Tsai Ing-wen's Choice: Traitor to Taiwan Independence or Traitor to Taiwan

Tsai Ing-wen's Choice: Traitor to Taiwan Independence or Traitor to Taiwan
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
January 16, 2015

Executive Summary: Tsai Ing-wen has announced her candidacy for the DPP presidential primaries. She is now approaching her final mile. She now faces her final choice. Looking ahead, Tsai Ing-wen must choose between being a "traitor to Taiwan independence" and a "traitor to Taiwan". Otherwise she will not be able to complete the final mile to the presidential palace.

Full Text Below:

Tsai Ing-wen has announced her candidacy for the DPP presidential primaries. She is now approaching her final mile. She now faces her final choice. Should she be a traitor to Taiwan independence? Or a traitor to Taiwan?

This terminology may sound extreme. This only by calling a spade a spade can we underscore the importance of her decision. If Tsai Ing-wen is elected president and insists on taking the Taiwan independence path, internal and external conflict will erupt. The foundations of the nation will be shaken. She could well become a traitor to Taiwan. If she wants to stabilize the nation, she must become a transformer, a reformer, a revolutionary, an apostate of Taiwan independence. The Taiwan independence movement could well regard her as a traitor. Tsai Ing-wen faces a dilemma, globally, internally, and externally. She faces an difficult choice. She must confront this choice as she approaches her final mile.

The key of course, is cross-strait policy. Tsai Ing-wen persists in repudiating the "1992 consensus". She has refused to deal with the "Taiwan independence party platform". Therefore the DPP national policy appears unchanged. It appears to advocate the following. One. Globalization without Mainland China. Two. Rejection of cross-Strait exchanges based on the 1992 consensus. Three. Peaceful development of cross-Strait relations under the Taiwan independence party platform. Alas, this road is impassable. As even green camp academics have conceded, doing so would lead to the “disintegration of the cross-Strait peace framework”. 

Consider Taiwan's situation. The "1992 consensus" and its "one China Constitution" and "one China, different interpretations" clauses function as strategic pillars of Taiwan's cross-Strait policy. If one abandons the "1992 consensus", support for and psychological identification with the ROC Constitution among the people of Taiwan will be lost. In other words, rejecting the 1992 consensus will lead to the self-destruction of the Republic of China. Consider the Mainland's situation. The "1992 consensus" is a framework that opposes Taiwan independence and uphold the ROC status quo. Absent this buffer, Taiwan independence elements would find themselves nose to nosw eith Beijing. The Republic of China's status quo would also be at risk.

Some Mainland academics think that Tsai Ing-wen being elected president would provide "new opportunities for the two sides." Beijing used the same words in 2008 when Ma Ying-jeou was elected. They said his election offered "new opportunities for the two sides." But the "new opportunities" referred to were very different in nature. In 2008 the "new opportunities" Ma Ying-jeou offered meant generous concessions. In 2016, the “new opportunities" offered by Tsai Ing-wen mean that the ruling DPP would will be taken prisoner and forced to do Beijing's bidding. Beijing will surely not pass up the "new opportunities" to implement a final solution to the vexing Taiwan problem. Just look at how Beijing responded to Wen-Je Ko' election. Tsai Ing-wen must realize how precarious her situation is. She must not give Beijing any excuse to act, and turn her into a traitor to Taiwan.

Taiwan faces three major challenges. One. The globalization policy dilemma. Two. Cross-Strait deep water. Three. An M-shaped society. Globalization must be dealt with. Otherwise Taiwan will confront both a political and economic crisis. If cross-strait relations are not properly resolved, Taiwan's globalization process will be imperiled. If globalization and cross-Strait relations cannot be reconciled, Taiwan's M-shaped society will not be able to transform its industrial structure and find policy solutions. Therefore cross-Strait relations remain the key to all three problems. Alas, Taiwan independence clearly has no viable options to deal with cross-Strait relations.

Tsai Ing-wen must now deal with a major contradiction in Taiwan society. This contradiction involves a clash between psychology and reality. Psychologically, the Sunflower Student Movement incited the aforementioned public resentment, especially “anti-China” (anti-Mainland) hatred. The Sunflower Student Movement obstructed passage of the STA, MTA, and FEPZ bills. It approached these major problems with a Taiwan Independence mindset. Clearly this was the wrong prescription for what ails it. As a result, Tsai Ing-wen now faces a dilemma. She won by pandering to the mob psychology of Taiwan independence. But now she must reject Taiwan independence and deal with real world problems. 

Tsai Ing-wen faces difficulties within and without. She clearly knows that Taiwan independence is a non-starter. If she wants the Democratic Progressive Party to return to power, she must become a transformer, a reformer, a revolutionary, and an apostate of Taiwan independence. She must even become a traitor to Taiwan independence. Without such a determination, she could plunge the nation into chaos and become a traitor to TaiwanThe

The cross-Strait situation includes "belated Taiwan independence" from the  Sunflower Student Movement. But many voters merely wanted to transcend blue vs. green bickering. They hope the DPP will transform itself. Besides, the thought of "abandoning Taiwan independence" is nothing new within the DPP. A proposal to freeze the Taiwan independence party platform is still pending before the Executive Council. Therefore "abandoning Taiwan independence" is a way the DPP can save itself as a political party. If Tsai Ing-wen becomes a "traitor to Taiwan independence" she will paradoxically become a savior to the DPP.

