Tsai Ing-wen's Status Quo is Nothing Like Washington's

Tsai Ing-wen's Status Quo is Nothing Like Washington's
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 12, 2015

Executive Summary: Xi Jingping stresses adherence to the 1992 consensus and opposition to Taiwan independence. Without the 1992 consensus “the two sides' foundation would no longer be secure and the earth would shake". Tsai Ing-wen refuses to abandon the Taiwan independence party platform. She seeks to “maintain the cross-Strait status quo" while repudiating the 1992 consensus. She offers no specific proposals, only slogans. That is a dangerous thing to do. The ROC needs a president who can stabilize the situation and ensure the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations. It does not need a troublemaker who trots out fuzzy policies as camouflage for Taiwan independence.

Full Text Below:

DPP Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen is the DPP's 2016 presidential candidate. On the 29th of this month, she will visit the United States in order to submit to an “oral exam”. American Institute in Taiwan Chairman Raymond Burghardt will soon visit Taiwan. He will meet with high-ranking government and party leaders, including Tsai Ing-wen as well.

The maintenance of stability in the Taiwan Strait is the cornerstone of American strategic interests in East Asia. Who is in authority on Taiwan affects Beijing/Washington relations. It also affects peace and prosperity in East Asia. Washington is concerned that the current election might end communications between Taipei and Beijing. That could result in miscalculations on either side or military conflict. It could even undermine the vital interests of the United States in the Western Pacific. Therefore Washington is deeply concerned about the leading candidates' cross-Strait policy platforms, especially Tsai Ing-wen's. It hopes to accurately gauge her cross-Strait policy path in case she comes to power. The Burghart/Tsai meeting amounts to a “pre-exam” before her “oral exam” in Washington. .

When Tsai Ing-wen won the DPP party nomination, she told reporters she advocated "maintaining the cross-strait status quo". She later told Taiwan independence elements that her maintenance of the cross-Strait status quo “was the same as the US government's." She probably cited the United States position to preempt any backlash from Taiwan independence elements. That may silence Taiwan independence elements. But it does nothing to address the defects in DPP cross-Strait policy.

Tsai Ing-wen must understand that Washington's handling of the Taiwan issue includes five interlocking elements. (A) Adherence to US one-China policy and the "One Law and Three Communiques" frameworkd. (B) Adherence to the Taiwan Relations Act, continued provision of defensive weapons to maintain cross-Strait military equilibrium. (C) Explicit opposition to unilateral changes in the status quo in cross-Strait relations, in word or in deed, no support for Taiwan independence, as well as opposition to CCP military annexation of Taiwan. (D) The United States supports the democratization of Mainland China. It believes that if Mainland society becomes more open and free, this will narrow the gap between the two sides' lifestyles and political systems. The US hopes to promote cross-Strait peace and resolve cross-Strait differences, (E) It is in the United States' strategic interest to maintain peace and stability in the region and to reach a peaceful settlement.

Is Tsai Ing-wen's cross-Strait status quo actually consistent with Washington's? Or is it nothing more than short term campaign strategy? If it is, then she must clarify her position on "one China", and declare that she does not support Taiwan independence. Alas, Tsai Ing-wen's “maintenance of the status quo” is definitely not Washington's. The key distinction is in the meaning of "one China". The DPP argues that one China does not include Taiwan. The United States argues that one China does include Taiwan. The United States insists that any change in the status quo must be achieved through peaceful means. The US position is actually closer to the KMT's position. The KMT adheres to the 1992 consensus, to the KMT version of the definition of one China, based on the consensus the two sides reached in 1992, with "one China, different interpretations" which the Mainland was willing to accept.

Over the past seven years, the KMT has proved that the steady development of cross-Strait relations has enabled the United States to maintain cooperation with both governments. Therefore, as former American Institute in Taiwan Chairman Richard Bush noted, the US government attaches great importance to the policies set forth by political parties on the Mainland and Taiwan. Maintaining cross-Strait peace and stability is the shared responsibility of the United States, the Mainland, and Taiwan.

The public on Taiwan hopes to continue consultations with the Mainland. This includes Mainland tourists visiting Taiwan, the passage of the MTA, the establishment of cross-Strait representative offices, issues of concern to both sides, participation in regional economic integration, sustainable development of cross-Strait peace and prosperity. Meanwhile, Taiwan will actively seek to membership in multilateral regional economic organizations such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP), the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (RCEP), and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Alas, the lack of a political basis for cross-Strait economic cooperation will make Taiwan's participation in regional economic integration mechanisms extremely difficult. Therefore presidential candidates from all political parties must confront the “China Factor” and strike a balance between cross-Strait economic policy and cross-Strait political policy.

Mainland China has undergone rapid economic growth in recent years. This has significantly increased international interaction and led to dramatic changes in people's lifestyles. This has inspired a new generation to pursue new ideas about freedom and democracy. The two sides have opened up channels of communication, politically, economically, and culturally. Communications and interactions continue to increase. , Taiwan's experience with democracy and constitutional rule may exert to some extent, a quiet influence on the Mainland. This may help the United States to understand the Republic of China's experience with democracy and constitutional rule. Its experience did more than ensure democracy and economic prosperity on Taiwan. It has also influenced democracy and constitutional rule on the Mainland. A prosperous Taiwan will facilitate the emergence of a democratic Mainland.

