From Policy Packaging to Policy Marketing

From Policy Packaging to Policy Marketing
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 10, 2015

Executive Summary: The KMT was routed in the recent nine in one elections. One of the main reasons was that merely having a bunch of well-intentioned, ambitious policy prescriptions was not enough. Opposition obstructionism and defamation took its toll. The public did not appreciate what was being offered. No matter how well the policies were packaged, no one was buying them. The policies simply could not be implemented. The Mao cabinet should rethink its policy marketing strategy. Its grand projects cannot be realized. It should do something tangible that people can feel, first hand. That might get peoples' attention.

Full Text Below:

The KMT was routed in the recent nine in one elections. One of the main reasons was that merely having a bunch of well-intentioned, ambitious policy prescriptions was not enough. Opposition obstructionism and defamation took its toll. The public did not appreciate what was being offered. No matter how well the policies were packaged, no one was buying them. The policies simply could not be implemented. The Mao cabinet should rethink its policy marketing strategy. Its grand projects cannot be realized. It should do something tangible that people can feel, first hand. That might get peoples' attention.

To invoke a business metaphor, the Ma government has long been adept at "wholesale marketing", but inept at "retail marketing", and even more inept at "professional marketing". Officials love to publish policy bills that resemble encyclopedias. But they can't be bothered to consider variables or alternatives. Under these circumstances, the tiny defect in the merchandise will be blasted by the political opposition or dissenting members of the public. Every defect will be blown out of proportion, and the policy as a whole will be discredited. This has been true of every policy including the STA, the Cross-Strait Agreement Oversight Regulations, and the FEPZ. Add to this endless protests by highway toll collectors, the San Ying Tribe, property owners evicted for the Taoyuan Aviation City. All of these underscore the ruling party's neglect for “retail marketing”.

Long-term national growth cannot do without large scale infrastructure planning. Policy ideas cannot be dictated by populist demagogues dispensing political favors in a haphazard manner. If that happens, we are lost. But conversely, social development on Taiwan has led to great importance placed on individual rights and opposition to all-encompassing public authority. Such is the current atmosphere. The government cannot continue to offer only "turnkey" and "wholesale marketing" solutions. It cannot continue to insist on a simple set of rules that everyone must comply with. It must make concessions. It must become more detailed oriented. It must think in terms of "retail marketing" and "customization". Otherwise it will continue encountering obstructionism and protests, and end up butting its head against a wall.

Take the FEPZ policy, for example. Opposition obstructionism prevented its passage in the Legislative Yuan. As a result, one of Taiwan's key advantages was lost. Yesterday, Pingtung University Associate Professor Cheng Po-wen penned an opinion piece for this newspaper. He said that if only the government had first designated Kaohsiung a "pilot project", given the port city of Kaohsiung's advantages, it might already have made considerable progress. Instead, the government repeatedly expanded the scale of the pilot project. Eventually it expanded to include "six harbors and one airport”, plus an "Agriculture Technology Park". As a result, the schedule was delayed and the scale was too large. The all inclusive package deal led to differences in opinion, and compromise was no longer possible.

In fact, the FEPZ cannot possibly be so grand a project. Its vision far exceeds the understanding and imagination of lawmakers. Nor is it something people can understand at a glance. Worse still, layer upon layer of legislation turned it into an unwieldy beast, replete with political pork for special interest groups and corrupt officials. Add to this malicious opposition obstructionism, and suddenly this golden goose egg was no longer marketable. The Mao cabinet recently considered decentralizing the FEPZ bill as part of its "Five Points of Innovation". It would abandon the "special legislation" and return to the original scheme where each jurisdiction dealt with its own regulations. This was tantamount to skipping the "FEPZ" and adopting an economic  "liberalization of the entire island" approach. But this also meant that the past two or three years of struggle to package the bill were all for naught.

The FEPZ is a major national economic and political policy issue. But it was "unmarketable" and "not passable".  How well it was packaged was irrelevant. This was a painful lesson. Now take the anti-demolition protests by residents of Miaoli Tai Po, the San Ying tribe, Taoyuan City and other locales. All of them involved eminent domain land acquisition or demolition of houses. No matter how generous the government settlements, inevitably some would balk. They might have emotional attachments to the land, or other motives. All of them needed a more delicate approach and individual treatment. They were not obstacles that could be swept aside by "administrative law".

Government agencies like to settle all problems with rules. They like to claim that that they absolutely cannot "make exceptions." In fact, public authority has become devalued. If public interests lack a "customer service" attitude, endless troubles will ensue. Take the construction of public housing for the Sijhou tribe. A small number of Aboriginal tribal members found it difficult to obtain loans. The New Taipei City Government should not have insisted that all residents obtain home loans. It should have offered some units as rental property. Wouldn't that have been the best of both worlds?

When Chang San-cheng became a cabinet member three years ago he said, "If Chunghwa Telecom earned five to ten percent less, it would eliminate 90% of all complaints". Consider how much money Chunghwa Telecom earns from each family and each young person every month. Chang San-cheng's implications were clear. This year, Chunghwa Telecom's revenue exceeded 200 billion NT. Average year-end bonuses amounted to 6.6 month's pay. Chairman Tsai Li-hang even announced pay raises. But is Chunghwa Telecom willing to do anything to eliminate 90% of all complaints?

