MAC: Hsia Replaces Wang Amidst Tripartite Wrangling

MAC: Hsia Replaces Wang Amidst Tripartite Wrangling
United Daily News editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
February 12, 2015

Executive Summary: Former Vice Chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council Chang Hsien-yao will not be indicted for leaking information to Beijing. Chairman Wang Yu-chi will assume responsibility and resign, to be succeeded by Deputy Defense Minister Hsia Li-yan. No agreement was reached on the M503 mid-Strait flight path proposed by the Mainland. Last Wednesday the MAC cited it as grounds for postponing Mainland Taiwan Affairs Office Director Zhang Zhijun's visit to Kinmen. Today Wang Yu-chi resigned. The Wang Zhang meeting is now a bust. The future of cross-Strait relations is now a matter of increasing concern.


Full Text Below: 

Former Vice Chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council Chang Hsien-yao will not be indicted for leaking information to Beijing. Chairman Wang Yu-chi will assume responsibility and resign, to be succeeded by Deputy Defense Minister Hsia Li-yan. No agreement was reached on the M503 mid-Strait flight path proposed by the Mainland. Last Wednesday the MAC cited it as grounds for postponing Mainland Taiwan Affairs Office Director Zhang Zhijun's visit to Kinmen. Today Wang Yu-chi resigned. The Wang Zhang meeting is now a bust. The future of cross-Strait relations is now a matter of increasing concern.

Over the past year, cross-Strait relations have been troubled. Last February Wang Yu-chi visited Nanjing. Last June Zhang Zhijun visited Taiwan. The two Wang Zhang meetings held on the two sides of the Strait authored a new page in cross-Strait history. But the impact of the Sunflower Student Movement, the Chang Hsien-yao leaks case, the never realized APEC Ma Xi meeting, Xi Jinping's underscoring of "one country, two systems", Hong Kong's Occupy Central protests, and the nine in one KMT election debacle all took their toll. Cross-Strait relations are the worst they have been since the Ma government took office in 2008.

Last August, Wang Yu-chi accused vice chairman and chief negotiator Chang Hsien-yao of leaking information to Beijing. This inflicted irreparable harm upon cross-Strait trust. Worse, it undermined the credibility of nearly 20 agreements reached by the two sides over the past six years. Chang Hsien-yao will not be prosecuted due to insufficient evidence. Chang Hsien-yao's behavior remains questionable, but at least the damage to cross-Strait relations has been minimized. The credibility of the cross-Strait agreements has been upheld. On the other hand, such incidents and their poor handling have precipitated political storms. They have exposed disarray and lack of leadership among those in authority. Wang Yu-chi is taking the fall. This may limit the damage to cross-Strait relations. But it makes the Ma government look even worse.

The two Wang Zhang meetings have already established the mechanism for regular meetings between those charged with cross-Strait affairs. MAC chairperson changes, such as Hsia replacing Wang, are unlikely to affect normal cross-Strait relations. The nine in one elections last November  dramatically changed the blue-green political landscape and the KMT power structure. Cross-strait relations are now part of a complex three-way struggle between the KMT, DPP, and CCP.

Given the changes in Taiwan's political situation, Beijing must be psychologically prepared for another ruling party change in 2016. It must be prepared to modify its strategic Taiwan policy arrangements. On the one hand, Beijing appears committed to maintaining normal cross-Strait relations. The Entrepreneurs Summit agreed upon last December will be held in Taipei, as planned. ARATS chairman Chen Demin will visit Taiwan, as planned. MTA technical consultations and three meetings concerning the cross-Strait financial industry will take place, as planned. The late January cross-Strait "Economic Cooperation Meeting" will be held in Taipei, as planned. Zhang Zhijun will visit Kinmen and attend the third Wang Zhang meeting, as planned. On the other hand, Beijing has reaffirmed the 1992 consensus and opposition to Taiwan independence as the foundation for cross-Strait interaction. In early January it unilaterally announced a new flight path near the center line of the Taiwan Strait. The strategic implications are self-evident. It is adopting a carrot and stick policy towards Taiwan. It has issued a powerful declaration. It will continue to offer cross-Strait economic benefits as incentives for cooperation. But it will not hesitate to apply pressure when it comes to the political bottom line. The blue and green camps will feel varying degrees of pressure. The DPP in particular will surely get Beijing's meaning, loud and clear.

Consider the KMT's nine in one election defeat. President Ma Ying-jeou has resigned as party chairman. His farewell address stressed the correctness of the KMT's basic path for the nation, and that the KMT was a victim of circumstances. The public on Taiwan has been skeptical of the Ma government's cross-Strait policy. Even New Taipei City Mayor Eric Chu, the newly-elected Chairman of the KMT, has publicly declared that the KMT must consider the psychological impact of its cross-Strait policy on the people of Taiwan, and who benefits from them. Also, Beijing's main consideration on Taiwan policy is no longer the Ma government's position. Its new, unilaterally established flight path provoked a public backlash on Taiwan. Fearing an impact on the 2016 elections, the Ma government has taken a tougher line on cross-Strait policy. Without warning it postponed Zhang Zhijun's visit to Kinmen. This is understandable. But the greatest advantage the KMT has over the DPP is its ability to maintain peaceful and stable cross-Strait relations. What if anything will Eric Chu do differently? Beijing and the DPP are undoubtedly watching.

