Chu/Xi Meeting: No Way Around the Republic of China
United Daily News Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
May 5, 2015
Executive Summary: The current Chu/Xi meeting is mainly a KMT/CCP exchange. But it establishes a tripartisan KMT/CCP/DPP interactive framework for 2016. The DPP has yet to participate. But this will also affect its future role.
Full Text Below:
The current Chu/Xi meeting is mainly a KMT/CCP exchange. But it establishes a tripartisan KMT/CCP/DPP interactive framework for 2016. The DPP has yet to participate. But this will also affect its future role.
This meeting underscores three main points. One. It affirms the 1992 consensus, and opposition to Taiwan independence as the shared premise for cross-Strait relations. Two. Under the premise of "expanding Taiwan's international space", Beijing is willing to find ways for Taiwan to participate in the RCEP, AIIB, and One Belt, One Road. This is an extension of the KMT's "from China to the world" policy. Three. The KMT and CCP have emphasized social equity and justice for the next generation as sound reasons for cross-Strait exchanges, and appropriate responses to internal objections.
Three synergies may ensue. One. Cross-Strait policy remains stalled at the level of the 1992 consensus. This may affect the immediate situation. But failure to go beyond the 1992 Consensus could lead to regret. Two. Regional economic co-operation as a bargaining chip significantly increases pressure on the DPP. Will the DPP reform its cross-Strait policy in the event it returns to power? That remains to be seen. Therefore the damage it suffers could be serious.
First consider the impact of the meeting on the DPP. The DPP can find little to criticize in the KMT/CCP meeting. The most Tsai Ing-wen could say was that "Cross-Strait relations must not be a KMT/CCP monopoly." Ironically, this is the biggest danger for the DPP.
In 2005, under the 1992 consensus, the Lien/Hu meeting established a cross-strait policy framework. That could be characterized as the KMT and CCP monopolizing cross-Strait relations. But since 2008, the Ma government has been in power. Based on the 1992 consensus, it has signed 21 cross-strait agreements. These represent national policy. They cannot be characterized as monopolization of cross-Strait relations by the KMT and CCP. Besides, the 1992 consensus is nothing less than a Taipei/Washington/Beijing consensus.
Between 2005 and 2008, the DPP forfeited responsibility. The political climate on Taiwan and cross-Strait relations objectives, were indeed the result of the monopolization of cross-Strait relations by the KMT and CCP. Eventually, in 2008, the DPP government's failures in cross-Strait policy forced it to step down. Therefore, Tsai Ing-wen's charges of KMT/CCP monopolization of cross-Strait relations are meaningless. So-called monopolization of cross-Strait policy by the KMT and CCP was consistent with the currents of history. It eventually became national policy. If Tsai Ing-wen returns to power, she cannot repeal the 21 agreements signed by the KMT and CCP.
Tsai Ing-wen, beware! If your party returns to power, do not repeat the Chen regime's cross-strait policy failures, which forced the KMT and the CCP to hold a Lien/Hu meeting and take charge of cross-Strait policy. Zhang Zhijun said "KMT/CCP forums must continue, they must be both more frequent and better". The implication was that if the mountain would not come to Mohammed, then Mohammed would go to the mountain. If the DPP refuses to reform its cross-Strait policy, but instead denounces cross-Strait relations as a KMT/CCP monopoly, then the CCP will have to wait until the DPP steps down. If that happens, the damage inflicted upon Taiwan will be unimaginable.
Eric Chu has asked why there is no relationship between the DPP and the CCP. If the DPP insists that there is no relationship between the DPP and CCP, then it is behaving like an ostrich with its head in the sand. Even if it returns to power, it must still deal with cross-Strait policy formulated by the KMT and CCP. This newspaper has repeatedly warned the DPP about winning the election campaign only to lose the policy path.
Consider the bottlenecks encountered during the current meeting, and how to break through them. Chu and Xi openly referred to the 1992 consensus. Eric Chu told Xi Jinping, to his face, that the 1992 consensus means that "The two sides of the Strait both belong to one China, but the content and definition differ”. He did not use the expression “one China, different interpretations”. This was the first time a KMT Chairman made such a statement in front of a CCP General Secretary. Eric Chu did not use the term "one China, different interpretations" out of restraint. But for him to make such a statement, face to face, may be regarded as a breakthrough.
One China, different interpretations is a solution to the problem of the Republic of China's status under “one China". In fact, for the past twenty years or so, Beijing has hoped that Taiwan would defend the ROC and the ROC Constitution. Unfortunately Beijing has been too restrictive about the "one China" definition, and too cavalier about de-legitimizing the Republic of China. It even argued that the "Republic of China has already been destroyed." This self-contradictory policy on cross-Strait relations has made any breakthrough on cross-Strait relations difficult.
