者（陳水扁）忽略其『競選語言』與『官方語言』的一致性，……讓美方對陳水扁略為恢復的信任再度受到損失。」最後的結果是：史東所期許的「台灣的尼克森」，變成了「陳水扁夢魘」。

全書給人的印象是：台獨只是操作選舉的題材，卻不是能夠用在美中台三邊競合關係的國家生存戰略。這也是《劉著》在坦率之中的最大隱諱。《劉著》認為，陳水扁失政的主因，在於陳水扁的剛愎、決策環境封閉，或不當利用美國官僚的內部矛盾等。但是，這些尚皆只是「戰術」或「戰鬥」層次的問題，真正的要害是在「戰略」層面。經歷扁政府的八年折騰，已經證實「台獨戰略」絕無可能維持美中台三邊關係的平衡；其實，陳水扁不是不知這個道理（《劉著》稱：扁很清楚其可行性微乎其微），但他只是要用台獨來撕裂社會、操作選舉而已，完全不問美中台三邊關係的國際效應，甚至是以挑釁三邊關係來挑激選情。這其實才是《劉著》最重要的揭露，卻竟也成了劉世忠筆下最大的隱諱。所謂「陳水扁夢魘」，其實就是「台獨夢魘」。

劉世忠筆下的陳水扁，馴順時，把就職演說稿呈美國御覽，更與美國來使面商公投方案；叛逆時，面對美國的「懲罰與報復」，演出迷航，與美國「幾近反目成仇」。清醒時，主張「政治統合」；偏激時，宣示「四要一沒有」（台灣要獨立／要正名／要新憲／要發展／沒有左右問題，只有統獨問題）。這豈是一個為國家掌舵的總統？實儼如一個酒駕的醉漢！

劉世忠亦為陳水扁隱。例如，陳水扁到宣布「四要一沒有」及「入聯公投」的階段，劉世忠仍指他是為了在卸任後留下政治遺產（Legacy），這是曲筆護扁；然事實卻是，當時陳水扁貪案大爆，他升高台獨操作，其實是要佔據台獨教主的地位，作為他卸任後對抗司法的資本。其次，三一九槍擊案對陳水扁執政正當性的衝擊，導致他後來的走投無路、鋌而走險，在《劉著》也是一筆帶過而已。

《劉著》自期能作為民進黨未來再執政時的參考。但此書似將整場國家悲劇視為陳水扁一人的失敗，卻隱諱了真正的敗因是在台獨戰略的絕對不可採行。例如：《劉著》暗示，陳水扁誤用「四不一沒有」綁住了自己；但是，以目前兩岸發展趨勢觀，民進黨倘再執政，若不說出比「四不一沒有」更確切的美中台三邊保證，台灣能走得下去嗎？

陳水扁錯了，這是《劉著》的坦率；台獨更是大錯，這卻是《劉著》的隱諱。只要台獨還在，民進黨若執政，就還一定會有另一個走投無路的「陳水扁」。