DPP Cross-Strait Policy: Empty Slogans?

DPP Cross-Strait Policy: Empty Slogans?
China Times editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
March 1, 2011

Cross-strait relations are special. Political parties on Taiwan disagree about what they ought to be. When addressing cross-Strait and Mainland policy, Blue and Green camp political leaders invariably avoid the tough issues. They invariably resort to obscurantist political jargon. But the purpose of language is communication. Only by communicating can we reach some sort of understanding. If political jargon is so vague that even people within our own political camp find it incomprehensible, that defeats the purpose of political discourse.

Democratic Progressive Party Chairman Tsai Ing-wen has been in the limelight recently, When the DPP established a think tank recently, it proposed a "new cross-Strait discourse." This discourse would begin by "identifying with Taiwan." It would adopt "Taiwanese values" as its core value. The two sides of the Taiwan Strait would "maintain peace but allow the two sides to remain different." They would "seek commonalities on the basis of peace." They would seek peace but not reunification.

Tsai Ing-wen offered a new understanding of cross-Strait relations. Her move was bound to attract attention. She is the Chairman of the DPP, which could well become the ruling party. Her understanding of such matters is likely to affect cross-Strait relations and Taiwan's development. Regrettably, Tsai Ing-wen's new discourse offers no clear direction. To say that one "identifies with Taiwan," and adopts "Taiwanese values" as one's core values, is meaningless. This was true even before Lee Teng-hui became president. The moment Chiang Ching-kuo said "I am also Taiwanese," identifying with Taiwan has been the national consensus.

The DPP boasts about its "identification with Taiwan," This helps distinguish it from its enemies. It also provides it with a basis for political mobilization. But this pitch involves a huge blind spot. Identification with Taiwan has long since ceased to be a DPP monopoly. Nor does it equate with the DPP's calls for independence. Most ROC citizens strongly identify with Taiwan, But they do not necessarily support Taiwan independence. After all, what is in "Taiwan's interest" remains open to interpretation.

In fact, ever since the opening of cross-Strait exchanges, interactions between the two sides have "maintained peace but allowed the two sides to remain different." They have "sought commonalities on the basis of peace." The two sides' political systems may be very different. But the two sides beliefs and values are very similar. They share historical memories of traditional Chinese culture, and of KMT vs. CCP rivalry. These factors underlie cross-Strait relations, and cannot be ignored. The DPP cannot sever these ties merely by advocating Taiwan independence. If the DPP is willing to confront the issue of cross-Strait relations, it cannot repudiate historical facts.

Following the five cities elections, the "princes" of the Democratic Progressive Party set forth their own proposals. Annette Lu, Frank Hsieh, Su Tseng-chang, and Tsai Ing-wen all came forth. Each candidate was vaguer than the next. Annette Lu opposed the 1992 Consensus. She proposed a 1996 Consensus. Frank Hsieh proposed a "constitutional consensus" to replace the 1992 Consensus, which the Democratic Progressive Party refuses to endorse. Su evaded the issue. But he affirmed that survival was foremost, and that democracy was the cornerstone. His terminology suggests that he knew cross-Strait exchanges must continue. He upheld Taiwan's belief in democracy. Maintaining peace while remaining different is a fait accompli. Chen Shui-bian has already advanced his "Five Noes" and his cross-Strait "Unification Theory." Therefore we would like to ask Chairman Tsai, just exactly what "commonalities" are you seeking? Do you agree with the 1992 Consensus? If not, what is the Democratic Progressive Party's alternative? Do you accept ECFA? If not, how does the DPP intend to deal with ECFA in the event it assumes power?

As the chairman of the largest opposition party on Taiwan, Tsai Ing-wen must make the Democratic Progressive Party more responsible to Taiwan. Especially since Tsai Ing-wen, or at least the DPP, is seeking the presidency in 2012. Is "maintaining peace while remaining different" and "seeking commonalities on the basis of peace" the theme of the DPP's 2012 election platform? If the DPP once again assumes power, what changes will there be to cross-Strait policy?

Ever since President Ma took office, he has been clear about advocating cross-Strait exchanges. He has been clear about Republic of China sovereignty. The two sides cannot possibly recognize each other legally. But they can refrain from repudiating each other in practice. He has been clear about "first economics, then politics." Under the framework of the ROC Constitution, he advocates "no [immediate] reunification, no independence, and no use of force," He advocates the development of cross-Strait relations on the basis of the 1992 Consensus. The Ma administration has not evaded the issues, either short-term or long-term. Ma administration theory and practice permit the development of cross-Strait relations. Meanwhile on the diplomatic front, the Republic of China expects one hundred nations to offer visa-free treatment this year.

Tsai Ing-wen blasted the Ma adminstration for identifying with China, for treating Chinese values as its core values. She blasted it for taking the road to "peace and reunification" and "peace and inevitable reunification." But she ignored the fact that the China which the Ma administration upholds is the Republic of China, as defined in our constitution. She persists in McCarthyite name-calling. It is hard to understand how someone who repudiates the Republic of China and the ROC Constitution, can have the temerity to run for Republic of China President.

