Tsai Ing-wen Could Be More Dangerous Than Chen Shui-bian

Tsai Ing-wen Could Be More Dangerous Than Chen Shui-bian
China Times Editorial (Taipei, Taiwan, ROC)
A Translation
May 29, 2015

Executive Summary: Former DPP Chairman Shih Ming-teh said that if Tsai Ing-wen is elected, she will be a "female version of Ma Ying-jeou" for eight years. Some people think Tsai Ing-wen is "Ma Ying-jeou + Chen Shui-bian". Is Tsai Ing-wen a female version of Ma Ying-jeou or Chen Shui-bian? The answer may depend on whom you ask. But questions such as this allow us to scrutinize Tsai Ing-wen's cross-Strait policy.

Full Text Below:

Former DPP Chairman Shih Ming-teh said that if Tsai Ing-wen is elected, she will be a "female version of Ma Ying-jeou" for eight years. Some people think Tsai Ing-wen is "Ma Ying-jeou + Chen Shui-bian". Is Tsai Ing-wen a female version of Ma Ying-jeou or Chen Shui-bian? The answer may depend on whom you ask. But questions such as this allow us to scrutinize Tsai Ing-wen's cross-Strait policy.

What is Tsai Ing-wen's cross-Strait policy? Mathematics has a relative coordinate system we can use to determine where Tsai Ing-wen stands compared to a control group. The best control group is Ma Ying-jeou and Chen Shui-bian. Simply examine Ma, Tsai, and Chen's cross-Strait positions. Ma Ying-jeou talks the talk and walks the walk. Tsai Ing-wen neither talks the talk nor walks the walk. Chen Shui-bian talks one talk, but walks another walk. Chen Shui-bian says one thing, but does another.

Of the three, Ma Ying-jeou has been the most consistent. He has adhered to the 1992 consensus and "no [immediate] reunification, no Taiwan independence, and no use of force" from beginning to end. Ma Ying-jeou's position has been the least elastic, the most transparent, most stable, and most predictable. Cross-Strait and foreign relations involve high-level, three way Washington/Beijing/Taipei political interactions. The complexity can be imagined. Good faith is everything. Loss of credibility means loss of trust. It means difficulty in reaching a consensus and difficulty in establishing a constructive relationship. Ma Ying-jeou's position has been the least elastic and the most predictable. It has also resulted in the most cross-Strait and diplomatic achievements.

Chen Shui-bian was the polar opposite. When he took office in 2000, he solemnly proclaimed, "I will not declare independence. I will not change the name of the nation. I will not make the two states theory part of the constitution. I will not promote a referendum on reunification vs. independence that changes the status quo. I will not repeal the National Unification Guidelines and the "five noes" of the National Unification Council. But two years later, Chen did a complete about face and trumpeted "Taiwan and China, one nation on each side".  His rhetoric kept changing. His position was the most elastic, the least stable, and the least predictable. Washington and Taipei found it difficult to trust each other. So did Taipei and Beijing. Collisions became the norm. Eventually Washington and Bejing were forced to establish channels to manage the Taiwan situation, humiliating the nation.

So what about Tsai Ing-wen? In terms of flexibility and predictability, she falls somewhere between Ma and Chen. In terms of transparency, she ranks dead last. The greatest difference between her, Ma, and Chen, is her ability to ask others questions without providing any answers of her own. Tsai Ing-wen uses lots of question marks, very few periods, and ever fewer exclamation marks. She is good at questioning others, but poor at suggesting solutions of her own, particularly on cross-Strait policy.

Tsai Ing-wen's "maintain the status quo" is abstract and ambiguous. Ma Ying-jeou has questioned both the "what" and the "how" of her policy. Julian Kuo, in "Tsai Ing-wen's Cross-Strait Challenges", notes the key to Tsai Ing-wen's cross-Strait posture. Regarding "what", Kuo cited polls. According to "Confronting Taiwan's Two Major Public Opinion Trends", over 85% of the public advocates "maintaining the status quo". Over 60% consider themselves "Taiwanese only". Both KMT and DPP candidates must of course face reality. That is why Tsai advocates maintaining the status quo.

This is the key to Tsai Ing-wen's "maintain the status quo". She hides her own preferences, then acts like a mirror, reflecting the reality of public opinion. She blasts Ma Ying-jeou's cross-Strait policy. But when asked about her own cross-Strait policy proposals, she invokes a "Taiwan consensus". No one can object to it. But no one can understand it either. When she advocates "maintaining the status quo" most people approve. But this is mere talk. A recent Legislative Watch Foundation poll showed that 68.3% approved of Tsai's proposal to maintain the cross-Strait status quo. Only 18.4% did not. But this is deceitful. It is not that the public approves of Tsai's proposals. It is that the public approves of maintaining the status quo, no matter who advocates it.

Refusal to specify "what" inevitably makes it difficult to specify "how". Julian Kuo responded to Tsai's "how to maintain the status quo". He said 'So far Tsai Ing-wen has never offered any detailed "new cross-Strait formula" to replace the 1992 consensus.' Therefore Tsai Ing-wen is neither a female version of Ma Ying-jeou or Chen Shui-bian. Ma Ying-jeou and Chen Shui-bian's cross-Strait policies are highly personal in nature. One was clear and consistent in his advocacy. The other was clear but inconsistent in his advocacy.

Tsai Ing-wen has changed her position on "how". She went from denouncing ECFA as "sugar-coated poison" to "unconditional acceptance". Tsai Ing-wen can claim that her cross-Strait policy stance "has not changed" only because she has never made her stance clear to begin with.

