Cross-Strait Peace Agreement is No [Immediate] Reunification, No Independence, No Use of Force

Cross-Strait Peace Agreement is No [Immediate] Reunification, No Independence, No Use of Force
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
October 18, 2011

Summary: Yesterday President Ma Ying-jeou boldly set forth a proposal for a cross-Strait peace agreement. This is an explosive issue that could transform the election into a vote of confidence in the president, and whether he should sign a cross-Strait peace agreement. How will the DPP respond to President Ma's peace agreement? It should think before reacting. It should reconsider its blind opposition to ECFA. It should consider how it painted itself into a corner, It should think about sparing itself any further embarrassment.

Full Text Below:

Yesterday President Ma Ying-jeou boldly set forth a proposal for a cross-Strait peace agreement. This is an explosive issue that could transform the election into a vote of confidence in the president, and whether he should sign a cross-Strait peace agreement.

This issue is highly sensitive and potentially explosive. Probably few people ever imagined President Ma would include such a sensitive and explosive plank in his campaign platform, After all, the potential backlash is difficult to gauge. But President Ma had the audacity to include the "golden decade" plank in his campaign platform. This shows his confidence in his campaign platform, It shows his confidence in public opinion. Objectively speaking, the measured promotion of a cross-Strait peace agreement is the very least a future Republic of China presidential candidate should promise the nation, It is the best and most essential policy contribution a future president can make.

The real meaning of the peace agreement is "no [immediate] reunification, no independence, and no use of force." It rejects Taiwan independence. Its theme is peaceful development. In fact the peace agreement is merely "no [immediate] reunification, no independence, and no use of force" written into law. This newspaper has long argued that the two sides should sign a peace agreement, as either an ultimate solution or interim solution.

For Taipei, a peace agreement would diminish the pressure to embark on immediate reunification. For Beijing, a peace agreement would help resolve internal disagreements over how to cope with Taiwan independence. Conversely, for Beijng, a peace agreement would extricate it from the "reunification quagmire." For Taipei, a peace agreement would diminish internal frictions over Taiwan independence. Both sides would benefit from a long term framework for peaceful development. It would be a mutally beneficial, win/win situation.

Over the past three years, authorities on both sides have taken full advantage of the opportunity provided by the outcome of the 2008 presidential election. They have dedicated themselves to cross-strait peaceful development. But the current election is having a negative impact. Tsai Ing-wen says she does not recognize the 1992 consensus and one China, different interpretations. James Soong and Lee Teng-hui are singing a duet, saying "Topple Ma, Protect Taiwan." The fruit of three years of blood, sweat, and tears could be destroyed overnight. The cross-Strait status quo is to vulnerable to unpredictable political developments on Taiwan. This shows how much. The past three years of peaceful development are a pocket filled with gold coins. All it takes is a single hole, and no matter how many more coins one adds to one's pocket, they will all fall through the hole.

If we want to accumulate more gold coins, i.e., promote peace, we must stitch the hole in the pocket. The needle and thread that will stitch the hole is the peace agreement. Only a peace agreement will enable the two sides to accumulate more gold coins. Only "no [immediate] reunification, no independence, no use force" will enable the two sides to promote peace. Only a peace agreement will ensure that the fruits of peaceful development are preserved, and not lost to the vagaries of a presidential election.

From another perspective, a peace agreement is more than "no [immediate] reunification, no independence, no use of force," written into law. It is "one China, different interpretations," written into law. This newspaper has long held that any peace agreement requires the two sides to recognize each other as both combatants and peace signatories. Therefore they should sign the treaty in their capacity as "President of the Republic of China" and "President of the Peoples Republic of China." After the agreement is signed, cabinet-level officials on both sides can establish a permanent "cross-strait peaceful development conference" framework. Such a peace agreement would write "one China, different interpretations" into law.

Such an agreement is in the interest of both parties. There is no better ultimate or interim solution than the aforementioned peace agreement. The public on Taiwan has endured 60 years of cross-Strait turbulence. President Ma is now offering a peace agreement, Most people should favor it, The only possible criticisms are that "Beijing may not agree to it," or "It may not be feasible." Will Beijing agree to it? Actually a peace agreement is is one of the highest priorities in "Hu Jintao's Six Point Proposal." Beijing has no reason to refuse or reject President Ma's proposal. Is it feasible? It will be if people on Taiwan are sufficiently united. We must insist on such terms as "combatants" and "peace signatories." This will ensure that negotiators for our side have sufficient maneuvering room.