Xi Jingping stresses adherence to the 1992 consensus and opposition to Taiwan independence. Without the 1992 consensus “the two sides' foundation would no longer be secure and the earth would shake". Tsai Ing-wen refuses to abandon the Taiwan independence party platform. She seeks to “maintain the cross-Strait status quo" while repudiating the 1992 consensus. She offers no specific proposals, only slogans. That is a dangerous thing to do. The ROC needs a president who can stabilize the situation and ensure the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations. It does not need a troublemaker who trots out fuzzy policies as camouflage for Taiwan independence.

蔡英文的維持現狀與美國大不同

代表民進黨角逐2016年總統大位的蔡英文主席，29日即將赴美「接受口試」，美國在台協會理事主席薄瑞光適時訪台，除拜會我黨政高層外，預期也會和蔡英文會面。

維繫台海安定是美國東亞戰略利益的基石，台灣政權遞嬗攸關中美台互動前景，也對東亞地區能否保持和平繁榮影響甚鉅。美國擔憂，兩岸間的交流溝通管道若因這次選舉結果而中斷，可能導致雙方的誤判，甚至引發潛在軍事衝突，破壞美國西太平洋地區的關鍵利益，因此高度關注主要候選人的兩岸政策，尤其對蔡英文，希望能精準掌握她如果執政後的兩岸政策走向。如果我們形容這次薄蔡會是蔡英文「口試」的「預考」，應該不為過。

蔡英文在獲民進黨提名的記者會表示，她主張「維持兩岸現狀」，後來更告訴獨派，維持兩岸現狀「與美國政府立場一樣」，她也許希望拿美國壓制獨派的反彈，但這句話也許可以封獨派的嘴，要擺脫民進黨兩岸議題困境卻斷無可能。

蔡英文應該明白，美國政府處理台海議題，有5個環環相扣的要素：（一）堅守美國的一個中國政策立場和「一法三公報」架構；（二）遵循台灣關係法規範，繼續提供台灣防禦性武器，以保持兩岸軍力動態平衡；（三）明確反對兩岸任何一方做出片面改變現狀言行，既不支持台灣獨立，也反對中共武力併吞台灣；（四）美國支持中國大陸政治民主化，因為美國認為，大陸社會越開放、越自由，將會拉近兩岸生活方式和政治制度差距，同時也將為兩岸和平化解歧見，增加成功的機會；（五）美國對台海議題的戰略利益是維持此地區和平穩定與和平解決。

如果蔡英文的維持兩岸現狀主張，真的與美國政府立場一致，而不是暫時性的選舉策略，那麼，就應對「一個中國」內涵提出清楚的說明，並表態不支持台獨。但蔡英文的「維持現狀」絕對不是美國的「維持現狀」，兩者最核心的差異在「一個中國」認知。民進黨認為「一個中國」不包含台灣，美國卻承認一個中國包含台灣，但美國堅持改變現狀必須經由和平手段。美國的立場其實與國民黨較接近，國民黨堅持的「九二共識」，是國民黨版的一個中國定義，是依據兩岸在1992年達成「一個中國、各自表述」的共識，大陸也願意接受。

過去7年國民黨執政已證明，兩岸關係穩健發展能促使美國同時與兩岸政府維持建設性合作互動。因此，美國在台協會前理事主席卜睿哲表示，美國政府重視的是大陸與台灣各政黨提出的整套政策，是否能維持台海和平與穩定，因為這是美中台共同的責任。

台灣民眾希望未來繼續與大陸協商，包括陸客來台中轉、兩岸貨貿協議、兩岸兩會互設辦事機構，以及兩岸共同參與區域經濟整合等雙方關切的議題，期能促進兩岸永續和平與繁榮；同時，台灣也將積極爭取參與跨太平洋夥伴協議（TPP），區域全面經濟夥伴協議（RCEP），以及亞投行（AIIB）等多邊區域經濟組織。但是，兩岸若缺少經濟合作的政治基礎，台灣參與區域經濟整合機制將會非常困難。因此，任何政黨的總統候選人都需要面對「中國因素」的現實，在經濟政策與兩岸政策間求得平衡。

大陸近年來經濟快速成長，國際互動明顯增加，人民生活方式已產生巨大變化，促發了大陸新世代追求自由民主的新思維。尤其兩岸開放交流迄今，無論是在政治、經濟，以及文化等層面，透過持續深化的溝通互動，讓台灣民主憲政發展過程中的經驗與價值，在潛移默化中對大陸社會與人民產生不同程度的影響，同時也讓美國瞭解，中華民國發展民主憲政，不僅能夠成為民主與經濟繁榮國度，更對中國大陸未來民主憲政發展產生正面影響，讓「幸福台灣，民主中華」效應，日益擴大。

習近平強調，堅持九二共識、反對台獨，若沒有九二共識，兩岸「基礎不牢，地動山搖」。蔡英文不改變台獨黨綱、否定九二共識前提下的「兩岸維持現狀」主張，只是提不出具體方案的口號，這是非常危險的。台灣需要一位能夠拿出辦法，穩住兩岸關係和平發展大局的總統，而不是一位用模糊策略包裝台獨的麻煩製造者。