Tsai Ing-wen refuses to clarify her cross-Strait policy stance. As an election strategy, this may make it difficult for opponents to land any hard blows on her. It may minimize her exposure to criticism. But her refusal to state her policy stance puts Taiwan in a quandary. It sets the two sides at odds with each other. Optimistically speaking, Tsai Ing-wen might not turn out like Chen Shui-bian. She might not destroy cross-strait trust. Pessimistically speaking, her totally opaque cross-Strait policy stance could be the biggest obstacle in the way of cross-Strait and Washington/Taipei trust.

Will Tsai Ing-wen really continue Ma Ying-jeou's constructive "talk the talk and walk the walk" cross-Strait policy? One cannot avoid skepticism. Let us hope she does not repeat Chen Shui-bian fickle betrayal of promises and scorched earth diplomacy. That much Tsai Ing-wen owes Taiwan. That is why voters must demand that Tsai Ing-wen make clear her cross-Strait policy.

蔡英文可能比陳水扁更危險
2015-5-29 中國時報

民進黨前主席施明德表示，如果選蔡英文，就是給「女版馬英九」8年時間，也有人認為，蔡英文是「馬英九+陳水扁」。蔡英文究竟是不是女版馬英九或陳水扁？答案或許見仁見智，但這些提問，倒是解析蔡英文兩岸政策的切入點。

如何定義蔡英文兩岸政策位置？數學上有一種「相對座標」的位置定位法可以參考，亦即找出與蔡英文比較的對應點，透過這個對應點，也就是對照組，來定義蔡英文的位置。最好的對照組就是馬英九與陳水扁。如果要簡單歸納馬、蔡、扁3人的兩岸態度。馬英九是「說到做到」；蔡英文是「不說不做」；陳水扁是「說一套做一套」。

3個人當中，一路堅持「九二共識」、「不統不獨不武」的馬英九，彈性最小，透明度、穩定度與可預測性最高。在兩岸與外交事務中，由於涉及美中台三邊高層政治互動，複雜程度可想而知，「無信不立」，「誠信」就成為一切的起點，失去信用就失去信任，就很難達致共識、建立建設性的關係。馬英九彈性小、可預測性高，也會帶來較大兩岸與外交成績。

陳水扁是極端的另一面，他在2000年上任時鄭重宣示：「不會宣布獨立，不會更改國號，不會推動兩國論入憲，不會推動改變現狀的統獨公投，也沒有廢除《國統綱領》與國統會的問題」的「四不一沒有」，2年後就變成「台灣中國，一邊一國」，以今我否定昨我，說法與做法不斷改變，彈性最大，穩定度與可預測性最低。因此，在他任內美台與兩岸難以建立信任，烽火衝撞成為常態，最後淪為「美中共管」台灣的局面，全民受辱。

蔡英文呢？彈性與可預測性可能居於馬扁之間，透明度確定是三者之末。她和馬扁最不同的地方在於她「善問而不答」，蔡式語法充滿問號，鮮有句號，更難找到驚嘆號。長於質疑他人，卻短於提出主張，在兩岸政策上尤其如此。

對這種抽象模糊性，馬英九從「內涵」與「方法」二層次，質疑蔡英文的「維持現狀」說。但郭正亮在〈蔡英文的兩岸論述挑戰〉一文中的點出了蔡式兩岸論述重點。在內涵論上，郭引用民調指出，「面對台灣兩大民意趨勢：『兩岸現狀指數』超過85%，『只是台灣人』比例超過60%，不管是國民黨或民進黨候選人，當然都要面對選舉現實。」因此蔡英文主張維持現狀。

這正是蔡英文在維持現狀的「內涵論」上的最大「特色」，她隱藏自己的特色，把自己當成一面鏡子，只現實投射民意現實。所以，對馬英九的兩岸政策她有諸多批判，但當被問及她的兩岸主張時，她強調「台灣共識」，這句話沒有人會反對，但也沒有人聽得懂；她講的「維持現狀」，多數人會贊成，但有說和沒說也沒差別。就像最近國會觀察基金會公布的民調，有68.3%民眾贊成蔡英文兩岸維持現狀主張，僅18.4%民眾不贊成。這與其說是民眾贊成蔡英文的主張，不如說是民眾贊成兩岸維持現狀，誰主張都一樣。

這種無特色的「內涵論」，必然導致「方法論」的難產。就如郭正亮對蔡英文「如何維持現狀」提出的看法：「直到今天，蔡英文還沒針對這個取代『九二共識』的『兩岸新公式』，拋出任何試探性的解答。」所以，蔡英文既不是女版馬英九，也不是女版陳水扁。馬英九和陳水扁的兩岸政策，都有很強烈的個人色彩，一個是一以貫之的主張明確，一個是主張明確但立場不斷跳動。

蔡英文除了技術性的立場調整，如對ECFA從「糖衣毒藥」調整為「概括承受」外，嚴格來說，蔡英文的兩岸立場並不跳動，但她的不跳動，不是因為她真的不跳動，而是因為她的主張不明確，人們無法準確定位她的立場，也就無法測量她有沒有移動。

我們必須提醒，在兩岸政策上「不說不做」的蔡英文，也許在選舉策略上，有如讓對手難於著力的武當棉拳，可以取得「打擊面縮小」、「打擊力減弱」的效果。但在治國上，「不說不做」卻會陷台灣於不利處境、置兩岸於對立風險。從樂觀論，蔡英文或許不會像陳水扁，讓兩岸互信全毀，但從悲觀言，她的兩岸主張透明度不足，將是兩岸與美台間建立互信的最大障礙。

要期待蔡英文延續馬英九在兩岸「說到做到」風格下的建設性成果，並不容易。但至少不要回到陳水扁「說變就變」的毀諾循環、烽火之路，這應是台灣社會對蔡英文最低程度的期待。因此，選民有權利要求蔡英文說清楚兩岸政策。