In sum, the key to President Ma Ying-jeou's campaign platform is the peace agreement. To make such a daring proposal during a presidential reelection campaign was a risky move. It was a show of political responsibility, political vision, and political courage. President Ma has elevated the importance of this election. It is now a vote of confidence in Ma Ying-jeou's cross-Strait peace agreement. On the one hand, he is appealing to the electorate, On the other hand he is asking Beijing to follow his lead. If he wins the election on this basis, he will be in a position to advance cross-Strait relations, and move it into previously uncharted territory. He will be in a position to turn "no [immediate] reunification, no independence, no use of force," into the law of the land. Conversely, if he is unsuccessful and loses, he will have to answer to history. The outcome will be determined by the electorate.

How will the DPP respond to President Ma's peace agreement? It should think before reacting. It should reconsider its blind opposition to ECFA. It should consider how it painted itself into a corner, It should think about sparing itself any further embarrassment.

兩岸和平協議就是不統不獨不武
【聯合報╱社論】
2011.10.18 02:29 am

馬總統昨在「黃金十年」兩岸篇提出的爆炸性議題，可能使這次總統大選成為「是否審酌推動兩岸商簽和平協議」的信任投票。

此一議題極為敏感，且具高度的爆炸性，恐怕很少人會想到馬總統居然會以此為大選政見，因為畢竟不易估量其後座力；但馬總統竟在其「黃金十年」政綱中提出，足見其對此一政見具有自信，亦對民意深具信心。因為，客觀而論，「審酌推動兩岸商簽和平協議」，應是未來任何中華民國總統所能為台灣做的最正確、最有利，也是最必要的政策貢獻。

「和平協議」的實質意義就是：不統、不獨、不武。它不是統一（不統），也排除了台獨（不獨），和平發展尤為基調（不武）；其實「和平協議」就是「不統／不獨／不武」的法制化與固定化。因此，本報社論一向主張兩岸應當簽訂「和平協議」；無論作為「終極方案」或「中程方案」皆可。

台北得以「和平協議」來迴避或減低統一的壓力，北京則得以「和平協議」化解台獨的爭議；反過來說，大陸方面得以「和平協議」而免於困在「統一的陷阱」；台灣方面則可藉「和平協議」降低內部受台獨撕裂的痛苦與消耗。這將使兩岸皆可獲得一可大可久的「和平發展」架構，可謂是對大陸及台灣兩利的局面。

三年來，兩岸當局利用「二○○八機遇」為兩岸「和平發展」作了極多且極大的努力；但經過此次大選的衝擊，出現蔡英文「否定九二共識／一中各表」，及宋楚瑜與李登輝合唱「倒馬保台」，竟使三年來的心血努力可能毀於一旦。由此可見台灣政情的莫測與兩岸現狀的脆弱，這好比兩岸三年來一同朝一只口袋裡放了許多和平金幣，但詎料這只口袋竟有一個破洞，即使放了再多的金幣，也可能從破洞漏掉。

若欲積蓄兩岸的「和平金幣」，就要縫補這只破口袋；而縫補的針線，就是「和平協議」。也唯有「和平協議」能使兩岸能在「不統／不獨／不武」的口袋中，繼續積蓄「和平金幣」，使每一分努力皆可望保住，不致因一次意外的總統大選而流失。

從另一角度看，「和平協議」非但是「不統／不獨／不武」的法制化與固定化；亦應當是「一中各表」的法制化與固定化。本報社論過去一再申論，「和平協議」的前提是兩岸必須相互承認為「交戰主體」及「議和主體」；亦即簽署者應為「中華民國總統」及「中華人民共和國主席」，簽約後並由雙邊內閣層次建立「兩岸和平發展會議」之類的機制，作為常設的運作機構。倘係如此，「和平協議」自是「一中各表」的法制化與固定化。

我們認為，對於兩岸的各自利害而論，皆不可能再有比前述「和平協議」更佳的終極方案或中程方案。台灣民眾經歷六十餘年心知肚明的兩岸動盪，對於馬總統在此時提出「和平協議」的方案，應當以同情及同意者居多，唯一可挑剔者則是「北京未必同意」或「未必做得到」。先談「北京未必同意」，其實「和平協議」本是「胡六點」的重中之重，北京對馬總統的提議沒有拒絕或否決的理由。再談「未必做得到」，則只要台灣民眾夠團結，例如在「議和主體」及「簽署者落款」方面共同堅持，則進退之間自可操持主動且操之在我。

歸納而言，馬總統在選戰方殷之際提出「和平協議」的關鍵政見，頂冒選舉失利的風險，應可視為極負責任與極具遠見及魄力的表現。馬總統應可將此次大選升高為「兩岸商簽和平協議」的信任投票，一者訴諸選民，一者引導北京。如果因此而贏得選舉，即可能將兩岸關係帶向「不統／不獨／不武」法制化的新境界；反之，倘若因此敗北落選，自己亦已可向歷史交代，一切交由國人共同承當。

至於民進黨如何因應馬總統的「和平協議」？勿再盲動，且先想一想反ＥＣＦＡ竟反到作繭自縛、無地自容的窘態吧！