The DPP must adopt a more pragmatic cross-strait policy, one acceptable to both Washington and Beijing. The DPP seeks the presidency in 2016. A more pragmatic policy is essential if Tsai Ing-wen hopes to complete the final mile towards the Presidential Palace. But the nine in one elections boosted support fot the green camp. The DPP will now find it difficult to change its cross-Strait policy. Xi Jinping is taking a tougher stance. Expecting Beijing to make further concessions is increasingly unrealistic. The KMT, DPP, and CCP are engaged in a three way struggle. The DPP has very few cards it can play. Tsai Ing-wen's final mile will remain rocky and strewn with obstacles.

Cross-strait relations have entered a new phase. The old model can no longer cope with rapidly changing circumstances. The KMT, DPP, and CCP must realize this. Can they move from wrestling with each other to understanding each other? Can they join hands and ensure peaceful cross-Strait relations? The political wisdom of the leaders of the three parties will soon be tested. The replacement of the MAC chairperson may be an embarrassing setback. But it may also be an opportunity for change.

陸委會王下夏上 兩岸關係三方角力
2015-02-12 03:04:27 聯合報 社論

陸委會前副主委張顯耀洩密案以不起訴處分，王郁琦主委隨即請辭以示負責，由國防部副部長夏立言接任。上周三陸委會才以大陸劃設海峽中線Ｍ五○三航線雙方協商未達成共識為由，推遲大陸國台辦主任張志軍訪問金門；如今王郁琦請辭，「王張會」已成絕響，未來兩岸關係會如何變化備受關切。

過去一年，兩岸關係處於多事之秋。去年二月王郁琦訪問南京及六月張志軍來台訪問，兩次「王張會」雖寫下兩岸官方互動的歷史新頁；但受到太陽花學運、張顯耀洩密案、ＡＰＥＣ「馬習會」破局、習近平強調對台「一國兩制」、香港占中事件、九合一選舉國民黨慘敗等一連串事件的衝擊，兩岸關係跌入二○○八年馬政府上任以來的低潮期。

在上述事件中，去年八月爆發王郁琦主委指控副主委兼我方首席談判代表張顯耀洩密一案，不僅對兩岸互信造成難以彌補的傷害，也讓過去六年多來兩岸簽署近二十項協議的公信力受到外界強烈質疑。如今張顯耀案因證據不足予以不起訴，雖不能因此認定張顯耀的所作所為沒有爭議，但對兩岸關係的傷害卻相對減輕，兩岸協議的公信力也得以維繫。另一方面，發生此一事件並因處理程序似顯錯亂而掀起政治風暴，亦暴露出主政當局的領導缺失及自亂陣腳；王郁琦為此扛起責任，雖可為兩岸關係止血，但對馬政府的整體形象卻是雪上加霜。

王張二會已確立兩岸事務首長會議的常態化機制，陸委會主委換人，王下夏上，尚不致影響兩岸正常往來和互動。但不可諱言，去年十一月底台灣九合一選舉後，因為藍綠政治版圖大幅消長及國民黨權力結構改變，兩岸關係正進入到國、民、共三方角力的複雜情勢。

鑑於台灣政局的變化，北京顯然已有面對二○一六年台灣再次出現政黨輪替的心理準備，對台政策的戰略調整及重新布局已陸續展開。一方面，北京致力維繫兩岸正常互動，去年十二月兩岸企業家峰會如期在台北舉行，海協會會長陳德銘訪台，兩岸貨貿協議技術性諮商及兩岸金融三會先後在北京舉行；今年一月底兩岸「經合會」在台北召開，緊接著又安排張志軍訪問金門及第三次「王張會」。另一方面，北京不斷重申「九二共識」及反台獨是兩岸互動的基礎；一月上旬又片面宣布在海峽中線附近劃設新航路，其戰略意涵不言而喻。這種對台軟硬兩手策略，具有強烈的宣示意義，既持續以兩岸經貿利益作為互動誘因，亦凸顯北京的政治底線及強大的施壓籌碼，對國內藍綠陣營都構成不同程度的壓力，尤其是民進黨更會感受到項莊舞劍的意味。

就國民黨而言，九合一敗選後，馬英九總統在辭去黨主席聲明中雖強調「國家總路線」並沒有輸，但形勢比人強，國內質疑馬政府兩岸政策的聲浪更加高漲，就連新任黨主席的新北市長朱立倫也公開表示，國民黨必須誠懇檢討兩岸政策對台灣人民心理層面的衝擊及在分配公平正義上的疑慮。再加上，北京對台政策顯已不再以馬政府立場為主要考量，片面劃設新航路更引發台灣民意強烈反彈；馬政府為避免拖累二○一六選情，在兩岸政策上轉趨強硬，無預警推遲張志軍訪問金門，可以理解。但相較於民進黨，國民黨最大優勢仍在於可以維繫兩岸和平穩定的互動關係，朱立倫會採取何種新作為，無疑是北京和民進黨關注的焦點。

民進黨兩岸政策如何務實調整，讓美國和北京都可以接受，一直被視為幾乎篤定代表民進黨角逐二○一六總統大位的蔡英文的最後一哩路。但九合一選後，泛綠陣營聲勢大振，相對壓縮民進黨內兩岸政策調整空間；面對習近平日益強勢的作為，期待北京退讓更不切實際。在國、民、共三方賽局中，民進黨可利用的籌碼不多，蔡英文最後一哩路仍然是荊棘滿布，挑戰重重。

兩岸關係已進入一個新的階段，老舊的車子已難肆應快速變化的各種情勢。國、民、共三方都應該有這樣的體認，如何從彼此的角力和互相牽制，走向相互諒解並展現誠意，共同維護兩岸和平發展大局，正考驗三方領導人的政治智慧。陸委會主委換人固是一次尷尬的內挫，卻或許亦是一個改變的契機。