We are entering an era of diversification. The government must go from "wholesale-oriented marketing” to "retail services marketing”. A policy should be “marketable” rather than "packaged well”. This is a lesson the Mao cabinet must learn from the KMT's recent setbacks.

從「包得好」到「賣得掉」談政策行銷
2015-02-10 01:23:26 聯合報 社論

國民黨九合一選舉慘敗，最主要的原因之一是，空有一堆立意良好、包裝宏大的政策，卻因對手的杯葛與中傷而受阻；加上民眾不領情，說得再好聽的政策也賣不掉。面對這種窒礙難行的窘境，毛內閣應該重新思考政策的行銷策略，與其不斷打造推不動的大部頭施政，不如做一些民眾感受得到的實事，也許更易收一新耳目之效。

以商業術語為喻，馬政府一向擅長「批發」，卻拙於「零售」，更拙於「專業行銷」；官員喜歡打造百科全書式的巨型套裝政策，卻怠於處理其間的變數或另類個案。在這種情況下，只要大部頭商品中有一點點瑕疵，遭到對手或異議民眾的批評指摘，缺點不斷被放大，結果整套政策就跟著掛了。從《服貿協議》、《兩岸協議監督條例》、「自由經濟示範區」政策的命運看，無一不是如此；包括高速公路收費員至今抗議不休，三鶯部落自救會、桃園航空城反迫遷的抗爭等，在在顯示執政黨對「零售」這塊的輕忽與漠視。

不可諱言，國家的長遠發展不能沒有大架構的規劃，政策構思也不應流於雞零狗碎、好施小惠式的民粹討巧；那樣的話，一定會迷失方向。但換一個角度看，當台灣社會的發展走到一個重視個人權益、反對公權力怪手無所不包的拐點，在這樣的氛圍下，政府決策若仍然只有「統包」、「批發」的概念，想要以一套簡單的規則要求所有人全部遵從，而不朝更細緻化的「零售」、「客製化」思維調整，勢必會不斷碰到杯葛與抗議，而陷入「撞牆」的困境。

以「自由經濟示範區」政策為例，由於在野黨的杯葛，法案遲遲無法在立院過關，已使台灣把握關鍵優勢發展的契機不斷流失。屏大副教授鄭博文昨天在本報民意論壇版投書，慨嘆如果當初政府先將高雄市劃為「示範區」，就高雄的港市特點率先試行，也許至今已經做出一些成績。然而，政府卻不斷擴張示範區規模，最後膨脹為「六海一空」外加「農業科技園區」；如此一來，不僅造成時日遷延，更因規模宏大、包山包海而致各方意見分歧，無從協調。

其實，自由經濟示範區的擘劃，不可謂不宏大高遠，但它所勾勒的願景不僅遠超乎國會議員的理解和想像，也不是民眾所能一目了然。更嚴重的是，經過層層的法案包裝，它反而成了令人望而生畏的龐然怪物，唯恐其中夾帶著某些利益集團或官員的私心；再加上在野黨的惡意杯葛，這顆包裝精美的金蛋遂根本賣不動。毛內閣最近考慮將示範區條例中的「五大創新重點」化整為零，棄「特別法」回歸原本各自的法規處理，形同跳過「示範區」朝「全島自由化」前進。這也意味，先前兩三年的努力包裝建構，又要全部拆掉重練，這簡直是白忙一場。

自由經濟示範區是國家重大經建政策，但是，「賣不掉」、「推不動」的政策，包裝得再漂亮也沒有用，這是血淋淋的教訓。再以苗栗大埔、三鶯部落、桃園航空城等地的拆遷抗爭為例，凡涉及土地徵收或拆遷民房，無論政府開出的條件多麼優厚，都仍免不了會有少數人持不同態度；不論他們是基於對土地的感情或其他因素，都需要以更細膩的手法個別溝通處理，而非一句「依法行政」便可解決。

政府部門人員辦事，喜歡用一套規則打發所有的問題，聲稱絕對不能「破例」。事實上，隨著公權力威望的「貶值」，對涉及人民權益的事若不抱著「客服」的態度面對，只會引發無窮後患。以溪洲部落社會住宅的興建為例，如果少數原住民確難負擔龐大貸款，新北市府似無必要要求所有住民一律貸款購屋，而可保留一些住宅供其租用，豈不更兩全其美？

再如，張善政三年前初入閣時曾說，「中華電信如果少賺五％到十％，可以減少九成民怨」。只要想想中華電信每月從每個家庭、每個年輕人身上拿走多少錢，人們即不難理解張善政的言下之意。而今年中華電信營收超過二千多億元，員工平均年終獎金達六．六個月，董事長蔡力行宣布要加薪；但是，可以減少「九成民怨」的事，中華電信又做了幾件？

當時代不斷走向多元分化，政府行銷也必須從「批發至上」兼顧「零售服務」。政策「包得好」不如「賣得掉」，這是毛內閣必須從挫折中學到的一課。