The two sides must realize that if the “Republic of China” loses its foothold on Taiwan, "China" is even less likely to gain a foothold on Taiwan. Eric Chu referred to "one China different interpretations” in front of Xi Jinping. This proved that both sides know the Republic of China cannot be bypassed. Transcending the 1992 consensus however, is something we can look forward to. Also, if one China, different interpretations stands, the pressure on the DPP will be increased.
Xi Jinping said "all political parties on both sides of the Strait" must deal with issues pertaining to cross-Strait relations. He was clearly addressing the DPP. Ten years ago, during the Lien/Hu meeting, the two sides shared a vision, and made the Lien/Hu meeting a glorious event. Ten years later, the Chu/Xi meeting has arrived at a point of uncertainty. By contrast, it appears simple, low-keyed, even boring. But if it helps people realize there is no getting around the "Republic of China," then the two parties' efforts may yet yield fruit. If the DPP persists in believing that "There is no relationship between the DPP and the CCP", then even if it returns to power, cross-Strait relations will be DOA.
2015-05-05 01:25:48 聯合報
為兩岸共同政治基礎。二、在「擴大台灣國際空間」的提法下， 對台灣參與RCEP、亞投行及一帶一路，北京方面表示「 可探尋合作方式」，這可視為國民黨「由中國走向世界」 政策的延伸。三、共同強調，為下一代建立公平正義社會， 以加強兩岸交流的合理正當性，並各自向內部喊話。
九二共識」的層次，或可影響眼前的情勢，但因未能超越九二共識， 誠屬缺憾。二、以「區域經濟合作」為籌碼， 大幅墊高了對於民進黨的壓力，倘若民進黨重返執政而不知轉型， 其所受損傷將更慘重。
民進黨對此次國共交流內容似乎找不到可以攻擊的題材， 主要批評只見蔡英文說「兩岸關係不能國共化」， 這卻正是民進黨最嚴重的危機所在。
可以稱為「國共化」；但至二○○八年馬政府主政， 基於九二共識所簽二十一項協議而推動的兩岸互動， 當然即是國家政策，而不能稱為「國共化」， 何況九二共識如今不啻已成「台／美／中」的三邊共識。
台灣的政治氛圍與兩岸關係願景，確實是由「國共化」 的連胡會所引領，終至二○○ 八年使得在兩岸政策上失敗的民進黨政府下野。因此，蔡英文批評「 國共化」並無意義；因為，如果「國共化」 的政策架構合乎歷史潮流，它終究會成為「國家政策」。例如， 蔡英文即使重返執政，亦無可能廢止由「國共化」 發展而來的兩岸二十一項協議。
由國共化連胡會引領兩岸願景」的噩夢。張志軍此次說，未來「 國共論壇」不但要「繼續辦下去」，而且要「愈辦愈好」； 言下之意是，山不轉人轉，民進黨若不知轉型，仍將由「國共化」 引領兩岸政策的話語權，再等民進黨下台。倘係如此， 台灣的蹉跎與損傷不堪想像。
沒有民共關係也是一種關係」的鴕鳥政策，即使重返執政， 其兩岸領域仍將受「國共化」的制約， 亦即恐將陷於本報屢次警告的「贏了選舉／輸了路線」的困境。
九二共識」，朱立倫當著習近平之面說：「兩岸同屬一中，但內涵、 定義有所不同（的「九二共識」）。」這當然就是「一中各表」， 卻未使用「一中各表」四字， 這是國民黨主席首次當著中共總書記作此表述。朱未用「一中各表」 四字，是保留；但當面說出了這一段話，卻可視為突破。
其實，二十餘年來，北京對台政策的核心， 俱在希望台灣能維持中華民國，能維持中華民國憲法；但是， 北京在「一個中國」的定義上， 卻過於故步自封而意圖否認中華民國，甚至稱「中華民國已經滅亡」 。此種政策上的自我矛盾，是使兩岸關係難以突破與超越的瓶頸。
即更無可能在台灣找到立足點。朱立倫此次在習近平面前說出「 一中各表」的立場，此一場景若在顯示兩岸均知「 中華民國是繞不過去的」，則對九二共識的超越亦是可以期待之事。 而且，如果「一中各表」可以確立，對民進黨的壓力將更形升高。
兩岸所有政黨」前的重大問題，已是擺明了向民進黨喊話。 十年前的連胡會，兩岸充滿新憧憬，因而使連胡會顯得華麗與飛揚； 十年後的此次朱習會，卻面臨吉凶莫卜的「重要節點」， 遂顯得簡約、低調，甚至沉悶。不過，此會若能促成「 中華民國繞不過去」的醒覺，則國共兩黨的共同努力尚可期待； 相對而言，民進黨若仍認為「沒有民共關係也是一種關係」， 則慎勿落到縱使重返執政，但在兩岸關係上卻形同被判出局。