The words and deeds of political leaders have a profound impact on the people of a nation. They cannot hide their own beliefs. Nor can they ignore the need to turn their beliefs into policy. These determine the direction a nation takes. Political language may be vague. But the direction the nation takes must not be. The Democratic Progressive Party has established a think tank. Tsai Ing-wen's cross-Strait understanding may be nothing more than general principles. But the DPP must behave responsibly. It must tell us just exactly what its "empty rhetoric" means for the future.

民進黨兩岸論述 僅「八字空言」？
2011-03-01 中國時報

兩岸關係特殊，台灣內部又缺乏充分共識，在論述兩岸關係與大陸政策時，藍綠政治領袖難免避重就輕，採取相對模糊的政治語言，但語言的功能在於溝通，並藉由溝通取得某種程度的理解，如果政治語言模糊到連自己人都直言「太深奧」，就完全失去論述的意義了。

民進黨主席蔡英文日前在眾人矚目中，於民進黨成立智庫的同時，提出民進黨的「兩岸新論述」：從台灣認同出發，以台灣價值為核心，兩岸必須維持「和而不同，和而求同」，這個「和」就是和平的和。

蔡英文針對兩岸提出新論述本來就會受到矚目，因為她是民進黨主席，也因為民進黨可能再執政，她的論述方向有很大可能影響兩岸關係，影響台灣發展。只不過令人遺憾的是，蔡英文的新論述裡，完全看不出可能的具體方向，從台灣認同出發，以台灣價值為核心，說了等於沒說，不要說從李登輝執政開始，從蔣經國說「我也是台灣人」的那一刻起，台灣認同就已經是國民共識。

民進黨執著於台灣認同，除了以其為區分敵我的標準外，也依賴其為政治動員的基礎。這種論述最大盲點是：台灣認同早已不是民進黨的專利，更不等於民進黨所堅持的台獨。絕大多數國民都擁有強烈的台灣認同，卻不一定會支持台獨。畢竟什麼才是「台灣利益」，本來就有很大討論空間的。

其實，兩岸自開放交流起，雙方互動一直都是「和而不同，和而求同」。儘管目前在政治體制上雙方確有相當落差，但不論是中華文化的本源、或是過往的國共分合下，在歷史記憶、信仰價值上都還是有相當程度的重疊，這是兩岸關係無法迴避的基本緣由，不是民進黨所主張的台獨或者台灣認同所能割斷的。民進黨願意正視兩岸關係，就不能否定既有的歷史事實。

五都選舉後，民進黨諸位天王先後提出主張，不論呂秀蓮、謝長廷或蘇貞昌，所言再模糊都比蔡英文具體。呂秀蓮反對「九二共識」，並負責任的提出她主張「九六共識」；謝長廷也提出以「憲法共識」，取代民進黨不認同的「九二共識」；蘇貞昌避開了，但他至少確認生存是王道，民主為基石，從語詞至少看得懂他要繼續兩岸交流，但堅持台灣所信仰的民主價值。請問蔡主席：和而不同是現實，陳水扁至少還提出過「四不一沒有」及兩岸「統合論」，你求的「同」又是什麼呢？是同意「九二共識」還是不同意？如果不同意，民進黨的替代主張是什麼？是接受ＥＣＦＡ還是不接受？如果不接受，民進黨如何後續處理？

身為最大在野黨主席，蔡英文必須更誠懇地認知民進黨是要為台灣負責的，尤其是蔡英文或民進黨是要競逐二○一二總統大位的，如果「和而不同，和而求同」八個字就是民進黨二○一二總統大選的兩岸政見主軸，請問誰知道民進黨若再執政，在兩岸政策上會有什麼變化或延續？

馬總統自就任以來，明確主張兩岸積極開放交流，在台灣主權認知上清楚表態：兩岸在法理上不可能相互承認，但在事實上應互不否認；做法上也明確提出「先經濟，後政治」，在中華民國憲法架構下，不統、不獨、不武，並以九二共識為基礎，發展兩岸關係，從遠期目標到短期做法，馬政府都沒有迴避。馬政府的主張和做法，讓兩岸關係有效開展，在外交上，台灣甚至在今年可望達到百國免簽證的亮眼成績。

蔡英文批評馬政府以中國認同、中國價值為核心，走的是「和而要統，和而必統」的路子，卻無視馬政府始終堅持的中國是憲法的中華民國，又是硬扣帽子的選舉語言。很難想像，一個完全否定中華民國、否定中華民國憲法，竟能如此理直氣壯地要競逐中華民國總統？

身為政治領袖，一言一行都對國家人民有深遠影響，既不能逃避自己的信仰，更不能輕忽自己所堅持的信仰落實於政策，就是國家發展方向，政治語言可以模糊，國家方向卻不能在虛空中打模糊仗。民進黨智庫甫成立，蔡英文的兩岸新論述或許只是一個大原則，民進黨必須更負責任地告訴我們，在這「八字空言」下，將有什麼具體主張和做法。