The presidential primary process gives Tsai Ing-wen time and space to maneuver, to adopt a position she can defend, now and in the future. One. She can find a way to follow up on the pan-ECFA framework, including the STA and MTA agreements. She can assume responsibility for them all. Two. She can cease evading the "1992 consensus” and adopt the "one China, different interpretations" path. Three. She can tone down her "Republic of China is Taiwan" rhetoric, and move toward a "ROC includes Taiwan" position. Four. Instead of opposing the Republic of China, she can champion the Republic of China. To do so, Tsai must actively seek "new cross-Strait opportunities". She must not allow herself to become Beijing's definition of "new opportunities".

Looking ahead, Tsai Ing-wen must choose between being a "traitor to Taiwan independence" and a "traitor to Taiwan". Otherwise she will not be able to complete the final mile to the presidential palace.


蔡英文的抉擇：台獨叛徒或台灣罪人
2015-02-16 01:59:06 聯合報 社論

蔡英文宣布參加民進黨總統初選，邁向她的最後一哩，也面臨她的最後抉擇：要作台獨的叛徒，或台灣的罪人？

這兩個名詞有些強烈，但非此不足顯現抉擇的重大。蔡英文若當選總統而仍堅持台獨路線，一旦內外衝突再起，國家動盪，她即可能成為台灣的罪人；而她若為安定國家，就必須作台獨路線的轉型者、修正者、革命者或拋棄者，即可能被視為台獨的叛徒。瞻望世局及蔡英文的內外處境，她確實面臨如此強烈衝突的抉擇，而她也必須以面對此種抉擇的心情邁向最後一哩。

當然，關鍵就在兩岸政策。迄至此時，蔡英文仍否定「九二共識」，且未處理《台獨黨綱》，因而其國政綱領似乎仍是：一、沒有中國的全球化。二、沒有九二共識的兩岸交流。三、維持台獨黨綱的兩岸和平發展。但是，這條路不可能走得下去；甚至可能如綠營學者所說，將造成「兩岸和平框架崩解」。

對台灣而言，「九二共識」的「一中憲法」及「一中各表」，可以成為台灣的兩岸戰略支柱；若自棄「九二共識」，則中華民國憲法的支撐力及認同感在台灣人民的心理上皆失憑藉。也就是說，否定九二共識，其實是中華民國的自毀長城。對大陸而言，「九二共識」則是反台獨及默認中華民國現狀的緩衝架構，失此則反台獨即針鋒相對，中華民國的現狀亦受衝擊。

有些大陸學者將蔡英文的可能當選二○一六總統，視為「兩岸新機遇」。同樣的說法，北京曾在二○○八年將馬英九當選總統喻為「兩岸新機遇」。但這兩個「新機遇」，卻有本質上的不同。二○○八年對馬英九的「新機遇」，是以讓利懷柔為主；但二○一六對蔡英文的「新機遇」，則是以挾持脅迫為主張。北京當然不會錯失將蔡英文若主政視為徹底解決台獨問題的「新機遇」，但看北京如何回應柯文哲，蔡英文即應知謹慎面對形勢，勿落北京口實而遭挾制，致成台灣罪人。

台灣面臨三大難題：一、全球化政策的困境，二、兩岸深水區。三、Ｍ型社會的衝擊。不戰勝全球化，台灣在經濟上及政治上將陷危機；但若不能搞定兩岸關係，台灣全球化的前途堪憂；而若不能理順全球化及兩岸關係，台灣的Ｍ型社會亦失去調整產業結構以尋求解決策略的基礎。所以，兩岸關係仍是三大難題的核心因素。但是，要處理兩岸關係，台獨顯然已非可行方案。

蔡英文如今正處於台灣社會在心理及現實上的重大矛盾中。在心理上，太陽花事件掀起了對前述三大難題的社會憤懣，又以抗中仇中為核心；但是，在現實上，太陽花事件所導致的對服貿、貨貿及自由經濟示範區的杯葛，仍然是以台獨思維來處理三大難題，卻顯然是拿錯了藥方。因而，蔡英文所面對的矛盾是：在獲得台獨群眾心理的支持下，卻可能必須以「去台獨」的方案來面對現實。

所以，蔡英文面對國家內外的困局，而明知台獨已非方案，若志在領導民進黨重返執政，即須有成為台獨路線的轉型者、修正者、革命者、拋棄者的決志，甚至不惜成為台獨的叛徒。因為，若無如此強烈深刻的決志，她的另一歸趨即可能使國家遭遇劇烈動盪，成為台灣的罪人。

其實，台灣及兩岸情勢演變至今日，固然有太陽花這一波「遲來的台獨」；但顯然也有一股想要擺脫藍綠糾纏的民意，對民進黨的轉型持有期待。何況，「去台獨」在民進黨中已非新思維，凍結台獨黨綱的提案仍在中執會的待議檔案中。因而，「去台獨」亦是民進黨自救新生之道；蔡英文若是「去台獨」的台獨叛徒，反而將成為民進黨的救星。

蔡英文將總統初選期程提前，可以爭取較具時空縱深的操作空間，爾今可為當為之事：一、設法促成泛ＥＣＦＡ架構如服貿、貨貿協議之完成，以便概括承受。二、勿再迴避「九二共識」，而宜試圖從「一中各表」的途徑入手。三、淡化「中華民國是台灣」的邏輯，轉向「中華民國加台灣」的論述。四、從中華民國的反對者，轉為中華民國的承當者。為今之計，蔡英文必須主動操持對「兩岸新機遇」的定義權，不能陷於前文所述北京所定義的挾制脅迫之「新機遇」。

瞻望前路，蔡英文須有在「台獨叛徒」及「台灣罪人」作一抉擇的覺悟與決志，非此恐不足以走完最後一哩。